Because our actions are determined by unconscious, unwilled regularities and that means that conscious free will is somewhat of an illusion.

I thought that is your own explanation of your theory. But, in fact, I went to the restaurant because I believed that my friend's recommendation was sound, and I wanted to eat in a good restaurant.

In fact, the most important factor is probably not that your friend recommended it, but because you've been programmed by natural selection to have the desire for food.

Did you choose this desire or was it chosen by an unwilled, unconscious regulation of nature.

OK. I just wanted to clarify that before we proceed.

You're missing other causal factors that led you to making the decision to go to the restaurant. In fact, the most important factor is probably not that your friend recommended it, but because you've been programmed by natural selection to have the desire for food. Did you choose this desire or was it chosen by an unwilled, unconscious regulation of nature.

What makes you think that is my reason for doing it? That may be in the background of why my reason is my reason. It may explain why that is my reason (although it is too vague to do much explaining of anything). But the fact that it explains my reason does not mean that it is my reason. I think that my reason for going is exactly what I said it was. Why I had that reason is something else. What you cite is not a reason anyway, it is a cause for my having the reason I had (given, of course, that you are right).

Did he choose to feel hungry, do you mean? No, of course not. He felt hungry because of his not digesting any macronutrients for a period of time (biological reason). If you want to call hunger a natural desire, even something which compels, I'll buy it. But that doesn't mean he didn't choose the restaurant he chose. It just means that the natural pain that hunger causes can compel one to eat.

So you're desire for food is not your reason for seeking food? Indeed I am describing a cause and that cause is unwilled and unconscious. Remember when I said that my sober perspective on free will is a result of its causal underpinnings? I didn't say anything about reason. This argument may be futile. We agree that determinism doesn't interfere with free will. We simply have different perspectives on the implications of deterministic free will.

---------- Post added 04-07-2010 at 06:43 PM ----------



I didn't say that he didn't choose the restaurant he chose. I'm not arguing against deterministic free will. I'm simply saying that my perspective on the matter has been sobered by it's deterministic underpinnings.

I told you why I went to that restaurant. Because it was recommended to me, and I believed that the recommendation was a good one. Naturally, I would not have gone had I not been hungry. My hunger was the occasion for going to the restaurant at that time. But not why I went to that particular restaurant. If the question was why I went to a restaurant, the answer would be because I was hungry and I believed I would get food in a restaurant. But that is, of course a different question from the question, why did I go to that particular restaurant. We have to get the issue straight.

but the fact that the will has been programed by an unconscious, unwilled causal regularity sobers my view of it.

I agree with all of that. There really is no issue here. You just seem to be trying to change my disenchanted view of deterministic free will.

I want to state this one last time. I do believe that free will and determinism are capable, but the fact that the will has been programed by an unconscious, unwilled causal regularity sobers my view of it.

Maybe you mean what William James said: that what he called "the block view" of the universe is pretty depressing. Well, maybe it is. I have just gotten inured to it. William James, though, made lemonade out of lemons. He also said that his general attitude is that he alone is free, and everyone else is determined. It is easier to live taking that view of things.

I wouldn't say that my view of free will is depressing, but it's certainly not enchanted. Freedom is mostly a matter of perspective and the fact that my will and everyone else's will is not free from external causation and unconscious regularities diminishes my view of it. Like you said, freedom is a matter of degree.

How is it a matter of perspective? A prison inmate is not a free man. Not from any perspective.

I'm talking about freedom from external causation. Two people in the same situation may feel differently about how free they are. I agree that it's not a matter of perspective, though. It's a matter of degree.

How someone may feel about how free he is has nothing to do with how free he is. Even if the prisoner feels as free as a bird, he isn't.

the fact that my will and everyone else's will is not free from external causation and unconscious regularities diminishes my view of i

But how could it be free from causation, since we both know everything has a cause? What I actually think is going on is that you have formed an enchanted view of free will, even though you say you haven't. And, after you formed it, you starting feeling this way - as if your concept of free will was irrevocably tainted in some way. But the fact of the matter is, free will does not and has not ever meant to imply a will that is free from everything. That, quite literally, wouldn't make any sense.

I take that back, there's probably some group of nutcases out there that uses the term like that. But, for the sake of this discussion, I think we should stay reasonable.

I think those "nutcases" are also called, "libertarians". They hold that determinism is false because free will is true. They are, along with those who make the same mistake, but draw the opposite conclusion from it, incompatibilists. It may very well be that our friend, Night Ripper, is a libertarian. I think that is why he argues as he does about natural law.

But how could it be free from causation, since we both know everything has a cause? What I actually think is going on is that you have formed an enchanted view of free will, even though you say you haven't. And, after you formed it, you starting feeling this way - as if your concept of free will was irrevocably tainted in some way. But the fact of the matter is, free will does not and has not ever meant to imply a will that is free from everything. That, quite literally, wouldn't make any sense.

I take that back, there's probably some group of nutcases out there that uses the term like that. But, for the sake of this discussion, I think we should stay reasonable.

I didn't say that it could be free of causation. I said that the fact that we are not free from external causation and unconscious regularities (natural selection, evolutionary psychology, etc.) sobers my view of free will. What am I not saying here?

What you are saying here, is of my interest.

Of course we are not free from external causation, we are part of this world. What do you mean when you keep saying it sobers your view of free will? The fact that we are not free from causation does what to your view of free will?

It diminishes its explanatory utility for an agent's actions. It, therefore, sobers or disenchants my view of it. I think I just heard an echo.