Well, yes, of course. But that the explanation for why, for example, water freezes at a particular temperature is no less an explanation because it, itself, has an explanation. If it is an explanation, then how does it suddenly become not an explanation because it has an explanation itself? That makes no sense. It is either an explanation or it isn't.

Let's be sure that we're keeping track of the point of our discussion. My sober perspective on free will is due to free will's causal underpinnings. You stated that my sober perspective was probably due to a misunderstanding of the nature of natural laws. If we agree that natural regulations, such as evolutionary psychology and environmental influence, cause agents to behave in certain ways, what am I misunderstanding?

To make myself clear, I never said that natural regulations force (in the coercive sense) people to do things or that natural regulations interfere with free will. Natural regulations, do however, cause people to do things by exerting overwhelming pressure both internally and externally. While it is true that these natural laws do not conflict with an agent's free will, it is equally true that these unwilled, unconscious natural laws are the causal underpinnings of free will.

1. The Earth rests on an elephant. The elephant rests on a turtle. The turtle rests on nothing.

2. The Earth rests on nothing.

Even though (1) and (2) have completely different meanings, implications, plausibility, and so on, they both don't explain anything, taken as a whole.

If the Earth rests on an elephant it rests on nothing?

Well. let's take an example, one I frequently give. Suppose I am caused to visit a restaurant because my friend recommends that restaurant to me, and I value his opinion. Now. although that recommendation of my friend caused me to visit that restaurant, nevertheless, I visited the restaurant of my own free will. That in this instance I was caused to do so in no way implied that I did not visit the restaurant freely. Reason I say this is that the cause of my visiting the restaurant did not compel me to do so. And therefore, since that was a cause that did not compel, I acted of my own free will. On the other hand, if I was compelled to visit the restaurant at the point of a gun, then that would have been a cause that did compel, and therefore, I would not have visited the restaurant of my own free will.

I didn't say that. Try again, please.

Once again, I never said that causality interfered with free will. I'm basically saying that the will itself reduces to unwilled, unconscious regulations of nature and that this sobers the concept up in my view.

But, in my example, I wanted to visit the restaurant. And I did so because I wanted to do so. I did not sleepwalk there. So, why do you say that?

Because our actions are determined by unconscious, unwilled regularities and that means that conscious free will is somewhat of an illusion.

1. The Earth rests on an elephant. The elephant rests on a turtle. The turtle rests on nothing.

2. The Earth rests on nothing.

Even though (1) and (2) have completely different meanings, implications, plausibility, and so on, they both don't explain anything, taken as a whole.

Because our actions are determined by unconscious, unwilled regularities and that means that conscious free will is somewhat of an illusion.

I don't see why the first means the second, even if the first is true. I still went to that restaurant because I wanted to do so. I went because my friend recommended it to me. Your theory about why I went is refuted by the fact I described. Why should I accept your theory, and what you say are its implications?

It is not disputed that you went because you wished and freely chose to go. What is needed is an underlying explanation of your wishing to do so. You can list all the factors you were conscious of in making your choice (your friend recommended the restaurant, you trusted him, you were hungry, etc, etc) but, however many you list, it is still possible that in those same circumstances you might have chosen otherwise. So is it just a brute fact that you chose as you did? Or is it due to "unconscious, unwilled regularities" as suggested by hue-man?

What is needed is an underlying explanation of his wishing to do so? But the explanation has to do with the conscious factors you mentioned. Yes, he could have chose otherwise, so what?

why he chose as he did is because his friend suggested the place to him, and/or because of any number of reasons (as you, again, noted)

Are you asking were there chemical/neural processes occurring during all of this?

is not a sufficient explanation.

Well, if he could have chosen otherwise, the conscious factors are not a sufficient condition for his wish/choice. Therefore, the following:

is not a sufficient explanation.

Why not? Why would not the fact that I wanted to go as a consequent of my friend's recommendation not a sufficient explanation. Most people would understand it. Why need it be supplemented by chemistry?

If the set of all the conscious factors causing me to do X is also compatible with my not doing X, it does not fully explain why in fact I did do X.

Unless, of course, you mean that I may not have done what I did if I had chosen otherwise.

Maybe we ought to talk about what a reason for action is.

If the set of all the conscious factors causing me to do X is also compatible with my not doing X, it does not fully explain why in fact I did do X.

Yes, that is what I mean.

If the conjunction of factors A, B and C is a sufficient cause of my choosing X, I do not understand how that same conjunction of factors could also be a sufficient cause of my choosing not-X. It seems illogical. If your choosing to go to the restaurant is caused by the set of all the factors you are aware of, and no others (i.e. no hidden chemical/neurological factors), how could your choosing not to go be caused by the selfsame set of factors, and no others? How can the same cause (fully) explain opposite effects?

Or do you mean that, if you had made a perverse choice (e.g. if you had decided not to go to the restaurant despite having very good reasons to go), your choice would have been uncaused?



Yes, I would be interested to know more about your views on this.

I don't see why the first means the second, even if the first is true. I still went to that restaurant because I wanted to do so. I went because my friend recommended it to me. Your theory about why I went is refuted by the fact I described. Why should I accept your theory, and what you say are its implications?

Please explain my theory as to why you went?