Since we are not free from causation, the ability for an agent's actions to be explained is diminished? Why is that? What does our not being free from causation have anything to do with the, as you put ir, explanatory utility for an agent's actions?

It's because the cause of our actions is ultimately an unconscious regularity of nature that was not of our choosing. Free will is the result of that cause, but it is not the foundational cause of our actions.

But you just admitted that free will was true (or was I wrong that you admitted that?), and so that means that there are actions of our choosing.

Wait, do you think we have the ability to make choice or not?

Yes, Zeth. I do believe that we have the ability to make a choice or not. I do believe in free will. I also believe that the will is the result of an unconscious, unwilled regularity that was not of our choosing and that our actions are better described by the unconscious, unwilled regularities of nature.

But why do you think our actions are better described by the unconscious, unwilled regularities? In general, when we seek to explain why someone made the choice they did, we are not referring to the matter from a scientific perspective ie. the chemical/neural processes which accompany that choice-making. If you ask why I just want to the grocery store, you wouldn't expect a response like, "Well, hue-man, 2mg of serotonin coursed through my CNS, and specific neurons fired in sector 2B of my neural network". From a philosophical perspective focusing on free will, or in most every day life, will sufficiently, in most cases, explains why we do what we do.

That there are other reasons which accompany the choices we make (regularities, chemical/neural processes, etc.), doesn't mean that our will isn't a sufficient explanation for why we choose what we do. An explanation isn't of less quality simply because it isn't the explanation which is most intricate or technical. Sometimes it is actually better to offer the simplest explanation, and sometimes the simpler explanation offers the best explanation

This basically amounts to, not a rejection of the fact that our actions are reducible to unconscious regularities of nature, but to whether or not it's more simple to say "He did it because he wanted to do it"

Nothing is prevented or governed, but these regularities can be explained; in other words, there are reasons why things act as they do. We can generalize based upon these consistently occurring reasons, and then come to general conclusions (laws). There's nothing mystical or mysterious about it, and nothing is being governed in any spooky metaphysical sense. It's simply coming to general conclusions about the world around us.

The point is, that even though things are reducible, our desires can still offer sufficient explanation for why we do things.

I haven't a clue what you're disgruntled about.

Yes, but our desires cannot sufficiently explain why we have desires. Like my conversation with Kennethamy, we have no essential disagreement. We simply share different perspectives on the substance of the concept of free will. With that in mind, why do we need to continue this discussion?

I am getting annoyed because I feel like a living echo.

But as you noted earlier, people have different notions of determinism, not to mention free will. So, what do libertarians means by determinism, when they say that determinism is false because free will is true? Do they simply mean that things don't have a cause, simply because we have the ability to make choice?

I don't think so. Some indeterminist/libertarians argue that the feeling or the intuition of freedom shows that determinism is false. Ughaibu used to argue that way. He gave the example of moving a finger at will.

My question is, what exactly do they think they are showing is false?

My question is, what exactly do they think they are showing is false?

5) imagine that I use radioactive decay, after the manner of Schrodinger, to decide whether or not to smoke at the turn of each hour, what causes my decision?

The decision here is not yours in the first place, neither is it free. . . . . . your decisions are fully caused, will included...why should will be an exception ?

You're not talking about cause, you're talking about determinism, and as I've stated, there are a bunch of reasons to reject determinism but no non-psychological reasons to accept it. So, I reject realism about determinism. In any case, even for realists about determinism, denial of free will is the height of irrationality, because it's self-refuting. This makes it worse than denial of evolution, moon landings, Shakespeare's authorship, etc.

You're not talking about cause, you're talking about determinism, and as I've stated, there are a bunch of reasons to reject determinism but no non-psychological reasons to accept it. So, I reject realism about determinism. In any case, even for realists about determinism, denial of free will is the height of irrationality, because it's self-refuting. This makes it worse than denial of evolution, moon landings, Shakespeare's authorship, etc.

do you deny causation?

1) Kennethamy has misrepresented me; getting them to raise a finger is a way of illustrating to some free will deniers that some actions will not occur until a conscious decision has been made to perform the action.
2) you say that "everything has a cause", but you still haven't explained what "cause" means for that claim to be true.
3) libertarianism is the claim that determinism and free will are incompatible, and free will is true. The falsity of determinism need not only depend on the truth of free will.
4) determinism and cause are distinct notions; for example, Kennethamy accepts that sub-atomic effects aren't determined, but if the cat dies, Schrodinger will have caused it's death. In this way there can be a causally complete non-determined world.
5) imagine that I use radioactive decay, after the manner of Schrodinger, to decide whether or not to smoke at the turn of each hour, what causes my decision?