Not at all. It is a distaste for the prevailing culture generally, which is consumerist, scientistic, materialistic and generally anti-spiritual. As you acknowledged in one of our previous dialogues, the overwhelming majority of academics in all kinds of disciplines are generally atheists. I am not opposed to atheism from the viewpoint of Christian evangelism. I am opposed to it because it is based on a general outlook which I regard as materialist. I know there are many individual philosophers who don't subscribe to those views, but I think that the majority do.

Actually, I was thinking of Trial of Galileo for heresy, and his subsequent house arrest and forced recantation of those elements of his discoveries that were thought to be in contradiction of Holy Writ. It is a fact that an apology of sorts was only offered for this by Pope John Paul II in the early 80's (I think it was). I do understand that the circumstances surrounding the issue are considerably more nuanced than many will allow.

But I believe that at the time of the original Council of Nicea and the formation of the early Church, many 'sapiential' elements in early Christianity were suppressed along with Gnosticism, and a literalist interpretation of Scripture adopted, among many other things which has had disastrous consequences for the development of religious doctrine in the West. (See, e.g., When Jesus became God, Richard E Rubinstein.)

In any case, it is indisputable that the construction of religion in the western world has led to a divorce of science and religion, whether you like it or not. This is not my invention.

Something is seriously amiss in Western culture in this whole area. In fact I don't understand what you are defending, and what you think I am criticizing.

That is a good question.It is a question that should be asked, and all I am really doing is encouraging people to ask that question. There is not a myriad. There are many schools, and nowadays quite a few people trying to develop businesses in the area, but if you study the field, there are some standouts and well established traditions, across a wide range of cultures. I am not pushing any particular school, but have already declared my allegiance with Mahayana Buddhism.

ethnocentrically biased generalities

Very interesting and I thank you for it. Ironic that you are deploying many of the same arguments that I have done in various skirmishes over the religious implications of Darwinism. But to return to the question at hand: are there 'modes of being'? Is reality heirarchical? Are there 'higher truths' or more refined levels of reality to which the only the philosophically educated, and/or the spiritually purified, might have access. Kennethamy has already answered in the negative on these points? What is your view of it?

You might care to expand on that, because it does sound rather more like an attempted insult, than a criticism, per se.
I fail to see how a position based on the idea of a 'perennial philosophy' which atttempts to encompass viewpoints drawn from various religious and philosophical traditions, can be characterised as 'ethnocentric'.

Back to the case in point, though. Herewith a very brief summary of the Platonic epistemology:

Types of knowledge in Platonism

1. Philosophical knowledge (noesis) Forms, Form of the Good

2. Mathematical knowledge (dianoia) Number, geometric order

3. Beliefs about physical things (pistis), Scientific knowledge, knowledge of physical objects

4. Opinions, illusions (eikasia), shadows, illusions, things with no actual being

Now for the definition of 'noesis' again from Wikipedia:

Now you say that "Plato is one of your favourites" but on the other hand that "you refuse to be elitist about truth".

So a couple of observations.

Do you think there is anything in the Platonic epistemology? Do you think there really is, or isn't, a "noesis" which corresponds with "the realm of forms"? Does it have any actual meaning outside the museum of thought?

Second, if you refuse to be elitist about truth, then I am afraid there is no hope for you in the Academy! Plato was unabashedly aristocratic in this regard. He felt that very few had the aptitude, or the interest, to really reach this plane of "noesis" which was the basis of all of the "first principles" of philosophy. This is one of the reasons that Popper attacked Plato as an enemy of "the open society".

Where, do you think, is the notion of "Noesis" preserved in the modern philosophical lexicon? If indeed the modern worldview maintains the idea that there are levels of reality, or realms of being, and types of knowledge that correspond with them, then please tell me where to find it. I read assiduously.

You condescension is irritating, but one has to learn not to be annoyed by these things. You seem to construe every conversation as a chance to start an argument - but then as you seem to take such delight in 'being right' I suppose all of us ignorant yokels should indulge you and be grateful for the opportunity of being sneered at.

In general, it can be said that ... a being is greater the more being it has. Another way to say this is a thing is greater the more things it has. Here are some ways a being can possess being in varying degrees:

- Knowledge: knowledge exists and thus it is a being. The more knowledge a thing has the more being it has ... and hence the greater the being is. A thing that does not have the capacity for knowledge is hence intrinsically less in being than a thing that does have such a capacity.

- Power: This is the capacity for doing something (usually, to cause a change in something). Powers also fall under being (because they exist) and hence the more power a thing has the greater that thing is (because it would have more being).

- Action: This is operation of actually doing something (not just the capacity for it). Since actions exist and are thus beings, and since the actions of a thing are a part of that thing ... then the more actions a thing performs the more being that thing has ... and thus the greater it is. Also, a thing is greater the more things it affects, since its actions (which a part of the thing) grow greater in existence with greater number of recipients.

- Existence: Obviously (as said before) a being is greater the more it exists. An actually existing being is greater than a potentially existing being. Also, the more a thing exists throughout space and time, the greater it is, for the greater points in space and time the thing occupies, the more it can be said to exist.

Being can be subdivided into "Real Being," "Ideal Being," and "Logical Being."

"Real Being" (i.e. Reality) can be subdivided into "Actual Being" and "Possible Being."

"Ideal Being" (i.e. Ideas) can be subdivided into "Subjective Being" and "Objective Being."

In short, Possible Being and Objective Being are exactly the same ... except the former is considered as being outside the mind, whereas the latter is considered as being understood by the mind.

Also, very oftentimes, we speak of "existing things" and "real things" when we are specifically only referring to "actual things" (though possible things are also real as well ... and of course Real, Ideal, and Logical Being all exist in some sense).

It is perfectly proper to speak in one logical tone of voice and that there exists minds, and in another logical tone of voice that there exists bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence . . . They only indicate two different senses of "exist," somewhat as "rising" has different senses in "the tide is rising," "hopes are rising," and "the average age of death is rising." A man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exists both minds and bodies.

I would be most obliged if you could supply a reference for that. I have been looking at the online version of Summae, although I will freely admit I am not qualified to even comment on it, never having been instructed in it. But I am on safe ground saying that Thomas certainly believed in 'incorporeal beings' such as God, and angels.

Tell me how 'the existence of God' could be regarded as the same kind of thing as 'the existence of creatures', if God exists everywhere, at all times, and is not embodied? The same can be said for angels. Their 'manner of existence' surely must be radically different from that which Thomas would call 'corporeal entities', would it not?

Now analytic and modern philosophy will not try and address this question, as far as I know. Many modern philosophers will assert that God does not exist or will say that whether God exists or not is a matter of faith, not of philosophy. But if there is a modern philosophical consideration of the nature of the existence of deity or angels I would be interested to read it.

Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. [(1)] In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition "God is omnipotent" contains two concepts that have their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word "is" is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. [(2)] Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say "God is," or "there is a God," then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept. (A598/B626)

I ask you: is the proposition, "This or that thing exists"--is this proposition, I say, an analytic or synthetic proposition? [(1)] If it is the former, then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but then either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself, or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and then inferred that existence on this pretext from its inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word "reality," which sounds idfferent from "existence," in the concpet of the predicate, does not settle it. For if you call all positing (leaving indeterminate what you posit) "reality," then you have already posited the thing with all itse predicates in the concept of the subject and assumed it to be actual, and you only repeat that in the predicate. [(2)] If you concede, on the contrary, as in all fairness you must, that every existential proposition is synthetic, then how would you assert that the predicate of existence may not be cancelled without contradiction?--since this privilege pertains only in the analytic propositions, as resting on its very character. (A598/B626)

Famous Kant passages with respect to his denial that existence was a predicate:



It is interesting to note that Kan't own theory of judgment (which shows up reminisciently among later philosophers and propositional logic) is so essential for having a univocal meaning of "to exist." So both in the "absolute" and "relative" sense of "to exist," neither copula is a predicate at all since all judgments involve the subject and predicate logical form. And because existence is not a predicate, therefore, no judgments can be made about a subject's "existence".

Here's the reason why:



---------- Post added 04-11-2010 at 08:06 AM ----------

P.S. I found myself thinking the same thing about Kennethamy's recent post. I hope what I said complements what he says.

Kind of funny they both got posted together at once....

But talking about a different meaning (sense) of "existence" seems to me to take an additional step that is unjustified. That is partly because I think that we have a pretty good understanding of what it means to say of something, X, that it exists, and I see no reason to think that God, however different He is from mundane objects, would not exist in exactly the sense in which mundane objects exist, despite the vast difference between the way (manner) God exist, and mundane objects exist.

I find this very interesting because I'm still haunted by it. You said there is a compromise between (sense) exist and (manner) exist. What does that mean?

If something exists in a different manner than another thing, are we not introducing new adverbial "ways" of verbially-existing back into discourse?

Do there become pluralistic notion of (Ex), then? Can we do this? Should we be doing it?



I'm not sure how to deal with this (I'm thinking of Quine's criticism of Carnap's introduction of different linguistic frameworks (or domains) which presumably allows us talk about numbers, for instance, as distinct from physical objects)...

I was just trying to suggest a way of expressing the notion idea that two things (or kinds of things) are so different from each other that such a difference deserves emphasis. So, it seemed to me that one way to do that would be to use the expression, "manner of existence". That seems to be all right as long as we do not confuse it with some kind of ambiguity of the term "existence" which seems to me at least false, if not worse. If, as you suggest, it does imply ambiguity, then, of course, I withdraw the suggestion.

Yes, Quine (as I recall) rejected the notion of different linguistic frameworks on the ground that it supposed the abhorrent analytic/synthetic distinction. I don't mean for my (I hoped) innocuous suggestion to have the kind of philosophical significance you ascribe to it.

But talking about a different meaning (sense) of "existence" seems to me to take an additional step that is unjustified. That is partly because I think that we have a pretty good understanding of what it means to say of something, X, that it exists, and I see no reason to think that God, however different He is from mundane objects, would not exist in exactly the sense in which mundane objects exist, despite the vast difference between the way (manner) God exist, and mundane objects exist.

That sounds right to me...I think you articulated that pretty well in your post.



Yes, I think this is where some of the trouble starts to arise. I don't know where I stand on it either. It seems to me that Quine and Carnap were right in one way, but both wrong in another...

Can we maintain the analytic/synthetic distinction while maintaining a univocal meaning of (Ex)? There doesn't seem to be anything dubious about this. I think it is perfectly reasonable. But the problem comes down to this analytic/synthetic distinction as it is seen in linguistic frameworks.

Carnap thought metaphysics was misguided (as the positivists do) because he accused it of asking questions about the ontological status of entities independent of that very framework within which it is asking that question:

For instance,

"Do numbers exist"? is analytic for Carnap, and the answer is trivially "yes." It is question that is internal to that number-framework. E.g., like, "what is the number of 2+2?" Or, "are there unicorns in the world"? Science says no.

"Do numbers exsit"? is senseless if it is asked in a deep ontological sense...It is an external question "do numbers really exist at all"? The answer is either meaningless or it is pragmatic.

This is like asking, "Are there really 64 squares on a chess board"? In the game of chess, the answer proposed externally becomes senseless. Within the framework, the answer is trivially "yes."

So ontology can only ask pragamtic questions like, "should we be adopting a framework in which numbers are countenanced to exist since adopting this framework is pragmatically useful"?

Quine thought all questions were pragmatic, and every linguistic framwork is subject to revision, precisely because he rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction.

But in addition to rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine accused Carnap of introducing a pluralistic ontology. So for those of us who maintain this distinction, might get trapped in ontological pluralism....(perhaps).

And it seems to me worse if one consequence of the notion is that any proposition of the form, "X exists" turns out to be analytic as it does for Carnap.
Any thoughts about this?

i.e. that whether something (or kind of thing) exists depends on our concepts in some way or other.

Presumably the answer to the question of whether or not concepts exist, depends entirely on our concepts.

So my proposal is that we strike an irenic (maybe ironic too) compromise, and distinguish between ways (manner) of existence, and the meaning of existence. How does that strike you?

For Descartes there is a pure thinking separate from the imagination. Our capacity for such pure thinking is in fact something we share with God. Descartes explains....that our true "ideas" are th same as those in the divine mind that has no corporeal imagination. Implicitly, Descartes thus argues here that that man as res cogitans is divine or at least participates in some aspects of the divine....For Hobbes, by contrast, we can have no idea of an incorporeal thing. Even things like emotions...are in Hobbes' view nothing other than the thing that evokes the emotion plus the effect on our body. Hobbes thus concludes that since we have no idea of our self or of God except as body, Descartes' whole argument collapses. Descartes argues, on the contrary, since we do have an idea of God, Hobbes objection collapses. Argument at this point can go no further, since the parties fundamentally disagree about the nature of man, his capacities and his relation to God

I am not a fan of "frames of reference" or, "language games", or "different worlds", or any of these notions that smack if Idealism of some kind; i.e. that whether something (or kind of thing) exists depends on our concepts in some way or other. Quine expresses this distaste somewhere of other, and I agree with him.