Why would this fact affect whether abstract object exist in the same way as concrete objects? You must mean that they are a different kind of object from concrete objects. And I agree with that. After all, to say either kind of object exists is only to say that the object exemplifies properties, and both abstract and concrete objects exemplify properties. Although, of course, abstract objects do not exemplify some of the properties concrete objects exemplify, and you point out. But then, shoes do not exemplify some of the properties that belt buckles exemplify, but you would not say that shoes and belt buckles exist in different ways would you. (Or, as you put it, the existence of shoes, and the existence of belt buckles is different)?

It seems to me that anyone who wants to say that abstract and concrete objects exist differently has to say something about the idea of existence. Don't you?

---------- Post added 03-22-2010 at 07:38 AM ----------



Yes, that is how you know farmers exist (as you, yourself, say). But it that what it is (or means) for farmers to exist? That you see them? Quine points out that when people say that things have different kinds of existence, they are confusing how we know something exists with what it is for it to exist. That is, of course, the confusion Berkeley makes, and in general, the confusion of Idealism.

It seems to me that anyone who wants to say that abstract and concrete objects exist differently has to say something about the idea of existence.

I've said plenty, on this and the numbers vs. words thread. Not only criticism of your position, also I've expressed my view that existence is vague; in the contemporary jargon, there is a distinction between existence defined by the exemplification of properties and as defined by the encoding of properties.

I've said plenty, on this and the numbers vs. words thread. Not only criticism of your position, also I've expressed my view that existence is vague; in the contemporary jargon, there is a distinction between existence defined by the exemplification of properties and as defined by the encoding of properties.

But to repeat, it does seem to me important that those who speak of a distinction among different ways of existing address the idea of existence. Doesn't it to you?

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I did not follow the thread about numbres and words. You state that existence is vague; is it not more to the point to say Our Human definition of Phenomens. Excuse me, English is not my first language, neither my favourite. I do not understand "exemplication of properties" or "the encoding of properties".
I have a vague Idea, but I could be totally wrong. May-be you can shed some light on my way through this Yungle they call Physics.

Yours sincerely, Pepijn Sweep's:Glasses:
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Yes, indubitably.

---------- Post added 03-22-2010 at 10:35 PM ----------

Here you go: Explanation of the Distinction

Yes, indubitably.

---------- Post added 03-22-2010 at 10:35 PM ----------

Here you go: Explanation of the Distinction

Your link fails to work.

Works fine for me.

Yes, sorry. I got it, finally. I just perused it, and will look at it again. It answers the second question of whether this distinction is supposed to explain the notion of ways of existing. But clearly, something of this sort is necessary. It will not do just to assume that there are differences in ways of existing without saying what those differences are supposed to be. It remains to see whether that distinction works, however. Anyway, thank you for that link.

The modern philosophers... recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that existence.

22. Aristotle, on the other hand, whose system, like all the greatest systems, was evolutionary, recognized besides an embryonic kind of being, like the being of a tree in its seed, or like the being of a future contingent event, depending on how a man shall decide to act. In a few passages Aristotle seems to have a dim of a third mode of being in the entelechy. The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of being. The whole philosophy of the scholastic doctors is an attempt to mould this doctrine of Aristotle into harmony with christian truth. This harmony the different doctors attempted to bring about in different ways. But all the realists agree in reversing the order of Aristotle's evolution by making the form come first, and the individuation of that form come later. Thus, they too recognized two modes of being; but they were not the two modes of being of Aristotle.

23. My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future....

OK here is a passage wherein C.S. Pierce proposes three modes of existence (thanks to Deckard who posted the link originally.)



Remainder at this link. It seems a rather odd argument to me, but as it supports the idea of modes of being I thought it might be relevant.

It really doesn't help any unless he tells us what a "mode of being" is. I suppose I can make any arbitrary division and call it "a mode of being". What would that show? It isn't an argument, so it isn't an odd argument. It is a kind of proposal, and he offers no particular reason to adopt that proposal rather than some other proposal, or any division at all. The important, and necessary preliminary question is, what is a mode of existence, and how do we tell?

How do you exist? Let me count the ways. (Apologies to Elizabeth Barrett Browning).

...Which is, nonsense.

Is it not already nonsense to use the word exist? I guess there are different uses for it, and maybe some are slipping my mind, but if I say "Chairs exist" have I indicated anything other than chairs?

So, If chairs exist, then chairs exist?

or:

Chairs exist = chairs + x + y + z + and so on relate to one another in some form or fashion?

or:

Yeah, I know what you mean when you say "Chair", so I'll say "Chairs exist"?

It really doesn't help any unless he tells us what a "mode of being" is. I suppose I can make any arbitrary division and call it "a mode of being". What would that show? It isn't an argument, so it isn't an odd argument. It is a kind of proposal, and he offers no particular reason to adopt that proposal rather than some other proposal, or any division at all. The important, and necessary preliminary question is, what is a mode of existence, and how do we tell?

Well I think one of the things that he said, not very clearly, is that Aristotle says there is such a thing as 'potential existence'. This is indicated by the concepts of telos, entelechy, and the like, whereby an oak tree potentially exists in an acorn. If you enlarge the scope of 'exists' to encompass things that potentially exist, it seems to me already that you have a different kind or mode of existence to the 'brute fact' mode of existence. He then goes on to talk of another 'mode of existence', that being of the likelihood that certain things will come to exist, that things will 'turn out' a certain way, which I guess is another idea of 'potential existence'. Except it seems to relate to the idea of the lawfulness of occurences - certain things are more likely to happen, owing to the laws of probability, or the laws of nature.

Added to that, someone mentioned previously that abstract objects, such as numbers, don't exist in time and space. But they obviously exist in some way or another. You can't say 'number 7 does not exist' while you can say 'the square root of 2 does not exist'. But it seems to me that to say the number 7 exists, is not the same as to say that horses exist. The existence of a number can only be demonstrated to somebody who is capable of counting. The existence of the horse is (I hate to say it) independent of anyone's perception of it.

So numbers and corporeal objects still seem to exist in different 'modes' or 'ways' as far as I can see.

So numbers and corporeal objects still seem to exist in different 'modes' or 'ways' as far as I can see.