Ways of existing?

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Humanity
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 03:14 am
@jeeprs,
Quote:
Originally Posted by Humanity
'Exist' is just the verb "is".


jeeprs wrote:

I don't know about that. I think 'to exist' and 'to be' mean different things. I propose that the word exist means 'ex' apart from 'ist' be. So to exist is to 'be apart', this thing, as distinct from that thing. Anything that exists can be counted, and has an identity. Actually, Kennethamy quoted a Quine saying on this very point, 'no entity without identity' in another thread.
You are introducing the issue of 'essence' vs 'existence'.
Since i do not venture into ontology, 'exist' is just 'is'.
But i recognize that the language games (Wittgenstein) of humans emerge and we have to deal with it and its limitations.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 05:06 am
@Humanity,
Humanity;140819 wrote:
Fundamentally 'existence' is not a predicate (Kant).
'Exist' is just the verb "is".

Despite the above, the word 'exist' is normall predicated by humans.

As such we end up with the following;

Humans (exist),

and since humans are multi-variate;

Humans [realist, non-realists, common, language games, etc. (exist)]

1. A realist will insists objects exist as independent of human minds waiting there externally for humans to correspond with them.
This is a delusional type of existence.

2. A non-realist will have a different conception of existence.

3. The common man will have a different view of existence.

4. A scientist (QM or non-QM) will have their own concept of existence.

5. There are other views on existence.

There are different consensus on the above views.
Why should one of the above be the ONLY existence.

This is why we need to acknowledge that there are different views of existence and no absolute existence.

But the fact remains, we cannot extricate 'exist' from the human element, i.e.

Humans (exist)

It just cannot stand alone, i.e

(((exist)))

So, realistically, fact is

Humans (exist)


What are the different concepts of existence? And, what are you talking about?

---------- Post added 03-18-2010 at 07:14 AM ----------

ughaibu;140821 wrote:

If a thing exists, then that thing exists now, this is a matter of grammar. That a thing existed does not imply that it exists now.
Does Lincoln exist, yes or no?


It is a matter of grammar. But I am using the term "exist" tenselessly. In the way "2+3 is 5" it is used tenselessly. "Exist" in mathematics has not temporal qualifiers, and neither has it in philosophy. I think you are confusing "exist" with, "alive".
Lincoln exists, but he is not alive. And,"X exists" no more implies "X exists now", than does, "the number 2 exists" imply that the number 2 exists now.
 
Humanity
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 06:53 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140851 wrote:
What are the different concepts of existence? And, what are you talking about?
You ask for ways of existing. I listed 5 ways in the earlier post.
 
Ahab
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 06:58 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140851 wrote:

It is a matter of grammar. But I am using the term "exist" tenselessly. In the way "2+3 is 5" it is used tenselessly. "Exist" in mathematics has not temporal qualifiers, and neither has it in philosophy. I think you are confusing "exist" with, "alive".
Lincoln exists, but he is not alive. And,"X exists" no more implies "X exists now", than does, "the number 2 exists" imply that the number 2 exists now.


From dictionary.com:

exist
verb (used without object)
1. to have actual being; be: The world exists, whether you like it or not.

2. to have life or animation; live.

3. to continue to be or live: Belief in magic still exists.

4. to have being in a specified place or under certain conditions; be found; occur: Hunger exists in many parts of the world.

5. to achieve the basic needs of existence, as food and shelter: He's not living, he's merely existing.


I think the lexicographer was wise not to add:

6. to have properties.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 07:18 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140851 wrote:
I think you are confusing "exist" with, "alive".
I'm not.
kennethamy;140851 wrote:
Lincoln exists, but he is not alive. And,"X exists" no more implies "X exists now", than does, "the number 2 exists" imply that the number 2 exists now.
Okay, it seems to me that you have claimed three things:
1) the set of things which exist has exactly the same members as the set of things with properties
2) to say in 2010 "Lincoln exists" is to utter a true statement because Lincoln has properties, or at least, Lincoln has the property of being dead
3) before the formation of the Earth, Lincoln did not exist.
Let's consider the case of sailors lost at sea, eaten by fish, their bodies digested and the fish dispersed to the four corners. In this case there is nothing we can point to and say "that's Ahab, he's dead", so it seems that there is nothing that could have the property of being dead. As a further example, there are porcelain coffee cups in this house and occasionally one gets broken, and that pisses my wife off, not because she's averse to coffee cups which have the property of being broken but because once broken they are no longer coffee cups. Just as Lincoln, once dead, is no longer Lincoln, the great orator, or whatever he was.
And, of course, dinosaurs. The vast majority of dinosaurs that lived have left no trace of their existence, thus all we can say about almost any dinosaur is "it was a dinosaur and it's dead". But according to you, that suffices for the existence of all dinosaurs, that is for a set whose only overall description is "were dinosaurs, are extinct".
Then there's the property of being a future president. This was true of Lincoln until he was inaugurated, which means that it was true long before the formation of the solar system, and this seems to commit you to the existence of Lincoln throughout the past.
So, as far as I can see, there are at least three ways of existing entailed by your position:
1) the existence of physical objects, with spacetime locations and with observable properties
2) the existence of causally inert unobservable abstract entities without location
3) the existence of category 1 objects that no longer have that existence but gain existence as parasites of type 2 objects.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 07:24 am
@Ahab,
Ahab;140870 wrote:
From dictionary.com:

exist
verb (used without object)
1. to have actual being; be: The world exists, whether you like it or not.

2. to have life or animation; live.

3. to continue to be or live: Belief in magic still exists.

4. to have being in a specified place or under certain conditions; be found; occur: Hunger exists in many parts of the world.

5. to achieve the basic needs of existence, as food and shelter: He's not living, he's merely existing.

Just as an historical note, Aquinas warned against saying that God existed in a different way, or in a different sense, from the way or sense that ordinary things existed, since he pointed out that to say that starts you on the slippery-slope to atheism.









I think the lexicographer was wise not to add:

6. to have properties.


But these are not different modes or ways of existing. These are just differences in how we talk about the different things that exist. It does not show that there are different ways of existing. Only that there are different things we say exist. And some of them concern how we know that something exists, not what we mean when we say it exists. You might ask yourself, what is in common to all these different uses of the term, "exist" that makes them uses of the same term, "exist". Do they only happen to be spelled and pronounced the same way? Are they all just homonyms? In other words, what makes them all ways of existing, and not something else? Have you a reply to that?

An historical note: Aquinas warns against saying that God exists in a different way, or in a different sense, from the way or sense in which ordinary objects exist, because he says that view starts the slippery-slope to atheism. He is, I think, right.
 
fast
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 07:59 am
@kennethamy,
I was about to enter her garage, and she said "[be] careful of the cats." I asked how many she had, and she said, "hundreds." She had two floor mats with a picture of a cat, six clocks (with cat drawings on it), a pack of fifty pencils with cat designs, a ceramic cat, and finally, I saw two actual living cats. Ignoring her euphemism, and assuming she did an accurate count of what she was talking about, she would have not said hundreds but instead said 61 (2+6+50+1+2).

But, does she really have sixty-one cats? Of course not, yet she seems to think she has two that exists as floor mats, six that exists as clocks, fifty that exists as pencils, one that exists as a ceramic, and two that exists as real cats.

However, we all know that cats exists as only cats can exist, as cats, and we all know that clocks exists as only clocks can exist, as clocks of course, and we all know that pens exist as pens, ceramics as ceramics, and let's not forget that floor mats exist as what else other than floor mats.

We won't make such a silly mistake as did the lady, but then again, we are prone to make very similar mistakes. All of those examples include objects that are actual physical objects. For example, we know better than confuse a cat with a statue of a cat, but why in tarnation do we become so clumsy when discussing things that are not physical?

We should not think that a cat can exist as an idea of a cat. Cats are cats, and ideas of cats are ideas of cats. We need to keep them separate, and some of us can, but even some of those that do still make some rather inconsistent mistakes.

For example, unicorns. All of a sudden, and apparently because there are no unicorns, some people cannot help themselves when they say that a unicorn is a concept or an idea, and when people do that, we need to remind them to distinguish, distinguish, distinguish. Understand that there is a difference between a creature, a concept of a creature, an idea of a creature, a statue of a creature, and even floor mats with designs supposedly depicting what a creature would look like if it so happened to exist.

X exists as X if X exists, and Y exists as Y if Y exists. Unicorns (X) do not exist, but if they did, they would exist as X (unicorns). Humanity's concept of a unicorn (Y) exists, and it exist as, guess what, Y (Humanity's concept of a unicorn).
 
pondfish
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 08:17 am
@kennethamy,
Addng references do not make you exist. References is also a manifestation.
 
mickalos
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 08:36 am
@Ahab,
Humanity;140819 wrote:
Fundamentally 'existence' is not a predicate (Kant).
'Exist' is just the verb "is".

Despite the above, the word 'exist' is normall predicated by humans.

As such we end up with the following;

Humans (exist),

and since humans are multi-variate;

Humans [realist, non-realists, common, language games, etc. (exist)]

1. A realist will insists objects exist as independent of human minds waiting there externally for humans to correspond with them.
This is a delusional type of existence.

2. A non-realist will have a different conception of existence.

3. The common man will have a different view of existence.

4. A scientist (QM or non-QM) will have their own concept of existence.

5. There are other views on existence.

There are different consensus on the above views.
Why should one of the above be the ONLY existence.

This is why we need to acknowledge that there are different views of existence and no absolute existence.

But the fact remains, we cannot extricate 'exist' from the human element, i.e.

Humans (exist)

It just cannot stand alone, i.e

(((exist)))

So, realistically, fact is

Humans (exist)


Humanity;140869 wrote:
You ask for ways of existing. I listed 5 ways in the earlier post.


Firstly, I'm not so sure Kant is right about existence not being a predicate. His argument seems to be that a 'real' predicate must add something new to its subject, yet existence seems to be presupposed. However, consider "Barrack Obama's grandfather is a father". Fatherhood is presupposed in the subject, but does that mean that '... is a father' isn't a real predicate in this context, merely a logical one? I'm unconvinced. Moreover, there are most definitely cases where existence is not presupposed. I might explain to a child that King Arthur is a legend, but King Alfred actually existed. Here existence seems to be being used as the kind of real predicate Kant talks about, to discriminate between different members of a heterogeneous class of kingly characters.

Secondly, I don't think that your examples demonstrate different types of existence, merely different ontological schemes. We disagree on what types of things exist, not on what types of 'existences' there are, which isn't entirely intelligible to me. For example, most people would agree with the statement: There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a number. Yet we still have (massive) ontological disagreement about the type of thing that the above variable refers to, which we can bring out by paraphrasing:

There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is an abstract idea.
There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a platonic form/abstract entity/universal.
There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a concrete particular.

etc.

Nobody really disagrees about existence (to be is to be the value of a variable, as Quine puts it), they just disagree over what types of thing exist.
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 09:27 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140874 wrote:
An historical note: Aquinas warns against saying that God exists in a different way, or in a different sense, from the way or sense in which ordinary objects exist, because he says that view starts the slippery-slope to atheism. He is, I think, right.
Didn't he indicate that by "God" he meant the only necessary thing? It wouldn't follow that he recognized atheism as logical. Or do I have that wrong?

---------- Post added 03-18-2010 at 11:32 AM ----------

mickalos;140888 wrote:
Secondly, I don't think that your examples demonstrate different types of existence, merely different ontological schemes. We disagree on what types of things exist, not on what types of 'existences' there are, which isn't entirely intelligible to me.
Maybe the confusion comes in the way we talk about processes as objects.

Reification?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 09:42 am
@mickalos,
mickalos;140888 wrote:
Firstly, I'm not so sure Kant is right about existence not being a predicate. His argument seems to be that a 'real' predicate must add something new to its subject, yet existence seems to be presupposed. However, consider "Barrack Obama's grandfather is a father". Fatherhood is presupposed in the subject, but does that mean that '... is a father' isn't a real predicate in this context, merely a logical one? I'm unconvinced. Moreover, there are most definitely cases where existence is not presupposed. I might explain to a child that King Arthur is a legend, but King Alfred actually existed. Here existence seems to be being used as the kind of real predicate Kant talks about, to discriminate between different members of a heterogeneous class of kingly characters.

Secondly, I don't think that your examples demonstrate different types of existence, merely different ontological schemes. We disagree on what types of things exist, not on what types of 'existences' there are, which isn't entirely intelligible to me. For example, most people would agree with the statement: There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a number. Yet we still have (massive) ontological disagreement about the type of thing that the above variable refers to, which we can bring out by paraphrasing:

There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is an abstract idea.
There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a platonic form/abstract entity/universal.
There exists an x such that 2 + 2 = x and x is a concrete particular.

etc.

Nobody really disagrees about existence (to be is to be the value of a variable, as Quine puts it), they just disagree over what types of thing exist.


I disagree with your kingly characters example. I don't see how there can be a distinction between a kingly character who exists, and one who does not exist when there are no kingly characters who do not exist. Nothing cannot be distinguished from something, for nothing has no properties. For something to be distinct from something else, both somethings must exist. "King Arthur does not exist" does not mean that something that is King Arthur does not exist. It means that nothing is King Arthur.

I, of course, agree with what you say about ways of existing. There is but one way of existing. Existing. As you say, disagreement is about what kind of thing exists, but not about in what way it exists.
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 10:36 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140901 wrote:
I, of course, agree with what you say about ways of existing. There is but one way of existing. Existing. As you say, disagreement is about what kind of thing exists, but not about in what way it exists.
So you wouldn't say water can exist as a solid, as a liquid, as a vapor. Water exists. It can take the form of a solid or liquid.

It takes the form of a liquid, but it can't exist as a liquid. Because it can only exist in one way. Liquid water exists. But water can't exist as a liquid. Hmmm.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 10:45 am
@Arjuna,
Arjuna;140916 wrote:
So you wouldn't say water can exist as a solid, as a liquid, as a vapor. Water exists. It can take the form of a solid or liquid.

It takes the form of a liquid, but it can't exist as a liquid. Because it can only exist in one way. Liquid water exists. But water can't exist as a liquid. Hmmm.


I would say that water can sometimes be a solid, etc. But I don't mind your saying that it can exist as a solid as long as what you mean is that water sometimes can be a solid. I object only to the implication of "exist as" if it is used to imply that there is a different mode of existence. Or, exists in a different way. As Berkeley said, "Speak with the vulgar, but think with the learned". We can all say that the sun rises at 6 am, just as long as we still are Copernicans.
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 11:00 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;140918 wrote:
I would say that water can sometimes be a solid, etc. But I don't mind your saying that it can exist as a solid as long as what you mean is that water sometimes can be a solid. I object only to the implication of "exist as" if it is used to imply that there is a different mode of existence. Or, exists in a different way. As Berkeley said, "Speak with the vulgar, but think with the learned". We can all say that the sun rises at 6 am, just as long as we still are Copernicans.
So you're seeing fuzzy thinking with "exists as."

If I say "God exists as a concept" I'm in danger of what? (I'm asking, not arguing)
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 01:22 pm
@Arjuna,
Arjuna;140923 wrote:
So you're seeing fuzzy thinking with "exists as."

If I say "God exists as a concept" I'm in danger of what? (I'm asking, not arguing)


I think the danger is suggesting that because there is the concept of God, that God exists (but in some funny way). That's why I wrote that the locution, "X exists as Y' is a way of eating your cake, and having it too. You infer from the existence of the concept of God (which is indisputable) to the conclusion of the existence of God, which is disputable.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 01:27 pm
@kennethamy,
It is definitely not correct to say that God exists, or exists in the way that things exist. This is why atheism is essentially correct in saying that God does not exist. Everything that exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and an end in time.

In Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich argues that attributing "existence" to God is problematic insofar as it renders God a determinate Being among beings.[INDENT][In regard to the Proofs] they [the scholastics] did not mean 'existence.' They meant the reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea which did not carry the connotation of something or someone who might or might not exist.
[/INDENT]He continues by arguing that every argument for the existence of God is more or less a failure qua argument, but that these arguments are unparalleled statements of the inerradicable question mark overhanging human finitude.[INDENT]The arguments for the existence of God neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God. They are expressions of the question Source

[/INDENT]
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 01:45 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;140992 wrote:
It is definitely not correct to say that God exists, or exists in the way that things exist. This is why atheism is essentially correct in saying that God does not exist. Everything that exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and an end in time.

In Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich argues that attributing "existence" to God is problematic insofar as it renders God a determinate Being among beings.[INDENT][In regard to the Proofs] they [the scholastics] did not mean 'existence.' They meant the reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea which did not carry the connotation of something or someone who might or might not exist.
[/INDENT]He continues by arguing that every argument for the existence of God is more or less a failure qua argument, but that these arguments are unparalleled statements of the inerradicable question mark overhanging human finitude.[INDENT]The arguments for the existence of God neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God. They are expressions of the question Source

[/INDENT]


As has been pointed out on this thread several times, to say that X is a different kind of thing from Y is one thing. But to say that X and Y exist in different ways, is a different thing. We cannot infer the second from the first. God and shoes are, no doubt, very different. But why should that mean that they "exist in different ways"? Everyone, including many believers, agree that believing that God exists is problematic. So Tillich is not telling us something particularly startling.

The arguments for the existence of God neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God. They are expressions of the question of God which is implied in human finitude

How can arguments not be arguments? I don't understand that. Perhaps what Tillich means is that they are not only arguments, but they are also something else. And that is, of course, possible. Arguments may have several purposes. One is always an attempt to establish the conclusion on the basis of the premises. But they may do other things too. (Of course, many philosophers have thought the arguments for God fail as proofs, but again, that is not news).
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 02:18 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141004 wrote:
How can arguments not be arguments?
Aristotle's arguments prove the existence of a mystery.

Thanks for the Systematic Theology reference jeeprs!
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 02:26 pm
@kennethamy,
They point to something beyond existence, but which is real (to the believer).

Another quote I found on Tillich about the matter:

Quote:
Religion is direction or movement toward the ultimate or the unconditional. And God rightly defined might be called the Unconditional. God, in the true sense, is indefinable. Since the Unconditional precedes our minds and precedes all created things, God cannot be confined by the mind or by words. Tillich sees God as Being-Itself, or the "Ground of all Being." For this reason there cannot be "a" God. There cannot even be a "highest God," for even that concept is limiting. We cannot make an object out of God. And the moment we say he is the highest God or anything else, we have made him an object. Thus, beyond the God of the Christian or the God of the Jews, there is the "God beyond God." This God cannot be said to exist or not to exist in the sense that we "exist". Either statement is limiting. We cannot make a thing out of God, no matter how holy this thing may be, because there still remains something behind the holy thing which is its ground or basis, the "ground of being."


I know it is slightly off topic, but it is a question of ontology. I think your approach basically says there is no such topic, doesn't it? Things either exist or not - it is a binary value. But there is an entire 'realm' (it is not really a realm) which cannot be so defined.
[/COLOR][/COLOR]
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 18 Mar, 2010 03:30 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;141024 wrote:
They point to something beyond existence, but which is real (to the believer).
Huh?

Eckhart was all about the ground of being thing. Bernard McGinn wrote a good book about him.
 
 

 
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