Only certain classes of objects presuppose existence. The famous example used by GE Moore is tame tigers. It makes perfectly good sense to say:
All tame tigers growl
Most tame tigers growl
Two tame tigers growl
A few tame tigers growl
Many tame tigers growl
etc.

However, when we predicate tame tigers with existence, we can say:

Two tame tigers exist
A few tame tigers exist
Many tame tigers exist

But some of the quantifying adjectives don't work:

Most tame tigers exist
Some tame tigers do not exist (i.e. 'Some but not all tame tigers exist')
All tame tigers exist (It 'works' grammatically, but is a vacuous tautology)
Compare with the similar case of presupposition:
Some/most grandfathers are fathers.

To look at this another way, we might represent the quantifying adjectives graphically. Imagine shading in a circle drawn on a piece of paper; for 'one' we shade a tiny section of the circle, for 'a few' we shade a bigger section, for 'most' we shade over half of the circle, and for 'all' we shade the entire thing. For the existential case, however, there is no circle already drawn. If we want to say 'one tame tiger exists' we would have to draw the smallest circle possible, for 'a few' a slightly larger one; however, we can get nowhere with 'most' or 'all' because they depend upon a circle already being drawn. (note: in the grandfather case we might think of a circle representing grandfathers being subsumed by a larger circle representing fathers, while in the tame tigers case we may think of just one circle, which may explain why the cases differ slightly e.g. when using 'many').

My point is that there are some cases in which existence is not presupposed of the class we are discussing. For example, if I were telling somebody with very little knowledge of history about Tolstoy's War and Peace I might quite rightly say, "Some of the characters in this novel did not exist", and I may correctly use any of the other quantifying adjectives in a similar vane. In this case I might imagine two, overlapping circles, one representing the class under discussion, and the other representing all that exists, with the quantifier determining how much overlap there is, but I may just as easily use shading as above; in both cases I'm assigning members of a class to a certain subclass (things that growl and things that exist). I would say that this kind of discourse takes place across a broader area of language than in discussing historical fiction or legendary Kings. For example, when we suspend judgement on a certain matter of fact, which seems to occur a lot in philosophy.


King Arthur had twelve knights?
Heathcliffe is a character in Emily Bronte's novel?
How about, Heathcliffe does not exist, he is a character in Wuthering Heights?

I certainly seem to be able to talk about things that don't exist, and I seem to be able to use 'exists' like other predicate, at least in some situations. One approach might be to use definite descriptions, but definite description is an unnatural analysis of language, and it certainly doesn't seem to be able to handle cases like these very well.


Surely this is just another distinction between types of thing, mind dependant and mind independent?

(Surely) We need some analysis of the phrase, "talk about things that do not exist". One question is, of course, what kind of thing does not exist. It is not (I suppose) as if the world could be divided into two kinds of things: things that exist, and things that do not exist: elephants and unicorns. There are really too many things in that world; a world that is, in any case, becoming crowded. As Russell remarked, it offends against a robust sense of reality. There are, I suppose, descriptions that we can talk about. For example, the description, "magical equine with horn topping its head", but talking about descriptions is not, of course, talking about things (except insofar as descriptions are things). It often helps to clarify when (to use Carnap's distinction) we go from the material mode of speech to the formal mode of speech. Or, in Quine's language, we make a semantic ascent. Even the later Wittgenstein thought that ordinary language could be misleading. Things that do not exist are not things and do not exist. Just as intellectual dwarfs are (generally) not intellectuals and dwarfs (As Quine pointed out).

So let us take the sentence:

In the legend, King Arthur had twelve knights.

What, precisely, does this mean? It cannot mean that the concept or description of King Arthur had twelve knights, since a concept or description is not the kind of thing that can have knights. Does it mean the (legendary) character of King Arthur? No, since you deny that there is a character that is King Arthur; you claim that nothing is King Arthur. What is it, then, that has the property of having twelve knights in the legend? Nothing? Does the italicised sentence imply that in the legend, there is nothing that had twelve knights?

If so, how can we make sense of the statement that "it is true that King Arthur had 12 knights, but false that he had 20 knights"?

Many posters tell us that this or that exists in a different way from something else. Thoughts exists in a different way from material objects; unicorns exist in a different way from horses, and so on. Sometimes they explain this by using the locution, "exist as". For example, they say that unicorns "exist as" ideas, or "exist as" concepts. The question about this particular locution is whether it means anything more that that, for instance, that the concept or the idea of the unicorn exists (but that unicorns do not exist)? In other words, "X exists as a Y" just means that the Y of X exists.

The question I want to ask is whether it makes sense to talk of "ways of existing", and, if it does, what does it mean to talk that way. What I think is that there is only one way to exist, namely, to exist, so that it makes no sense to talk of different ways of existing. I also think that when someone says that this or that exists in this or that way, what he is really saying is that this or that does not exist, but maybe that something else does exist, usually the idea, or the concept, of this or that. It is a way of saying both that something does not exist, but that it does exist (but in a funny way). Which is, nonsense.

Consider collective nouns referring to aggregates, like schools of fish, or flocks of sheep. It is quite reasonable to ask whether a school of fish really exists (i.e. is there actually a school of fish there.) We might go there and see them all feeding on the surface - definitely a school of fish exists. But suddenly, the whole school breaks up and each fish goes off in a separate direction. The school of fish no longer exists, but no particular member of it has ceased to exist; what we designate as 'school' no longer exists. This would suggest to me that some things that can be said to exist do not have a very high degree of reality, particularly collective descriptions of this kind.

The reason why you can't grasp the idea is because in modern or analytic philosophy, things either exist or they don't. That is what is thought to be the 'scientific' outlook, anyway. The idea of modes of existence or degrees of reality is thought to be out-dated or not amenable to empirical science. But it is just another example where analytic philosophy fiddles in the backroom and leaves what it thinks of as the serious work to science.

It's not so much that analytic philosophy has it that something either exists or does not. You should blame the law of the excluded middle for my thinking that. Poor analytic philosophy goes only where logic allows it to go. A slave to logic, poor thing. Even if there are modes of existence (whatever those are) it is still true that something either exists or it does not exist. If it has a "mode of existence" (whatever that is) it nevertheless exists. Just as even if something is tiny, it still exists.

Philosophy should not want to compete with science. It tried that for a while. But it really did not do well. Why try it again? Anyway, philosophy thinks that philosophy is serious too. More than one thing can be serious.

Know Thyself

If you think philosophy is serious, you should do philosophy seriously and find out why you and the likes are indeed slaves to the concept of,
"it is still true that something either exists or it does not exist".

It goes a very long way and perhaps could be a long journey for you..
here's a clue..
Amazon.com: The Evolution of Reason (9780521791960): William S. Cooper: Books

Slave to the law of the excluded middle and to logic. Does not feel like a burden to me. "We must follow the argument wherever it leads". Socrates.

The individual fish I had for dinner last night no longer exists. Why should that fact indicate the fish I ate didn't have a "high degree of reality"? Seemed pretty darn real to me.

You are the expert in formal logic, and i am sure you are aware your conclusion is as good as the truth of your major premise plus stated or implied assumptions.

Unfortunately you are starting from the unrealistic and unproven assumption that reality is absolutely independent of the human variables.

I think that reality is independent of how human beings perceive reality, if that is what you mean.

How do you exist? Let me count the ways. (Apologies to Elizabeth Barrett Browning).

Many posters tell us that this or that exists in a different way from something else. Thoughts exists in a different way from material objects; unicorns exist in a different way from horses, and so on. Sometimes they explain this by using the locution, "exist as". For example, they say that unicorns "exist as" ideas, or "exist as" concepts. The question about this particular locution is whether it means anything more that that, for instance, that the concept or the idea of the unicorn exists (but that unicorns do not exist)? In other words, "X exists as a Y" just means that the Y of X exists.

The question I want to ask is whether it makes sense to talk of "ways of existing", and, if it does, what does it mean to talk that way. What I think is that there is only one way to exist, namely, to exist, so that it makes no sense to talk of different ways of existing. I also think that when someone says that this or that exists in this or that way, what he is really saying is that this or that does not exist, but maybe that something else does exist, usually the idea, or the concept, of this or that. It is a way of saying both that something does not exist, but that it does exist (but in a funny way). Which is, nonsense.

Is the existence of a fictional character the same is the existence of an actual person? Is the existence of a mathematical proof the same as the existence of a geographical location? It would seem obvious to me that the answer in both cases is no. In each case, both examples exist, but what is meant by 'exist' is different. Or the nature of the existence of a fictional character, real person, mathematical proof and location is different for each.

Is the existence of a fictional character the same is the existence of an actual person? Is the existence of a mathematical proof the same as the existence of a geographical location? It would seem obvious to me that the answer in both cases is no. In each case, both examples exist, but what is meant by 'exist' is different. Or the nature of the existence of a fictional character, real person, mathematical proof and location is different for each.

"Same" how? Fictional characters (whatever that means) are not the same as actual persons, of course! But if fictional characters exist, then they exist "in the same way" as actual persons. Of course, now the question that comes up is what we mean (if we mean anything) when we say that fictional characters exist. Quine suggested that philosophers give away the term, "exist" to those who want to use it, and keep for themselves the term, "there is" ("there are"). Then people would be less confused about how things exist, because they would not be so tempted to talk about "ways of 'there is' or ways of 'there are'". And, after all, all we mean when we say, for example, "Elephants exist" is that there are elephants. And all discussion can then be about what kind of things elephants are, and whether there are that kind of thing, instead of bothering about pointless questions about existence.

sorry I still don't buy it. But I will do some more reading on it.