I don't know what kind of refutation a metaphysical refutation would be, as distinct from a refutation. For instance, it seems to me that the fact that objects like the Moon existed before minds is a refutation of the Idealist view that material objects are not mind independent. Whether that is a metaphysical refutation I cannot say, but it does seem to me to be a refutation. And it seems to me that the counter that in order to conceive of the Moon before the advent of minds minds are necessary, so that science does not show that the existence of the Moon is mind-independent, is a pathetic counter. It is, in fact, what has been called Berkeley's "master argument", and also, a variant on what David Stove has called, "the worst argument in the world". I dwell on this because I want to point out that from the fact that arguments can be thought up to defend a theory is no reason to think that the theory is irrefutable.

There seems to be an underlying assumption that because Berkeley had, built into his theory, internal defenses which could be trotted out to insulate his theory from what would normally be refutations, that those internal defenses are enough to counter those refutations. So that, for example, because in Berkeley's view the fact that Johnson's foot does not pass through the stone, but encounters the stone, does not show that the stone is (indeed) a material object, that is enough to show that Johnson's demonstation did not refute B's contention that the stone was not a material object, and that Johnson was naive, or failed to understand, and so on. But why should we accept the view that because Berkeley can trot out defenses already implicit in his theory, that he has thus immunized his theory from criticism, let alone. refutation. Are we to suppose that these internal defenses cannot, themselves be criticized? That just because, for instance, Berkeley argues that it has not been shown that the Moon in independent because in order to show it, we have to conceive of the Moon, thereby making the Moon mind-dependent, we have to whimper away having had our counter itself countered? Of course not. The mere fact that Berkeley is able to trot out a defense is no reason to think that his defense is successful. His theory is vulnerable not only internally, but also externally. That science shows that the Moon predated consciousness simply trumps any defense Berkeley can trot out (although Berkeley can, and does trot out an instrumentalist theory of science to counter this attack on his theory, which, by the way, is not implicit in his theory).

The central point is this: that Berkeley can defend his view from criticism does not, in the least, show that his defense is successful, nor that the criticism is the result of a misunderstanding of Berkeley. Kicking the stone by itself, does not refute Berkeley, since it still has to be explained why it refutes Berkeley, but it is a good start, and seems to me exactly the way to go.

It seems you demand much of Berkeley. Tell me, what manner of defense of any sort did Johnson even offer for his curt rejection of Berkeley. Was it sufficient for him to have been a pompous ass?

Please bear in mind that this thread that you started is about Johnson and his kick-the-stone "refutation." It is not about Berkeley except by reference. From a philosophical perspective, Johnson's "refutation" is rubbish. Perhaps he would make a good stand-up comedian, maybe a little slapstick. Johnson kicks stone, says "Ouch! Never trust a Bishop when it comes to kicking stones." (Audience laughs!)

If you want to argue against Berkeley, why not start another thread so we can all have at him? Here I am forced to defend him by condemning Johnson whose action has no innate philosophical merit.

Samm

I know all about the quad. The poem was by Ronald Knox of Oxford University.

But what does this mean?

In Berkeley's case, the fact that "things" may predate humanity is no proof that they are "material".?

Specifically, what does the phrase, "in Berkeley's case" mean?

That the Moon predates people would not persuade B. that the Moon is mind-independent. I know that. I would not expect him to have a sudden conversion to materialism by that revelation. He would have a counter, probably either his "master argument" or a more subtle view that science is merely instrumental, and does not give us philosophical truth. Rather the same counter-argument that was given against Galileo's advocacy of the Copernican theory. In fact, such an argument was given as the preface to "Two New Principles" by Cardinal Bellarmine, who writes that the Copernican theory must not be taken as a philosophical truth, but only as a "convenience" for prediction. In other words, instumentalism. And, indeed, Berkeley discussed science and espouses instrumentalism as his philosophy of science. And, of course, he is forced to do so, since he could not allow that science would show it to be "philosophically true" that the existence of the Moon predated consciousness.

But should we accept an instrumentalist view of science? That the Moon does not "really" predate consciousness, but thinking so is only "as if" and a convenience. Or should we believe that what science tells us (about the Moon) is literally true?

Indeed, how, "in Berkeley's case" (as you put it) would you handle the Moon objection, which is, in principle, no different from kicking the stone?

Unlike Berkeley, I believe that everything that is (materially?) real in this universe IS a conscious being, some sentient and some not. Berkeley, being a Christian would say that reality exists in the mind (and consciousness) of God which is shared with man beginning on the sixth day when man was created. I like my view better, but it could be said that I am not that far from Berkeley in the end.

Samm

The "pre-existence" of the moon, or the moon existing before Berkeley, is not problematic for Berkeley because of his belief that God perceived it prior to Berkeley's existence, and continuously perceives it.

Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

As I understand it, this thread is about whether we can refute someone only on their own terms. Hence the talk about arguing internally and externally, and of salvage operations.

I don't think you have to disprove something in order to refute it. 'Refute' can also mean to overthrow by argument or evidence. I think this:



Is an adequate refutation of Berkeley. Otherwise, how do you refute something that can't be disproven?

.

Pyrrho wrote:

The "pre-existence" of the moon, or the moon existing before Berkeley, is not problematic for Berkeley because of his belief that God perceived it prior to Berkeley's existence, and continuously perceives it.

If that means that Berkeley would not believe it was a problem for him, of course, I agree. He would not. But, of course, that is not the issue. The issue is whether it is problematic for Berkeley's philosophy. If the Moon existed before there was consciousness, and, to the best of our knowledge, that is true, does that refute Berkeley. The answer is clearly, yes.

What difference does it make whether it is problematic for Berkeley? We are not discussing the history of philosophy, but philosophizing. At least, so I believed. If B. has to resort to God to salvage his theory, that's fine. Deus ex machina. It is an historical curiosity. Given your views, why would you believe that if the only way Berkeley can defend his theory is to resort to God, or, as Sammy does, resort to the view that the Moon is conscious, that Berkeley's theory has not been refuted? Suppose that a murderer's defense is that a pixie was the actual murder, and that he was, therefore innocent. Would you consider that an adequate defense? Consistency is a necessary condition of truth, not a sufficient condition.

Compare this with what Hume said about Leibniz's way to solve the problem of evil. He agreed that Leibniz had solved the logical problem of evil. With enough assumptions, he could make the existence of evil consistent with the existence of God. But, as Hume pointed out, that would not in anyway show that it was completely implausible that evil should be compatible with an all good and all powerful God. Similarly, it is possible to make the existence of the Moon compatible with B's theory that there are no material objects because nothing can be mind-independent consistent. But, so what. Given the assumptions that Berkeley must make to produce such view, he ends up with an utterly implausible theory. And that is the point.

Did Samuel Johnson misunderstand George Berkeley?

The famous story (in Boswell's Life of Johnson) that Samuel Johnson kicked a rock (or was it a stone?) and cried out, "Thus I refute Berkeley". Berkeley, of course, denied that there were any material objects. It is often said (with some condescension) that all this showed was that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley, and that what Johnson did was not a refutation of Berkeley's view. My question is whether this criticism of Johnson is correct. Why didn't Johnson refute Berkeley by kicking the stone or rock?

I don't agree that such a general condemnation of metaphysics can do the job. It has too many of its own problems. However, when you say that this thread is about whether we can refute someone only on their own terms, I rhink that is the point exactly. And when you follow that up by suggesting that if that is so, of course, B. cannot be refuted, you are exactly right. And you state my point for me. Somehow, the idea has got around, that only internal refutations are allowed [emphasis added], and it turns out that internal refutations are impossible (unless you can show some internal inconsistency). The most recent version of Idealism, post-modernism has done most to promulgate this view of thinking about abstract theories, but Wittgenstein's very worst idea about "language games" has contributed to this view that somehow, philosophical, and other theories, are hermetically sealed against refutation. In fact, some post-moderns have used the term, "hermeneutics" to describe this way of looking at things. But, this is but another form of Idealism.Truth is what you make of things, and there is no external check on truth. Thomas Kuhn (in his influential book, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions") tried to push this same idea on to science, and a number of scientists actually took this view up. But it seems to have died in science, but not in philosophy, or in the social sciences.

As I argue in my previous post, David Hume (prescient as ever) put his finger on this issue in his discussion of the problem of Evil. And, I am glad to see that you see what is going on too.

Yes, except for one thing: Berkeley asserts that God has consciousness and has existed forever, and therefore the moon did not exist prior to consciousness, according to Berkeley. But you are right that it would show him wrong if one demonstrated that something existed prior to there being consciousness. All of this, though, is going beyond the scope of the opening post of this thread.




I did not say that the only way Berkeley can save his theory is by using God; I said that is how he tried to do it. And I did not say that his attempt worked. But all of this is beside the point of the thread. The thread was started with a very narrow mission, and a discussion of whether or not Berkeley was wrong is going beyond the scope of the opening post. Just to remind you of your own post, with the title question:




Answering that question does not require any particular position on the question of whether or not Berkeley was right. And, as I have repeatedly stated, I believe that Berkeley is wrong for at least a couple of reasons. But that is unimportant for whether or not Johnson kicking a stone refuted Berkeley, or whether or not Johnson declaring that such a thing refuted Berkeley indicates that Johnson did not understand Berkeley.

---------- Post added 03-15-2010 at 06:10 PM ----------




I get the impression that you are directing this at me. I did not state that the only way to refute a theory was from the inside. That is one possible way, but generally speaking it is not the only way.

In any case, this thread was started not as a discussion of whether or not Berkeley was right, and not whether or not we have more than one way to refute him. Disagreeing with Johnson about the efficacy of his argument does not entail agreement with Berkeley on anything, nor does it entail believing that one must only attack Berkeley from the inside. I happen to think that it is often best to attack a position from the inside, but not always, and I certainly do not think that it is generally the only possible way to attack a position. But I do think that Johnson failed to refute Berkeley, and I do think that his attempt, if it was a serious and honest attempt, showed that he failed to understand Berkeley's position. But that does not mean that there is anything good or right about Berkeley's position.

This thread has melded into the the other thread, "has Johnson refuted Berkeley?" Clearly, they are connected, since Johnson would not have refuted Berkeley, if he had not understood Berkeley". I don't think that Johnson did misunderstand Berkeley, because I think that kicking the stone does refute Berkeley. So it does come to whether kicking the stone did refute Berkeley. And, I think it did (although it has to be explained why).

But the fact that Berkeley can defend his view against Johnson does not show that Johnson did not refute him,

since that would clearly depend not only on whether Berkeley could defend his view, but on whether his defenses were adequate. I don't, for instance, think that the defense that everything is conscious is adequate, nor that God in in the quad is adequate. Since there is no reason to believe either, and a great deal of reason to believe neither.

To Pyrrho: I was, of course, directing my criticism against you. It is true that you do not say that only internal criticism will refute a theory. But I think that is the way you pitched what you said. We can all admit that Berkeley would trot out the "God in the quad" defense. But neither of us thinks that is much of a defense. So what is the point of mentioning it? Except that it would be, of course, an internal defense.

You are still dancing around the question, where do those sensations which things are supposed to be made of, come from?
Hallucinations are created by the hallucinators own mind, and there is no external object which is their cause. How about non-hallucinations?
Like that tree I now see through the window. Where do those sensations come from.
Or, do you think that those sensations are created in my own mind too, and that the tree is also an hallucination? Which would mean that everything was an hallucination. In that case, how would you distinguish between real hallucinations, and what we call, reality?

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dullness and limitation of our faculties.

35. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.

Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief in a reality that is completely ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc. Philosophers who profess realism also typically believe that truth consists in a belief's correspondence to reality.

Then why not consider the question, why did not Johnson refute Berkeley, instead of attacking Johnson? Or, alternatively, why does not the fact that the Moon predated human consciousness, refute Berkeley's contention that material objects, like the Moon, are mind-dependent. Either would do. And then you needn't resort to abusive ad hominems.

Here is the position:

According to science, the Moon existed before consciousness.
According to Berkeley, nothing can exist independently of consciousness.

I pick science. Your turn.

Okay, please present why you think it does refute Berkeley.





True, but I don't think what Johnson did was relevant to what Berkeley said. And that is why I don't think it refutes Berkeley. It has nothing to do with whether Berkeley has any good reason to believe his story or not.




God in the quad was mentioned in connection with the pre-existence of the moon, which is something that is irrelevant to what Johnson did in kicking a stone.

Well, I thought I had explained. By kicking a stone, Johnson kicked a material object, and according to Berkeley, there are no material objects. Therefore, Johnson refuted Berkeley.

Every time you say this, you show that you don't get the argument. Really I am not trying to be discourteous or rude when I say that. Berkeley's Three Dialogues are a discussion between Philo and Hylas, where the latter takes the position of a 'Johnson' and presents all of the common-sense arguments for why Philo (alias Berkeley) must be incorrect in denying the reality of material substance (note emphasis.)

All that Johnson did in 'kicking the stone', and all that you are doing, is demonstrate over and over, not that Philo/Berkeley's argument is wrong, but that he doesn't understand it. Berkeley doesn't deny the reality of experience. To understand his argument needs a close consideration of what he means by 'perception', 'exist' and (especially) substance.

But this has been put to you about a dozen ways in this thread, and your response has not changed one iota throughout, so I can imagine that this post will also end up lying against the courtyard wall, with all the stones.....

kennethamy quoted my post as follows:
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Quote Originally Posted by Samm: Unlike Berkeley, I believe that everything that is (materially?) real in this universe IS a conscious being, some sentient and some not. Berkeley, being a Christian would say that reality exists in the mind (and consciousness) of God which is shared with man beginning on the sixth day when man was created. I like my view better, but it could be said that I am not that far from Berkeley in the end.

Samm
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To which kennethamy replied:

So you think that the Moon is a conscious being, and that is how you defend Berkeley from the Moon objection. I see. If you had told me that before, we need not have wasted all this time. I thought I was talking to a rational person.
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kennethamy, are you incapable of reading much less understanding me? Read the words, "Unlike Berkeley, I believe..." I'm so frigging tired of your responding to what I have not said and never understanding what I have said.

I then said, as you can see, assuming you can read, "Berkeley, being a Christian would say that reality exists in the mind (and consciousness) of God..." You say you thought you were talking to a rational person. If I were talking to a literate person, I would challenge your remark, but since you show no evidence of being able to read, that would be a waste. I think its clear to anyone reading our posts here that I'm at least as rational as you. I will not invite you to read the explanation for my belief in cosmic consciousness since you have already made your choice about my belief without even bothering to hear me out, and frankly I don't think you capable of understanding it anyway.Samm

But, in fact, isn't it that the Moon is a conscious being the way that you defend Berkeley from the objection that the Moon exists independently of consciousness? And if that is true, then how am I wrong when I say that is not a rational defense of Berkeley?

Well, I thought I had explained. By kicking a stone, Johnson kicked a material object, and according to Berkeley, there are no material objects. Therefore, Johnson refuted Berkeley. ...