You posed a did-question; Did Samuel Johnson misunderstand George Berkeley? As did-questions are of the yes/no variety, your question presupposes that exactly one of the following assertions is true:
1) yes, Johnson did misunderstand Berkeley
2) no, Johnson did not misunderstand Berkeley.
On the face of it, I see no reason to doubt that exactly one of these assertions is true. So, your question appears to me to be legitimate, and I'm not convinced that it's difficult. What do you think that the difficulty consists of?

I did not know that was why you thought B's criticism was incorrect, since you did not say why. I have not yet replied to Pyrrho post, but I will. I think Pyrrho is mistaken, but he is the only one to reply to the OP relevantly.

No, I have nothing to say about cognitive constructs. I am not even sure what those are.

ughaibu;131593 wrote:

So, your question appears to me to be legitimate, and I'm not convinced that it's difficult. What do you think that the difficulty consists of?

I suppose answering it. What else?

Okay, a question is difficult if deciding which assertion correctly answers that question, is difficult. What is it about this question that you think qualifies it as a question to which the correct answer is difficult to decide?

Sorry, I don't want to be drawn into such a futile and silly discussion.

Erotetics can hardly be dismissed as futile or silly. If your question is "too difficult", as you contend, then that difficulty is worth analysing. Should it turn out to be the case that there is an insurmountable difficulty, for example; insufficient information, then one can profitably reject the question.

Johnson did not thusly refute Berkeley because Berkeley never said that one would not have various feelings and sensations. The sensation we call "kicking a rock" is not inconsistent with Berkeley's position, and thus does not refute Berkeley.

What B. said was that those sensations Johnson had when he kicked the rock constitute the rock that Johnson kicked. (Not only, of course, that Johnson has sensations when he kicked the rock. Johnson did not deny that). So, the question is whether when Johnson kicked the rock he was kicking his (Johnson's) own sensations. What Johnson was trying to do was demonstrate that what he kicked when he kicked the rock, was not a compilation of his own sensations, but rather, that he was kicking something which caused the sensations he had. Something, by the way, we all believe is true. And, if my description of what Johnson was doing is correct, then I don't see how he was misinterpreting Berkeley. Of course, there is a different question. Was Johnson refuting Berkeley, as Johnson claimed he was. I think so, but that, of course, is a very different question from the question whether he was misinterpreting Berkeley, and should not be confused with it. (Of course, whether what Johnson did was inconsistent with Berkeley's position is the issue of whether he refuted Berkeley, not whether he misinterpreted him).

Sorry it took such a long time for me to post this reply.

P.S. I have been using the term "misinterpret" rather than "misunderstand". I did not mean to do that. But I don't think that it makes any significant different here.

None of the things that Johnson demonstrated when he kicked the rock conflict in any way with what Berkeley said. And since Johnson seems to have thought otherwise, that is prima facie evidence that he misunderstood Berkeley.

So, the question is whether when Johnson kicked the rock he was kicking his (Johnson's) own sensations.

Your first point concerns whether Johnson refuted Berkeley. See the thread, Did Johnson refute Berkeley? I just posted.

Your second point seems to argue that it follows from the premise, Johnson did not refute Berkeley, although he thought otherwise, it follows he misunderstood Berkeley. That seems to me a non-sequitur.

What B. said was that those sensations Johnson had when he kicked the rock constitute the rock that Johnson kicked. (Not only, of course, that Johnson has sensations when he kicked the rock. Johnson did not deny that). So, the question is whether when Johnson kicked the rock he was kicking his (Johnson's) own sensations.

What Johnson was trying to do was demonstrate that what he kicked when he kicked the rock, was not a compilation of his own sensations, but rather, that he was kicking something which caused the sensations he had.

Something, by the way, we all believe is true.

And, if my description of what Johnson was doing is correct, then I don't see how he was misinterpreting Berkeley. Of course, there is a different question. Was Johnson refuting Berkeley, as Johnson claimed he was. I think so, but that, of course, is a very different question from the question whether he was misinterpreting Berkeley, and should not be confused with it. (Of course, whether what Johnson did was inconsistent with Berkeley's position is the issue of whether he refuted Berkeley, not whether he misinterpreted him).

Sorry it took such a long time for me to post this reply.

P.S. I have been using the term "misinterpret" rather than "misunderstand". I did not mean to do that. But I don't think that it makes any significant different here.

Not at all - I think you should say that 'when he kicked the rock he had the tactile sensation of his boot striking an object, and the visual and aural sensations of the object moving'. The argument is not saying 'we see sensations' or that 'the sensation is the object of perception'. It is saying that the act of perception and interaction with an object comprises sensations which create the experience of the object. And I think there is a certain sense in which this is indubitable. But what it means is the important question.

Thus, one would need something beyond normal experience (i.e., a discussion of metaphysics) to disprove him, not some scientific experiment with a rock.

What sort of thing do you imagine could dispute him? His position seems almost unfalsifiable.

...
The thing to understand about Berkeley is that he was a superb critic of the views and arguments of other philosophers (like Locke). In the history of philosophy there is no one better, or even, maybe as good, except for Hume. ...

We agree on that much anyway. In Hume's case, he got much of his criticism of Locke from Berkeley, which Hume says himself. Hume was right about Berkeley: his best arguments were essentially destructive or skeptical. And those arguments were often quite good.

Pyrrho wrote:

Thus, one would need something beyond normal experience (i.e., a discussion of metaphysics) to disprove him, not some scientific experiment with a rock.

What sort of thing do you imagine could dispute him? His position seems almost unfalsifiable.

The post to which you seem to be referring:




That is not properly stated. He is not kicking sensations; his kicking is his sensations, and possibly involves the sensations of others (according to Berkeley).

As for what would refute him, the type of argument required is mentioned in what you quote from me above: a discussion of metaphysics. When there are two positions, that both give you the exact same appearances, but give a different description of the underlying reality, it should be completely obvious that no argument about appearances will be relevant, and consequently no scientific experiment is going to settle the matter. It may be, of course, that since both are going beyond experience, you may want to say that they are both nonsensical. But if that makes it nonsensical, then the metaphysical position that is known as materialism is also nonsensical. And, indeed, metaphysics generally would be nonsensical, as it attempts to go beyond experience and describe the underlying reality.

1. If the Moon existed before people, then Idealism is false.
2. The Moon existed before people.
3. Therefore idealism is false