The famous story (in Boswell's Life of Johnson) that Samuel Johnson kicked a rock (or was it a stone?) and cried out, "Thus I refute Berkeley". Berkeley, of course, denied that there were any material objects. It is often said (with some condescension) that all this showed was that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley, and that what Johnson did was not a refutation of Berkeley's view. My question is whether this criticism of Johnson is correct. Why didn't Johnson refute Berkeley by kicking the stone or rock?

No, it was to show that what I am saying is very much in accordance with what Stove is saying. Stove agreeing with me does not show that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley. I was, however, hoping that you would think about the matter a little more carefully because of your respect for Stove, but it has not turned out as I had hoped.





It is true enough that not being fazed by something is not proof that one ought not be fazed by something, but the fact is, Berkeley was not fazed by such things and trying to persuade him, or anyone who agreed with him, would have to involve something that would faze him. A proof that uses premises that are in dispute is a fairly useless proof, and in this case, the premises (if we wish to pretend that his action is really an argument) which are evidently intended, essentially beg the question at issue. If you are going to argue with Berkeley or one who agrees with him, it is pointless and absurd to use arguments with premises that are such that the person would not accept them. I might as well "prove" to everyone online that I am sitting on a wooden chair by pointing at it. It does not prove it to you or anyone online who had any inclination to not take my word for the matter.

Since I am not succeeding in the current approach, let me start asking the questions. What, exactly, is Johnson supposed to be accomplishing by his action? Who is he going to be convincing? Please do not now tell me that there is a difference between a proof and convincing someone, as I am well aware of that. But what, exactly, did Johnson accomplish?





Suppose instead of Berkeley, we were talking about whether or not we were brains in vats. Do you imagine that kicking a stone would disprove such an idea? Why or why not?

If you say, by kicking a stone, he really is kicking a stone rather than simply appearing to kick a stone, my question is, how is one to tell the difference between those two ideas? That they are different I will not presently dispute; but it is necessary that we can tell a difference in order for Johnson's "proof" to be of any use.

Perhaps telling you a story will help illustrate the problem with what Johnson did. I have seen a magician do the trick of "turning water into wine", by pouring the water from one vessel into another (just as it is described in the Bible as Jesus' first miracle, by the way). There was water in the first vessel, but after it was poured into the second vessel, what was poured out of the second vessel was wine. Now, did he prove that he could really turn water into wine? If you say no (with which I will obviously agree), how is this really different from what Johnson did? That Johnson did something, in some sense of the words "did something", Berkeley need not dispute. The question is, did he really do what he professed to do, or was it merely a Berkelian illusion? His action does not show or prove which is really occurring, just as my magician example does not show whether he was really turning water into wine, or simply created the appearance of doing so. In order for Johnson's proof to be a proof, it must be that he shows that he is not merely appearing to be kicking a stone, but really is kicking a stone (in a materialist sense of the expression). Otherwise, his proof is no better than the magician's proof that he can turn water into wine (which, of course, the magician did not call a "proof", as he knew better, unlike Johnson).

Edited to add:

Imagine, after the magician performed the trick of turning water into wine, that someone were to wonder whether or not the magician really turned water into wine. Then suppose that the magician says, okay, I will prove it, and performs the trick again. The magician, in such a case, is either missing the point of what is being suggested, or is simply a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. The issue is whether or not the appearance matches up with the reality. So showing another appearance of the same thing without anything else done is irrelevant and beside the point. Likewise, with Berkeley and Johnson. Johnson is like the magician. Berkeley has already seen the appearance, and is suggesting that it might really be a trick. Johnson simply performs the trick again, and pretends that that proves something about the reality. So either Johnson has missed the point, or he is a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. I have suggested that it is his understanding that is at fault rather than his integrity, though I have no argument against supposing instead that he was simply a charlatan trying to pull a fast one.

Of course, maybe (in some sense of the word) the magician is really turning water into wine, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more. Likewise, maybe Johnson is really kicking a material stone, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more.

But the nature of reality is such that our knowing of it is an essential ground or component of it. You like to imagine that the vast universe exists whether you perceive it or not, whether you know it or not. It seems obvious that it does. But the way in which it might exist, in the absence of your knowing of it, is hypothetical at best. Whatever you imagine it to be, is still the product of a specifically human intelligence, that sees things from a particular point of view, and pictures them in a particular way.

Reality and existence are not the same. The words 'to be' and 'to exist' are not synonymous. A human BE-ing is an individual instance of the greater reality within which everything exists. That greater reality was depicted by Berkeley as God, or Absolute Mind. This in itself is not an objective reality, but the transcendental subject of all experience.

jeeprs, I agree with your analysis of Berkeley's motives and his vision.

I was once arrested in a Quaker demonstration against the bombing of Cambodia (in 1972). About 50 of us shared one wing of the D.C. jail in which we were placed, and we spent the night singing anti-war songs and wondering if our actions would make a difference. I never slept after that very long day and went to court the next morning and afternoon, very tired and hungry. As I sat in the courtroom, I experienced a very interesting illusion as the entire courtroom appeared in my consciousness as if it were inside a matchbox or other small container placed immediately in front of my eyes. It was in fact as if I were some large being whose body was outside the reality I observed as I looked through the eyes of the tiny copy of me sitting in the courtroom as if they were a peep hole by which I could look inside the box at the courtroom and the activities of the tiny people who occupied it. It was in essence only a change of perception which incorporated no real change in what I saw but only a change in how I conceived what I saw.

Berkeley's vision is like this. He realizes that if indeed all our perceptions have the nature of ideas or images in the mind, and if indeed all our knowledge of ourselves and our world (universe) comes from our perceptions, then there is no basis in our consciousness to conclude that there is any such thing as an external material reality in which we are distinct material objects. Instead, there is only the reality of mental images and ideas that convey a reality we interpret as material.

Samm

You see, I think the sensations are caused by material objects.
Berkeley thinks they are caused by God.
You think neither is true. So, what is your explanation?

Berkeley thinks they are caused by God.
You think neither is true. So, what is your explanation?

Well a rock may exist, but not be perceived. For example, a rock that right now lies on top of Mt. Everest. Or, it is possible that there is a diamond at the very bottom of the Pacific Ocean, which is not, and cannot be perceived. If you think that is impossible, then show it. I really cannot understand why anyone should think that something cannot exist and not be perceived. I suspect, as I have already said a number of times, that it is because some people fail to distinguish between how we know that something exists, and the existence of that thing. That failure is at the bottom of Idealism. It is the failure to distinguish between epistemology and metaphysics. (It is why Berkeley claimed for himself the title of the only true empiricist, for he reduced the existence of something to our knowledge of its existence, and knowledge to the having of sensations and nothing else. So he reduced the existence of something to the having of sensations. It is empiricism gone wild. A textbook example of what Wittgenstein called the philosopher "in the grip of a theory". It might, given a particular sense of "know" be impossible to know that something exists unless it is perceived, but, clearly, it is not impossible for something to exist unless it is perceived. And that is the heart of the matter. For Berkeley tries to persuade us that because the first is true, that the second is true. But that is trying to persuade us to accept a fallacious argument.

3. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions.
For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible.
Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out (not related to) of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

"...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself." He claimed that an observing subject can only know material objects through the mediation of the brain and its particular organization. The way that the brain knows determines the way that material objects are experienced. "Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this can leave nothing to be desired. But all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time."

If you have no arguments, I suppose that visions are better than nothing. (Or, maybe not). But I don't think that Berkeley would have felt complimented when you called his philosophy a vision. In fact, I have a feeling that he would have resented it as an indication that you did not take his views, and his arguments for them, seriously. To call them a vision would be (he would have thought) the most serious misunderstanding of him of all.

Schopenhaur wrote that From Wikipedia article on Materialism

It is not hard to see. Berkeley is the guy that thinks everything is mind, and thus , all associated with a pattern of sensation which as far as i can tell are mental properties associated with mind. Thus, the kick by Samuel, result in a pattern of sensations which are mental properties that are part of samuel m` s mind.

Wow! you appeared to have found the holy grail of the philosophy of mind, i.e. the answer to the hard problem of consciousness.
You have linked sensations arising from consciousness to matter.
You should submit your findings and claim your Nobel prize.


I know i have sensations and the best answer i can provide is to rely on Darwin's evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience and the likes.

---------- Post added 03-14-2010 at 10:18 PM ----------

You had interpretated Berkeley's
esse is percepi wrongly from the common sense perspective and without understanding Berkeley's ideas at all. Your's a strawman.
Berkeley asserted that things exists even if no humans are perceiving them, albeit other spirits are perceiving them. Note,


Therefore if someone had seen a rock on top of Mt. Everest and assuming nothing had happened to dislodge it, Berkeley as above would have agreed that the rock is still existing thereon. (subject to other reservations but not relevant at this point).

Thus when Berkeley evoked 'esse is percepi', he was not implying that existence is based on common sense perception.
The perception of B, if we were to interpret it in accordance to later idealists after B, referred to a very complicated process of how reality is actualized and brought to consciounsess.
Berkeley mentioned 'some other spirit' and this has to be understood clearly.
From hindsigths and the theories of later idealists, this 'spirit' is not with reference to something supernatural or god but have has relationship with the mind and modern sciences.

From Berkeley's treatise, one can conclude that Berkeley's main philosophical thrust was to prove the philosophical realist wrong and his 'esse is percepi" is a side theory which must to be properly understood by anyone who want to rely on this point to support or critique it.

Pyrrho;137292 wrote:

No, it was to show that what I am saying is very much in accordance with what Stove is saying. Stove agreeing with me does not show that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley. I was, however, hoping that you would think about the matter a little more carefully because of your respect for Stove, but it has not turned out as I had hoped.





It is true enough that not being fazed by something is not proof that one ought not be fazed by something, but the fact is, Berkeley was not fazed by such things and trying to persuade him, or anyone who agreed with him, would have to involve something that would faze him. A proof that uses premises that are in dispute is a fairly useless proof, and in this case, the premises (if we wish to pretend that his action is really an argument) which are evidently intended, essentially beg the question at issue. If you are going to argue with Berkeley or one who agrees with him, it is pointless and absurd to use arguments with premises that are such that the person would not accept them. I might as well "prove" to everyone online that I am sitting on a wooden chair by pointing at it. It does not prove it to you or anyone online who had any inclination to not take my word for the matter.

Since I am not succeeding in the current approach, let me start asking the questions. What, exactly, is Johnson supposed to be accomplishing by his action? Who is he going to be convincing? Please do not now tell me that there is a difference between a proof and convincing someone, as I am well aware of that. But what, exactly, did Johnson accomplish?





Suppose instead of Berkeley, we were talking about whether or not we were brains in vats. Do you imagine that kicking a stone would disprove such an idea? Why or why not?

If you say, by kicking a stone, he really is kicking a stone rather than simply appearing to kick a stone, my question is, how is one to tell the difference between those two ideas? That they are different I will not presently dispute; but it is necessary that we can tell a difference in order for Johnson's "proof" to be of any use.

Perhaps telling you a story will help illustrate the problem with what Johnson did. I have seen a magician do the trick of "turning water into wine", by pouring the water from one vessel into another (just as it is described in the Bible as Jesus' first miracle, by the way). There was water in the first vessel, but after it was poured into the second vessel, what was poured out of the second vessel was wine. Now, did he prove that he could really turn water into wine? If you say no (with which I will obviously agree), how is this really different from what Johnson did? That Johnson did something, in some sense of the words "did something", Berkeley need not dispute. The question is, did he really do what he professed to do, or was it merely a Berkelian illusion? His action does not show or prove which is really occurring, just as my magician example does not show whether he was really turning water into wine, or simply created the appearance of doing so. In order for Johnson's proof to be a proof, it must be that he shows that he is not merely appearing to be kicking a stone, but really is kicking a stone (in a materialist sense of the expression). Otherwise, his proof is no better than the magician's proof that he can turn water into wine (which, of course, the magician did not call a "proof", as he knew better, unlike Johnson).

Edited to add:

Imagine, after the magician performed the trick of turning water into wine, that someone were to wonder whether or not the magician really turned water into wine. Then suppose that the magician says, okay, I will prove it, and performs the trick again. The magician, in such a case, is either missing the point of what is being suggested, or is simply a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. The issue is whether or not the appearance matches up with the reality. So showing another appearance of the same thing without anything else done is irrelevant and beside the point. Likewise, with Berkeley and Johnson. Johnson is like the magician. Berkeley has already seen the appearance, and is suggesting that it might really be a trick. Johnson simply performs the trick again, and pretends that that proves something about the reality. So either Johnson has missed the point, or he is a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. I have suggested that it is his understanding that is at fault rather than his integrity, though I have no argument against supposing instead that he was simply a charlatan trying to pull a fast one.

Of course, maybe (in some sense of the word) the magician is really turning water into wine, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more. Likewise, maybe Johnson is really kicking a material stone, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more.

If (thank you for the suggestion) a magician set up a way of appearing to kick a stone, and then showed how he did it, that would be a distinction between appearing to kick a stone and kicking a stone. You are not, are you, claiming that Johnson was pretending to kick a stone, so that he only appeared to kick a stone.

Johnson really did kick a stone. There is no reason to suppose he only appeared to kick a stone. You problem (I thought) is whether by kicking a stone, Johnson was kicking a material object. Isn't it? No one would dispute that Johnson kicked a stone.

If stones are not material objects, then what would be a material object? B. would agree that if stones were not MOs then nothing would be an MO, and his reply would be that nothing is a material object. There are no material objects, and that the idea of a material object is a confused idea.

By kicking the stone, Johnson is reminding us that there are such things as material objects (as contrasted, perhaps, with things like shadows, or after-images), for if a stone were not a material object, the foot would encounter no resistance and pass right through the stone.

I think Ken has argued his case OK. I don't agree with his conclusions but I understand why in his opinion Berkeley's view seems outlandish. For what it's worth.

I am not saying anything about what I believe regarding whether or not Johnson kicked a material stone. I am saying that Berkeley did not believe it, and simply showing him the same appearance twice does not prove anything about the underlying reality. If Johnson really did kick a material stone, that is NOT THE SAME AS PROVING that he kicked a material stone. That distinction is essential to the discussion. No one is disputing the appearance; the issue is the underlying reality AND HOW THAT UNDERLYING REALITY IS KNOWN.





The whole issue is, did Johnson kick a material stone or not, and how do we know this? If it was analogous to the magician turning the water into wine, then he did not; it only appeared as if he kicked a material stone. Berkeley was well aware of the appearances of things, so merely producing another appearance of a like nature does not prove him wrong; it would be like the magician simply performing the trick again to "prove" that he really could turn water into wine. That is not proof of the relevant issue, even if the magician really did have supernatural powers and really did turn water into wine. In order for the magician to prove that he really did have supernatural powers and could really turn water into wine, he would have to allow us to examine his apparatus, and he would have to demonstrate the ability under specially controlled conditions. Simply doing the same trick twice would prove ABSOLUTELY NOTHING about the underlying reality. Likewise, even if Johnson really did kick a material stone, that does not prove the relevant issue, because we see the appearance just as before, so it is not producing any new evidence on the matter. Producing another appearance of a like nature does not prove what the underlying reality is, just as the magician producing another appearance of turning water into wine does not prove what the underlying reality is. Simply put, Johnson needs to do something analogous to what the magician needs to do in order to prove that his description is genuine. The magician simply saying, I really do have the power, and doing the trick again proves nothing. Likewise, Johnson saying it really is a material object and doing the "trick" again proves nothing.

Ken, Johnson kicking the stone to prove Berkeley was wrong means that in his understanding of Berkeley he must believe that the substantiality of his foot and the stone is in itself adequate to disprove Berkeley. What then, do you suppose Berkeley would have expected the foot to penetrate the stone under any normal condition? Can you really suspect that a philosopher respected enough for his arguments to remain in our textbooks to this day could have been so naive in his philosophy as to have expected Johnson's foot not to contact the stone in just such a common manner? Regardless, the particulars of Berkeley's philosophy, I believe that Johnson was necessarily incorrect and disrespectful of the Bishop to suggest thusly that the Bishop might believe such a ridiculous notion. I see no reason to doubt that Berkeley misunderstood the implications of his philosophy at least enough to realize if he had suggested that a foot could penetrate a stone. Therefore, I conclude that Johnson was wrong to make such a childish argument and was insulting to think it appropriate.

You have made much better arguments against Berkeley's ideas in this thread, but I cannot trust your understanding of Berkeley as long as you maintain rigid support of Johnson's idiocy.

Samm

It seems to me that if Johnson kicked at the stone, and his foot did not pass through it (as if it were a ghost-stone) that would prove that the stone was a material object.

And, of course, his doing that again would not add to the proof (unless Berkeley did not believe what he saw the first time). If kicking at the stone, and the fact that the foot did not simply pass through the stone, but encountered the stone, and the foot was effected by the stone, doesn't prove that the stone is a material object, then I do not know what would prove it.

...
It would have to be done conceptually, if at all. ...

...
As for what would refute him, the type of argument required is mentioned in what you quote from me above: a discussion of metaphysics. When there are two positions, that both give you the exact same appearances, but give a different description of the underlying reality, it should be completely obvious that no argument about appearances will be relevant, and consequently no scientific experiment is going to settle the matter. It may be, of course, that since both are going beyond experience, you may want to say that they are both nonsensical. But if that makes it nonsensical, then the metaphysical position that is known as materialism is also nonsensical. And, indeed, metaphysics generally would be nonsensical, as it attempts to go beyond experience and describe the underlying reality.

And anyone who understood the above is going to know that kicking a rock is completely irrelevant to whether Berkeley is right, so Johnson either did not understand Berkeley, or he was being disingenuous (see post above).

It would, then, be up to Berkeley (or you) to say what it was that would be required to prove it, if what Johnson did, failed to prove it. Or, is it your position that there is nothing that Johnson (or anyone) could do to prove that the stone is not a material object? But, in that case, of course, you should not have asked for proof in the first place if you already believed that nothing could constitute proof. A request for such proof would be disingenuous at best.

The fact that neither you nor Berkeley would not allow anything to be proof that the stone was a material object (and in particular, would not allow what Johnson did to constitute proof) merely shows that if would not be possible to prove to you or Berkeley that the stone was a material object. That is, it would not be possible to persuade either of you, that the stone was a material object. But, of course, it does not follow from the fact that you could not be persuaded, that what Johnson did was not a proof. It is not necessary to prove to, to prove. Whether someone is persuaded by a proof is a psychological matter, not a logical matter. As I have pointed out, as Quine wrote, all hypotheses are underdetermined by the evidence for them, and the fact that it is always possible to defend any hypothesis from refutation by making enough (ingenious assumptions) is just a consequence of the underdetermination of all hypotheses. We can, to use another phrase of Quine's, defend any belief, "come what may" by making enough adjustments in our other beliefs. So, the (mere) fact that Berkeley can account for Johnson's "experiment" within his own theory cannot show that what Johnson did does not refute Berkeley. Any theory has to be examined as a whole, and if, and when, enough objections are ranged against it, which it can fend off only by making further assumptions which are paradoxical, the theory eventually falls of its own weight, for there are too many holes that need patching up.*

*A textbook case of this from the history of science is the fall of the phlogiston theory of combustion. The theory was finally just abandoned, because too many outre' assumptions had to be made in order to maintain it. The same is true of Idealism.

No. If I have a dream of kicking a stone, my foot does not pass through it. But there is no material stone.





What would be needed is something like what I stated long ago (post #9, and more clearly in #37 of this thread): To disprove Berkeley:


http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/metaphysics/7708-did-samuel-johnson-misunderstand-george-berkeley.html#post131475

and


http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/metaphysics/7708-did-samuel-johnson-misunderstand-george-berkeley.html#post134076





You keep bringing up me and my views, which are not the topic of this thread. But to respond to that, I am in agreement with Hume, so I think it is an idle matter (to put it politely, which is as you have expressed it previously). But the subject of the thread involves Berkeley's ideas, not mine.

Now, in Berkeley's case, he gives arguments for his position. I have already admitted, by saying that I agree with Hume, that I am unconvinced by Berkeley's arguments. But he gives some arguments. To disprove him, an analysis of his arguments would be in order. Kicking a stone does nothing to his arguments. Nor is kicking a stone providing a positive argument in favor of some other metaphysical theory about the underpinnings of perception. In order to refute Berkeley, some discussion of metaphysics is in order. That could either take a form analogous to Berkeley's arguments, or it could be an argument in favor of the idea that metaphysical arguments of such a nature are nonsensical. But whatever approach one takes, kicking a stone isn't going to get the job done, which should be obvious to anyone who understands Berkeley.

I am astonished that you have thought that kicking a stone is a metaphysical refutation. Why would you believe that?

I don't know what kind of refutation a metaphysical refutation would be, as distinct from a refutation.

For instance, it seems to me that the fact that objects like the Moon existed before minds is a refutation of the Idealist view that material objects are not mind independent.

Whether that is a metaphysical refutation I cannot say, but it does seem to me to be a refutation. And it seems to me that the counter that in order to conceive of the Moon before the advent of minds minds are necessary, so that science does not show that the existence of the Moon is mind-independent, is a pathetic counter. It is, in fact, what has been called Berkeley's "master argument", and also, a variant on what David Stove has called, "the worst argument in the world". I dwell on this because I want to point out that from the fact that arguments can be thought up to defend a theory is no reason to think that the theory is irrefutable.

There seems to be an underlying assumption that because Berkeley had, built into his theory, internal defenses which could be trotted out to insulate his theory from what would normally be refutations, that those internal defenses are enough to counter those refutations. So that, for example, because in Berkeley's view the fact that Johnson's foot does not pass through the stone, but encounters the stone, does not show that the stone is (indeed) a material object, that is enough to show that Johnson's demonstation did not refute B's contention that the stone was not a material object, and that Johnson was naive, or failed to understand, and so on. But why should we accept the view that because Berkeley can trot out defenses already implicit in his theory, that he has thus immunized his theory from criticism, let alone. refutation. Are we to suppose that these internal defenses cannot, themselves be criticized?

That just because, for instance, Berkeley argues that it has not been shown that the Moon in independent because in order to show it, we have to conceive of the Moon, thereby making the Moon mind-dependent, we have to whimper away having had our counter itself countered? Of course not. The mere fact that Berkeley is able to trot out a defense is no reason to think that his defense is successful. His theory is vulnerable not only internally, but also externally. That science shows that the Moon predated consciousness simply trumps any defense Berkeley can trot out (although Berkeley can, and does trot out an instrumentalist theory of science to counter this attack on his theory, which, by the way, is not implicit in his theory).

The central point is this: that Berkeley can defend his view from criticism does not, in the least, show that his defense is successful, nor that the criticism is the result of a misunderstanding of Berkeley.

Kicking the stone by itself, does not refute Berkeley, since it still has to be explained why it refutes Berkeley, but it is a good start, and seems to me exactly the way to go.

By "metaphysical refutation" I mean a refutation of a metaphysical position. What qualifies as a refutation depends upon what is being refuted, which is an obvious truism. To prove that a particular triangle does not have interior angles adding up more than 180 degrees need not be the same as a proof about all triangles. Likewise, a proof about triangles in mathematics is likely to be quite a bit different from a proof about some material object that is roughly triangular shaped. With a material object, I am likely to get out a measuring device and measure various aspects of the object and let that suffice as my proof, which is obviously quite a bit different from what one does in a geometry class.





In Berkeley's case, the fact that "things" may predate humanity is no proof that they are "material". God, according to Berkeley, perceives things from eternity. It may be worth quoting a limerick by Ronald Knox, with an anonymous limerick response:
[INDENT][INDENT]There was a young man who said "God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the quad."

"Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God."[/INDENT][/INDENT]George Berkeley - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia





I never said that Berkeley's position is irrefutable. Indeed, if I believed that, I would not agree with Hume; I would then agree with Berkeley.





How do you derive such ideas from what I have stated? Of course Berkeley can be criticized! But kicking a stone is not a refutation of his claim. And understanding Berkeley entails knowing that. That is the totality of the point of my responses. I have NEVER said that he could not be refuted, nor have I said that he ought to be believed for a moment.





I don't think he can really defend his theory from certain kinds of criticisms, but that is another matter. Since Berkeley's theory is not a scientific theory, a scientific sort of refutation would be out of place. By that I mean that one does not perform an experiment in a lab to decide whether Berkeley's ideas are correct or not, and, indeed, attempting to prove or disprove his ideas in such a manner shows a misunderstanding of what it is he is claiming. He is not claiming anything about what science claims.





Okay, we at least agree in part. Kicking the stone does not by itself refute Berkeley. But since that is what Johnson appeared to think, we now seem to agree that Johnson did not refute Berkeley, and gets us a step closer to agreeing that he did not understand Berkeley if he thought that it did refute him.

I, however, do not think it is the right place to start. But rather than leave you in suspense, I will give a brief idea of what I think of Berkeley's theory, which is something that one might guess from what I have said so far:
[INDENT][INDENT]Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[/INDENT][/INDENT]