In fact, that confusion is the foundation of Idealism. It is the confusion of metaphysics with epistemology.

Consider it as follows: it is not an 'imaginary' stone in the sense of an object that only appears to be there, like a holographic projection, that is kicked with an imaginary foot. I can understand why one would imagine that, but that is not the argument. The argument is that when we kick the stone, we experience the sensation of kicking, and the sensation of the stone moving. We don't experience anything other than these sensations. Without sensations we can't be said to have perceived anything. So do we have two things? The stone and the sensation of the stone? Actually, we don't. Whenever we have contact with the stone, whether visual or tactile, what we have is the sensation of the stone.

Now is there a stone apart from the sensation? You always insist there is, but where is the stone? Why, there is it! And when you gesture towards it, and I look at it, I experience the visual sensation of seeing the stone, as we both do. It is no stone without sensation, and no sensation without stone.

Phil: We agree, then, that sensible things include only things that are immediately perceived by sense. Now tell me whether we immediately perceive:

• by sight anything besides light, colours, and shapes;
  
• by hearing anything but sounds;
  
• by the palate anything besides tastes;
  
• by the sense of smell anything besides odours;
  
• by touch anything more than tangible qualities.
  

Hyl: We do not.
Phil: So it seems that if you take away all sensible qualities there is nothing left that is sensible.
Hyl: I agree.
Phil: Sensible things, then, are nothing but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities.

Berkeley's intelligence (or lack of it) is not relevant to what he believed. He attacks materialism over and over again, and, it is his view, materialism is an illusion wrought by the Devil to conceal God from people, since when it is realized that materialism is false, and immaterialism is true, it will be clear that since the world is spiritual, and nothing material can be the cause of what is spiritual, only God could be the cause of the world. So, the immaterialism of the world is Berkeley's argument for God.

Berkeley never held that material objects exist only as ideas in the mind I(whatever that might mean).
Berkeley held that there were no material objects.
There were physical objects, chairs, stones, stars, but their esse was percipi, (their existence was to be perceived).
Like all other Idealists, Berkeley confused what something is, with how it is known.
In fact, that confusion is the foundation of Idealism. It is the confusion of metaphysics with epistemology.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion.
That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.
The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.

24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind.
To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all.
And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction.
It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction.
This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

The question is, then, how do you separate the sensation from the stone? When you have the sensation of seeing the stone, is the stone one thing, and the sensation another? If you say yes, then what is 'the stone' in the absence of any sensation of it? And what is the sensation of it, the absence of any object?

From the First Dialog:


(This translation taken from Early Modern Texts - Philosophers and Philosophy Topics)

---------- Post added 03-13-2010 at 06:43 PM ----------

I don't think it is a 'leap of faith'. On the contrary, the leap of faith is that required by the assumption that there is a thing, other than that which is perceived, isn't it?

But how I know I am dreaming is an entirely different issue from the point I made that when I am dreaming, what I am dreaming is happening is not happening. I agree that there is the problem of whether we can know whether we are dreaming (although I don't think it is a serious problem) but the fact remains that dreams are not reality, and that when I am dreaming I am in India, I am at home in the United States.

When you are in bed having a dream in your sleep about riding an elephant in India, you are actually at home in the United States, but that reality too is of the nature of a dream and it is one from which you have no alternative waking state.

Samm

I examined my passport closely, but there was no stamp that indicated that I had been to India, so you must be wrong. Unless, of course, I got in illegally. And how would I have got there? I really don't recall taking a long plane journey.

If reality were a dream, then what would a dream be? (If all money was counterfeit, then what would counterfeit money be?)

It's not that I am wrong but that you are unwilling to see anything beyond your own presumptions. You are a sorry excuse for a philosopher if you cannot see the opinions of others for the blinding glare of your own opinions. I give up on you, and will hereafter consider you an obstruction to meaningful discourse. Have fun with your sophistry.

Samm

But have you a reply to my question, if reality is a dream, then what is a (real) dream? I guess not. I see the opinions of others (how can I help it). But they are wrong. In the meantime, why not answer my question, just for sport?

Reality has the nature of a dream insofar as it is internal, it is in the mind. If you want to think of it as a dream, think of it as God's dream; for Berkeley said that reality was created and maintained in the mind of God as an idea of an external world shared by all the mortal and finite minds of men. Our own bodies are part of that idea (or dream?) in the mind of God. Material existence is an illusion created by our participation in the universe envisioned in the mind of God and reflected in our own sensations. Real dreams are nothing more than they seem to us. We might say they are proof that we are made in the image of God. Or we might not. Especially if we don't believe in God. But of course, Berkeley was a Bishop. His philosophy only says that God's creation of the world (universe) and man is a mental process and that the reality God creates is a reality of idea, a reality of images in the mind. Now do me a favor and quit clinging to Johnson's silly argument. You must know that Johnson was wrong and that there are much better arguments for an external reality that is not an idea in the mind of God. Either way I have answered your question and need have no more to do with your sophistry.

Samm

The courtyard is littered with stones, and although not much progress made, at least one long-held secret has been revealed.

KENNETHAMY IS JOHNSON!

And, as far as he is concerned, Berkeley is thoroughly refuted.

So let's move on.:bigsmile:

Thanks Kennethamy- I get the drift. I will award you a technical victory in the matter of identifying a valid syllogism. I really must go to the tip now so goodbye.

The courtyard is littered with stones, and although not much progress made, at least one long-held secret has been revealed.
KENNETHAMY IS JOHNSON!
And, as far as he is concerned, Berkeley is thoroughly refuted.
So let's move on.:bigsmile:

I agree with the above.

Two dimensional 2D JOHNSON could not understand 3D Berkeley.
A refutation based on 2D can never ever refutes a 3D theory.
2D JOHNSON's refutation was a strawman
2D KENNETHAMY IS 2DJOHNSON!

I'll ask the question one more time. If all of reality is a dream, then what are we doing when we are (really) dreaming? Dreaming the dream that is reality?

There seems to be a bit of denseness here.

When we state that the cup is half-empty and half-full at the same time, there is an obvious contradiction if we look at it from the logical perspective.
But it is true if we qualify which perspective we are using in seeing the half-emptiness and half-fullness.

Truth is based on how we define the rules and play the language games re Wittgenstein.

Similarly when we state that all of reality is a dream, this contradiction can be reconciled by referring to the rules adopted for the language games.
In the common sense perspective, a dream is a dream, reality is reality and they can never the the same.

With reference to the language games of Berkeley, common sense reality and dream are on the same continuum.
Common sense reality has stronger 'signals' while dreams has weaker ones.

With reference to the language games of general neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience, reality, dreams and hallucinations are also on a continuum and operate by one main core operation.
What we termed as common sense external reality has more additional special features that enable a higher degree of actuality.

In this sense, all of reality are dreams or even hallucinations.
Howeer, such a sentence should not be taken too literally, but in a philosophical forum we should understand that it is meant to highlight there is a greater meaning to some issue other than from the common sense perspective.