@kennethamy,
kennethamy;137071 wrote:... (I thought that Pyrrho's quote from Stove was supposed to show that Johnson did misunderstand Berkeley, by the way).
No, it was to show that what I am saying is very much in accordance with what Stove is saying. Stove agreeing with me does not show that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley. I was, however, hoping that you would think about the matter a little more carefully because of your respect for Stove, but it has not turned out as I had hoped.
kennethamy;137020 wrote:But was their trouble that they were ignorant of, or that they denied, some empirical facts or other, of which we are apprised? (Stove)
The problem here is how we should understand "empirical facts". When G.E. Moore displayed his hands in that famous lecture at the British Academy, and said, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand" and explained that he was displaying objects in the external world and thus refuting Kant's complaint that no one has proved the existence of "external objects" was Moore too simply misunderstanding Berkeley? We could ask what, if what Johnson and Moore did, was to misinterpret Berkeley, then what could they have done that would have correctly interpreted Berkeley? Anything? That Berkeley already knew that Johnson could do what he did, and was not fazed by it, does not seem to me a good argument for the conclusion that he should not have been fazed by it.
It is true enough that not being fazed by something is not proof that one ought not be fazed by something, but the fact is, Berkeley was not fazed by such things and trying to persuade him, or anyone who agreed with him, would have to involve something that would faze him. A proof that uses premises that are in dispute is a fairly useless proof, and in this case, the premises (if we wish to pretend that his action is really an argument) which are evidently intended, essentially beg the question at issue. If you are going to argue with Berkeley or one who agrees with him, it is pointless and absurd to use arguments with premises that are such that the person would not accept them. I might as well "prove" to everyone online that I am sitting on a wooden chair by pointing at it. It does not prove it to you or anyone online who had any inclination to not take my word for the matter.
Since I am not succeeding in the current approach, let me start asking the questions. What, exactly, is Johnson supposed to be accomplishing by his action? Who is he going to be convincing? Please do not now tell me that there is a difference between a proof and convincing someone, as I am well aware of that. But what, exactly, did Johnson accomplish?
kennethamy;137020 wrote: It is, of course, never impossible to make your view impervious to refutation "come what may" by making enough assumptions to fend off the evidence. But that fact does not show that you have shown your position has not been refuted. It shows more about the capacity for a philosopher to be caught in the grip of a theory, than that he is able to defend his theory successfully. The anthropologist, Evans-Pritchard, who lived among the Azande in Africa pointed out how they believed that disease was caused by witches, and had ready, and ingenious explanations for the empirical objections to their theory, so that when Evans-Pritchard immersed himself in their theory, he nearly got rid of his doubts about it. It is always open for anyone to argue, "You did not refute me, you just misunderstood me", and argue for it. That is why Moore's proof was constantly criticized as having begged the question.
Suppose instead of Berkeley, we were talking about whether or not we were brains in vats. Do you imagine that kicking a stone would disprove such an idea? Why or why not?
If you say, by kicking a stone, he
really is kicking a stone rather than simply appearing to kick a stone, my question is, how is one to tell the difference between those two ideas? That they are different I will not presently dispute; but it is necessary that we can tell a difference in order for Johnson's "proof" to be of any use.
Perhaps telling you a story will help illustrate the problem with what Johnson did. I have seen a magician do the trick of "turning water into wine", by pouring the water from one vessel into another (just as it is described in the Bible as Jesus' first miracle, by the way). There was water in the first vessel, but after it was poured into the second vessel, what was poured out of the second vessel was wine. Now, did he
prove that he could really turn water into wine? If you say no (with which I will obviously agree), how is this really different from what Johnson did? That Johnson did something, in some sense of the words "did something", Berkeley need not dispute. The question is, did he really do what he professed to do, or was it merely a Berkelian illusion? His action does not show or prove which is really occurring, just as my magician example does not show whether he was really turning water into wine, or simply created the appearance of doing so. In order for Johnson's proof to be a proof, it must be that he shows that he is not merely appearing to be kicking a stone, but really is kicking a stone (in a materialist sense of the expression). Otherwise, his proof is no better than the magician's proof that he can turn water into wine (which, of course, the magician did not call a "proof", as he knew better, unlike Johnson).
Edited to add:
Imagine, after the magician performed the trick of turning water into wine, that someone were to wonder whether or not the magician
really turned water into wine. Then suppose that the magician says,
okay, I will prove it, and performs the trick again. The magician, in such a case, is either missing the point of what is being suggested, or is simply a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. The issue is whether or not the
appearance matches up with the
reality. So showing another appearance of the same thing without anything else done is irrelevant and beside the point. Likewise, with Berkeley and Johnson. Johnson is like the magician. Berkeley has already seen the appearance, and is suggesting that it might really be a trick. Johnson simply performs the trick again, and pretends that that proves something about the reality. So either Johnson has missed the point, or he is a charlatan who is trying to pull a fast one. I have suggested that it is his understanding that is at fault rather than his integrity, though I have no argument against supposing instead that he was simply a charlatan trying to pull a fast one.
Of course,
maybe (in some sense of the word) the magician is really turning water into wine, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more. Likewise, maybe Johnson is really kicking a material stone, but simply performing the trick again does not establish that, which would take something more.