Anyway, off the point. I only had one comment I wanted to have criticized here. I think esse means 'to be', and 'to be' does not mean the same as 'to exist'. It is true that I can say that 'I exist' and 'I am', however I think the two terms mean different things. 'My existence' refers to my being in the world, the external facts of my person, etc. 'My being' is the ground in which these inhere. I suppose I am veering off into some kind of existentialism here.

But as a result, I think there is a difference between the ideas 'to be is to be perceived' and 'something only exists if it is perceived'. The role of mind is pivotal, once again. It is within the mind that the nature of existence is realized, or made real. This does not say outside the human mind, or a mind, that nothing exists. I think it is to say, that outside mind, nothing either exists or does not exist. But I know that is not going to stand up, on face value. I certainly have much more reading to do.

Ayway I acknowledge this has not much to do with Berkeley. I now understand - thanks to all - the limitations of Berkeley's view. I don't think his view is without some truth, or without merit, but at the same time, I also don't believe it provides a complete philosophical outlook. At best it is a statement that says 'in an important sense, esse est percipe' - and then proceeds to try and create an entire worldview on this basis.

whatever. Again, this charge is empty. If you think people have a strawmanned Berkeley, then show it. I don't believe you at all.

haha! No. The empricial sciences can only reveal a posteriori truth because they are empirical sciences. All philosophy (including Kant's Transcendental Analytic) yields a priori necessary truths because it is a non-empirical enterprise. sheesh...you are in desperate need of a philosophical dictionary.

Sure, this would be valuable in its own right. But this isn't a philosophical project. This is a scientific one. You will get results about empirical condtioning, cognitive functioning, and derive empirical theories about memory access, cognitive report, and control, and perhaps some results about psychological behavior too. But science cannot reveal normative rules about the a priori logical and metaphysical principles governing all sense-experience--which is precisely what a Transcendental Project seeks to uncover. At most, these sciences will reveal empirically-conditioned neural patterns about emprically testable cognitive behavior. It will not reveal normative logical and metaphysical principles because whatever empirical theory you happen to derive scientifically will actually presuppose these logical and metaphysical principles themselves by which these theories are derived. So these principles are presupposed in all experience itself, not derivable from all experience. This is exactly what is so Unique about Kant's Transcendental project. He wants to uncover what it is that makes experience normatively, logically, and metaphyiscally possible--not merely empirically possible: which is all that scientific research will unconver.

Are you now a student at a university? If you are, you should know that online peer-reviewed journals will not let download articles, print them, or read them unless you are affiliated with an actual university--otherwise you will have to pay at around 20 to 40 bucks for each article.
Most of the contemporary groundbreaking work in philosophy, and in every other academic discpline for that matter, is published in these peer-reviewed journals and not in actual books (although some are). So your online access to these journals will be severely limited unless you are enrolled in a university or are willing to pay high bucks for these articles.

"Didn't go further" with respect to what??

Oh yeah? And how so? Can you explain why you think this? or are you just claiming to know something you actually don't again?

Remember, Berkeley starts out his arguments with what he calls a very "common sense" princple but then derives (albeit invalidly) a very counterintuitive conclusion. And Moore approached the topic of skepticism, just like everyone seems to be approaching Berkeley's argument here. Moore used the "your modens ponens is my modus tollens" reply to the skeptic. Like here:

Skeptic says:

If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
Therefore, I do not know that I have hands.

Moore says:

If i do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
But I do know that I have hands.
Therefore, I do know that I am not a brain in a vat.

So which premise is more plausible than the other? That I know that I have hands? Or that I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat?
Philosophers will answer differently.

I would respond similarly to Berkeley about Idealism if I were to take this approach.

670 PHILONOUS. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?


682 PHILONOUS. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them.
To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses.
These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.
A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of.
It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects.
I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot.

.I had provided other arguments how Johnson misunderstood Berkeley. If Johnson had read and understood Berkeley, he would not have kicked the stone because Berkeley acknowledge the externality of the stone.

.From the above, Berkeley clearly stated that he believed in the common sense.

.To refute Berkeley point that the rock exists internally in mind as ideas and sensation (a strawman), Johnson kicked a rock to demonstrate it is external to his mind. thus it is moot for Johnson to rely on common sense itself to prove otherwise

I don't see any reference to "externality" here. If the stone is just an idea, how can the stone exist externally in space anyway? Ideas cannot be extended in space because they are not spatial-temporal kinds of things. You just mean to say that ideas cannot exist independently from the mind. Independence and externality are not the same thing. The former expresses the condition of something not existing contingently on something else, the latter expresses spatial extension.


The "common sense," here, is only expressed in the intuitively obvious truth that,

Real sensible things are immediately perceived.

The non-common-sense and intuitively false conclusion is,

Real sensible things are Ideas.


Not it isn't. Johnson tried to demonstrate the conclusion that "Real sensible things are material substances" is more likely true than Berkeley's conclusion that "Real sensible things are Ideas." This is why Berkeley's deriving a totally counterintuitive conclusion from a very commonsense principle should make anyone immediately suspicious that something has gone terribly wrong in Berkeley's argument! Berkeley has no more priviledge over the demonstration in offering evidence for his conclusion than Johnson has in offering evidence for his.

For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action,
did not objects affecting our senses
partly of themselves produce representations,
partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations,
and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience?

There is a problem with Moore's version, you see. The hands that you know you have are the same hands that the brain in a vat would know that he had.You do not know that you have hands beyond those of your experience because, well, you might be a brain in a vat.

Nor does it logically follow from your first premise, in both of these syllogisms, that a certain knowledge that you are not a brain in a vat would entail a consequent certain knowledge that you have hands.

My opinion is that Berkeley argued that feet and stones are not material, but he never argued, nor was it his intent to imply, that being non-material realities, they must also necessarily be insubstantial realities. In this case, I do not understand how

Johnson's action of kicking a stone can in any way refute Berkeley's argument that reality is not fundamentally material in nature.

He was just trying to show that Berkeley has no more reason to suppose the stone is not material than that the stone is material. And Johnson was right.

I don't think this is true, but as it is a completely different argument to the main one I will pursue it elsewhere.

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 11:55 AM ----------

.[/QUOTE]

Knowing is intrinsic to 'being' and extrinsic to 'existing'

No idea what that means. (I hope you did not expect that I would).

Some philosophers, famously Meinong, distinguished between existence and "subsistence", but held that both what exists and subsists (like The Golden Mountain) are. It was Meinong whom Russell accused of lacking a robust sense of reality.

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 10:56 AM ----------

ACB;143959 wrote:

If he had understood him, Johnson could have said something like: "There is no good reason to doubt the common-sense view that (2) is true". He had no need to prove (1), as no-one ever doubted it.

Johnson could very well have said, "and that is why there is no good reason to doubt commonsense", just after he kicked the stone.

Berkeley stated that he was standing on the stone.
If that is not "externality" what else is it?

It is implied that he was standing on a stone that was external to his leg, body, brain and mind within a common sense perspective.

The consequence and effect, imo, is no difference from what Kant described, except Berkeley was not that detailed.

I think you did not understand what Hylas understand by real thing or real stone.

To Berkeley, the real stone is that empirical stone that he was standing on.

To Hylas, the real stone is the stone-in-itself comprising of matter and substance which are independent of the mind.

Hylas's real stone-in-itsef is non-existence which Berkerley was attempting to refute.

I agree that Berkeley has no more reason (indeed, he has less reason) to suppose the stone is not material than that it is material. I think it is reasonable to believe (as Johnson did) that stones and other solid-looking objects are material. But that is not the point.

There are two propositions involved:
1. This stone is solid.
2. What is solid is material.

Kicking a stone provides evidence for (1), but how can it possibly provide evidence for (2)? I think (2) is true, because it accords with common sense, but kicking a stone does not make it any likelier than it was before. That is the essential point; Johnson did not refute Berkeley "thus" (i.e. by kicking the stone). But he thought he did. Therefore, he misunderstood Berkeley.

If he had understood him, Johnson could have said something like: "There is no good reason to doubt the common-sense view that (2) is true". He had no need to prove (1), as no-one ever doubted it.

I agree that Berkeley has no more reason (indeed, he has less reason) to suppose the stone is not material than that it is material. I think it is reasonable to believe (as Johnson did) that stones and other solid-looking objects are material. But that is not the point.

There are two propositions involved:
1. This stone is solid.
2. What is solid is material.

Kicking a stone provides evidence for (1), but how can it possibly provide evidence for (2)? I think (2) is true, because it accords with common sense, but kicking a stone does not make it any likelier than it was before. That is the essential point; Johnson did not refute Berkeley "thus" (i.e. by kicking the stone). But he thought he did. Therefore, he misunderstood Berkeley.

If he had understood him, Johnson could have said something like: "There is no good reason to doubt the common-sense view that (2) is true". He had no need to prove (1), as no-one ever doubted it.

Now, Berkeley does not take this step. He simply says that all we can know of reality is ideas in the mind, therefore let us presume only that reality itself is nothing more than ideas in the mind. This in itself is good philosophy, is it not? And in this sense, it is we who argue for an external and/or material reality who are supposing something that is not immediately evident from the information of our senses.

Samm

Extrain said:
"Skeptic says:

If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
Therefore, I do not know that I have hands.

Moore says:

If i do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
But I do know that I have hands.
Therefore, I do know that I am not a brain in a vat.

So which premise is more plausible than the other? That I know that I have hands? Or that I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat?"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Your first premise for both of these syllogisms is "If not A then not B." The skeptic then goes on to say, "Not A, therefore not B." This merely repeats the conditional premise as a conclusion. Moore however goes on to say "B, therefore A." I am pointing out to you that the inverse ("If A then B.") of your opening premise is not supported. Nor is your conclusion that "if B then A." In other words, Moore's logic is very faulty.

My most immediate challenge is this. How does Moore come to the conclusion: "But I do know that I have hands."??? How does he know that he has hands? Because he can see them? Then the initial premise is wrong, because even the brain in the vat can see hands and feet and clouds in the sky and fish in the sea. The hands that are experienced are the same whether the subject is as experienced or is a brain in a vat. How does Moore claim to know that he has hands other than those of his experience?

Samm

Extrain said:
"Skeptic says:

If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
Therefore, I do not know that I have hands.

Moore says:

If i do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have hands.
But I do know that I have hands.
Therefore, I do know that I am not a brain in a vat.

So which premise is more plausible than the other? That I know that I have hands? Or that I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat?"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Your first premise for both of these syllogisms is "If not A then not B." The skeptic then goes on to say, "Not A, therefore not B." This merely repeats the conditional premise as a conclusion. Moore however goes on to say "B, therefore A." I am pointing out to you that the inverse ("If A then B.") of your opening premise is not supported. Nor is your conclusion that "if B then A." In other words, Moore's logic is very faulty.

My most immediate challenge is this. How does Moore come to the conclusion: "But I do know that I have hands."??? How does he know that he has hands? Because he can see them?

Then the initial premise is wrong,

because even the brain in the vat can see hands and feet and clouds in the sky and fish in the sea. The hands that are experienced are the same whether the subject is as experienced or is a brain in a vat.

How does Moore claim to know that he has hands other than those of his experience?

The question is not how Moore knows he has hands. The question is whether Moore knows he has hands. Moore thought is was far more probable that we know we have hands than that we do not know we are BIV. So do I. How Moore knows he has hand is a very different issue.

Wait. Isn't the actual question:

What makes the skeptic think it is more likely that we don't know that we are not BIV's than that we do know that we have hands?

The question is not how Moore knows he has hands. The question is whether Moore knows he has hands. Moore thought is was far more probable that we know we have hands than that we do not know we are BIV. So do I. How Moore knows he has hand is a very different issue.

No, you're still not understanding what's going on here.

First, "If A then B" is not logically equivalent to the converse "If B then A." So you are totally inventing a new premise NO ONE holds here--neither Moore, nor the Skeptic.

Second, the skeptic argument just IS the argument above. Moore is not proposing it, the skeptics are. Moore is just responding to their argument by turning it in to a modus tollens rather than a modus ponens argument. So the structure of the argument is the same for both the skeptic and Moorean-type of non-skeptic. Some non-skeptics deny the truth of the first premise altogether, Moore doesn't. But just about all skeptics will maintain the first premise--because that's the only way they can make a case.

Moore is trying to show the skeptic argument is no more plausible than than his own by adopting the skeptic's own premise. So essentially, Moore is trying to show the skeptic up in the skeptic's own territory.



Yes, that's how Moore does it. So he is shifting the burden of proof onto YOU. That's how the strategy WORKS. So the question for the skeptic is: what makes you think you do NOT know that you are NOT a brain in a vat? The burden of proof is on YOU no less than Moore.


No it's not, because you got the wrong premise. Please pay attention to what's being claimed here. The skeptic makes the claim that,

If I do not know then I am not a BIV, then I do not know that I have hands.

Moore agrees completely. But then Moore claims: I know I do have hands. That's his evidence. Therefore, he knows that he is not a BIV.



Again, you are missing the point. Moore has already given you his answer. Whether or not his evidence is satisfactory is not the point. So the burden is now on you. The question for you is:

How do you know that you don't know that you are not a BIV?

Can you answer this? If you can't, then Moore has the upper hand because he has evidence to support his premise (however basic), while you are still lacking support for this premise altogether. So the burden switches to the skeptic. See how this works?



...because it is immediately self-evident in his experience. But how he knows this is not question. The question is whether Moore knows it...and whether this is more probable than that we do not know that we are not BIV's.
---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 11:14 AM ----------



Wait. Isn't the actual question:

What makes the skeptic think it is more likely that we don't know that we are not BIV's than that we do know that we have hands?

That, I think, is still a different issue. The present is is the truth (plausibility) of the premises.

Let me be brief, Extrain.

Oh, puh - leeeaze!!!

Go dream your dreams and believe that your beliefs are beyond challenge. You're as intransigent as anyone here, and that says a lot.

I won't be bothered with you any more.

Samm

Rather, the skeptic is claiming you do not know that you are not a BIV

But separating (1) and (2) as if they were completely distinct propositions is an arbitrarily stipulated distinction that is invented to work on behalf of Berkelians. The reason is that the commonsense view is that the following statement is analytic, and hence, necessarily true.

(3) All solid objects are material.

So when I kick the rock, I am demonstrating that all solid objects are material. Hence, it is an argument against Berkeley who denies the truth of (3).