Did Samuel Johnson misunderstand George Berkeley?

Get Email Updates Email this Topic Print this Page

Humanity
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 09:05 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;143331 wrote:
And I've already addressed this numerous times. Berkeley tells us how to distinguish error form veracity, but he doesn't tell us what error consists in.

Take the allegedly illusory perception of a stick appearing broken in a glass of water. The big question is this: why is the perception of a stick being broken in water an erroneous perception in the first place if no such material stick exists??? Berkeley has NO answer to this question--which is a good enough reason to reject his view.

Moreover, if some of my ideas are erroneous, then God is implanting erroneous ideas in my mind such as the perception of a stick being broken in a glass of water. And this makes God a deceiver. I find that very implausible.
Bold=mine.

Meaning that if he had an answer to the above, you would accept his view.
I mentioned it before, that Berkeley did account for 'error' in his theories.
Here is another where it is directed at the same point you raised above.

715 HYLAS. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

716 PHILONOUS. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions.
Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right.
But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the
same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken.
In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken.
But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.
The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system.
We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.


Btw, the above is just evidence to point out that Berkeley did cater for 'error' in his scheme of ideas.
The above is for your reference, i am not prepared to argue the point in detail, as you had misunderstood Berkeley ideas right from the beginning and have a narrow understanding of what is 'perception' in Berkeley's perspective.

---------- Post added 03-24-2010 at 10:28 PM ----------

Ahab;143358 wrote:
There are philosophers who have studied and taught Kant for years who would disagree strongly with that view.

You might want to check out Arthur Collin's "Possible Experience" for an alternate view of the matter.
OK, had a glance Arthur Collin's "Possible Experience" and noted there are opposing views, but who is to decide what is final.

From my reading of Berkeley and Kant, i inferred that both share the same core ideas.
To both the sensible and experience is central to their core beliefs.

It is just like both Kant and Berkeley had experienced instances of human orgasms and they are describing the same thing in different ways.
Berkeley thought it was a gift from god via our minds, while Kant thought it was endowed from some pre-existing handed down and embedded experience called categories.

It is from hindsight and with modern knowledge that i am confident, both Berkeley and Kant are describing the same reality as what it should be from the perspective and they are quite right about it.
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 09:31 pm
@kennethamy,
[QUOTE=Extrain;143331] You will also be incapable of telling us whether you think the world is fully material, fully mental, or partly material and mental, or none of the above. [/QUOTE] Quite the contrary, The world as we discussed has both mental and material properties and these properties are really just different manifestations of some more fundamental reality which itself consists of events or process. (process philosophy in a nutshell).

[QUOTE=Extrain;143331] So what? This doesn't undermine the philosophical distinctions made here. Only philosophers crazy enough as Berkeley adopt Idealism, a full-blown absolute position contrary to most mankind. So what's your point? [/QUOTE] Einstein once said if you can not explain your idea so an intelligent 5 yr old can understand it then you do not understand it. (or something to that effect).

My point is that more clarity results from directly discussing concepts like matter and mind and the relationship between them: than from a lot of the terminology that gets thrown around in "philosophy circles". Of course all specialized areas of knowledge do this, create their own language and terms which are generally difficult for outsiders to understand. In general it is better to say what you mean, with clarity, in terms that even those lacking your formal education and specialized terminology in the area might understand especially in an all comers philosophy forum such as this.

In my opinion, which you do not have to share (although our worldviews seem quite similar and we should be able to communicate) terms like realism , antirealism, objectivism, idealism and materialism get thrown around a lot, but are used in different ways by different people even in philosophy writings, and thus lack the precision necessary for effective communication. I readily admit I am not as familiar with philosophical writings or philosophical terminology as some others on the forum but generally I recognize clarity of thought when I see it and have been shown to be capable of understanding the basic nature of most ideas when they are well presented even if I do not agree with them.

I am a process philosophy (A.N.W), panentheist, process theology (Hartshorne) and a panpsychist advocate. Where that puts me with respect to all the other terminology I do not know. I suppose for those unfamiliar with those concepts that would not be very clarifying but I am happy to elaborate rather than tell someone to read the works of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne and David Skirbina and then get back to me.

I keep presenting the dependency of Berkeley's idealism on Berkeley's notion of the infinite mind of god, and the dependency of all forms of idealism on some form of the transcendent because others keep forgetting, ignoring or denying it. I do not think any full blown atheist, agnostic or materialist can accept any extensive or transcendent form of idealism. In fact such a notion probably strikes them as "silly", "irrational", or my favorite "unrealistic".
 
Humanity
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 09:36 pm
@prothero,
prothero;143368 wrote:
I am a process philosophy (A.N.W), panentheist, process theology (Hartshorne) and a panpsychist advocate.
I am agreeable with process philosophy not the others. Note Heraclitus as well.
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 09:55 pm
@Humanity,
Humanity;143369 wrote:
I am agreeable with process philosophy not the others. Note Heraclitus as well.
Well not to totally derail the thread but process philosophy entails a certain monism to mind/matter and thus a certain degree of panpsychism. The theological implications of process theology are less essential to the general notion of process as primary reality and creativity as ultimate principle. My form of process philosophy is pretty much straight Alfred North Whitehead (talk about difficult reading).
 
Humanity
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 10:15 pm
@prothero,
prothero;143373 wrote:
Well not to totally derail the thread but process philosophy entails a certain monism to mind/matter and thus a certain degree of panpsychism. The theological implications of process theology are less essential to the general notion of process as primary reality and creativity as ultimate principle. My form of process philosophy is pretty much straight Alfred North Whitehead (talk about difficult reading).
Just like what i did with Berkeley, i would not have any problem taking out the theistic elements.

I agree with Kant that theistic concepts (a necessity for many) arose out of abuses of pure reason.
I can live without these theistic concepts and i do not condemn those who need it.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 24 Mar, 2010 10:25 pm
@ACB,
ACB;143270 wrote:
From post #364:


So the fact that a stone is solid (as shown by kicking it) does not prove that it is material. Hence Johnson did not refute Berkeley "thus". QED.

---------- Post added 03-24-2010 at 10:46 PM ----------





If you assert that all dogs are brown, and I reply to you that what you assert is unlikely, since there is really no good reason all dogs should be brown or be all any color, I could be said to have refuted you even if I have not shown you a non-brown dog. "Refute" need not mean, "prove not". It may mean only, "show it is very implausible".
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 12:18 am
@kennethamy,
Pyrrho wrote:
You evidently do not get the point of the magician example. Johnson did not prove that he kicked a material object, or even that there was a material object to be kicked. In order to refute Berkeley, he needs to do that. Kicking a stone proves nothing, just like my magician example does not prove that he can turn water into wine, even if he really has that ability. You do agree, don't you, that if you saw a magic act, you would not simply believe the appearance was real, right? But suppose it was real. It being real would not prove it is real, and that is the point; that is why kicking a stone, material or otherwise, is insufficient to prove anything about what Berkeley was saying.


But we often prove things by doing things. For instance, I can prove to you that the brakes on my car stop my car, by, of course, pressing on the brakes. Or do you not think my pressing on the brakes proves that the brakes stop my car?

With your magician example, if the magician repeatedly turned water into wine, I am not sure why that would not be proof that he could turn water into wine. What would the magician have to do in order to prove he could turn water into wine?

With this sort of logic, I am not sure how we could prove anything. Don't we often go by empirical evidence?
 
SammDickens
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 01:08 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;143379 wrote:
If you assert that all dogs are brown, and I reply to you that what you assert is unlikely, since there is really no good reason all dogs should be brown or be all any color, I could be said to have refuted you even if I have not shown you a non-brown dog. "Refute" need not mean, "prove not". It may mean only, "show it is very implausible".

That makes absolutely no sense as a response to ACB's post to which you appear to have been responding. WHat on earth are you trying to say???

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 02:24 AM ----------

Zetherin;143421 wrote:
But we often prove things by doing things. For instance, I can prove to you that the brakes on my car stop my car, by, of course, pressing on the brakes. Or do you not think my pressing on the brakes proves that the brakes stop my car?

With your magician example, if the magician repeatedly turned water into wine, I am not sure why that would not be proof that he could turn water into wine. What would the magician have to do in order to prove he could turn water into wine?

With this sort of logic, I am not sure how we could prove anything. Don't we often go by empirical evidence?

But in this case, the point to be proven, continuing your analogy, is not that the brakes on your car work. It is whether your brakes are made by Delco or by Baysmark. Pressing on your brakes will not answer this question, although some here seem to think only Delco brakes will work while no others will. Were that true, then pressing the brakes and having them fail would likely prove that your brakes were not Delco. But of course, brakes that do not work are not made because they cannot be sold. So it is unlikely that pressing the brakes will prove anything except that whatever kind of brakes you have either do or don't work when pressed.

As to the magician, his brakes are working just fine thank you.

Samm
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 01:27 am
@Humanity,
Humanity,
One of the most well-known Scholars of Kan'ts Critique is Robert Hanna from whom I took a graduate course last semester which was devoted to studying this entire work. You can find Hanna's own entries here in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/

Also check out Kant and Foundations of Analytic Philosophy by Hanna (2002). Your interpretation of Kant is completely incorrect.

Humanity;143345 wrote:
I have read Kant's CoPR very thoroughly except for the last few chapters.


Then you obviously missed the following crucial sections in the Critique where Kant explicitly is taking on the refutation of two types of Idealism:
The Skeptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes who merely doubts the existence of the external world, and what Kant calls "the Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism of Berkeley" which says
(a) matter is impossible
(b) Idealism applies to all objects
(c) All the proper objects of all human cognition are nothing but ideas.

Kant claims all of (a)-(c) are false here in the section titled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" in the CPR where he takes both Descartes and Berkeley to task both in the A and B editions:

A341-405/B399-432

READ IT AGAIN.

In stark contrast to Berkeley, Kant argues at length that,

(d) Transcendental Idealism says that, not only is the existence of matter possible, but is also a necessary condition of all possible experience whatsoever.
(e) Transcendental Idealism does NOT say all proper objects of human cognition are nothing but ideas (objects existing only within the mind).
(f) And finally, that Transcendental Idealism makes room for Empirical Realism which implies that "necessarily something actually exists outside my concsious states in space." (B274) And if fact, this is the exact conclusion of his refutation of Berkeley's Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism.

Humanity;143345 wrote:
Despite Kant refutation of Berkeley, they both share the same core ideas (other than the absolute existence of God).


No they do not. They are complete opposites. In fact, Robert Hanna says that, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism differs sharply from Berkeley's Metaphysical or Dogmatic Idealism, which says that (a) matter is impossible and (b) that necessarily (x) (x is either an idea in a conscious mind or x is a conscious mind). In this sense, K.'s idealism is also paradoxically the most robust realism imaginable. Indeed, in the B edition he offers an explicit refutation of idealism."

(1) Kant asserts and establishes the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge of the external world; whereas Berkeley (like all empiricists) denies the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.
(2) Kant's Transcendental Idealism says the existence of matter is the necessary condition for the possibility of all sensible experience, whereas Berkeley's Metaphysical Idealism says the exact opposite, namely that, the existence of Matter is necessarily impossible for any sense-experience.

Here is the essence of Kant's actual argument in his own words,

(A) "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" (B 276)
(B) All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception" (B 276)
(C) "That which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. (B225)
(E) "This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside of me" (Bxl)
(E) "But this persisting element cannot be an intution [a sense-perception] in me [contra Berkeley]. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are reperesentations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be deternmined" (CPR Bxxxix n.)
(F) "Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" (B 275-276)
(G) Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination. Therefore, it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination. (B276)
(H) "I.e., the consciousness of my existence is at the same time (zugleich) an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276)

So Berkeley's metaphysical Idealism is false Q.E.D.

(A) through (H) is Hanna's own reconstruction of Kant's argument against Berkeley's Idealism from the text itself--so there is alot more to consider in the text--but that is the gist of it.

Humanity;143345 wrote:
Btw, in the first Edition of the CoPR, Kant agreed with Berkeley completely but changed his mind in the 2nd edition with a slightly different interpretation of transcendental idealism.


I seriously doubt this. The B edition was added later, and that's where most of his refutation of Idealism of Berkeley comes from--but His ideas in the A edition cannot rightly be said to be proposing Berkeley's Metaphysical Idealism whatsoever. Kant's entire task has always consisted of finding the Transcendental conditions of all possible experience. He is not, like Berkeley, making metaphysical claims about the world at all. In fact, as you SHOULD know, Kant reject the possibility of metaphysics altogether. So I don't sympathize with your interpretation of Kant at all--and I am confident your views are compeletly incorrect about Kant, not to mention in direct opposition to what most (if not all) current Kant scholars think.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 03:24 AM ----------

Humanity;143359 wrote:
Meaning that if he had an answer to the above, you would accept his view.


No. Meaning that his very Idealism, in virtue of what it is, necessarily CANNOT account for error. See below.

Humanity;143359 wrote:
I mentioned it before, that Berkeley did account for 'error' in his theories.


No he doesn't. He can't, simply in virtue of the very nature of what his hypothesis says--namely, that matter doesn't exist, only ideas. Judgments are veridical if and only if they truthfully represent the outside world. But if there is no outside world at all, then judgments about the outside world cannot be said to represent, or fail to represent, an outside world. Why is this so difficult to understand? See below.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143359] 715 HYLAS. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked? 716 PHILONOUS. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions. [/quote][QUOTE=Humanity;143359]
Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right.[/QUOTE]
Why is his perception "right"? Is it because the oar is actually crooked? But physical oars don't exist. So how can he be right about the physical oar?
What are his perceptions about anyway? His perceptions cannot be about actual physical oars, since only ideas and other minds exist. So this person's perceptions can only be about other perceptions. So allegedly what a person correctly perceives by sight can be nothing other than another "crooked" perception.

Problem 1: Immaterial perceptions aren't crooked or straight. Only physical objects can be crooked or straight. So Berkeley is committing the logical fallacy of Category Equivocation here. This is just as bad as saying "ideas are green and numbers sleep furiously." It is totally nonsensical.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143359] But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived[/quote]

Ok, so suppose he does make the judgment that if he pulls the oar out of the water then he would perceive the oar to be broken. This is a judgment about what he will perceive, should he pull the oar out of the water, not a judgment about the oar itself. So suppose that he does pull that oar out of the water and, lo and behold, the oar appears to be straight after all.

So his original judgment about what he would have perceived should he pull the oar out of the water is mistaken because he was wrong about what he would have perceived. This is fine. But most of our judgments in the everyday world, not only consist of making second-order judgments about what we will perceive should we do this or that (which is merely an inductive inference about future unobserved cases), but also consist of making first-order judgments about what we think is, de facto, the case at hand--in this example, concerning the oar.

So suppose he perceives the object to be crooked, which, according to Berkeley is a veridical perception. But suppose further, this same person also passes the judgment that the oar is straight--which happens to be a correct judgment. Again, we can ask the same question that we did above.

Why is his judgment "right"? Is it because the oar is actually straight? But physical oars don't exist. So how can he be right about the physical oar?
Since only ideas and other minds exist, the allegedly correct judgment can only be about another perception. In this case, then, the person is passing a correct judgment about another perception that is, in fact, really straight.

Problem 2: In the first case, the object of the persons perception was a crooked perception. But now in the second case the same object of the person's judgment is a straight perception. So the same perception is both straight and crooked at once--contradiction.

What the person correctly perceives immediately is perception1.

Perception1 is crooked.

Similarly, the person makes a correct judgment about the same perception1 when he judges it to be straight. So,

Perception1 is straight.

So perception1 is simultaneaously both straight and crooked. Contradiction.

But perhaps to avoid the contradiction we can say that the object of the judgment is a different object than the object of perception altogether. That would be fine, just incredibly strange. Why would my perception in the first case be about a different object than the object of my judgment in the second case? This is totally counterintuitive, since there don't appear to be two perceptions here, just as there don't appear to be two oars. So the act of judging and the the act of perception both clearly seem to be about one and the same object, the oar--or as Berkeley would have it--the perception1.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143359] Btw, the above is just evidence to point out that Berkeley did cater for 'error' in his scheme of ideas.[/QUOTE]

...and you forgot to add that it fails miserably.

Berkeley can talk all day long about how we go about recognizing erroneous judgments, etc.,--but he can't give an account of what, exactly, this error consists in. And I just showed that whatever this account would look like, it most certainly either results in a contradiction or is counterintuitive at best.

For instance, a realist about the external world (such as Kant and many others) will say that a false judgment that X consists in the fact that the judgment fails to veridically represent the world as at is.

What can Berkeley say? That a false a judgment that X consist in the fact that the judgment fails to veridically represent the world as it is? But what world? There doesn't exist an external world for Berkeley at all. So Berkeley can't give this same account. Instead, the only account of error to which he has recourse are those errors involving second order erroneous judgments about what we would have perceived should we have done this of that. So clearly Berkeley has no means of accounting for first-order erroneous judgments without also involving himself in a contradiction.
[QUOTE=Humanity;143359] The above is for your reference, i am not prepared to argue the point in detail, as you had misunderstood Berkeley ideas right from the beginning and have a narrow understanding of what is 'perception' in Berkeley's perspective.[/QUOTE]

Let me get this straight: (1) You are not prepared to argue any points in detail, but then continue to insist that I am wrong?? LOL!

Further:
(2) I've given several arguments against Berkeley's Idealism, but you won't tell me why you think my arguments are invalid or unsound.
(3) You continue to claim I misunderstand Berkeley, but you won't tell me how I do, in fact, allegely misunderstand him.
(4) You continue to claim Berkeley's technical understandings of "perception," "matter," and "Idea" are "more complex than ordinary conventional meanings," but you won't tell me what these allegedly esoteric meanings actually are to which you and Berkeley presumably have some kind of priviledged mystical access no one else does.

This is not how honest philosophers undertake these kinds of discussions, and I find it terribly uncharitable and dishonest. You might as well be quoting from the Bible itself for proof that the the Bible is Divinely inspired, just as you continue to quote from Berkeley's texts without telling me how these passages relate to actual objections I continue to advance in this thread. As a result, the only arguments you've offered on the table for consideration have amounted to nothing but a continued appeals to some kind of vague and mysterious Berkeleyan Authority without actually engaging in any amount of critical thinking or rational discussion yourself. I hate to say it, you're coming up drastically short here.
 
Humanity
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 04:51 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;143432 wrote:
Let me get this straight: (1) You are not prepared to argue any points in detail, but then continue to insist that I am wrong?? LOL!

Further:
(2) I've given several arguments against Berkeley's Idealism, but you won't tell me why you think my arguments are invalid or unsound.
(3) You continue to claim I misunderstand Berkeley, but you won't tell me how I do, in fact, allegely misunderstand him.
(4) You continue to claim Berkeley's technical understandings of "perception," "matter," and "Idea" are "more complex than ordinary conventional meanings," but you won't tell me what these allegedly esoteric meanings actually are to which you and Berkeley presumably have some kind of priviledged mystical access no one else does.

This is not how honest philosophers undertake these kinds of discussions, and I find it terribly uncharitable and dishonest. You might as well be quoting from the Bible itself for proof that the the Bible is Divinely inspired, just as you continue to quote from Berkeley's texts without telling me how these passages relate to actual objections I continue to advance in this thread. As a result, the only arguments you've offered on the table for consideration have amounted to a continued appeal to some kind of vague and mysterious Berkeleyan Authority without actually engaging in any amount of critical thinking or rational discussion yourself. I hate to say it, you're coming up drastically short here.
I noted your point on Kant's refutation of Berkeley's idealism.
I know Kant did differentiate his transcendental idealism from Berkeley's, but despite the differences, i still see core similarities as both are still idealism albeit as different type and name.
Btw, i have great respect for Kant and his philosophy is way greater than that of Berkeley.

As for the points on Berkeley, you have a lot of arrows to shoot but they are not landing on the target and in line with what i intend to discuss.

As for the point on Berkeley and 'error'.
You merely stated that Berkeley had none at all.
The evidence i provided was to prove you wrong.
Whether he was right or wrong on this quote is not the issue on hand.

Re my unwillingness to go into detailed argument;
Btw, i started in pg 6 of now 40+ pages and i have provided quotes after quotes to get those opposing Berkeley to get in line with his ideas before they critique him with fairness and justice.
After ~40 pages of these slipshod approach i find find it wasting my effort and getting no where.
What is repeated is, esse is percepi.

That is why i started a new OP and hoping to get it on track. But even then ...
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 05:25 am
@Humanity,
Humanity;143446 wrote:
I know Kant did differentiate his transcendental idealism from Berkeley's, but despite the differences, i still see core similarities


How so? Explain.

Humanity;143446 wrote:
as both are still idealism albeit as different type and name.


No. Berkeley's idealism is a metaphysical thesis about what does, and does not, exist. Kant's Transcendental idealism is an epistemological thesis about the conditions of all possible experience (and knowledge).

Humanity;143446 wrote:
As for the points on Berkeley, you have a lot of arrows to shoot but they are not landing on the target and in line with what i intend to discuss.


Again, this is an empty accusation unless you can back it up.:Not-Impressed:

Humanity;143446 wrote:
As for the point on Berkeley and 'error'.
You merely stated that Berkeley had none at all.


And he doesn't. Why are you still not understanding the difference between describing how we are supposed to go about epistemically recognizing error (which is all that Berkeley shows), and giving an account of the conditions which make error possible in the first place such as a failure of correspondence between our Ideas and a fact distinct from our Ideas?

If a philosopher cannot answer the latter question, then his (Berkeley's) answer to former question is totally arbitrary and moot. In fact, there is no such thing as a fact of my-being-in-error on Berkeley's account at all simply because the external world does not exist. Error doesn't exist for Berkeley because it can't.

And further, if God is the source of all the ideas he implants in our minds, then those ideas that are allegedly "erroneous" make God a deceiver.

Humanity;143446 wrote:
The evidence i provided was to prove you wrong.

And it has succeeding in accomplishing nothing on Berkeley's behalf.

Humanity;143446 wrote:
Whether he was right or wrong on this quote is not the issue on hand.


Of course it is. If Berkeley is wrong, then my criticism stands.

Humanity;143446 wrote:
Btw, i started in pg 6 of now 40+ pages and i have provided quotes after quotes to get those opposing Berkeley to get in line with his ideas before they critique him with fairness and justice.


I will no longer address your hanging Berkelian quotes unless you start addressing my arguments against Berkeley's Idealism. I've shown several things so far, all of which you refuse to address:

(1) I have already shown what most commentators will call his "Master Argument" is actually invalid.
(2) I've already shown his argument rests on an unsubstantiated and dubious premise, namely that, the sensation of the object is identical to the object sensed. So he just collapses this age-old distinction which most philosophers think ought to be maintained. Even worse, Berkeley provides no argument for this claim at all, neither in the Treatise, nor in the Dialogues, but just assumes it throughout. It is the one implicit premise in all his arguments that are supposed to make them work. If one can show this premise is either false, or dubious, Berkeley's case is substantially weakened, and Berkelian Idealism rendered highly unlikely.
(3) If Berkelian Idealism is true, then error doesn't exist.
(4) Kant's Transcendental argument against Berkelian Idealism.

*All of these reasons provide sufficient justification for rejecting Berkelian Idealism.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 05:46 am
@SammDickens,
Samm;143426 wrote:
That makes absolutely no sense as a response to ACB's post to which you appear to have been responding. WHat on earth are you trying to say???

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 02:24 AM ----------



Samm


Obviously, that evidence may make something highly plausible, but may not prove it, in the sense of mathematical demonstration. So,kicking a stone may not refute (beyond all doubt) that there are no material objects, but it does so beyond all reasonable doubt (at least in an age when there were no holographs).

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 07:59 AM ----------

Extrain;143451 wrote:

(3) If Berkelian Idealism is true, then error doesn't exist.
(4) Kant's Transcendental argument against Berkelian Idealism.

*All of these reasons provide sufficient justification for rejecting Berkelian Idealism.


Yes. Berkeley can (perhaps) account for the appearance of errror via lack of coherence. But he cannot account for the existence of error, vIa correspondence. For Berkeley (as for Rorty) it is "the world well lost".

Of course, you are right about Kant. Kant insisted that he was not a subjective Idealist just because he repudiated Berkeley. Of course, he did not distinguish between subjective and other kinds of Idealism since it was Kant himself, who cleared the path to Absolute (or objective) Idealism

Humanity just does not distinguish between the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas. He wants to engage only in the latter, but not in the former.
 
Humanity
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 06:17 am
@kennethamy,
Humanity wrote:
Btw, in the first Edition of the CoPR, Kant agreed with Berkeley completely but changed his mind in the 2nd edition with a slightly different interpretation of transcendental idealism.
Here's Schopenhauer's remarks on the issue in his 'CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY'

Quote:

But when later I read Kant's great work in the first edition, which is already so rare, I saw, to my great pleasure, all these contradictions disappear, and found that although Kant does not use the formula, "No object without a subject," he yet explains, with just as much decision as Berkeley and I do, the outer world lying before us in space and time as the mere idea of the subject that knows it.
Therefore, for example, he says there without reserve (p. 383):
"If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must disappear, for it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our subject, and a class of its ideas."
But the whole passage from p. 348-392, in which Kant expounded his pronounced idealism with peculiar beauty and clearness, was suppressed by him in the second edition, and instead of it a number of remarks controverting it were introduced.

In this way then the text of the "Critique of Pure Reason," as it has circulated from the year 1787 to the year 1838, was disfigured and spoilt, and it became a self-contradictory book, the sense of which could not therefore be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to any one.

The particulars about this, and also my conjectures as to the reasons and the weaknesses which may have influenced Kant so to disfigure his immortal work,
I have given in a letter to Professor Rosenkranz, and he has quoted the principal passage of it in his preface to the second volume of the edition of Kant's collected works edited by him, to which I therefore refer. In consequence of my representations, Professor Rosenkranz was induced in the year 1838 to restore the "Critique of Pure Reason" to its original form, for in the second volume referred to he had it printed according to the first edition of 1781, by which he has rendered an inestimable service to philosophy; indeed, he has perhaps saved from destruction the most important work of German literature; and this should always be remembered to his credit


But let no one imagine that he knows the "Critique of Pure Reason " and has a distinct conception of Kant's teaching if he has only read the second or one of the later editions.
That is altogether impossible, for he has only read a mutilated, spoilt, and to a certain extent ungenuine text. It is my duty to say this here decidedly and for every one's warning.
[Unquote]

Sidenote: Even Schopenhauer grasped the main point of Berkerley, i.e. "No object without a subject," i.e. unthought matter.
The misinterpretation of "Esse is Percipi" by Johnson and his supporters is a strawman.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 06:48 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;143453 wrote:
Yes. Berkeley can (perhaps) account for the appearance of errror via lack of coherence. But he cannot account for the existence of error, vIa correspondence. For Berkeley (as for Rorty) it is "the world well lost".


Exactly. It's funny that you mentioned Rorty, because I was thinking the same thing when I was typing all this out.

kennethamy;143453 wrote:
Of course, you are right about Kant. Kant insisted that he was not a subjective Idealist just because he repudiated Berkeley. Of course, he did not distinguish between subjective and other kinds of Idealism since it was Kant himself, who cleared the path to Absolute (or objective) Idealism


I think that sounds right, although Kant would surely not appreciate this German Idealism turn in the 19th century from people like Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling because it was thoroughly metaphysical in spirit--precisely what Kant rejected as even possible at all...so we cannot forget Kant's Transcendental Idealism also cleared the path to empirical realism evidenced in later philosophers like Frege, Russell, and perhaps Carnap.

kennethamy;143453 wrote:
Humanity just does not distinguish between the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas. He wants to engage only in the latter, but not in the former.


I can tell. Now we have some new quotes from Schopenhauer's take on Kant's ideas--ideas which Schopenhauer tried to wed with Platonic Abstract Metaphysics.

Kantian scholars unanimously reject Schopenhauer as a reliable source on Kant anyways.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 06:53 AM ----------

Humanity;143460 wrote:
Here's Schopenhauer's remarks on the issue in his 'CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY'

Quote:

But when later I read Kant's great work in the first edition, which is already so rare, I saw, to my great pleasure, all these contradictions disappear, and found that although Kant does not use the formula, "No object without a subject," he yet explains, with just as much decision as Berkeley and I do, the outer world lying before us in space and time as the mere idea of the subject that knows it.
Therefore, for example, he says there without reserve (p. 383):
"If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must disappear, for it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our subject, and a class of its ideas."
But the whole passage from p. 348-392, in which Kant expounded his pronounced idealism with peculiar beauty and clearness, was suppressed by him in the second edition, and instead of it a number of remarks controverting it were introduced.

In this way then the text of the "Critique of Pure Reason," as it has circulated from the year 1787 to the year 1838, was disfigured and spoilt, and it became a self-contradictory book, the sense of which could not therefore be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to any one.

The particulars about this, and also my conjectures as to the reasons and the weaknesses which may have influenced Kant so to disfigure his immortal work,
I have given in a letter to Professor Rosenkranz, and he has quoted the principal passage of it in his preface to the second volume of the edition of Kant's collected works edited by him, to which I therefore refer. In consequence of my representations, Professor Rosenkranz was induced in the year 1838 to restore the "Critique of Pure Reason" to its original form, for in the second volume referred to he had it printed according to the first edition of 1781, by which he has rendered an inestimable service to philosophy; indeed, he has perhaps saved from destruction the most important work of German literature; and this should always be remembered to his credit


But let no one imagine that he knows the "Critique of Pure Reason " and has a distinct conception of Kant's teaching if he has only read the second or one of the later editions.
That is altogether impossible, for he has only read a mutilated, spoilt, and to a certain extent ungenuine text. It is my duty to say this here decidedly and for every one's warning.
[Unquote]

Sidenote: Even Schopenhauer grasped the main point of Berkerley, i.e. "No object without a subject," i.e. unthought matter.
The misinterpretation of "Esse is Percipi" by Johnson and his supporters is a strawman.


Sorry. Nice try, no cigar. I regret to inform you that Kantian scholars unanimously reject Schopenhauer as a reliable source on Kant at all.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is thoroughly metaphysical and is a perversion of Kant's actual ideas contained in the Critique. You also need to keep in mind that real Kantian scholarship has been undertaken the last 200 years since Schopenhauer's own isolated fumbling over trying to understand the text when it first came out. So you will get drastically different interpretations of it by most scholars who are in direct opposition to Schopenhauer's own poorly-formed biases.
 
Humanity
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 07:06 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;143470 wrote:
Exactly. It's funny that you mentioned Rorty, because I was thinking the same thing when I was typing all this out.



I think that sounds right, although Kant would surely not appreciate the German Absolute Idealism turn in the 19th century from Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling because it was thoroughly metaphysical in spirit--precisely what Kant rejected as even possible at all...so we cannot forget Kant's Transcendental Idealism also cleared the path to empirical realism which is self-evident in his Critque of Berkeley's metaphysical idealsim.



I can tell. Now we have some new quotes from Schopenhauer's take on Kant's philosophy--ideas which Schopenhauer tries to wed with Platonic Abstract Metaphysics.

Kantian scholars unanimously reject Schopenhauer as a reliable source on Kant anyways.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 06:53 AM ----------

Humanity;143460 wrote:
Here's Schopenhauer's remarks on the issue in his 'CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY'

Sorry. Nice try, no cigar. I regret to inform you that Kantian scholars unanimously reject Schopenhauer as a reliable source on Kant at all.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is thoroughly metaphysical and is a perversion of Kant's actual ideas contained in the Critique.
I accept there are opposing views but who are you to decide who is right or wrong.
Btw, some big majority did claim the Earth was flat.

I am not claiming Wiki has the highest degree of reliability.
Apparently the only criticism of Kant listed in wiki is that of Schopenhauer.

Where is your source to support your above assertion?

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 08:19 AM ----------

Extrain;143470 wrote:
Sorry. Nice try, no cigar. I regret to inform you that Kantian scholars unanimously reject Schopenhauer as a reliable source on Kant at all.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is thoroughly metaphysical and is a perversion of Kant's actual ideas contained in the Critique. You also need to keep in mind that real Kantian scholarship has been undertaken the last 200 years since Schopenhauer's own isolated fumbling over trying to understand the text when it first came out. So you will get drastically different interpretations of it by most scholars who are in direct opposition to Schopenhauer's own poorly-formed biases.
Wrong again, Schopenhauer did discuss about metaphysics in a positive note,
but his philosophy is not fundamentally metaphysical and ultimately not resting on anything ontological.

The last para of Schopenhauer in WAWR Vol. I confirmed it.

But, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself,
this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways, is nothing. 1

1 This is also just the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists,
the "beyond all knowledge," i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more
[no longer exist]. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt, " Ueber das Mahajana und Pradschna-Paramita.")


Schopenhauer did rely on some of Kant's idea but the rest of his philosophy is from his own thoughts with association from Hinduism and Buddhism.

As is noted, on the main issues you are normally off tangent.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 09:19 AM ----------

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
I know Kant did differentiate his transcendental idealism from Berkeley's, but despite the differences, i still see core similarities

Extrain;143451 wrote:

How so? Explain.

I had mentioned earlier, i am only interested in the non-theistic aspects of Berkeley's philosophy.
On this note, both Berkeley and Kant introduced the mind as a critical concept in their consideration of reality.
The fundamental of both their philosophies are in opposite contrast to philosophical realism, which assert that reality is absolutely independent of all human involvements.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
as both are still idealism albeit as different type and name.
[QUOTE=Extrain;143451]
No. Berkeley's idealism is a metaphysical thesis about what does, and does not, exist. Kant's Transcendental idealism is an epistemological thesis about the conditions of all possible experience (and knowledge).
While Berkeley theory in wholesale is metaphysical, i.e, it eventually entailed god,
I am only interested in the non-metaphysical aspect of Berkeley's philosophy, i.e the mind factor and his refutation of philosophical materialism.

My approach to their philosophies is as follows;
I agree with Berkeley in term of the mind factor, to extend his theory I would exclude the god concept and replace it with Kant's transcendental idealism which is more detailed.
To further extend Kant's theory to a higher philosophy, I will introduce the modern sciences of Physics, Neuroscience, Cognitive neuroscience, Physics (including QM) and others.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 08:36 am
@Humanity,
Humanity;143475 wrote:
I accept there are opposing views but who are you to decide who is right or wrong. Btw, some big majority did claim the Earth was flat.


Oh please. Kant can be difficult to read sometimes. But you know just as well as I do that when numerous scholars wrestle with a certain passage that appears to be isolated from the rest of the context in which it occurs, these scholars will try to determinine that passage's place with respect to the overall design-plan of the entire work, compare that passage to the rest of the author's ideas elsewhere, and evaluate the consistency of various interpretations of the passage with respect to author's own philosophical outlook as a whole. As a result, scholars will acquire an almost near certainty about the author's meaning and intention of writing what he or she did. And Berkeley's Idealism is NOT one of these acceptable interpretations at all.

After all, Kant NEVER said he agrees with Berkeley's principle that Schopenhauer mentions. In fact, Kant went to great length in refuting Berkeley's Idealsim. So you and Schopenhaur are just totally delusional if you think Kant is Berkelian Idealist. I don't know why I have to keep harping on this point.:rolleyes:

You need to pick up all the modern day commentary on Kant's Critique, stop cherry-picking isolated passages out of context that *appear* to support your point, and stop mentioning only a very small minority of misguided people who agree with you while ignoring all the rest of the scholarship which emphatically disagrees. I have devoted my strictest attention to the Critique many times over; I possess extensive notes about it which come from my own readings and others' readings of the text; and I have written several papers on this work myself. But guess what: I do NOT see George Berkeley's Idealism evident anywhere in the Critique.

Kant's genius is too often overlooked by only the lazy-minded readers who continue to mistake Kant for simultaneously asserting and denying Berkelian Idealism. So you can only be incredibly arrogant if you think Kant was so dense as to fail to notice he himself made such allegedly glaring contradictions. So you obviously don't understand his philosophy at all, nor made the charitable attempt to really understand while exploring authors' commentary of it in depth. It is also evident you don't understand Berkeley's philosophy either because you are incapable offering your own readings of his texts while consistently refusing to engage with my own criticism of them.

Humanity;143475 wrote:
I am not claiming Wiki has the highest degree of reliability. Apparently the only criticism of Kant listed in wiki is that of Schopenhauer. Where is your source to support your above assertion?
Kant's Theory of Judgment (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Abela, P., 2002, Kant's Empirical Realism, Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press.
Benacerraf, P., 1965, "What Numbers Could Not Be," Philosophical Review, 74: 47-73.
---, 1981, "Frege: the Last Logicist," in P. French, et al (eds.), The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Midwest Studies in PhilosophyThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/content-nonconceptual/>.
---, 2003b, Thinking without Words, New York: Oxford University Press.
Boole, G., 1854, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Cambridge: Macmillan.
Boolos, G., 1998, Logic, Logic, and Logic, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Boolos, G., and Jeffrey, R., 1989, Computability and Logic, 3rd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brandt, R., 1995, The Table of Judgments: Critique of Pure Reason A67-76; B92-101, trans. E. Watkins, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
Chomsky, N., 1975, Reflections on Language, New York: Pantheon.
Cook, V., and Newson, M., 1996, Chomsky's Universal Grammar: An Introduction, 2nd edn., Oxford: Blackwell.
Denyer, N., 1992, "Pure Second-Order Logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 33: 220-224.
Frege, G., 1953, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
---, 1972, Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, trans. T.W. Bynum, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Friedman, M., 1992, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hanna, R., 1993, "The Trouble with Truth in Kant's Theory of Meaning," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 10: 1-20.
---, 1998, "How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer," European Journal of Philosophy, 6: 115-145.
---, 2000a, "The Inner and the Outer: Kant's 'Refutation' Reconstructed," Ratio, 13: 146-174.
---, 2000b, "Kant, Truth, and Human Nature," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 8: 225-250.
---, 2001, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press.
---, 2002, "Mathematics for Humans: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic Revisited," European Journal of Philosophy, 10: 328-353.
---, 2005, "Kant and Nonconceptual Content," European Journal of Philosophy, 13: 247-290.
---, 2006, Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press.
---, 2008, "Kantian Non-Conceptualism," Philosophical Studies, 137: 41-64.
Hazen, A., 1999, "Logic and Analyticity," in A.C. Varzi (ed.), The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CA: CSLI, pp. 79-110.
Hylton, P., 1984, "The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt against Idealism," in R. Rorty (ed.), Philosophy in History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 375-397.
Kitcher, P., 1990, Kant's Transcendental Psychology, New York: Oxford.
Linsky, L., 1992, "The Problem of the Unity of the Proposition," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 30: 243-273.
Longuenesse, B., 1998, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, trans. C. Wolfe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
McDowell, J., 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Parsons, C., "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic," in C. Parsons, Mathematics in Philosophy, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 110-149.
Priest, G., 2001, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W.V.O., 1961, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn., New York: Harper and Row, pp. 20-46.
Reich, K., 1992, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, trans. J. Kneller and M. Losonsky, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Sellars, W., 1963, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in W. Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, New York: Humanities Press, pp. 127-196.
---, 1968, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Strawson, P.F., 1966, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London: Methuen.
Von Humboldt, W., 1988, On Language, trans. P. Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whitehead, A.N., and Russell, B., 1962, Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L., 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
---, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan.
---, 1969, On Certainty, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, New York: Harper and Row.
Wolff, M., 1995, , Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

And there are many, many more sources I can pull up.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 08:19 AM ----------

Humanity;143475 wrote:
Wrong again, Schopenhauer did discuss about metaphysics in a positive note, but his philosophy is not fundamentally metaphysical and ultimately not resting on anything ontological.


Huh? What do you think he discusses in the The World as Will and Representation? He reserves half of his discussion for Kantian Transcendental themes in the Representation part. But then devotes the other half to discussing the Will To Live which Schopenhauer equated with the Kantian Thing-in-Itself. THAT is metaphysical Idealism par excellence! Schopenhauer is even more of a metaphysician than Berkeley!

Humanity;143475 wrote:
The last para of Schopenhauer in WAWR Vol. I confirmed it.

But, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself,
this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways, is nothing. 1

1 This is also just the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists,
the "beyond all knowledge," i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more
[no longer exist]. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt, " Ueber das Mahajana und Pradschna-Paramita.")


There you go again: snipping people's words out of context, as if Schopenhauer literally meant that the Will does not exist. If he didn't think it actually existed, then why did he devote half of his works to writing about it?? You obviously have not read his works in their entirety, which I have. The "nothingness" to which he refers directly relates to the lack of a higher purpose in our lives as a result of our being complete slaves to the dictates of all the determinations of the Will in spite of the individual manifestation--the so-called "person"--which is merely an offshoot of it.

Humanity;143475 wrote:
Schopenhauer did rely on some of Kant's idea but the rest of his philosophy is from his own thoughts with association from Hinduism and Buddhism.


Of course! Half of Schopenhauer's work (the world as representation) is devoted to exploring the transcendental conditions of all possible experience where Kant left off. The other half of Schopenhauer's work (the world as will) consists of tying in Platonic, Advaita Vedanta Hindu and Buddhist Ethical and Religious Philosophy into his discussion of the Kantian Thing-in-Itself which Schopenhauer identified as the Will.

Humanity;143475 wrote:
As is noted, on the main issues you are normally off tangent.


Which issues??? Quit making these completely unwarranted allegations against me without backing it up. I don't even know what you are talking about. YOU are the one bringing up Schopenhauer. So YOU need to stick to the the Topic at hand.:rolleyes:

Have you ever had any formal philosophical training at all? I have had 8 years of it, and 7 years outside academia on my own time. Further, have you read both volumes of WAWR in their entirety? No. I didn't think so. You are quoting from Wiki which shows you have no access to any real academic literature on these things whatsoever--nor that you have ever actually devoutely studied them in depth for years on end. So stop being so presumptuous as if you knew what you were talking about, because you obviously don't.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 08:42 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;143523 wrote:

Have you ever had any formal philosophical training at all? I have had 8 years of it, and 7 years outside academia on my own time. Further, have you read both volumes of WAWR in their entirety? No. I didn't think so. You are quoting from Wiki which shows you have no access to any real academic literature on these things whatsoever--nor that you have ever actually devoutely studied them in depth for years on end. So stop being so presumptuous as if you knew what you were talking about, because you obviously don't.


Could you please try to argue without using abusive ad hominems which are, as always, irrelevant and annoying?
 
Humanity
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 08:54 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;143523 wrote:
Have you ever had any formal philosophical training at all? I have had 8 years of it, and 7 years outside academia on my own time.
Academic philosophy is a dying trade.Very Happy
It just churned out plastic philosophers out of rigid moulds.

Quote:
Further, have you read both volumes of WAWR in their entirety? No. I didn't think so. You are quoting from Wiki which shows you have no access to any real academic literature on these things whatsoever--nor that you have ever actually devoutely studied them in depth for years on end. So stop being so presumptuous as if you knew what you were talking about, because you obviously don't.
As usual, wrong again!
Who is being presumptuous here?
I bought the 2 volumes of WAWR ~10 years ago and have been reading them regularly.
With the internet, i now have the digital copy and i have put in some effort to ensure i understand Schopenhauer's philosophy thoroughly.
I have very detailed flowcharts of both Schopenhauer and Kant ideas and they differ at the core with regards the thing-in-itself.
From the few comments of yours on Schopenhauer i can gather you are off tangent with his main ideas.

Quote:

You need to pick up all the modern day commentary on Kant's Critique, stop cherry-picking isolated passages out of context that *appear* to support your point, and stop mentioning only a very small minority of misguided people who agree with you while ignoring all the rest of the scholarship which emphatically disagrees. I have devoted my strictest attention to the Critique many times over; I possess extensive notes about it which come from my own readings and others' readings of the text; and I have written several papers on this work myself. But guess what: I do NOT see George Berkeley's Idealism evident anywhere in the Critique.

It is the case of one wrong start and your whole theory collapses.
I am always mindful of Wittgenstein's
Quote:

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. On Certainty - Wittgenstein
I believe that is the case with your understanding of Berkeley's ideas (i.e. the non-metaphysical aspects)
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 09:05 am
@Humanity,
Humanity;143475 wrote:
On this note, both Berkeley and Kant introduced the mind as a critical concept in their consideration of reality.

Berkeley did nothing with regard to this--no more than David Hume and John Locke anyway. It was only Kant who actually introduced the Transcendental Project for the first time in History--that is why the Critique is such a monumental work.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143475] The fundamental of both their philosophies are in opposite contrast to philosophical realism, which assert that reality is absolutely independent of all human involvements.[/quote]

This is false. Kant did NOT say Transcendental Idealism is to be contrasted with philosophical realism. In fact, he says the exact opposite. And the proof against Berkelian Idealism I mentioned from Kant's text on the other page demonstrates just this.
You continue to lump Kant in with Berkelian Idealism. But you are totally mistaken!

[QUOTE=Humanity;143475]I am only interested in the non-metaphysical aspect of Berkeley's philosophy, i.e the mind factor and his refutation of philosophical materialism.[/QUOTE]

I hate to break it to you: you are NOT going to find any Transcendental project that explores in more depth the synthetic a priori conditions of all experience than the one found in Kant's own Critique. Berkeley didn't even have a Transcendental project at all. He merely ran with an epistemic empiricist principle and drew invalid conclusions from it. I even recommend reading David Hume rather than Berkeley, since you can't understand Kant's project unless you first understand Hume's project. Truly. In fact, Kant's Transcendental Project is intended to be an answer to Hume's skepticism --and the problems presented by Hume's philosophy underlies all Kant's transcendental expositions found in the Critique--especially in the four principles: The Axioms of Intuition, The Anticipations of Perception, The Analogies of Experience, and The Postulates of Empirical Thought.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143475] I agree with Berkeley in term of the mind factor, to extend his theory I would exclude the god concept and replace it with Kant's transcendental idealism which is more detailed.[/QUOTE]

Berkeley made horrible blunders, and his philosophy is rather reserved for the simple-minded. I doesn't accomplish anything. It is dead end. So I strongly recommend devoting your full blown attention to Kant in depth instead. His philosophy is incredibly fruitful and fuels further research and exploration unlike Berkeley's philosophy which is a stale dead end.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143475]To further extend Kant's theory to a higher philosophy, I will introduce the modern sciences of Physics, Neuroscience, Cognitive neuroscience, Physics (including QM) and others.[/QUOTE]

But the results of modern sciences only yield empirical a posteriori truths, and their discoveries as they stand are very foreign to Kant's actual enterpise. Kant's project is a Transcendental project concerning uncovering the a priori necessary truths within the spontaneous cognitive faculties of mind--and these kinds of results empirical science cannot provide due to the very nature of its subject. Science is empirical. Kants project is a priori pure, whichdoesn't take in any emprical content provided by empirical perception at all as material from which to draw conclusions about the necessary condtions of all possible experience.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Mar, 2010 09:16 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;143541 wrote:



Berkeley made horrible blunders, and his philosophy is rather reserved for the simple-minded. I doesn't accomplish anything. It is dead end. So I strongly recommend devoting your full blown attention to Kant in depth instead. His philosophy is incredibly fruitful and fuels further research and exploration unlike Berkeley's philosophy which is a stale dead end.



.


Yes he did. And that is why he is such an important philosopher, and we can learn so much from him just by unraveling his mistakes. How could his arguments be any good when they are in support of such an absurd conclusion? But how much can we learn from his arguments? A great deal! In addition, he was an excellent and shrewd critic of representative realism from whom representative realists have a lot to learn. Even now. So, I cannot agree with your assessment of him.
 
 

 
Copyright © 2025 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.05 seconds on 01/08/2025 at 03:24:46