I agree with you on this.

As i had demonstrated earlier, Johnson misunderstood Berkeley.
In addition Kennethamy went along with Johnson blindly.
Both were merely kicking a 'strawman'.

I have read Berkeley's Treatise and now almost finish rereading the Dialogs (15pgs to go).

Beside the concept of god, Berkeley was specifically refuting the philosophical 'matter' of the materialist.
The materialist insist that all objects are made up of some ultimate inert corporeal substance called matter.
Berkeley did not agree or seemingly 'detest' that concept of matter of the materialist.
Berkeley agreed that matter is sensed externally, can be physically kicked or dreamt,
but 'matter' in whatever form is inevitably associated with the mind.
Berkeley provided very convincing intermediate and sub-arguments and
the only weakness, imo, he had to conclude with the god-of-the-gap.
For us, we can extend (not complete) Berkeley's theory with Kant's categories
and follow up with the various modern sciences.

If Kennethamy has intellectual integrity, he should read both books
and argue within the whole context of the book rather than picking bits of passages and blindly piggy-backed on Johnson.

Although I disagree with kennethamy about whether or not Johnson refuted Berkeley, Berkeley is well worth remembering because of the flaws he discovered in Locke's philosophy. Hume observed this long ago, that the best arguments in Berkeley are skeptical rather than constructive.

So, even if we regard his positive theories as worthless, he is far from being a worthless philosopher.

Edited to add:

It is also worth mentioning that someone who is worthless might still be remembered, because all it takes to be remembered is popularity. Many people like pretty lies, so those who are good at telling such things tend to be better remembered than they deserve to be remembered.

Many modern scientists made reference to Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and the likes.

Berkeley was not refuting anything. He was denying or rebutting Realism. To refute is one thing; to rebut or deny is a different thing. No one refutes anything simply by asserting it is false.

At least you are agreeing Berkeley is denying or rebutting Realism.

Well, Berkeley not only deny and rebutt, he convincingly refuted Realism.
His very thorough and detailed refutation are in both his Treatise and Dialog.

imo, Berkeley did 'kill' materialism, but there was no need for Berkeley to refute Realism in the first place.
On a gentlemen basis, the onus is on Realism or Materialism to prove its claim.

Name one who refers to Berkeley (with some evidence, please).

Note,
1709 - George Berkeley publishes New Theory of Vision
Milestones in Neuroscience Research

History of Neuroscience

I have read hundreds of scientific research papers and i came across Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and the likes very frequently.

Frankly even if i do not produce any evidence as above, i would confidently assert my statement,
and don't give a damm about your ignorance.

This is now the age of the internet, you should read at least 500 scientific papers of various subjects to keep up to date.

I agree with you on this.

As i had demonstrated earlier, Johnson misunderstood Berkeley.
In addition Kennethamy went along with Johnson blindly.
Both were merely kicking a 'strawman'.

I have read Berkeley's Treatise and now almost finish rereading the Dialogs (15pgs to go).

Beside the concept of god, Berkeley was specifically refuting the philosophical 'matter' of the materialist.
The materialist insist that all objects are made up of some ultimate inert corporeal substance called matter.
Berkeley did not agree or seemingly 'detest' that concept of matter of the materialist.
Berkeley agreed that matter is sensed externally, can be physically kicked or dreamt,
but 'matter' in whatever form is inevitably associated with the mind.
Berkeley provided very convincing intermediate and sub-arguments and
the only weakness, imo, he had to conclude with the god-of-the-gap.
For us, we can extend (not complete) Berkeley's theory with Kant's categories
and follow up with the various modern sciences.

I agree with most of what you say about Berkeley's system. Berkeley, as far as I can remember (I haven't read Berkeley in a while, and I didn't read him as closely as I could have), argues that 'material object' can only be intelligible if it means a grouping of phenomenal qualities (sense data, ideas, etc. Read as you please) that regularly occur together. Johnson kicking the stone doesn't refute this.

The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts established by experiment

To account for the demonstrated facts, quantum theory tells us that an observation of one object can instantaneously influence the behavior of another greatly distant object--even if no physical force connects the two. Einstein rejected such influences as "spooky interactions," but they have now been demonstrated to exist. Quantum theory also tells us that observing an object to be someplace causes it to be there. For example, according to quantum theory, an object can be in two, or many, places at once--even far distant places. Its existence at the particular place it happens to be found becomes an actuality only upon its (conscious) observation.

I agree with most of what you say about Berkeley's system. Berkeley, as far as I can remember (I haven't read Berkeley in a while, and I didn't read him as closely as I could have), argues that 'material object' can only be intelligible if it means a grouping of phenomenal qualities (sense data, ideas, etc. Read as you please) that regularly occur together. Johnson kicking the stone doesn't refute this.

Is appealing to God as the metaphysical source of ideas his only weakness, though? His arguments against representational realism are, I think, very good, and very convincing, but he falls down when arguing against direct realism. The arguments against sensible properties are susceptible to the same objections as the argument from illusion, and the master argument is just appalling. There are some very good arguments against Berkeley's system in favour of direct realism, but you're right in saying that Johnson's isn't one of them.

direct realism or common sense realism, is a common sense theory of perceptionworld is pretty much as common sense would have it. All objects are composed of matter, they occupy space, and have properties such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour. These properties are usually perceived correctly. So, when we look at and touch things we see and feel those things directly, and so perceive them as they really are. Objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone present to observe them doing so."

Of course Berkeley denied Realism. He was an Idealist. That is what Idealists do. They deny Realism. What arguments refuted Realism? It is not enough just to say he had arguments. They need to be cited, and to be examined.

Why does Realism have the burden of proof?
Realism is the view that is initially probable. But, in any case, that is what this thread is all about. Whether Johnson proved Idealism was false, and therefore, that Realism is true.

Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief in a reality that is completely ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc. Philosophers who profess realism also typically believe that truth consists in a belief's correspondence to reality.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dullness and limitation of our faculties.
35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.
The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.

........it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.

Objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone present to observe them doing so.

I am sure they do. G.E. Moore, I seem to recall, said that if subjective idealism was correct, then a train would not have wheels when you were sitting in the carriage (which Berkeley avoids by positing 'absolute mind'.)

However I think this comment demonstrates a misconception. The notion of perception or ideation in all of these arguments is not nearly so clear-cut as it might seem.

Think about the example of the Moon, prior to the development of any life on earth. Did it exist? Well of course it did - you can measure the age of the moon quite accurately.

But in the absence of any observer, how did it exist? You will picture it, floating serenely above an early earth when there was no-one on it. But this picture too is generated by the human imagination of it. Its existence, in this picture, is seen from the perspective of an observer, imagining it floating in empty space. It is a viewpoint, located in (imaginary) space and time. Without such a viewpoint, 'where' is the object and 'how' does it appear?

I think the naive rejection of idealism imagines that idealism is saying that, if there were no humans observing the moon - for example, before humans evolved - then there would be no moon there. Humans evolve, and voila, moon appears. But it is not saying that.

What Kant said, as I understand it, is that for any object to exist intelligibly, to have any kind of form, or be located in time and space, it must be perceived by some intelligence. Things exist for this intelligence, in relation to its fundamental intuitions which provide the ground, as it were, within which things exist and are related. This does not say anything about matter as such, or it absence as such; all we can conceive of is the way it exists for us.

What bedevils this entire dialog is cartesian dualism. This is the implicit metaphysic of the modern world - wherein 'the world' exists objectively and the subjective intelligence 'represents' it.

A non-dualist philosophy dissolves many of these difficulties. In this understanding, we are the universe, knowing itself. That is the role of Anthropos in the Cosmos.

Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics.
But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend.
Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, ......

PHILONOUS. (Berkeley) ..... It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind.
'Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language;
most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things;
as is plain in the terms COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, &C.,
which, being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.

PHILONOUS. I own the word IDEA, not being commonly used for THING, sounds something out of the way.
My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding.

Berkeley had no problem with direct realism.


Note,

HYLAS. (Realist) What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS?
PHILONOUS. (Berkeley) With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.

Other than the concept of god, the main thrust of Berkeley's Treatiste and Dialogs is his refutation of 'Matter' of philosophical (btw not scientific) materialism and philosohical realism.
If you inferred anything else, that is secondary to the above.

As far as Johnson was concerned, he was miles away from refuting Berkeley.

The typical anti-Berkeley refutation is, he/she will ask you to stand in from of an on-coming train, whenever anyone discuss Berkeley's idea, or jump off a cliff since he/she assumed that Berkeley believed reality is all in the mind.
imo, it is based on this same ignorance that Johnson did the refutation himself by kicking the stone to demonstrate that the stone is not an 'ideal' in mind.



---------- Post added 03-20-2010 at 02:12 AM ----------

Berkeley specifically denied 'matter' of philosophical realism, not plain realism.
Berkeley however accept common sense direct realism and scientific realism/matterialism.
If you want Berkeley's arguments, you will need to read his two books, i.e. Treatise and Dialogs.
It is not practical to reproduce his argument in one or two syllogistic presentation.

It is Philosophical Realism that is in contention in this OP not Realism in general.

Johnson mistook that Berkeley was disputing common sense realism when in fact he did not.

I have repeated and provided evidences that Berkeley was not questioning common sense realism at all. Note..


Berkeley was not interested in the common sense realism of kicking stones.
If Johnson were to kick the stone in front of Berkeley, B would be laughing at him for missing the point.

The philosophical realist or materialist has the onus of proof because they speculated beyond experience that there exists an ultimate 'matter' that is independent of mind and experience.
Kant followed up with this and called it transcendental illusion or delusion.

Clearly, common sense realism is something quite different from objects consisting of ideas in the mind of some perceiving bein. Direct realism states there are mind independent objects (independent of all minds, including god) whose essence is not to be perceived, but simply to be. For realists, direct or indirect, objects are not ideas (that is what makes them realists). Realism is irreconcilable with idealism, to suggest otherwise is simply wrong.

In a way, you are correct. Berkeley recognised that his ontology had few, if any practical implications, short of changing the conceptual meanings of what a few terms such as 'object' and 'matter'. However, in another, very real, way, you are wrong to say this means Berkeley is a realist; he wasn't, that's not what realism means.

I am sure they do. G.E. Moore, I seem to recall, said that if subjective idealism was correct, then a train would not have wheels when you were sitting in the carriage (which Berkeley avoids by positing 'absolute mind'.)

However I think this comment demonstrates a misconception. The notion of perception or ideation in all of these arguments is not nearly so clear-cut as it might seem.

Think about the example of the Moon, prior to the development of any life on earth. Did it exist? Well of course it did - you can measure the age of the moon quite accurately.

But in the absence of any observer, how did it exist? You will picture it, floating serenely above an early earth when there was no-one on it. But this picture too is generated by the human imagination of it. Its existence, in this picture, is seen from the perspective of an observer, imagining it floating in empty space. It is a viewpoint, located in (imaginary) space and time. Without such a viewpoint, 'where' is the object and 'how' does it appear?

I think the naive rejection of idealism imagines that idealism is saying that, if there were no humans observing the moon - for example, before humans evolved - then there would be no moon there. Humans evolve, and voila, moon appears. But it is not saying that.

What Kant said, as I understand it, is that for any object to exist intelligibly, to have any kind of form, or be located in time and space, it must be perceived by some intelligence. Things exist for this intelligence, in relation to its fundamental intuitions which provide the ground, as it were, within which things exist and are related. This does not say anything about matter as such, or it absence as such; all we can conceive of is the way it exists for us.

What bedevils this entire dialog is cartesian dualism. This is the implicit metaphysic of the modern world - wherein 'the world' exists objectively and the subjective intelligence 'represents' it.

A non-dualist philosophy dissolves many of these difficulties. In this understanding, we are the universe, knowing itself. That is the role of Anthropos in the Cosmos.

As if that made it all, all right. What they are really doing is changing the meaning of the term, but pretending it is the same term, only "from a philosophical perspective".

So, philosophers get away with a tactic which, if it were employed by a used-car salesman, would be called, "bait-and-switch".

That is foolish. There are a lot of technical terms in every discipline, and that is true even for used car salesmen if they have some sort of trade journals. If you have problems with the technical terms, then don ` t study philosophy.

The famous story (in Boswell's Life of Johnson) that Samuel Johnson kicked a rock (or was it a stone?) and cried out, "Thus I refute Berkeley". Berkeley, of course, denied that there were any material objects. It is often said (with some condescension) that all this showed was that Johnson misunderstood Berkeley, and that what Johnson did was not a refutation of Berkeley's view. My question is whether this criticism of Johnson is correct. Why didn't Johnson refute Berkeley by kicking the stone or rock?

I once read that philosophy is the most difficult thing to express to another mind, not the exact wording i'm sure, but close enough.

Our thoughts are seemingly bound to our sensations, I often wonder what words look like to a blind man. What would we think, without, sound ,vision,touch ,smell,taste. What sensation would we feel.

Would it be possible to think at all. From this perspective I think Johnson may have been right but I find the explanation difficult to comprehend as of this writing :perplexed: