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Pyrrho;140304 wrote:

You evidently do not get the point of the magician example. Johnson did not prove that he kicked a material object, or even that there was a material object to be kicked. In order to refute Berkeley, he needs to do that. Kicking a stone proves nothing, just like my magician example does not prove that he can turn water into wine, even if he really has that ability. You do agree, don't you, that if you saw a magic act, you would not simply believe the appearance was real, right? But suppose it was real. It being real would not prove it is real, and that is the point; that is why kicking a stone, material or otherwise, is insufficient to prove anything about what Berkeley was saying.

I don't understand why, if Johnson kicked a material object (the stone) that would not prove that Berkeley was wrong when he denied there were material objects. Could you explain that?

Could it be because they are sound arguments? There is that possibility. It is not that you have the truth, but I have the arguments, so much as that I have the truth because I have the arguments.

But I commend you, because you are rare. You can appreciate the power of argument, and not simply sluff it off as philosophical trickery (when you notice it at all) as so many on this forum do. There is, at least, the possibility of reasoned discourse with you (and, of course, a number of others).

But why do you think that the scientific outlook confines itself to appearance? It was (and is) thought by many, that it was science that went beyond appearance to expose reality. That is why the term "science" derives from the Latin word for "knowledge".


Yes. And that leads us into a further question (which I have mentioned earlier) concerning Berkeley's view about science, and natural laws. He did not believe that the laws of science were about material objects, and if they were not about material objects, then what were they? Berkeley was an instrumentalist in the philosophy of science. (Please see my post #160)

Of course Berkeley could explain the responses of feet and stones to kicking. How could he have been taken seriously unless he did? But, the question is whether his explanation held water. This goes back to the difference between internal and external criticism.

Well I still don't believe that. But it has become clear that arguing with Johnston is pointless. He believes what he believes, and I still don't think he has grasped Berkeley's point, but there is no point going around in circles.

I will make one last observation on this topic however. The World's Largest Machine has now been completed, at literally astronomical expense. It is conducting experiments which can only be designed and understood by the world's foremost experts. And it is still largely occupied with understanding a very deep, subtle and difficult question which despite all of our science, still eludes us.

And that is, the nature of material substance.

I did, but I found it trivialising, along the lines of the Flying Spagetti Monster and the comparison of Deities with mythical figures such as santa claus and the tooth fairy. I would automatically place that in the class of 'failed arguments' as it indicates the proponent has no real grasp of the issues at hand, and accordingly resorts to ridicule. Dawkins and Hitchens do this a lot.

Wiki is not sufficient, you need to read the original Treatise and Dialogs (i'm now refreshing)
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I am sorry, but could you explain what you mean? I meant it to illustrate what a hermetically sealed theory is, and to point out the weakness. And also, to point out that although Berkeley's theory also can be hermetically sealed against refutation (as some of you have understood it) it has exactly the weakness of the Omphalos Hypothesis. No ridicule was intended. Serious criticism was the intention. (Could you say who the "proponent" is you are talking about, and what the serious issues you mention are the "proponent" has no real grasp of?) I suppose that you do not for a moment believe the Omphalos Hypothesis is true, but let me ask you whether you think it is refutable in any way? If not, then why don't you think it is (or at least may be) true?

If you had bothered to actually look at the link, you would have seen that it was to the text of Berkeley's A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. "Wiki" has more than just encyclopedia articles; they also have complete texts of various books. It is a link to Wikisource, not to Wikipedia.

The quote about which you were so dismissive was a quote from Berkeley (specifically, from A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge), not from someone writing about him.

Here is the link again, so you can easily see that it is not merely a link to an article in an encyclopedia:

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge - Wikisource

Fair enough. I do see your point now. But I did take the 'omphalos hypothesis' to be blatantly ridiculous, which I am sure you can understand. I can also believe that a young-earth creationist might be attracted to such an idea, but then, they are willing to believe anything that supports what they (sadly) understand as 'faith'.

I think that this 'omphalos' hypothesis is different to Berkeley's philosophy in a very important particular, namely that it proposes that the world was 'created' in such a way that what appears to be ancient, really is not so, and that we are all being deceived. But the nature of Berkeley's claim is not the same as that. I think Berkeley would have no problem, in principle, with scientific realism (and neither did Kant.) Provided that it is understood that the objects of scientific enquiry have no absolute or independent existence, Berkeley agrees that they all behave according to physical descriptions and scientific laws and so on. He does not think the world is a fantasy or an illusion in the sense that a Johnson understands his position. As I have said, if philosophical idealism consisted of the notion that the world exists in our brains, nobody ever would have paid any attention to it. It is a much more subtle position than that.

I said before that to understand the viewpoint of idealism requires something akin to conversion, and it is true. In my case, it came via Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, and then reconnecting the dots in Ancient Greek philosophy, specifically Plotinus. I am starting to understand what this idea of 'Nous' or 'Big Mind' is about. It is about being spiritually aware, which is a religious outlook, but not characteristic of the 'downtown' faiths that most peope understand. It is kind of religious, but not in the way that most Christians understand it. (In fact, philosophical idealism is always very close to what mainstream Christianity would regard as heresy, for various reasons.)

I am trying to find time to read a current, non-dualist philosophy of mind text called 'Neither Brain nor Ghost' by W Teed Rockwell that draws on John Dewey, and presents a theory of mind that might reconcile some of these antinomies.

if philosophical idealism consisted of the notion that the world exists in our brains, nobody ever would have paid any attention to it.

Fair enough. I do see your point now. But I did take the 'omphalos hypothesis' to be blatantly ridiculous, which I am sure you can understand. I can also believe that a young-earth creationist might be attracted to such an idea, but then, they are willing to believe anything that supports what they (sadly) understand as 'faith'.

I think that this 'omphalos' hypothesis is different to Berkeley's philosophy in a very important particular, namely that it proposes that the world was 'created' in such a way that what appears to be ancient, really is not so, and that we are all being deceived. But the nature of Berkeley's claim is not the same as that. I think Berkeley would have no problem, in principle, with scientific realism (and neither did Kant.) Provided that it is understood that the objects of scientific enquiry have no absolute or independent existence, Berkeley agrees that they all behave according to physical descriptions and scientific laws and so on. He does not think the world is a fantasy or an illusion in the sense that a Johnson understands his position. As I have said, if philosophical idealism consisted of the notion that the world exists in our brains, nobody ever would have paid any attention to it. It is a much more subtle position than that.

I said before that to understand the viewpoint of idealism requires something akin to conversion, and it is true. In my case, it came via Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, and then reconnecting the dots in Ancient Greek philosophy, specifically Plotinus. I am starting to understand what this idea of 'Nous' or 'Big Mind' is about. It is about being spiritually aware, which is a religious outlook, but not characteristic of the 'downtown' faiths that most peope understand. It is kind of religious, but not in the way that most Christians understand it. (In fact, philosophical idealism is always very close to what mainstream Christianity would regard as heresy, for various reasons.)

I am trying to find time to read a current, non-dualist philosophy of mind text called 'Neither Brain nor Ghost' by W Teed Rockwell that draws on John Dewey, and presents a theory of mind that might reconcile some of these antinomies.

Doing something is not the same as proving one has done it. And that is why Johnson's "argument" fails.

The following argument is valid:

1. If stones are immaterial, your foot will go through them when you kick them.
2. Your foot does not go through them when you kick them.
3. Therefore, stones are not immaterial (i.e. they are material).

If Berkeley had asserted or implied premise 1, then Johnson's action would indeed have refuted him. But Berkeley (as far as I am aware) did not assert or imply premise 1. The idea that one would encounter resistance when kicking a stone was presumably accepted by him from the outset; it was not just an add-on to save himself from refutation.

Johnson was wrong on two counts. Firstly, he simply assumed premise (1) without argument, so he did not properly establish the conclusion (3). Secondly, if he had produced an argument to justify (1), it would have been that argument, and not the kicking of the stone, that would have refuted Berkeley. (Obviously, any sane person who is persuaded of (1) will immediately accept (3).)

The same kind of thing applies to the Omphalos hypothesis. To refute it (if pressed), one needs to invoke Ockham's Razor or some similar general argument. Merely pointing at a fossil is of no use whatever.

I agree with Pyrrho:

As I understand it, Johnson is not merely refuting Berkeley by showing that he is kicking a material object, the stone. He is doing that, but not merely doing that. What he is doing is trying to show that the term, "material object" makes sense.

For you to think that Berkeley is right, is for you to think that the term, "material object" makes no sense. Is that what you think?

No, I think that the term "material object" makes sense, and that stones and many other things are material objects. But I still don't understand how Johnson's kicking a stone proves either of those propositions. Anyone who believes that stones are material would still believe it in the absence of Johnson's action; and anyone who believed they were immaterial would not be persuaded otherwise by his action. The mere act of kicking a stone is of no evidential value in this case. So how can it refute Berkeley? Surely a metaphysical theory can only be refuted (if at all) by a metaphysical argument.

Surely a metaphysical theory can only be refuted (if at all) by a metaphysical argument.

Can Berkeley be refuted? Of course. Johnson did it.

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Perhaps you might venture an opinion as to why anyone remembers Berkeley's name if his doctrine is so easily refuted.

I would have thought so, also.



Perhaps you might venture an opinion as to why anyone remembers Berkeley's name if his doctrine is so easily refuted.

The following argument is valid:

1. If stones are immaterial, your foot will go through them when you kick them.
2. Your foot does not go through them when you kick them.
3. Therefore, stones are not immaterial (i.e. they are material).

If Berkeley had asserted or implied premise 1, then Johnson's action would indeed have refuted him. But Berkeley (as far as I am aware) did not assert or imply premise 1. The idea that one would encounter resistance when kicking a stone was presumably accepted by him from the outset; it was not just an add-on to save himself from refutation.

Johnson was wrong on two counts. Firstly, he simply assumed premise (1) without argument, so he did not properly establish the conclusion (3). Secondly, if he had produced an argument to justify (1), it would have been that argument, and not the kicking of the stone, that would have refuted Berkeley. (Obviously, any sane person who is persuaded of (1) will immediately accept (3).)

The same kind of thing applies to the Omphalos hypothesis. To refute it (if pressed), one needs to invoke Ockham's Razor or some similar general argument. Merely pointing at a fossil is of no use whatever.

I agree with Pyrrho: