On The Contrast Between Appearance And Reality

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kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 06:49 pm
@MMP2506,
MMP2506;132533 wrote:
In some sense yes. Philosophy is traditionally considered a love for wisdom. Skepticism is radically anti-knowledge, therefore anti-philosophy. It's like calling atheism a religion. One could if he so chooses, although it's a bit of a contradiction.


Skepticism is the denial of knowledge only if a particular theory of knowledge is accepted, namely, knowledge as certainty. But, if we allow that knowledge is not certainty, we can say that skepticism is the denial of knowledge only in the sense that knowledge is certainty. David Hume made this clear by distinguishing two senses of "skepticism": Academic, and Pyrrhonian. He rejected the first, but accepted the second, which was knowledge without certainty.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 06:51 pm
@Pythagorean,
pagan;132551 wrote:

QM seems to undermine objectivity in the sense that measurement cannot be passive. This is mind dependence in terms of perception....

General relativity undermines objectivity in the sense of the gods eye view. There is no overall spacetime perspective to look down upon the rest. Every perspective is uniquely intrinsic to reality.


Quite true Pagan. Much to the discomfort of your hardcore scientific postivists, relativity and QM have seen metaphysics come back into the picture.

Good, all-purpose quote in this context:

Quote:
Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, ever since promulgated his highly influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other". Richard J. Bernstein is recognized as having coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 06:57 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;132570 wrote:
Quite true Pagan. Much to the discomfort of your hardcore scientific postivists, relativity and QM have seen metaphysics come back into the picture.

Good, all-purpose quote in this context:


I think that Einstein pointed out that for there to be relativity, there had also to be something absolute. Like the velocity of light.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 07:16 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;132282 wrote:

Where did you ever get the idea that the experience of X is identical with X?


There are different ways to conceive of X but these are all forms of experience. X-in-itself, which you seem to be hinting at, is still the experience of the concept X-in-itself, which connects to the idea of noumena. But noumena is a limiting concept. If it is presented as more than a limiting concept, it becomes paradoxical. If we speak of that which is beyond our experience, what could we be speaking of?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 07:36 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;132584 wrote:
There are different ways to conceive of X but these are all forms of experience. X-in-itself, which you seem to be hinting at, is still the experience of the concept X-in-itself, which connects to the idea of noumena. But noumena is a limiting concept. If it is presented as more than a limiting concept, it becomes paradoxical. If we speak of that which is beyond our experience, what could we be speaking of?


X is the experience of X? Wherever did you get such an idea. Elephants are the experience of elephants? How could that be? There can be elephants and no experience of elephants. And there can be the experience of elephants (hallucinations) but no elephants. Therefore, it is false that the experience of elephants is, itself, an elephant.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 07:55 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;132593 wrote:
There can be elephants and no experience of elephants.


We have no way of knowing this.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 07:56 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;132575 wrote:
I think that Einstein pointed out that for there to be relativity, there had also to be something absolute. Like the velocity of light.


Perfectly true but I don't know what that means in philosophical terms. I need to do some more reading on it. But the point of referring to Einstein, relativity and the paradoxes of QM is to argue that the naive realist position (the word 'naive' is not intended pejoratively in this context) has been undermined, not just by philosophical argument, but by scientific discoveries. That is why those many physicists, who you criticize elsewhere for 'not being philosophers', have become interested in mystical spirituality (for want of a better term). They are casting about for a world-picture which makes more sense of the empirical data because the idea that the Universe is composed of a bunch of things, stuff, or particles no longer makes sense. As Sir James Jeans said, it resembles a great mind more than a great machine. Hence the rediscovery of metaphysics.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 07:58 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;132604 wrote:
We have no way of knowing this.


We do have ways of knowing this.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 08:10 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;132607 wrote:
We do have ways of knowing this.


How can we know of anything apart from experience, the broad sense of the word? It seems to me that experience includes everything. If you can offer this, you will go down in history as one of the great philosophers.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 09:42 pm
@Pythagorean,
But this is what the empiricists say, basically, isn't it? I mean what are you saying here that either Locke or Berkeley didn't say? The only distinction is that Locke said we have experience of objects while Berkeley said that we can't distinguish between the experience and the objects. But Berkeley is still classified as an empiricist and saying, it all comes down to experience. (As distinct from the rationalists, who said we have innate ideas.)
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 10:01 pm
@Pythagorean,
I realize how unoriginal the thought is, but others aren't. True, I could rest content and not reply to their objections, but I feel that debating such questions sharpens my understanding as well as my pen. (I am assuming the last post was addressed to me: no one was quoted.)
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 10:40 pm
@Pythagorean,
Hey I wasn't taking a shot at you or anything. A couple of people have made the same point. I was just drawing attention to the fact that this emphasis on 'experience' is very similar to good ol' empirical philosophy.

I suppose having opened the subject I should mention William James'Radical Empiricism which I think has a bearing:

Quote:
It asserts that experience includes both particulars and relations between those particulars, and that therefore both deserve a place in our explanations. In concrete terms: any philosophical worldview is flawed if it stops at the physical level and fails to explain how meaning, values and intentionality can arise from that.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 11:01 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;132605 wrote:
Perfectly true but I don't know what that means in philosophical terms. I need to do some more reading on it. But the point of referring to Einstein, relativity and the paradoxes of QM is to argue that the naive realist position (the word 'naive' is not intended pejoratively in this context) has been undermined, not just by philosophical argument, but by scientific discoveries. That is why those many physicists, who you criticize elsewhere for 'not being philosophers', have become interested in mystical spirituality (for want of a better term). They are casting about for a world-picture which makes more sense of the empirical data because the idea that the Universe is composed of a bunch of things, stuff, or particles no longer makes sense. As Sir James Jeans said, it resembles a great mind more than a great machine. Hence the rediscovery of metaphysics.


Right, Locke's empiricism was based on what he called the persistence of things. Which was the theory that our experience of a certain thing remained the same until it was destroyed. This mode of thought was based upon Newtonian physics and a theory of space controlled by Euclidean geometry. Even Kant once said if Euclidean geometry was ever overturned, he would be forced to rethink his entire metaphysics.

These two axioms are becoming increasingly turned over with every advancement in QM. The problem remains, however, that the entire world still constructs a reality ruled by an absolute notion of space and time. The average person today couldn't even imagine the existence of anything resembling spacetime as it is proposed by modern physics. Therefore, it is impossible for them to understand how relative experience itself actually is.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 11:07 pm
@Pythagorean,
I posted this on another thread, but it seems relevant here as well. Kojeve, of course.

Quote:

I see no objection to saying that the natural World eludes conceptual understanding. Indeed, this would only mean that the existence of Nature is revealed by mathematical algorthm, for example, and not by concepts--that is by words having a meaning. Now, modern physics leads in the end to this result: one cannot speak of the physical reality without contradictions; as soon as one passes from algorthm to verbal description, one contradicts himself (particle-waves for example). Hence there would be no discourse revealing the physical or natural reality. This reality (as presented as early as Galileo) would be revealed to man only by the articulated silence of algorthm.....Now it does seem that algorthm, being nontemporal, does not reveal Life. But neither does dialectic. Therefore it may be necessary to combine Plato's conception(for the mathematical, or better, geometrical, substructure of the world) with Aristotle's (for its biological structure) and Kant's (for its physical, or better, dynamic, structure), while reserving Hegelian dialectic for Man and History..
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Thu 25 Feb, 2010 11:19 pm
@Reconstructo,
I see language as the foundation of conceptual understanding and interrelated subjectivity. Words and numbers are both signifiers for a signified concept, and it is only through language that these concepts can be communally spread. What natural science considers objective reality is only possible because of the rationality of the meaning brought into reality by words.

Let me edit this a bit and say that language is not the only way in which concepts can be spread, just the most common.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Fri 26 Feb, 2010 12:29 am
@MMP2506,
MMP2506;132667 wrote:
The problem remains, however, that the entire world still constructs a reality ruled by an absolute notion of space and time.


You mean, people generally and instinctively still continue to see things this way, despite what relativity and QM says to the contrary? I suppose this is quite understandable. I mean, it took an Einstein so see that things weren't this way.

MMP2506;132674 wrote:
I see language as the foundation of conceptual understanding and interrelated subjectivity. Words and numbers are both signifiers for a signified concept, and it is only through language that these concepts can be communally spread. What natural science considers objective reality is only possible because of the rationality of the meaning brought into reality by words.


For some reason, I am very attracted to the idea of mathematical realism. I think number describes a reality. The fact that number is not actually apparent to anyone who can't count makes it even more interesting. It is a non-material attribute of the nature of things. I don't know if I accept 'representationalism' - that number is an mental operation that corresponds to a physical reality. I think mathematics somehow reflects the deep structure of reality itself, and is neither objective nor subjective. It is not an attribute of the physical world, because without anyone to count, numbers don't exist. Yet it is also not an attribute of the individual mind, because it is the same for all minds. I am still contemplating this. It seems important to me.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 26 Feb, 2010 12:35 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;132604 wrote:
We have no way of knowing this.


As a matter of fact, if there were elephants, but no people, then there would be elephants but not experience of elephants. Don't we know that is true, since it would be impossible for there to be experiences of elephants unless there were people to have such experiences. And, don't you suppose that some place in Africa, there are elephants, but no people around.

In any case, what has knowing whether something is true to do with whether that something is true? Something can be true, and no one know it is true.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Fri 26 Feb, 2010 12:48 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;132690 wrote:

It is not an attribute of the physical world, because without anyone to count, numbers don't exist. Yet it is also not an attribute of the individual mind, because it is the same for all minds. I am still contemplating this. It seems important to me.


This conception of number seems transcendental, and it's one I share. Geometry is not something I've thought much on. But algebra and arithmetic seem like modifications of unity, or the number 1. Could all numbers stand or fall on the possibility of what the number one refers to? Is this number one a sign for the concept of substance?

---------- Post added 02-26-2010 at 01:53 AM ----------

kennethamy;132692 wrote:
As a matter of fact, if there were elephants, but no people, then there would be elephants but not experience of elephants. Don't we know that is true, since it would be impossible for there to be experiences of elephants unless there were people to have such experiences. And, don't you suppose that some place in Africa, there are elephants, but no people around.

In any case, what has knowing whether something is true to do with whether that something is true? Something can be true, and no one know it is true.


All of these elephants exists conceptually as your experience. Being - being = "being." Elephant - elephant = "elephant." That's not your usual math. No sir. Your are projecting your memory/concept of elephants into imaginary situations.

If I do any kind of supposing at all, I am experiencing this supposing.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Fri 26 Feb, 2010 12:56 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;132690 wrote:
You mean, people generally and instinctively still continue to see things this way, despite what relativity and QM says to the contrary? I suppose this is quite understandable. I mean, it took an Einstein so see that things weren't this way.



For some reason, I am very attracted to the idea of mathematical realism. I think number describes a reality. The fact that number is not actually apparent to anyone who can't count makes it even more interesting. It is a non-material attribute of the nature of things. I don't know if I accept 'representationalism' - that number is an mental operation that corresponds to a physical reality. I think mathematics somehow reflects the deep structure of reality itself, and is neither objective nor subjective. It is not an attribute of the physical world, because without anyone to count, numbers don't exist. Yet it is also not an attribute of the individual mind, because it is the same for all minds. I am still contemplating this. It seems important to me.


The Pythagoreans worshiped the meaning behind numbers, and maybe rightly so. Their concept of number was much different from ours today, as for them, numbers weren't used to differentiate, but to relate. The idea was that numbers are necessarily in each other, such as "1" being necessarily in "2" and so on. This way quantifiable data is an attempt to display similarities between things. I think this method of relatedness is ingeniously rational by its very definition.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 26 Feb, 2010 01:25 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;132697 wrote:
This conception of number seems transcendental, and it's one I share. Geometry is not something I've thought much on. But algebra and arithmetic seem like modifications of unity, or the number 1. Could all numbers stand or fall on the possibility of what the number one refers to? Is this number one a sign for the concept of substance?

---------- Post added 02-26-2010 at 01:53 AM ----------



All of these elephants exists conceptually as your experience. Being - being = "being." Elephant - elephant = "elephant." That's not your usual math. No sir. Your are projecting your memory/concept of elephants into imaginary situations.

If I do any kind of supposing at all, I am experiencing this supposing.


I suppose you mean that there is such a thing as the concept of elephant. I cannot imagine what else you might mean by, All of these elephants exists conceptually. And that some people see, etc. elephants.

Doesn't "we experience supposing" just mean, "We suppose things"? You don't really believe that each time someone supposes something, he has some particular experience called, "the experience of supposing" do you? But even if that were true (which it clearly is not) what is its relevance?
 
 

 
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