@jgweed,
jgweed;131826 wrote:
I might also suggest that even though we may be mislead by appearances (or perhaps perceptions), we are able to "correct" these mistakes without any reference to anything other than appearances.
One possible description of appearances could be a blithering mental chaos as is perhaps the way a house fly or some other instinctual blind and dumb animal experiences the world. The immediate impressions of nature blinded mankind for tens of thousands of years and he gave mystical interpretations to his immediate sense impressions and this is said to have held him down and kept him as more of an instinctual dumb animal himself.
To construct a correct view of reality, as is done in a courtroom for example, one needs to apply reason to a vast array of eye witnesses in hopes to discover what really took place. What it is that we are analysing in this case is not straightforward appearances but rather, accounts of appearances and other accounts which are all then turned into data and then interpreted. It seems there must be a reasonabale seperation between the immediate impressions on our senses, which yield no direct knowledge
per se, and a more meaningful account of things.
It was Descartes who famously argued that when we examine matter (which is the source of truth according to him) we use our reason and not our senses because the senses deceive us.
Of course one could argue that in Descartes wax argument it is the senses alone that account for our veridical knowledge of its primary quality of 'extension', i.e. extended substance. Which of course could imply that extension is also deceptive and does not exist in itself but only in the senses of the observer. That extension too is just appearance. And that is Berkeley's idealistic rejoinder.
Philosophers have never proved the non-existence of the thing-in-itself, they have only said that such a subject is not worth discussion. And that is a prejudice not a philosophical argument.
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