The following is a philosophical work for debate among forum members. I'll be posting the complete argument over the next few days.

Please attempt to grasp the whole argument before offering a criticism.

Keep in mind that it is all too easy to attack an argument piece by piece.

An argument should be understood in its entirety before any reasonable comments or criticisms can be made, and if you wish to attack this argument, all I ask is that you have a sufficient grasp of the argument. It has taken 25 years to formulate. Considering, a simple rejection by a few words will not prove sufficient to crush it or stamp it out.

The argument amounts to a defense against atheism. The claim is that theists have no rational grounds to support the belief in the existence of a Supreme Being. This argument addresses that false notion.

This argument also amounts to a system of philosophy. While I have been told by a philosophy professor that philosophers are no longer in the habit of putting forth systems of philosophy, I do not abide by what other people think philosophers do or don't do. Philosophy can't be held in check by anyone and no one can put arbitrary rules on what philosophers should be doing or shouldn't be doing. The simple statement that philosophers are no longer in the habit of putting forth philosophical systems is no different than saying something like: Philosophers are no longer allowed to think.

Sorry. But I was given a mind. So have you. We have the right to think. No one has yet put forth a taxing system that taxes people by the volume of the thoughts that go through their heads. Maybe one day there will be such a tax. Until then, I'll go ahead and keep thinking, and I don't have to suggest to you that you should do the same. We all think all the time and we should go on thinking, until the worms start eating at us.

The following argument is the result of thinking. It is not an argument like any other put forth previously; although Hegel is given mention. But there is no real comparison with anything put forth by any other philosopher, past or present. Immanuel Kant is mentioned because if it were not for Kant, this system of philosophy would not have been attempted. It addresses Kant's challenge.

I had a mind to post several threads, but have since changed my mind. What I'll do is type out the whole argument on this thread, and I may revise the title accordingly.

Footnotes throughout will be presented in brackets following the numbered footnotes that appear in parentheses.




[CENTER]Causal Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being
(As a Science of Metaphysics)[/CENTER]

[CENTER]Introduction[/CENTER]

The Causal Argument presented here answers the challenge voiced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. However, since its publication almost three centuries ago the misunderstandings that immediately plagued the Critique prompted Kant to write a second work: The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Might be Brought Forth as a Science. Since this later work was meant to address these misunderstandings, and is far less daunting and easier to grasp, is is this work that will be referred to throughout the following. (1)

[Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant. The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, Co., Inc., New York, 1950. Page numbers appear in brackets following each quote.]

The challenge voice by Kant went out to speculative philosophers, also known as metaphysicians, to raise metaphysics to the level of a science. By a science, Kant implied a system of objectively valid, as opposed to merely arbitrary, a priori philosophical principles, derived from pure reason. It is not meant here to argue whether there is in fact any understanding that we can truly call a priori, or pure. This would demand that we go beyond the scope and the intent of this argument, which is only to present a system of understanding that falls in line with Kant's strict critical demands. It is only important to understand that what Kant implied by the term a priori, were were principles not derived from observation, experience, or repeated testing and trails, but principles that could be thought out entirely in the mind, and only afterward, applied to the test of observation and experience.

Something similar to this can be seen in the theories put forward by astrophysicists and that cannot be tested through any ordinary scientific methods, but are yet understood as being objectively valid, for mathematics has its own inherent rules to which all mathematicians adhere. There is no lack of consensus, even though the theories may never be proven. This is at least something like the a priori method that Kant demanded from speculative philosophers, short of which Kant was adamant in his insistence that metaphysics did not, and could not exist.

Whether the following science in answer to Kant falls in line with this demand on Kant's part will be for those who are more familiar with this philosopher to debate.

It is also argued here that it is only by the actual presentation of such an a priori system of principles that there remains any practical possibility of overcoming those misunderstandings that still plague Kant's critical philosophy, (2) ...

[In his book, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (Collier Books, Macmillan, New York) Mortimer J. Adler states in the section Knowledge and Opinion, that Kant wrote his critical works in an attempt to establish Euclidean geometry and traditional arithmetic as true sciences ... and he completely denounces Kant's transcendental philosophy as an extraordinary elaborate and ingenious intellectual invention, but Adler completely glosses over Kant's fundamental intention (making no mention of it) and this fundamental intention was to point metaphysicians in the direction of a priori certainty ... hoping thereby to establish metaphysics as a science. Unfortunately, the profound difficulty of such an undertaking is of such a magnitude (appearing not only pretentious, but in some minds, something only a lunatic would think of hoping to realize), that it prompts more practically minded philosophers such as Adler to draw conclusions with regard to Kant that seem more palpable. In doing so, they sadly underestimate Kant, and entirely misunderstand the one fundamental point of his critical philosophy ... to which Kant himself appears unmistakably clear in his Introduction to the Prolegomena, writing: "These Prolegomena are for the use, not of mere learners, but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself ...." [255-256] implying the discovery of the science, should it ever be realized. It is this profound challenge that Adler completely fails to appreciate, and it is for this reason that he utters his denouncement of Kant by writing: 'How anyone in the twentieth century can take Kant's transcendental philosophy seriously is baffling.' [98]. More practically minded philosophers, to which there is no shortage in the world, are no doubt bound to agree with Adler's estimation, and will as such continue to deny what they think to be impossible, even given the realization of the science Kant foresaw more than two centuries ago.]

... and only with this task accomplished will it be seen how far-reaching Kant's thinking truly was.

The demand for such objectively valid reasoning and understanding is such a crucial sticking point with Kant that in the opening to his Prolegomena he poses the question to anyone hoping to demonstrate anything in this regard: "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" [275-276]

The following Causal Argument can be defined as a synthetic cognition a priori, according to Kant's definition. But Kant asks: How is it possible?

This question is answered as follows:

The possibility of this Causal Argument is realized through the utilization of the pure and universal concepts of space, time (or simply: spacetime) mass, and mind. There are no other universal concepts that need to be employed in order for one to grasp an understanding of this argument.

However, the term mind, as employed throughout this argument, must be understood in the context of how it is defined within this argument, as opposed to how it may be defined outside of this argument.

It should also become clear with the very first principle that will follow that the universal concept of mind is the most crucial concept of all. Without grasping its definition as employed here one cannot possibly comprehend this argument. And if one fails to comprehend this argument then it must be conceded that neither can one successfully defend or refute this argument.

The four a priori principles that are derived through the utilization of these universal concepts are:

1. The Causal Principle.
2. The Principle of Divergence.
3. The Principle of Equal Relation.
4. The Principle of Progressive Design.

The most significant conclusion reached by these four principles is that the universe is not the accidental work of mere random and indeterminate material forces, but the result of a pure, dynamic force of mind that infinitely transcends, yet governs the whole of the universe, and everything in the universe.

To begin with, it should be of some interest to note that cosmologists have dated our universe back in time some 15 billion years, to a primeval first state, in which space, time, and the mass of the universe, were reduced to a state of sero spacetime with, paradoxically, an infinite density --the so-called singularity ... the state from which our universe, arguably, arose.

This Causal Argument reaches this same conclusion but it pushes the regression of all things even further back, beyond the singularity, to the point that provides for its premise, and that can rationally be defined as an ultimate first state.

This ultimate first state, for the lack of no more appropriate definition, can also be defined as the simplest of all possible states, and it is from this simplest of all possible states that the universals mentioned, advanced through the causal process defined through these principles, to the state in which we now find all things.



[CENTER]The Causal Principle[/CENTER]

Kant provides the direction with regard to the beginning for a science of metaphysics with what he calls the first antinomy of pure reason, as follows:

Thesis: The world [universe] has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit.).

Antithesis: The world [universe] is, as to time and space, infinite. [339-340]

The thesis and antithesis are offered their respective proofs, but as the thesis and the antithesis with their proofs are in direct contradiction to each other, either the thesis or the antithesis must be false. They cannot both be true.

This argument decides in favour of the thesis, but how is the disproof of the antithesis accomplished?

Kant steers our thinking in a certain direction by stating (with regard to anyone who might take a critical look at this problem for pure reason):

"But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling about possibility and conjecture, which are suited as little to metaphysics as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of so-called common sense, which does not convince everyone but accommodates itself to personal peculiarities ... We might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures." [369-370]

And as to the importance of this obstacle:

"I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have establsihed it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions and to force it to self-examination. For every proof which I have given of both thesis and antithesis I understakd to be responsible, and thereby to show the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all knowledge by pure reason with me more thoroughly." [340-341 -footnote]

Kant understood that without resolving this antinomy no science of metaphysics would be possible, thus he asks his critical reader to devote to this antinomy his chief attention.

It is of no small significance that cosmologists have estimated the age of the universe at roughly 15 billion years, and have concluded that the universe did have an ultimate beginning. This in turn means that the universe is not, as the antithesis suggests, something that has always simply existed. (3)

[3: Olbers' Paradox draws the same conclusion. Yet it is possible to suggest that the universe did exist in some form ... albeit remotely removed from its present state ... which is another way to look at this Causal Argument, and the transformation that it proposes that brought it from its simplest of possible states, to its present state.]

As for this antinomy, it could be argued that it rests upon the very thing that Kant shunned in metaphysics: the magic wand of so-called common sense, for it is common sense, not critical thinking, that would have us conclude that only nothing can follow from nothing.

The very definition of nothing as found in any common dictionary is a common-sensed definition, but if we are to avoid the trap of appealing to common sense, as Kant would advise, then we must take a critical look at the antinomy; and here we can begin this critical look at the antinomy by asking the simple question: What it is that we have in mind when we think nothing?

The common-sensed answer is, of course: Nothing.

But a more critical reflection on just what we have in mind should lead to something more like the following:

The very act of thinking nothing amounts to something. It is, in reality, impossible to think nothing. However far removed we may imagine our thinking to be from all that constitutes the reality surrounding us, and in which we are engulfed, we can never grasp in our understanding a state in which all thought has been overcome. There will always be something outside of the mind that will draw us back to reality. The outside world is something we cannot escape, anymore than we can escape from the inner world of the mind that reflects both inwardly and outwardly.

With this much it then becomes possible to put forth a critical definition of nothing as an alternative to the common-sensed definition of nothing; and this critical definition consists of two a priori representations, or ideas, that come to mind when we attempt to think nothing, as follows:

A) The idea or the concept of a total, or an absolute void [absolute in the sense that the universe and all that it can be said to contain is cancelled out existence] as an ultimately simple, unconditional, indivisible, immutable, and eternally or infinitely boundless state that exists, and cannot be thought of as not existing; and this, only in relation to:

B) The conditional, finite, and subjective, internal thought of A.

Now the immediate difficulty follows that in removing the subjective thought of A from the premise, we are then truly left with nothing at all. That is, if we do not exist, then we cannot think either A or B.

But the removal of our own thinking process from this premise does not remove the necessary, unconditional state of A.

A still remains, and the argument is that if A remains as a necessary condition that can never be thought of as not existing (even with our existence cancelled out), then B is also necessarily given.

So what is implied then, in this reduction, is not a state of nothing, according to the practical, common sensed definition; but rather, a simplest of all possible states, or a state most closely approximating, but never obtaining to what we can call a total, or an absolute void.

As B invariably follows, given A, we then have an understanding, and the only possible understanding that pure reason can ever afford us, of that state which is the least of all possible states imaginable, or conceivable.

These two pure representations present us with the idea of an ultimate first state, or that ultimate beginning beyond which there can be no further regression backwards to even greater simplicity; and conversly, they then present to our thinking that ultimate first state from which all things must have advanced forward, from this simplest of all possible states, towards greater complexity, and being.

To the definition of these A and B representations we may then add the further definitions:

1. The simplest of all possible states.
2. The ultimate point to which the regression of spacetime, mass, and mind towards greater simplicity, terminates.
3. The ultimate first state from which the advancement of spacetime, mass, and mind towards greater complexity, begins.

A further critical judgment follows in this regard and this is that a state of nothing in the absolute sense, as regards the universe as something separate to us, is impossible; so that as regards the universe itself, there is no such state that amounts to an absolute void from which only nothing is possible.

The fact that the universe exists proves that there never was, and never could have been, a state such as nothing from which only nothing could have followed. That is, there always must have been, however infinitesimal (and this is the crux of the whole difficulty), something from which something else has followed. And it is the A and B representations that provide for our only possible understanding of what that something was.

It should be of paramount importance that in this consideration one otherwise dogged problem of philosophy has been overcome, and that problem is the problem of an infinite regress. If, that is, we should begin at some more complex condition, the question always arises: 'From where did this supposed complex condition originate?' Each conditon that begs this question informs us, intuitively, that we have not yet arrived at a pure understanding of that ultimate first state from which all things must have followed.

Insofar as we cannot beg the question with regard to the A and B representations proposed, this problem has been overcome.

It is of some significance as well that Hegel addresses Kant's first antinomy in a somewhat similar manner, but in all the collected works attributed to Hegel, the place where it is found that he addresses the antinomy still fails to explain how the first antinomy is overcome.

The closest we find to a solution to the antinomy, and in which Hegel suggests something such as what has been proposed here, appears in Hegel's Science of Logic, as follows:

" ... we see that absolute spirit, which is found to be the concrete, last, and highest truth of alll being, at the end of its evolution freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an immediate being: it resolves itself to the creation of a world which contains everything included in the evolution preceding that result; all of which, by reason of this inverted position, is changed, together with its beginning, into something dependent on the result, for the result is the principle. What is essential for the science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that itself in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the last first. [208] (4)

[From The Philosophy of Hegel, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (A Modern Library Book, Random House, N.Y., 1953).

But there is nothing in this brief section (nor anywhere else in the works attributed to Hegel) that would satisfy Kant's demand for a priori, certainty.

Further, what does Hegel mean by a pure immediate?

And what is meant by: in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself?

The clearest Hegel comes to explaining his meaning is found in the following:

" ... in any science a beginning is made by presupposing some idea -such idea being next analyzed, so that it is only the result of this analysis which affords the first definite concept of the science. Were we too to observe this procedure we should have no particular object before us, because the beginning, as being the beginning of thought, must be perfectly abstract and general, pure form quite without content; we should have nothing but the idea of a bare beginning as such, it remains to be seen what we possess in this idea.

"So are there is nothing: something is to become. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; so that being is already contained in the beginning. The beginning thus contains both, being and nothing; it is the unity of being and nothing, or is not-being which is being, and being which is also not-being."

While it may be said that Hegel involves himself here in some apparent contradictions, I think this criticism is all too easy. What I think Hegel is suggesting is that we should not just be accepting our ordinary terms dogmatically, but we should try to be seeing more than just what our common sense suggests to us. Hegel, in the above, reflects an anti-black- or-white, either-or, reasoning; such as that reflected in the presumption upon which the first antinomy rests.

In this respect, orthodox Kantians, among whom the most common-sensed thinkers can be found, cannot accuse Hegel of violating Kant's critical demands; although, no doubt, they will argue otherwise.

Hegel continues:

"Further, being and nothing are present in the beginning as distinct from one another; for the beginning points forwards to something other; it is a not-being related to being as to an other; that which is-beginning, as yet is not: it is advancing towards being. The beginning therefore contains being as having this characteristic; that it flies from and transcends not-being, as its opposite."

Here Hegel has offered his own argument against the common-sensed judgment that nothing is only nothing, and that's all there is to the matter.

"And further, that which is-beginning, already is, and equally, as yet, is not. The opposites being and not-being are therefore in immediate union in it; in other words, it is the undifferentiated unity of the two." [211]

And continuing on:

"That which constitutes the beginning (and that is, the very beginning itself) must therefore be taken, in its simple immediacy without content, as something not admitting analysis, hence as pure vacuity, as Being ... If anyone, impatiant of the consideration of the abstract beginning, should demand that we begin, not with the beginning, but directly with the matter itself, the answer is that the matter is just this empty being: it is the coure of the science that we are to discover what the matter is; the science must not therefore presuppose this as known ... If any form is taken for the beginning in preference to empty being, then the beginning suffers from the flaws mentioned."

The difficulty Hegel is confronted with is that the void with which he begins seems to suggest nothing for critical reflection, yet, the analysis that Hegel suggests is not possible, must at least be attempted, for it is only by such an analysis that we can move beyond Hegel.

Such an analysis has already begun with the A and B representations.

So the next question follows: What more, if anything, can be found in these representations?

Here I will again defer at first, to Hegel:

"Whatever element of intellectual intuition is present at the beginning of the science, it cannot be anything but primary, immediate, and simple determination; or, if the object of such intuition is called the eternal or the divine of the absolute, the same applies to whatever of these elements is present in the beginning .... Hence in such a representation a beginning is not made with the concrete, but with the simple immediate when the movement starts. Further, if a concrete thing is taken as the beginning, there is lacking the proof whichis demanded by the complex of determinations contained in the concrete [the problem of the infinite regress] ... The expression of the absolute, the eternal, or God (and God has the most undisputed right that the beginning should be made with Him), or the contemplation or thought of these, may contain more than pure Being: if that is so, such content has yet to manifest itself to thinking (and not to presentational) knowledge; for, however rich this content, the first determination which emerges into knowledge is something simple, for it is only the simple which does not contain something more than pure beginning: the immediate alone is simple, for there only no transition has taken place from one to an other. If these richer forms of presentation, such as the Absolute, or God, express or contain anything beyond being, then this is, in the beginning, but an empty word and mrere being; so that this simple vacancy without further meaning is, absolutely, the beginning of philosophy ... This consideration is so simple that the beginning as such requires no preparation nor further introduction; and this preliminary discussion was not so much intended to deduce it as to remove all preliminaries." [216-217]

Hegel speaks of a movement or a transition from a vacuous state of not-being, to a state of Being.

Where Hegel falls short is in his failure to outline how the simple immediate that he refers to, has undergone the process of change that led it from its ultimate first, and simplest possible state of being, to all the complexity that now exists in the universe. He has not explained by means of any a priori principles, or system of reasoning,the causal process that has, by necessity, compelled all things towards their present state of being.

While this may seem to demand the impossible the following will show that the difficulty of the task lies not in the question that demands an answer as much as it rests in our habitual ways of thinking.

Let us for the moment then, go beyond both Kant and Hegel, and attempt a further analysis of the A and B representations.

In these two pure and simple representations we have the concept of a necessary relation between Cause and effect, for the concept of A as an infinite, or constant, unconditional state, can be thought of as an Absolute, First Cause, or motivating factor that compels into being, the effect of B.

As A is given as an infinite, or constant motivating factor, then B, as has been argued, must inevitably follow; regardless of however infinitesimal.

Any argument that the apparent insignificance of such a beginning still leaves us with only a nothing from which only nothing can follow, is countered by the argument that we are here speaking of the most infinitesimal and most remote of all possible beginnings. The criticism therefore cannot help but arise, but while it may appear that there is in this sufficient grounds to argue against the possibility of B, the necessary insignificance of such a minute and simplest of all possible beginings should rather help us to understand and account for the possibility of B.

To clarify things further then:

A can be defined further as the external, ultimate, and the inevitable First Cause to a necessary, internal condition B, that folllows as an effect, however infinitesimal, compelled or motivated towards being through its pure relation to the objective state of A, as its ultimate Cause.

Here the Causal relation implied is not however, that of a static, or an immobile relation, but rather, that of a dynamic relation between Cause and effect. For as A remains an unconditional and constant/infinite state, and hence, as that motivating factor that compels into existence the effect of B, then B must follow as an internal force compelled to expand away from its finite state of being, towards the objective state of A, as its ultimate Cause.

The Causal Principle that follows from this simple analysis can now be put forth as follows:

A) The Absolute or the Ultimate First Cause to:

B) The effect of an internal, expanding, dynamic force of mind, compelled towards A, by virtue of the pure state of relation between A and B.

Further, as A is that of an infinite or constant motivating factor, it follows that B -despite it being a finite effect- must by means of this constant motivating factor, inevitably, and necessarily, obtain to A.

This is a necessary conclusion that is inherent to the Causal Principle; that is, it is inherent to the proper and full understanding of the principle and what is implied by the A and B representations.

However, the question then follows: How are we to understand the causal process whereby the effect =B can be understood as obtaining to the Absolute =A?

This is explained by the following principle.


[CENTER]The Principle of Divergence[/CENTER]

The complete causal process by which the effect proposed can be understood as moving from its simplest of all possible states to the Absolute can be understood as a series of interconnected stages of cause and effect, wherein each stage went through an expanding, then a contracting phase, and wherein each stage intensified over each preceding stage, and wherein spacetime, mass, and mind, emerged from this simplest, most unified, least complex states, to their most complex, most diverse, and most intense of possible states.

This causal process is explained as follows:

The dynamic nature of the effect =B, can be understood only by thinking of it as an expanding sphere, drawn to expand away from its finite frame by virtue of its pure realtion to the external state of A, as its costant motivating factor.

But is is impossible to think of such an effect as continuing to expand away from its finite sphere indefinitely, or without end, for implicit to the concept of this effect is the concept of change. And this change, we must necessarily attempt to understand if we hope to have any understanding of what is implied by the effect.

With the concept of the dynamic nature of the effect we have seemingly increased the difficulty with which we are faced, for with the concept of this expanding effect we have introduced into our thinking the concept of two opposing forces (however minimal these may be thought), with the effect being thought of as a dynamic force moving in opposition to the constant, unchanging, unconditional state of its Cause. That is, In the very idea of the effect we seem to have introduced the idea of its impossibility.

But rather than increase the difficulty of advancing our understanding further, this conflict in fact provides the very means by which we may do just that -advance our understanding of what is implied by the effect.

The effect is by its own definition a conditional and a finite state, while its Cause can only be understood as an unconditional and infinite state, external to this effect.

The finitude of this effect can be understood in that it can only be thought of as an expanding sphere, and therfore, as a dynamically expanding sphere that must diminish in its force in proportion to its increasing sphere.

The effect then, while necessitated due to its initial pure state of relation to its Cause (and that is explicit in the definition of the A and B representations), could only have followed to a finite extent; for its realization implies that a state of opposition between Cause and effect ensued once the effect was given.

This opposition between Cause and effect can be understood in terms of a certain change in the form of the effect. And this change can be thought of as a divergence of the effect away from its initial state, or away from its initial pure relation to its Cause.

[To this point, the explanation of this opposition may appear vague, but this opposition leads to a further clarification of the Principle of Divergence that will more clearly help us to account for the change implied by the effect, and the nature of this opposition between Cause and effect.]

It follows then that due to the opposing state of relation that ensued between this Cause and effect, that this effect, once its outwards force of expansion had completely dissipated, would have been driven back to the original point from which its expansion began.

However, as the Absolute Cause to this effect implies an infinite motivating factor, once this effect had been driven back to its initial, originating point, this effect would once again have ensued, as before, so that what would have followed would then have been a succession of expanding and contracting stages -implying a series of successive effects, all following the same inevitable process of expansion and collapse.

What then is to be grasped in our understanding is not simply a complete series of expanding and contracting stages, but a series in which each successive stage intensified over that of each preceding stage.

The Cause for this intensifying series is to repeat, the Absolute state that provides for the Ultimate Cause, and the ultimate objective of B.

As for the change implied by this effect in its movement towards A, this can be understood in terms of its successive intensification, and by means of its successive divergence away from the pure form it consisted of at the very beginning of this series.

This overall change we can understand further by introducing into our idea of this series, the concept of mass, or density, without having any exact idea as to the nature or form of this mass or density.

This mass or density we can think of as necessarily decreasing with the outward expansion of the effect, and conversely, increasing with its contraction back to its originating point.

[Another concept can be thought of here; for instance: the concept of heat, although it is not necessary for the purpose of this argument and as with other concepts, it may simply be implied.]

We can follow through then to the logical judgment that this series continued to intensify due to the constant and Absolute motivating factor that drove this series, with the result that each stage throughtout this series brought about a further divergence in the form of the overall effect.

To visualize this overall change we can think of the form of any particular stage within this series as remaining at the beginning of this series, more unified or whole, but with the latter stages, this form must have become more divergent, and more disproportionate as opposed to whole.

Before explaining this further there are two crucial factors that should be clarified further so that we can understand how the universals mentioned came into being.

One factor is the continuing state of relation between Cause and effect ... this being the factor that drove this series.

The other factor is the divergence of the effect which implies an opposing stage of relation between Cause and effect.

These two factors are the crucial factors that we need to grasp in order for us to comprehend not only the possibility, but the necessity of this series.

David Hume offers some insight here, in his Treatise of Human Nature, wherein we find the following:

1. The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time.
2. The cause must be prior to the effect.
3. There must be a constant union between [sic] the cause and effect. It is [sic] chiefly this quality that constitutes the relation.
4. The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. (5) [Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. -Oxford, 1967, pg. 173.]

This particular quote is given mainly as a note of interest, but it helps to clarify the problem with which we are faced, and also, the means of overcoming this difficulty.

It is not simply a coincidence that the process explained here follows according to Hume's rules and does so as a matter of necessity. The system works because there is what Hume mentions in his rules, a constant relation between Cause and effect.

We could form no understanding whatsoever of a complete series such as proposed here, if we thought of each of the successive stages making up this series, as remaining completely identical -so that no change in the universals mentioned could be thought of as having followed.

There must have been a change from one stage to the next, and this change can best be thought of as having the form of a successive intensification, as stated, and wherein each stage led further away from the simplest of all possible states proposed as the ultimate beginning of this series.

Through the use of the concept of expansion, the constant state of relation between Cause and effect can be thought of as having been maintained between the outermost edge or limit to each stage of expansion, and the Absolute Cause compelling these stages. For it follows that the outermost edge or limit to each stage of expansion would have had the most intense rate of expansion, while those divergent forces that trailed off from this outermost edge would necessarily have had lesser rates of expansion. And here it should be seen where the concept of mass becomes crucial to our understanding of the change that is implied by this series.

The outermost edge to each stage of expansion would by virtue of its more intense rate of expansion, have maintained a constant relation to its Absolute Cause from one stage to the next, whereas the mass that can be thought of as having trailed off from this outermost edge would have trailed off into a more divergent, and more differentiated mass of separate forces by virtue to their decreased rates of expansion.

This mass of more divergent, disproportionate forces can be thought of as those forces that as a whole, opposed expansion, whereas that force that remained at the outermost edge of each stage of expansion, and that maintained the greatest rate of expansion and a constant union with the Absolute Cause of this series, was that force that compelled these expansions.

However, the successive intensification and divergence of these forces would not have continued indefinitely, and this judgment follows by virtue of a strictly logical and necessary line of reasoning, that will be explained as follows:

First of all, it must be kept in mind that it is the A and B representations that have been utilized to clarify this process. And here they continue to be of importance; for it is the B representation that we must equate with the outermost edge to each stage of expansion. It is the B representation then whereby a costant relation between Cause and effect can be understood as having been maintained throughout the successive stages of this series. But with the change implied by this process we have introduced another concept: the concept of mass. And for the purpose of clarity and simplicity, this concept of mass will be referred to in the following by the designation X.

The crucial factor to be grasped is then that as this series continued, the successive divergence between the outermost foce of expansion =B, and those forces that diverged from it =X, became more and more intense, and more and more pronounced.

Here we can then begin to gather the understanding of the necessary and the inevitable end, or the completion of this series, for just as it is impossible to think of the separate stages of this series as having neither a beginning, nor an end; so it is impossible to think of this series as a whole as having neither a beginning, nor an end.

The inevitable end of this series can be understood with the help of the third principle, as follows:


[CENTER]The Principle of Equal Relation[/CENTER]


The pure concepts of spacetime, mass, and mind are the universals by which one may grasp the concept of this series, or this model of how those universals came into being ... leading from their simplest possible level of intensity and being, to their greatest possible level of intensity and being.

This model describes a dynamic causal process and to understand and visualize this process a certain demand is necessarily placed on the reader's conceptual ability. The difficulty the reader confronts is that of grasping the picture of a dynamically intensifying series of expanding and contracting stages, and the successively increasing divergence of forces trailing off from the outermost edge of each stage of expansion. However to grasp this picture of a dynamically intensifying series it is not essential that we understand anything apart from this general idea of its intensification, so the difficulty, if there is any admission of difficulty, is not one that cannot be overcome.

Here the overall idea is that the dynamic outermost force representing the effect =B, that maintained a constant relation between Cause and effect, grew more intense with each successive stage, and did so in that it maintained a whole, or unified form due to its greater rate of expansion; whereas those forces =X that trailed off from this pure, outermost force, became more disproportionate, and more divergent in their form as this
series continued.

We must keep in mind here that the definition afforded B in the Causal Prinkciple is that of a dynamic, mobile force of mind; and it is those forces that diverged from B, that provided the counterforce to each stage of expansion. The objective of B can then further be explained as not only its inevitable obtaining to its objective state =A, but its overcoming the divergent forces =X, that acted as a counterforce towards its obtaining to its objective state =A.

It is stated that this series must have reached an inevitable end, for it is impossible to think that this intensification of divergent forces went on indefinitely. The end of this series was reached when the divergence between these opposing forces reached a certain critical stage, and this is explained as follows:

In thinking of those forces that diverged from B in its movement towards A as a mass of more intense and more concentrated and more disproportionate forces, we are asked to think of a successively increasing divergence or separation between the form of B and the form of X. While B remained a unified, pure force of energy throughout this series, those forces that diverged from it, could only have grown more disproportionate and more intense, and thus more material, as opposed to whole, in their form.

It follows then that the divergence between these opposing forces must inevitably have reached a certain critical stage wherein no further divergence between these forces remained possible; and this critical stage would have been reached when B finally separated entirely from those forces =X that diverged from it.

This critical stage therefore marked that stage wherein B was brought to such a level of intensity that it overcame completely, those forces opposed to expansion. The two crucial factors that would have decided this critical stage are then: The intensity of B was such that it was equal to the mass of those forces =X that diverged from it; and: This critical stage was that stage wherein B, in its overcoming X, finally obtained to the Absolute.

Until this critical stage was reached the opposing forces generated by this series simply continued to undergo further intensification; but once this critical stage was reached those forces generated by this series could no longer undergo any further intensification, and consequently, this series reached its inevitable end.

Hence this series was brought to a final sate in which there existed these two separate, yet equally balanced forces: A pure, unified, force that can best be defined as a pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind; and separate to this: A mass of more substantial, disproportionate, material forces =X, and that can further be defined as the derivative of B in its movement towards A.


[CENTER]Principle of Progressive Design[/CENTER]


The relation expressed in the Causal Principle is that a dynamic relation between the two representations explained.

The two opposing (in form) forces that were generated by the causal process driven by this dynamic relation were:

1. The mass of the universe, and separate yet related to this:
2. The pure, dynamic force of mind by which this mass was generated into existence.

It should be apparent that the term mind, however, is not being used here in any ordinary sense of the term, for there is nothing implied here other than the pure relation of mind expressed by means of the relation between the A and B representations, and between B and X, as the derivative in the movement of B to A; with B splitting off entirely from X with it's obtaining to A; and there is also nothing in the whole operation of the series proposed that suggests anything other than a kind of mechanical operation.

It is only upon the end of this series, wherein B splits off from X, and obtains to A, that it becomes possible to suggest something other than a simply mechanical operation; for the divergent mass of forces generated by B in its movement towards A, must as a whole be thought of as being perfectly counterbalanced by, and tied to B in such a manner that within B must rest the potential to govern the whole of these separate, material forces, generated by its movement to A. This potential must be considered as iherent to B by reason of its pure, or immaterial form, so that as such, B must have the capacity to both inhabit, and to know, at the most fundamental level, the matter of which thel universe is composed, and thus, to direct the material fabric of the universe, at its most fundamental level, according to its design.

Here then we can proposed a Principle of Progressive Design, for this philosophy begins with the simplest of all possible states, and this state can further be defined as the simplest of all possible relations of mind. Reason affords the only logical explanation of the causal process arising from this beginning, and while resistance may be exprected towards this philosophy from some, there is nothing here that conflicts or in any way contradicts the findings in science ... even with respect to the field most closely related to this same subject, the science of cosmology. To the contrary, this philosophy also points back to an ultimate beginning, but while a state of zero spacetime with infinite density leaves mathematical theorists with an insoluble paradox, this philosophy equates this same state with the originating point of the series that preceded and ultimately led to this beginning.

This then provides the grounds for a concluding principle regarding the intelligent design apparent in the universe, in that the regress of this series point back to an ultimate beginning, predating even the earliest beginning know to science; and to what can best be defined as the simplest of all possible relations of mind. The causal process following from this beginning implies a movement from ultimate simplicity to ultimate complexity and a transition from this ultimate beginning to the infinite mass of the singularity, as well as a transition of the pure relation of mind that drove this series from its ultimate beginning, and its simplest possible state of being, to its final stage, and its obtaining to its greatest possible state of being as Absolute Spirit, Absolute Mind, and Absolute Being.

Though these principles rest upon pure reason they provide rational grounds for that which is otherwise left to the uncertain grounds of a theology shrouded in mystery. And though this philosophy is bound to raise the objection that here, reason, in venturing beyond the bounds of all possible experience, gives birth to a mere illusion, this argument while it extends to the furthest possible extreme, and necessarily so, cannot be shown to extend entirely beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only that it draws to the closest approximation of a total void of experience, so that we are yet left with pure intuition and a pure understanding by means of concepts, without which we would then be open to the objection. But as we are not without the means to extend our understanding futher, and considering the critical form of this argument and the a priori form of its principles, this objection, while the most likely of all, cannot hold.

Futher, although the present empiricist worldview adopts not only a skeptical but at its worst, a hostile stand to the thought of such an Ultimate Reality, it is this one Supreme Reality that accounts for the serious anomalies that otherwise plague the favourite child of this worldview -evolution. But here the need for another critical judgment arises, for as regards this there are but two choices open for deliberation. One choice offers the empiricist position, and this position insists on its original premise a scientifically definable condition from which all else has followed. The other choice leads to the objection that such an original premise proves a logical contradiction, and that any denial of this objection betrays the empiricist notion that hard science offers the only means towards true understanding, while pure philosophy offers not only an inferior, but a false means towards understanding; yet where the question pertains to the ultimate origin of all things it is those who hold to the standard of a strict, empirical science, to the exclusion of pure reason, who adopt the inferior position, for to maintain the consistency of a strict empirical method they, by the force of their own convictions, force themselves to admit to a certain blindness towards the profound depth of the question.

This blindness reveals itself whenever there appears in the many scientific works directed at this same question the lack of any critical distinction between the understanding and the explanation as to the what, and the understanding and the explanation as to the why.

What took place?

Why did it take place?

The two questions are not the same.

There is no doubt that cosmologists, for instance, who now lay claim to a knowledge of all the fundamental laws of physics, are able to explain through these laws those events are thought to have taken place since the Planck time onwards; and while in this cosmologists have gone much further than the vast majority of philosophers could ever hope, this knowledge, when the question is taken in its ultimate sense, amounts not to an underanding of why those events took place, but merely to an understanding of what took place.

To clarify this even further: When mathematical theorists suggest various models that are thought by some to address the question of the origin of all things in the ultimate sense, these models, given their necessary empirical nature, must begin with certain assumptions --these assumptions forming the necessary empirical preliminary conditions upon which these models are grounded. Now even if such models regarding the ultimate origin of all things can be said to be objectively valid, the question, when driven as far as possible, demands an explanation for how these preliminary conditions themselves came to be. But lacking any such explanation as to how these supposed preliminary conditions came to be, means that these models fall short in their accounting for the why.

The question taken in its ultimate sense follows through then to an unavoidable critical judgment, and this is that such an understanding that would truly constitute an understanding of the why, as opposed to simply the what, points to an understanding that could only reside in an Absolute Mind capable of grasping the whole of all that has ever existed, that does exist, or that may exist, in its seemingly infinite complexity; and save for the a priori understanding that can do no more than point to the necessary existence of such an Ultimate Reality, the quest on the part of mathematical theorists bound by a strict empirical method to arrive at a similar understanding, is conducted in vain. The critical impasse of an infinite regress arising from the inescapable human need to press the question as far back as possible will always prevent mathematical theorists from overstepping their bounds, and will always confirm the need for pure philosophy.

Hence, in this failed distinction concering the what and the why, strict empiricists err whenever they assert the authority of science over philosophy and pure reason with regard to those questions that belong not to science, but to philosophy; and while this philosophy removes even the premise of assuming that there exists a necessary, Eternal Being, and so removes from this any blindness towards the profound depth of the question, it is speculative reason in this most critical sense, that provides the one and only possible rational, and purely philosohical proof in the existence of such a Being.

Finally, the only possible remaining objection that the nature of such a Being as an immaterial spirit is itself an impossible, self-contradictory idea, is the same as to argue that a reduction of matter to such a simple underlying essence as pure spirit is itself an impossible, self-contradictory idea; yet science now discloses a reduction of matter beyond atoms to ever simpler forms ever further distanced from hard matter, and at what point are we to assume that this reduction of matter abates?

The empiricist must insist, that if it abates it abates at that which still remains physical in its essence, but what are we to say is the nature of this yet physical essence?

Here science only goes so far, for that which is so distanced from that which is more readily observed leads at best only to conjecture, and whether the issue has to do with the ultimate origin of the universe, the true nature of the human mind, or what it is that constitutes the essence of life, it inevitably ends in one deciding upon those terms and conditions that best reflect one's individual preference. For empiricists, it becomes a matter of deciding upon those terms and conditions that best express their central dogma that only matter exists, and for those who reject this position, it becomes an admission that the fundamental, underlying substance of the physical world reduces ultimately to pure spirit, and against this, the empiricist, unable to deny the findings of science that lead ever further away from the central dogma that only matter exists, and unable to withstand the a priori principles that undermine this dogma, is deprived of all rational grounds for further objections.

But what then is to be said given the scientific evidence that provides, as empiricists claim, the true account of human origins through evolution as evident given a fossil record extending millions of years into the past, and that renders superfluous any such notion as a Supreme Being?

Here the failed distinction between the understanding of the what and the why arises again, and the concept that is of paramount importance when it comes to the recognition of this failed distinction is again the concept of cause and effect, and it is here again that empiricists are left confronting the same critical impasse of an infinite regress.

Here the problem has to do with the physical mechanism that is thought to be driving the evolutionary process at its simplest biological level. But even granting all the knowledge gathered from science in this area, when the question is driven as far as possible, this knowledge, regardless of its factual or its theoretical nature, falls short of satsifying the critical demands imposed by the depth of the question.

The understanding in demand again is not an understanding of what took place. What is in demand is nothing less than a demonstration of the dynamic mechanism of change that empiricists believe, and must believe, is responsible for driving this process. But any appeal here to a physical mechanism of change fails, for the same intuitive question arises: How did this physical mechanism of change come to be? If this question is not answered, then the solution fails; and hence, all empiricist attempts at reach for an understanding of the why, are doomed to failure.

Driven then by the need to press the question as far as possible we are led to the philosophical alternative, and to the preceding argument that by necessity, follows through to the judgment that the universe in all its infinite complexity, from the formation of the elements, to the formation of galaxies and stars, and the intricate, vast and complex web of life that has advanced over billions of years on Earth, attests not to the existence of a mindless physical mechanism of change (an impossible idea), but to the continuing drive of the Supreme Author of this design to bring all things to an ever greater state of complexity and being.

Given then this, as it may be called, Principle of Progressive Design, as a logical conclusion of the previous principles, the otherwise persistent anomalies that plague the theor of evolution disappear; for instance: the relatively brief period of time over which species related to the human family progressed to the level of Homo sapiens. This period, of about four million years, reflects only 0.1 percent of the Earth's 4.6 billion year history ... a period of time far too short according to many scientists for the normal processes of evolution to have achieved such advances. In the attempt to overcome this difficulty various theories have been proposed to account for how evolution proceeds not gradually, but rapidly; yet all such theories are prone to the same criticism leveled here against empiricist theories with respect to the question of origin taken in its ultimate sense.

The preceding principles are the only means of meeting the critical demands imposed by the question when driven as far as possible, and the Principle of Progressive Design that follows from the preceding three principles overcomes those difficulties for which there are no possible emirical solutions, for it expresses an Absolute consciousness in which the whole of creation, from its most minute features to its greatest and most complex features, are understood in their entirely, as they exist both in themselves, and as they exist in relation to the whole of creation; and it expresses a Supreme Mind that has advanced in its dynamic consciousness, and creative capacity, through the very act of creation. And it expresses a Supreme Mind that has through this boundless capacity for intelligent and purposeful thought and design given life, through a complexity of processes and actions that infinitely transcend finite human comprehension, and that defy all strict empiricist attempts to rationally account for the why of this creation, to a vast and diverse community of other beings who can share to some finite extent this same capacity for intelligent and purposeful thought and design.


[CENTER]Further Points of Consideration[/CENTER]