Skepticism and Belief

@Mr Fight the Power,

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

People accept that they may not be able to fathom all that is. From this it follows that they may believe some proposition that is nonsensical. I think that is what Ken is going for and it is what I was leading to, but I realize I'm stupid. One simply wouldn't know what one is believing.

Without delving too far into mysticism and talk about the spiritual, I am asking you to reflect sincerely on the consequences of saying of someone that he or she believes a contradiction.

We don't need to start talking about "religion" and thus getting into this seemingly automatic mode of respect and austerity. Forget that nonsense. I'm not here to attack or defend religion.

I am telling you quite straightly and concretely: We cannot believe contradictions. "Nonsense" and "senseless" are luxury terms we can do without.

Stick to contradictions--use the word "contradiction." No one can believe a contradiction is true. If they say they do believe it, you must determine whether or not they understand that it is a contradiction.

No one can or does believe that 2+2=5. If you stipulate that a Priest told you and you accept everything the Priest says as true, you are not talking about belief anymore. You are talking about comraderie, compansionship, social coercion, obedience, groupthink.

No one can persuade you to believe it, but someone can coerce you or persuade you into saying that you believe it. The outward, overt, explicit, visible, ostensible act of believing (whatever that is supposed to be) does not imply that one actually believe it.

Singing hymns and praying in church does not imply that those people believe this or that. Theologians, priests, etc go through the motions of religion tradition and ritual; but some of them do not believe, on basis of their determining that whatever is supposed to be believed is a contradiction or is inconsistent with the overall doctrine or is flatly false.

@nerdfiles,

The last sentence was not sarcasm, it was a concession.

We cannot believe nonsensical propositions, because nonsensical propositions have no content which to believe in.

It took me a reevaluation, but it is plain.

@nerdfiles,

And do what you will with your "I am stupid" business. I'm not in the business of calling people stupid. If you want to play the game of philosophy, which is what I presume this forum is about, I am going to push people to do philosophy the best way I see fit. It isn't about intelligence, it's about playing the game a certain way. I don't think you cannot do philosophy my way, but I will not stand for idle talk and grab-assing. Neither of these two things implies stupidity. I don't know what your intelligence is, but I do know that if you give me an argument which is fallacious or you have no intent to play the game as I see fit, I will point this out. Bear in mind, I have preached the rules of my game which I think everyone will find plausible and fair: principles of charitable interpretation, focus on the topic at hand, etc.

It doesn't follow that because I say "as I see fit" that I am wrong. I can have standards and express them. If you don't want to play, then simply cash in your chips and move on. I will argue with whoever I think is at least trying to play the game properly and I will try to explain myself as clearly as I can.

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

And do what you will with your "I am stupid" business. I'm not in the business of calling people stupid. If you want to play the game of philosophy, which is what I presume this forum is about, I am going to push people to do philosophy the best way I see fit. It isn't about intelligence, it's about playing the game a certain way. I don't think you cannot do philosophy my way, but I will not stand for idle talk and grab-assing. Neither of these two things implies stupidity. I don't know what your intelligence is, but I do know that if you give me an argument which is fallacious or you have no intent to play the game as I see fit, I will point this out. Bear in mind, I have preached the rules of my game which I think everyone will find plausible and fair: principles of charitable interpretation, focus on the topic at hand, etc.

It doesn't follow that because I say "as I see fit" that I am wrong. I can have standards and express them. If you don't want to play, then simply cash in your chips and move on. I will argue with whoever I think is at least trying to play the game properly and I will try to explain myself as clearly as I can.

I have been playing your game (given my own opinion on the topic at hand, I rather like that term), it is a tactic of mine to play the others game because sticking to one's own game is fruitless and most games end up in the same place anyways.

I don't particularly like your style, but I am self-assured enough to not really care.

@Mr Fight the Power,

After nerdfiles stated this:

nerdfiles wrote:

We should, or at least I set us out to (perhaps not conspicuously), concern ourselves with belief-that statements where the "that" calls for a proper declarative statement.

...

Thus, these statements are propositions which can express facts about reality.

I haven't a clue why mysticism was even brought up. I believe it was clear the kind of belief you're (Ken and Mr. FTP) suggesting is not what is being discussed here. How it followed that we're now bowing down to nonsensical beliefs dictated by priests is beyond me. I'm sure we're all intelligent enough here to understand: Yes, some people believe things blindly (nonsensically). It almost feels like an insult to even have to mutter this as it's so obvious, and no one is discussing/contesting anything about this. It's already been clarified this is not the sense of belief we're seeking necessary and sufficient conditions for, has it not?

How is any of this "Nerdfiles game"? All he's doing is critically thinking about necessary and sufficient conditions regarding beliefs that are truth-propositions (*thinkable*). I'd hardly call this a game - isn't this something we should all be intently focusing on? I mean, much of philosophy is based upon these analytical belief statements - the one's being delved into here. Asking 'how' people come to believing these truth-propositions seems like logical analysis to me. I think this has little to do with nerdfiles, and more to do with the critical thought I'd hope many should be engaging in in the epistemology forum, no?

---

First, what do you mean here:

nerdfiles wrote:

If the conditional statement itself somehow got 'round the material implication of the "belief"-part being false

How would we get around the material implication? Is not reality (material world) where a truth-proposition (belief) is based?

Conditions:

(1) "The proposition must be thinkable" (insofar as REALITY, remember - please don't bring up anything to do with "God", "Angels", "The Trinity", or any such conjured notion that has nothing to do with reality)

I find this condition solid. I've been sitting here in between classes going over example after example trying to break this, but I haven't been successful. I simply cannot believe (remember guys, the belief we're speaking of here!!) in a squared-circle, any more than I can believe 2+2=5.

(2) "The proposition must not be a contradiction"

I believe this to be solid also. I cannot believe a line is both straight and crooked. I cannot believe a shape is both a square and a circle. I cannot believe a human is both dead and alive.

---

I apologize for not contributing more, I am still heavily contemplating this. I'm reading, thinking, and will write more when I've come to any new conclusions (or notions I think could be conclusions)

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

Right. Given the example we do not call it a case of belief.

If I say "Believe X or I will shoot your entire family and assassinate the President and crush your dog under a heavy box" what in God's name has anything AFTER the "or" to do with belief? It's coercion. It's not belief. So don't call it belief. You wouldn't accept that a trained parrot believes things simply because it can utter a string of sounds like resembles "I believe God exists." You wouldn't start looking for religious parrots because you wouldn't count that as a genuine belief.

Propositional belief doesn't mean "accept as true". If by "belief" you do mean this, then you're not even talking to me. We'll be talking past each other for the entirety of this discussion.

Again, countradiction example (you really need to sit and think about contradictions and what it means to believe them): "If my priest tells me that {the house is on fire and the house is not on fire}, then I believe that the house is on fire and the house is not on fire is true"

No one, regardless of the source, can believe a contradiction. Whether it is a priest or the President or God.

You cannot believe a contradiction nor can you believe that a contradiction is true.

A contradiction cannot possibly be true. You cannot believe something that is not true and which cannot possibly be true.

Have you ever read Orwell's 1984? At the end of the novel, Winston Smith believes that 2+2=5.
I don't know about you, but I am not infallible, and, as a result, I have believed many things that are not true. Alas! Most people have. It is called "being mistaken". What you may mean is that you cannot both believe a proposition, and also believe it is untrue. That, of course, is correct.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

After nerdfiles stated this:

I haven't a clue why mysticism was even brought up. I believe it was clear the kind of belief you're (Ken and Mr. FTP) suggesting is not what is being discussed here. How it followed that we're now bowing down to nonsensical beliefs dictated by priests is beyond me. I'm sure we're all intelligent enough here to understand: Yes, some people believe things blindly (nonsensically). It almost feels like an insult to even have to mutter this as it's so obvious, and no one is discussing/contesting anything about this. It's already been clarified this is not the sense of belief we're seeking necessary and sufficient conditions for, has it not?

We are dealing with belief in factual propositions. Mysticism may not be physical, but it could be factual reality. Whatever formative factors may have led to the belief are irrelevant. Whether you believe unicorns exist cause a wizard told you, or you believe God exists because a preacher told you, you still believe in a proposition that has meaning concerning reality.

"Blind" belief, that is, belief that is formed below typical standards, is belief nonetheless.

The belief is not what is nonsensical. We are referring to belief in a nonsensical proposition. And belief in a nonsensical proposition is impossible because nonsensical propositions have no content that can be believed.

Quote:

How is any of this "Nerdfiles game"? All he's doing is critically thinking about necessary and sufficient conditions regarding beliefs that are truth-propositions (*thinkable*). I'd hardly call this a game - isn't this something we should all be intently focusing on? I mean, much of philosophy is based upon these analytical belief statements - the one's being delved into here. Asking 'how' people come to believing these truth-propositions seems like logical analysis to me. I think this has little to do with nerdfiles, and more to do with the critical thought I'd hope many should be engaging in in the epistemology forum, no?

Nerdfiles originally called it a "game". It was just an expression and I had no issue with the term.

I called it his game because I think he is going down the wrong road with this. I am a minimalist and I believe that mention of truth (and subsequently knowledge and belief) is merely a rhetorical device.

I'm mainly here because I like thought games.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Have you ever read Orwell's 1984? At the end of the novel, Winston Smith believes that 2+2=5.
I don't know about you, but I am not infallible, and, as a result, I have believed many things that are not true. Alas! Most people have. It is called "being mistaken". What you may mean is that you cannot both believe a proposition, and also believe it is untrue. That, of course, is correct.

Not sure that is good evidence. If anything that would indicate that they altered the understood definition of 5.

First off, believing a contradiction would be, exactly as you say, believing a proposition to be true and untrue.

@nerdfiles,

The distinction is that contradictions cannot be true. Believing false this and that is contingently false. Believing that Russia is in the United States can be corrected with the right fact of the matter.

Nothing makes 2+2=5. Also, nothing makes a category mistake true ("Bob is the number 4").

Contradictions are not just "not true"; they are necessarily not true. It's different from having false beliefs about this or that contingent matter, matters of fact. It is not possible to believe a contradiction and it is not possible to believe that a contradiction is true.

One may be mislead by its subtlety or superficial truth, its "seeming true". But that's the exact point: You don't {believe} it; you believe {what mislead you}. Something that "seems true" is not true on that account. Someone cannot "seem to believe that it is true". Either you believe or you do not, on this matrix.

@Mr Fight the Power,

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

We are dealing with belief in factual propositions.

That's correct, truth-propositions are what we're dealing with.

Quote:

Mysticism may not be physical, but it could be factual reality.

How?

Quote:

Whether you believe unicorns exist cause a wizard told you, or you believe God exists because a preacher told you, you still believe in a proposition that has meaning concerning reality.

I think there's a distinction. If you believe in any abstract notion that is nonverifiable, has no bearing on empirical evidence, this is not a factual, truth-belief.

Quote:

"Blind" belief, that is, belief that is formed below typical standards, is belief nonetheless.

But that's not the type of "belief" we're dealing with!

Quote:

The belief is not what is nonsensical. We are referring to belief in a nonsensical proposition. And belief in a nonsensical proposition is impossible because nonsensical propositions have no content that can be believed.

Can you give me a nonsensical proposition which one could believe? A nonsensical proposition to me would be: "I believe in unicorns, goblins, and gods" - it defies sense. These abstract notions have nothing to do with reality. Once again, blind "belief" is not what we're dealing with.

@nerdfiles,

We are dealing with factual "believe-that" statements, as opposed to opinion/value based "believe-that" and "believe-in" statements.

Nerdfiles posited a normative distinction, but I am hardly convinced that we can make any fundamental distinction between beliefs based upon the process of their formation.

@Mr Fight the Power,

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

We are dealing with factual "believe-that" statements, as opposed to opinion/value based "believe-that" and "believe-in" statements.

Nerdfiles posited a normative distinction, but I am hardly convinced that we can make any fundamental distinction between beliefs based upon the process of their formation.

The fundamental distinction lies in the proposition itself. As described, the opinion/value-based "believe-that" and "believe-in" propositions are outside the realm of 'true' and 'false'. This is one distinction. The process of formation is not what has been focused on here.

Why are you not convinced? Please ask something specific.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

The fundamental distinction lies in the proposition itself. As described, the opinion/value-based "believe-that" and "believe-in" propositions are outside the realm of 'true' and 'false'. This is one distinction. The process of formation is not what has been focused on here.

Why are you not convinced? Please ask something specific.

I see this as more a matter of "I wouldn't have believed if..." than "I never really believed it".

I can see this really presenting an issue with the definition of knowledge though, and I think this is where it comes in. Consider this scenario (sorry for the aside):

My coworker makes a visit to a water fountain which, to his misfortune, malfunctions and sprays him with water. He comes into my office, and feeling belligerent when I asked if it was raining outside, says "Yes". Unbeknown to him, it is raining outside, and I, taking him at his word, believe correctly that it is raining outside.

I am justified in accepting his word, who wouldn't accept it? But, since he blatantly lied to me, we would be hard pressed to say that I actually knew it was raining.

This is a Gettier Problem I guess, and I would say that it is likely solved by examining what we consider justification of knowledge rather than saying that it is not true belief. I bought it hook, line, and sinker, I may have not believed it otherwise, but I believed it nonetheless.

@nerdfiles,

We are examining the justification of knowledge - these are the necessary and sufficient conditions spoken of.

I'd argue you didn't actually know if it was raining or not, but you believed what your co-worker said. There's a difference: You believed in the character of your co-worker to provide you with truthful information, not the actual truthful information. You could have easily not believed him had he been someone that has lied to you in the past, and then we wouldn't even be here - and that's important because it shows how he's the key in this belief-process. If you believed your co-worker, this is blind-belief. It's no different than if a priest said, "There is a God", and one believed it.

I think personal empirical evidence plays a key within the belief-propositions spoken here. Check out my (1) from the last page.

@nerdfiles,

NO GETTIER PROBLEM.

That is why I oriented us around it in the first place.

First post: "Pre-Gettier and Post-Gettier we generally and more or less plausibly hold (1)"

This thread is about the necessary and sufficient conditions for belief not knowledge. We should talk about the implications our account of belief has on knowledge. It does not follow that our conception of belief will fall or prevail in the face of Gettier-type cases because these cases presume an already standing conception of belief. Gettier problems do not necessary attack all conceptions of belief.

We need a conception of belief before we can put it to Gettier-type tests.

@nerdfiles,

Quote:

This thread is about the necessary and sufficient conditions for belief not knowledge

Do not the truth-beliefs we're focusing follow knowledge? Facts and truth are knowledge, no?

Quote:

We should talk about the implications our account of belief has on knowledge

An account of the beliefs I presumed we were speaking of, would be knowledge. I'm utterly confused now.

@nerdfiles,

I only mentino the Gettier problem to show that your normative factor deals with knowledge and not beliefs in general.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Do not the truth-beliefs we're focusing follow knowledge? Facts and truth are knowledge, no?

An account of the beliefs I presumed we were speaking of, would be knowledge. I'm utterly confused now.

Truth is not knowledge, since there are many truths which are not known. For instance, it is either true that the number of grains of sand on Wakiki Beach in Hawaii is odd, or it is true that the number of grains of sand on Wakiki Beach is even. But no one knows which it is, odd or even. Truth does not imply knowledge, but knowledge does imply truth. So truth and knowledge are not the same.

Beliefs are not knowledge, since beliefs may be either true or false, but knowledge can be only true.

@Mr Fight the Power,

I'm still stuck on the ambiguity of the word "believe" or "belief."

Here's how it seems to sort out for me:

Propositions:
1. This light works.
2. The world is round.
3. The snake is dead.
4. People have landed on the moon.
5. Jesus saves.

In response to each of the propositions, whether I say, "Yes, I believe it" or "Yes, I know it" I may be conveying any of the following:

A.
B. It must be true because ___ said it is (credulity)
C. I think it is extremely likely/by all evidence appears to be true, so I treat it as true (critical realism)

However, if my attitude is, upon hearing any of those propositions, "It's plausible, but I still have some serious doubts" I cannot honestly say, "Yes, I know it." I may, however, still say, "Yes, I believe it" or some similar construction involving "believe."

So, while we sometimes employ the term "believe" in precisely the same way that we employ the term "know," we also employ the term "believe" (a)to express some level of personal doubt, or (b) to indicate that someone else's conviction does not rise to the level of what we consider knowledge.

Given these ambiguities, it would seem that an analysis of "belief" cannot be done without specifying the precise context and nuance of the particular belief in question (even within the constraints of propositions).

"Believe" apparently can mean "give full mental assent to" or "give partial mental assent to." In the latter case, it would seem to be no more mysterious than suspension of conviction.

@nerdfiles,

kennethamy wrote:

Beliefs are not knowledge, since beliefs may be either true or false, but knowledge can be only true.

The beliefs we're speaking of here are truth-propositions. Therefore, it made sense to me that these beliefs would follow from knowledge. I'm not saying knowledge is belief, I'm saying for these particular beliefs, it seems as though knowledge is involved - a *knowing* of an actual reality. If knowledge is not involved, I don't understand.

Quote:

Truth is not knowledge, since there are many truths which are not known. For instance, it is either true that the number of grains of sand on Wakiki Beach in Hawaii is odd, or it is true that the number of grains of sand on Wakiki Beach is even. But no one knows which it is, odd or even. Truth does not imply knowledge, but knowledge does imply truth. So truth and knowledge are not the same.

You're correct. I should have said truths can be knowledge - and knowledge seems to be necessary if one were to believe (within the "belief" we're using). In other words, the truths we do know (knowledge) lend to us believing in these truth-propositions.

Dichanthelium wrote:

Given these ambiguities, it would seem that an analysis of "belief" cannot be done without specifying the precise context and nuance of the particular belief in question (even within the constraints of propositions).

Did you even bother to read the thread? The context of "belief" with which we're focusing has been noted countless times. We clarified this pages ago.

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