knowledge is merely one of faith's children

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kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 28 Jan, 2009 10:22 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... the examination of various metaphysical boundary conditions to see if they have anything to say about "knowledge is merely one of faith's children" ...


Why not just discuss the issue? (What are "boundary conditions"? And why read about Plato in this respect? )
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Wed 28 Jan, 2009 10:40 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
What are "boundary conditions"?


... sorry - engineering jargon again Sad ... "boundary conditions" are the extremes ... and examining the extremes is frequently more enlightening than examining the typical (at least it is in engineering) ... so examining self-evidence and belief in extreme metaphysical stances is a form of discussing the issue ... but whether or not such examination will result in any enlightenment in this case remains to be seen! ... (this is what happens when you let an engineer into a philosophy forum - blame the moderators! Wink) ...
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 09:44 am
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... sorry - engineering jargon again Sad ... "boundary conditions" are the extremes ... and examining the extremes is frequently more enlightening than examining the typical (at least it is in engineering) ... so examining self-evidence and belief in extreme metaphysical stances is a form of discussing the issue ... but whether or not such examination will result in any enlightenment in this case remains to be seen! ... (this is what happens when you let an engineer into a philosophy forum - blame the moderators! Wink) ...


Then why not just discuss the issue rather than discussing Plato?
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 09:58 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Then why not just discuss the issue rather than discussing Plato?


... given that you've simply repeated your question, I could simply repeat my answer - but I doubt that would accomplish anything Sad ...
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 10:10 am
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... given that you've simply repeated your question, I could simply repeat my answer - but I doubt that would accomplish anything Sad ...


Well, it is more probable that we will get to some kind of answer by discussing the question, than we will by discussing something that has nothing to do with with the question. At least so it seems to me. I wonder why it doesn't seem so to you.
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 10:29 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Well, it is more probable that we will get to some kind of answer by discussing the question, than we will by discussing something that has nothing to do with with the question. At least so it seems to me. I wonder why it doesn't seem so to you.


... okay, let's see if explicitly projecting the question on to a selection of extreme metaphysical positions helps to demonstrate where I was trying to go with this:

- Is knowledge merely one of faith's children for a Metaphysical Solipsist?
- Is knowledge merely one of faith's children for a Naive Realist?
- Is knowledge merely one of faith's children for a Platonic Realist?

... and finally, do the answers to the question as applied to these extremes in any way enlighten us as to the answer to the question in general?
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 02:03 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Well it is, partly. But then, as I have been saying, trust is a product of knowing. It is because I know that sensory perception is reliable that I trust it. So, trust is no more "basic" than is knowing.


1. What do you mean by "know"? Does it mean possession of information that cannot possibly be false?

2. How do you "know that sensory perception is reliable"?
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 04:15 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... so for a naive realist, "red" is self-evident, yes? ...


Not sure. There must be various degrees of naive realism. For example, a naive realist who is educated concerning the physiological functions of human vision may admit that seeing an object as red means "I see an object that appears red, and though the color may vary depending upon environmental conditions and my sensory processes, even so, the existence of the object itself is indisputable, because I see it.
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 07:07 pm
@Dichanthelium,
Dichanthelium wrote:
I see an object that appears red, and though the color may vary depending upon environmental conditions and my sensory processes, even so, the existence of the object itself is indisputable, because I see it.


... but at that point are you still a Naive Realist, or are you now a Representative Realist? Wink ...
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 07:21 pm
@Dichanthelium,
Dichanthelium wrote:
1. What do you mean by "know"? Does it mean possession of information that cannot possibly be false?

2. How do you "know that sensory perception is reliable"?


1. Roughly, that I believe some proposition, p. That the proposition is true, and that p is adequately justified. For instance, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador because I believe it, it is true, and I have adequate justification for it.
And no, I might be mistaken, although, of course, if I know, I am not mistaken-otherwise I would not meet the (above) truth condition of knowledge.

2. Roughly, the way I know a car is reliable. It rarely breaks down. Of course, when my senses "break down" when I make a mistake, I discover that I have by using my senses, and I am usually able to correct my mistake by the use of my senses. So sense perception is a kind of self-correcting mechanism. Unlike a car.
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 09:00 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... but at that point are you still a Naive Realist, or are you now a Representative Realist? Wink ...


Well, if a Representative Realist is someone who thinks he knows something just because he is seeing something, I have no alternative but to consider Representative Realist as a subcategory within Naive Realist.
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 09:38 pm
@Dichanthelium,
... yeah, I'm not at all sure how this categorization stuff works :perplexed: ... here's what Wikipedia has to say about Representative Realism (for what it's worth):

Quote:
Representational realism states that we do not (and cannot) perceive the external world as it really is; instead we know only our ideas and interpretations of the way the world is. This might be said to indicate that a barrier or 'veil of perception' prevents first-hand knowledge of the world, but the representational realist would deny that 'first hand knowledge' in this sense is a coherent concept, since knowledge is always via some means.


... anyhoo, has the examination of selected extreme metaphysical stances provided any enlightenment so far? ... or am I just wasting our time?
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 09:51 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
1. Roughly, that I believe some proposition, p. That the proposition is true, and that p is adequately justified. For instance, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador because I believe it, it is true, and I have adequate justification for it.
And no, I might be mistaken, although, of course, if I know, I am not mistaken-otherwise I would not meet the (above) truth condition of knowledge.


Thank you! I think this may help us understand exactly where our misunderstanding or disagreement lies. Here are the follow-up questions and comments that occur to me:

1.a. "Roughly" needs to be explained, doesn't it? If we weren't trying to be precise, we wouldn't be having such a hard time.
1.b. "that I believe some proposition, p,..." indicates that knowing is a kind of believing, doesn't it? And is "believing" the same as "trusting that something is true" or "having faith in the veracity of something"?
1.c. "that the proposition is true" rules out what we might call "false knowing" or "self deception" right? In other words, if I say I know something, but what I claim to know is demonstrably false, we will not consider that to be knowing, right?
1.d. "that p is adequately justified" implies that there exists a definition of "adequately justified." What is the definition and method?
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Thu 29 Jan, 2009 10:08 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke wrote:
... yeah, I'm not at all sure how this categorization stuff works :perplexed: ... here's what Wikipedia has to say about Representative Realism (for what it's worth):

....

... anyhoo, has the examination of selected extreme metaphysical stances provided any enlightenment so far? ... or am I just wasting our time?


Hmmm...Yeah, I'm not sure either:Not-Impressed:. I guess I figure it's more important to work out the concept than to know whose school you are sitting in:Glasses:. On the other hand, to the extent I follow a well-trodden path, it can't be smart to not learn the lingo:listening:! What's the distinction between Representational Realism and what I have been thinking of as Critical Realism:shocked:?

I think a review of the various metaphysical stances is essential. I'm trying to formulate something along those lines, but I'm not quite ready ...
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 30 Jan, 2009 09:50 am
@Dichanthelium,
Dichanthelium wrote:
Thank you! I think this may help us understand exactly where our misunderstanding or disagreement lies. Here are the follow-up questions and comments that occur to me:

1.a. "Roughly" needs to be explained, doesn't it? If we weren't trying to be precise, we wouldn't be having such a hard time.
1.b. "that I believe some proposition, p,..." indicates that knowing is a kind of believing, doesn't it? And is "believing" the same as "trusting that something is true" or "having faith in the veracity of something"?
1.c. "that the proposition is true" rules out what we might call "false knowing" or "self deception" right? In other words, if I say I know something, but what I claim to know is demonstrably false, we will not consider that to be knowing, right?
1.d. "that p is adequately justified" implies that there exists a definition of "adequately justified." What is the definition and method?


"Roughly" just indicates that there is more that needs to filled in then there is the time or energy.

Knowing is a kind of believing (I have qualifications about that, but they are not relevant here). But knowing is a lot more than just believing. It is believing that is true, and is justified. As I pointed out before, believing is different from faith or trust in that it requires evidential support whereas faith or trust does not (although, it should).

There is no false knowing. If you think you know something, and it turns out to be false, then you did not know it in the first place. (I don't know what self-deception has to do with it)

Adequate justification varies with context, and also varies with what is at stake. You need more justification to send a man to an execution chamber, than to give him a traffic fine. So there is no general definition.
 
MJA
 
Reply Fri 30 Jan, 2009 10:15 am
@kennethamy,
[CENTER]TRUTH
KNOWLEDGE IS THOUGHT
EDUCATION INCREASES THOUGHT
WISDOM IS TRUTH
ENLIGHTENMENT REDUCES THOUGHT
TO A SINGLE SIMPLE TRUTH
ONENESS OR EQUALITY
THE SINGLE SIMPLE
WISDOM OR
TRUTH
MJA[/CENTER]



And as far as knowing the Earth is round,
I beg to differ: It's flat in some places!


http://www.viamagazine.com/images/articles/salt_flats06.jpg

=
MJA

How would you like to uncork that rocket!
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Fri 30 Jan, 2009 12:40 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
[Knowing] is believing that is true, and is justified.


How do you know whether or not something is true? Let's examine an example. "I know the earth is round." How do I know that I have indeed expressed a true fact?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 30 Jan, 2009 06:43 pm
@Dichanthelium,
Dichanthelium wrote:
How do you know whether or not something is true? Let's examine an example. "I know the earth is round." How do I know that I have indeed expressed a true fact?


I suppose you have to read some astronomy, and astrophysics. Or you have to take the word or reputable people in the field. Of course, you have to make sure they are reputable. Most of our knowledge is inferred and not direct.
 
paulhanke
 
Reply Fri 30 Jan, 2009 08:34 pm
@Dichanthelium,
Dichanthelium wrote:
Hmmm...Yeah, I'm not sure either:Not-Impressed:. I guess I figure it's more important to work out the concept than to know whose school you are sitting in:Glasses:. On the other hand, to the extent I follow a well-trodden path, it can't be smart to not learn the lingo:listening:! What's the distinction between Representational Realism and what I have been thinking of as Critical Realism:shocked:?

I think a review of the various metaphysical stances is essential. I'm trying to formulate something along those lines, but I'm not quite ready ...


... yeah, I was hoping for a more enlightening continuum to expose itself by looking at the extremes ... what we found at one extreme is a perspective where experience and reason are self-evidently simply what they are (but only paradoxically so) ... and at at the other extreme is a tension between one perspective where experience self-evidently corresponds to reality while reason is fallible, and another perspective where reason self-evidently corresponds to reality while experience is fallible (is this extreme-realist tension a mirrored image of the extreme-idealist paradox?) ... as interesting as this is, it does not further illuminate the "kernel" of self-evident knowledge that we had already identified in the middle of the continuum (where nothing self-evidently corresponds to reality and both reason and experience are fallible) - that is, the only self-evident knowledge is the knowledge that "I experience" and "I reason" ...
 
Dichanthelium
 
Reply Sat 31 Jan, 2009 07:16 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I suppose you have to read some astronomy, and astrophysics. Or you have to take the word or reputable people in the field. Of course, you have to make sure they are reputable. Most of our knowledge is inferred and not direct.


Then I don't understand why you resist what seems to me a perfectly logical conclusion.

If you read something, you have to have reading material, and you have to use your eyes and your reasoning powers. Any knowledge that you claim to have as a result of that process would indicate that you have put your trust in the source of the reading material, your sensory perception, and your reasoning powers.

Is this not so?
 
 

 
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