knowledge is merely one of faith's children

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Yes, that would appear to be right. I'm not sure what the implications would be....What is the metaphysical solipsist doing when he corrects himself, as in "Oops! I thought that was a piece of hard candy, but it's actually a marble, and now I have a broken tooth."

... I was wondering about that myself ... but if you're already playing the "observation" mind game with yourself, you're halfway there Wink

... I'll have to noodle on what the implications are (if any) ...

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

No, I know. I only said they are wrong because that is my observation based on my familiarity with the facts that are available. I think I can prove to your satisfaction that they are wrong, but we should pursue that discussion in that topsy-turvy place they call the Philosophy of Religion portion of this site, don't you think? I'll start a new thread, called "Kierkegaard and Luther Were Wrong!"

AB's definition is incomplete. It only covers one kind of faith, which is naive faith, which is the twin brother of naive realism, and both of them are alive and well both in religious and in scientific circles.

Naive faith is what is ordinarily called, "faith". Belief, on the other hand, is not faith because it is usually supported by reasons or evidence. My belief that my son is innocent of the charges brought against him by the police is supported by the evidence that he was not at the scene of the crime; but if I have faith that my son is innocent, then I am implying that my belief that he is innocent is unsupported.

Webster's Collegiate.
1 a: allegiance to duty or a person : loyalty b (1): fidelity to one's promises (2): sincerity of intentions2 a (1): belief and trust in and loyalty to God (2): belief in the traditional doctrines of a religion b (1): firm belief in something for which there is no proof (2): complete trust.

It is, of course, the second meaning to which I am referring

That is why the word, "faith" derives from the Latin term for trust.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Naive faith is what is ordinarily called, "faith". Belief, on the other hand, is not faith because it is usually supported by reasons or evidence. ...

a. I have faith in this bridge.
b. I trust this bridge.
c. I believe in this bridge.
d. I know this is a dependable bridge.

(1) All four statements convey the same concept and message.

(2) Any of those statements could be made naively (unsupported by reasons or evidence).

(3) Any of those statements could be made critically (supported by reasons or evidence).

(4) Statement "d," even if it is being uttered by an expert, and even it is based on all the reason and evidence in the world, is still, in the final analysis, equivalent to a, b, or c.

(5) Our expert in (4), above, cannot claim to know unless he has faith/ trust/ belief in something.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

a. I have faith in this bridge.
b. I trust this bridge.
c. I believe in this bridge.
d. I know this is a dependable bridge.

(1) All four statements convey the same concept and message.

(2) Any of those statements could be made naively (unsupported by reasons or evidence).

(3) Any of those statements could be made critically (supported by reasons or evidence).

(4) Statement "d," even if it is being uttered by an expert, and even it is based on all the reason and evidence in the world, is still, in the final analysis, equivalent to a, b, or c.

(5) Our expert in (4), above, cannot claim to know unless he has faith/ trust/ belief in something.

To "believe in" means one thing. "To believe" means another. This is not a matter of words (that's "semantics") it is a matter of concepts. The concept of faith (as the dictionary says) differs from that of just belief. All faith is belief, it is true, but not all belief is faith. My belief that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is not faith. I have evidence. But, my belief in my son (that he is innocent of the charges) is faith. I have no evidence. I really don't care about the words. Let's just talk about two kinds of belief; belief (1) with evidence, and belief (2) without evidence, or even contrary to the evidence. What does it matter what we call it? It is the concepts that count. Isn't it true that people have (and do have) religious beliefs (2)? It is a matter of historical and sociological fact that they do. Isn't the belief in the virgin birth a case of belief (2), and not of belief (1)?

@kennethamy,

... anyhoo, the only real implication I see here is that "reason" itself can (in extreme cases) be self-evident knowledge because if what you're reasoning about is of no correspondence/consequence then reason simply is what it is ... I wonder how far "up" the idealism ladder you have to go before "reason" overwhelmingly resides in the domain of belief? ... not that I'm totally up to snuff on Kant's transcendental idealism, but "reason" at that level seems to be in the domain of belief moreso than not - but is transcendental idealism the boundary? a cross-over point? ... I dunno.

And while we're looking at the extremes here, what does an examination of naive realism have to say?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

To "believe in" means one thing.

Okay, what does it mean?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... anyhoo, the only real implication I see here is that "reason" itself can (in extreme cases) be self-evident knowledge because if what you're reasoning about is of no correspondence/consequence then reason simply is what it is ... I wonder how far "up" the idealism ladder you have to go before "reason" overwhelmingly resides in the domain of belief? ... not that I'm totally up to snuff on Kant's transcendental idealism, but "reason" at that level seems to be in the domain of belief moreso than not - but is transcendental idealism the boundary? a cross-over point?

I'm going to have to do a little reading before I can formulate an answer. One thing that occurs to me is that, if I were to adopt the position of Idealism, I would have do some reasoning in order to get there. So if I become an Idealist and you ask me why I did that, I would have to recount my reasoning, which is as much as saying that I have faith in my reasoning powers. I'm still stuck with faith/ belief/ trust in something, right?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

So if I become an Idealist and you ask me why I did that, I would have to recount my reasoning, which is as much as saying that I have faith in my reasoning powers. I'm still stuck with faith/ belief/ trust in something, right?

... ack! - a paradox! ... my reasoning about experience leads me to the belief that the whole of reality merely exists in my head; but my belief that the whole of reality merely exists in my head implies that my experience and reasoning simply are my own invention and correspond to nothing! ... boy, am I glad I'm not a metaphysical solipsist! Wink

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... ack! - a paradox! ... my reasoning about experience leads me to the belief that the whole of reality merely exists in my head; but my belief that the whole of reality merely exists in my head implies that my experience and reasoning simply are my own invention and correspond to nothing! ... boy, am I glad I'm not a metaphysical solipsist!

Good stuff!:a-ok: I think I'm inclined to steer clear too.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I'm going to have to do a little reading before I can formulate an answer. One thing that occurs to me is that, if I were to adopt the position of Idealism, I would have do some reasoning in order to get there. So if I become an Idealist and you ask me why I did that, I would have to recount my reasoning, which is as much as saying that I have faith in my reasoning powers. I'm still stuck with faith/ belief/ trust in something, right?

I don't know why you use the word, "stuck". After all, you have good reasons to trust your reasoning power, don't you? It is an excellent survival mechanism, after all.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I don't know why you use the word, "stuck". After all, you have good reasons to trust your reasoning power, don't you? It is an excellent survival mechanism, after all.

Sure, an excellent survival mechanism, but an equally excellent self-destruction mechanism.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Sure, an excellent survival mechanism, but an equally excellent self-destruction mechanism.

Does that mean that survival is not a good reason for trusting our reason? After all, anything can be misused. Consider fire. It can be destructive too.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Does that mean that survival is not a good reason for trusting our reason? After all, anything can be misused. Consider fire. It can be destructive too.

I don't think I ever said that I don't have good reasons for trusting my reasoning powers. I do recall saying that they are not infallible, and that when I say I know something, I can ask myself, "How do I know?" Often, the answer is, "because I trust my sensory perceptions and my reasoning powers." Thus I cannot avoid the observation that knowing is a product of trust.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

And while we're looking at the extremes here, what does an examination of naive realism have to say?

... so for a naive realist, "red" is self-evident, yes? ... so that puts a naive realist in the same park as a metaphysical solipsist as far as experience goes - that is, "red" is self-evident for both, albeit in different ways ... but the specific way in which each sees experience as being self-evident becomes a crucial difference when it comes to reason ... again, for the metaphysical solipsist when reason "conflicts" with experience, it doesn't mean anything, because reason, experience, as well as the conflict are all products of and exist within the mind - they simply are what they are ... the naive realist, on the other hand, gives ontological priority to experience - when reason conflicts with experience, experience wins and so reason must be fallible ... so for the naive realist, only reason requires belief.

Hmmmmm ... I wonder if there's a name for a metaphysical stance that turns naive realism on its head? ... that is, is there a metaphysical stance that assumes that experience represents the world as it is but that gives ontological priority to reason such that when reason conflicts with experience, reason wins? ... or is that just too darned incoherent?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I don't think I ever said that I don't have good reasons for trusting my reasoning powers. I do recall saying that they are not infallible, and that when I say I know something, I can ask myself, "How do I know?" Often, the answer is, "because I trust my sensory perceptions and my reasoning powers." Thus I cannot avoid the observation that knowing is a product of trust.

Well it is, partly. But then, as I have been saying, trust is a product of knowing. It is because I know that sensory perception is reliable that I trust it. So, trust is no more "basic" than is knowing.

@kennethamy,

Platonic realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

Platonic realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Awfully nice of you to provide the link, but may I ask what it has to do with this thread?

@kennethamy,

... sorry 'bout the lack of context ... it's a potential answer to the question "is there a metaphysical stance that assumes that experience represents the world as it is but that gives ontological priority to reason such that when reason conflicts with experience, reason wins?" ...

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... sorry 'bout the lack of context ... it's a potential answer to the question "is there a metaphysical stance that assumes that experience represents the world as it is but that gives ontological priority to reason such that when reason conflicts with experience, reason wins?" ...

O.K. And what has that to do with the thread?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

O.K. And what has that to do with the thread?

... the examination of various metaphysical boundary conditions to see if they have anything to say about "knowledge is merely one of faith's children" ...

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