knowledge is merely one of faith's children

@Sekiko,

Sekiko wrote:

I think it might be cautiously said that when you seek justification for something that you allege to know, the source of that justification is to be found in something other than the belief itself. This is an important qualification for "knowing" something. If on the other hand, I have faith in something, it can be explained as having the justification of the belief ultimately come from the belief itself.....This could be said to be a crucial difference in determining what you know and what you have faith in, especially explaining the success of facts which we purport to know, and the observance of a lack of success concerning facts with which we profess faith.

Okay, but can't "knowing" be a naive and circular process just as "faith" can be?

God exists.
How do you know?
Because the Bible says so.
How do you know the Bible is reliable?
Because God inspired it.

This apple is red.
How do you know?
Because my sense of sight says so.
How do you know your sense of sight is reliable?
Because red always appears red to me.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium;43245 wrote:

Okay, but can't "knowing" be a naive and circular process just as "faith" can be?

God exists.
How do you know?
Because the Bible says so.
How do you know the Bible is reliable?
Because God inspired it.

This apple is red.
How do you know?
Because my sense of sight says so.
How do you know your sense of sight is reliable?
Because red always appears red to me.

[SIZE="4"][INDENT]
Unfortunately, there is no linguistic way of explaining why our sense of sight is reliable. The above example, however, is not circular reasoning. Our belief in the redness of the apple is validified by our sight. But our sense of sight is not validified because apples are red. Do you see?

In other words, ultimately, for any proposition to be knowledgable, it ultimately gets its validity from sense impressions. Those sense impressions, however, never get their validity from the propositions. As long as you can be content with sense impressions, knowledge is secure. Smile

One thing though, I'm tired of people getting so worked up into a dizzy fear that our sense impressions aren't "real". Bloody hell, it doesn't matter if they're valid or not, our sense impressions aren't going anywhere. What's more, if we are real, then the sense impressions would have to be at least as real as we are, and if we aren't real, then what's the damn problem!?

God, I'm tired of existential whining...

Oops, I think I slipped a bit into rant mode. Sorry bout that. back to the topic of the thread.
[/INDENT][/SIZE]

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

This apple is red.
How do you know?
Because my sense of sight says so.
How do you know your sense of sight is reliable?
Because red always appears red to me.

I know that my sense of sight is reliable because it infrequently goes wrong; just as I know my car is reliable because it infrequently breaks down. (Of course, if I have weak eyes, my sense of sight is not as reliable as that of someone who has better eyes than I do).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

"Reliable" does not mean perfect or infallible. A very reliable car may still break down on comparatively rare occasions.

The most predictable or reliable aspects of my car might be things like that the tires will wear down with use under "as before" conditions, or that the tank will need re-filling. However, even these sure things, the surest things, depend on conditions. If I go a thousand miles of downhill I don't need any top-up. Ordinarily, tis fact is of no importance. But if you are out nearly out of gas and it's ten miles to the nest station, you want it to be mostly downhill. Or your car changes to become not so much your car, but a problem.

Quote:

But trust is not something contrasted with knowledge, as you are assuming. We trust is a means to knowledge. It is a part of the evidence we use to support out claim to know. How do we know that one physician is a better physician than another so that we go to him? Because he has credentials which we trust. And, why do we trust those credentials? Because they are supported with evidence-senses and reason. It is not, trust or knowledge, but knowledge (partly) on account of trust, and trust supported by reason and the senses. I have abundant reason to trust my senses and reasoning powers. It is not "blind trust".

When was the last time you checked an M.D.s medical license ?:bigsmile:

I do not trust my reasoning powers as much as I did last month. I was stumped by the Monty Hall problem and the explanations did not present themselves in a way that was helpful to me.
Only upon starting to experiment with coin tosses and imaginary hands of cards could I see how I was fooled.

@Sekiko,

[quote=Sekiko]Unfortunately, there is no linguistic way of explaining why our sense of sight is reliable. [/quote]

Not sure what you mean there. Any explanation would require the use of language, wouldn't it?

[quote=Sekiko]The above example, however, is not circular reasoning. Our belief in the redness of the apple is validified by our sight. But our sense of sight is not validified because apples are red. Do you see?[/quote]

The point I was trying to illustrate was that knowing something can be the result of a naive and circular form of reasoning. The proposition was that in order for me to say I know something, I first have to have faith in something. In the case of the apple, I cannot say that I know the apple is red unless I have faith in my sight processes. Again, the point is not to cast a blanket of doubt over every form of knowledge, but to (1) recognize the ultimately tentative condition of every knowledge claim, (2) steer away from naive realism, and (3) recognize that faith is more primary than knowledge.

[quote=Sekiko]In other words, ultimately, for any proposition to be knowledgable, it ultimately gets its validity from sense impressions. Those sense impressions, however, never get their validity from the propositions. As long as you can be content with sense impressions, knowledge is secure. Smile

[/quote]

I agree that, "Those sense impressions, however, never get their validity from the propositions." However, it is a very common error to suppose they do. People have been telling us how to interpret our sense perceptions ever since we were born. For example,

"That large dark bird I see flying overhead is a hawk."
"How do you know?"
"Because Joe the bird expert told me so."

In such a case, I see something (a large dark bird) that matches my earlier impression, and I interpret my sensory impression on the basis of an earlier proposition supplied to me by Joe. It's a naive claim, but we do it all the time.

Aside from that, I agree that, "As long as you can be content with sense impressions, knowledge is secure." This, I would argue, is just another way of saying, "As long as you can trust/ have faith in/ believe in your sense impressions, knowledge (which, by its very nature is always ultimately tentative) is secure (meaning that we have no choice but to adopt certain forms of knowledge and assume them to be true for the sake of the practical aspects of our lives).

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

The point I was trying to illustrate was that knowing something can be the result of a naive and circular form of reasoning. The proposition was that in order for me to say I know something, I first have to have faith in something. In the case of the apple, I cannot say that I know the apple is red unless I have faith in my sight processes. Again, the point is not to cast a blanket of doubt over every form of knowledge, but to (1) recognize the ultimately tentative condition of every knowledge claim, (2) steer away from naive realism, and (3) recognize that faith is more primary than knowledge.

it would seem to be more primary, but if we consider a newly hatched creature, it might seem that information gathering is the activity going on and faith comes from seeing regularity in the environment.
It might be that faith is inborn; faith in our means of perception might be as old as that means of perception.

@memester,

How old is the ability to have faiths ? That would seemingly predate the human species. What does it take, to have faith ? A brain ?

Does making a choice, or decision in response to a perceived input , constitute a show of faith ?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Please help me analyze this concept! Maybe it is old hat, I don't know...

Whatever I call "knowledge" is one or another form of faith.

Whenever I say that "I know something," I am actually saying, "I believe something to be true."

Whatever I claim to "know," is a claim based upon trust in something.

Example: "I know that the earth is round."

Translation: "I have faith that the sources of information available to me, which tell me that the earth is round, are trustworthy." "I have reviewed the information that has been presented to me concerning the shape of the earth, and, based upon my logical analysis of that information, I believe it." "I trust the scientific evidence, the mathematical formulae, the professors, the authorities who say, 'the earth is round'."

Dichanthelium, Smile

Apparent reality is biologically determined, this means NOT that apparent
reality is your creation and that it is ultimately true, but that it is an interpretation, and that the experience is true, true to your biology. So, as apparent reality is a biological readout so to is the truth, if the sense of truth is your own biology, all else is of the imagination, but even the imagination has its roots within apparent reality, thus it has its roots within your own biology. If you cannot experience it, if you have not experienced it, it is of the imagination, NOT necessary false, only biology can tell. If one wishes to claim knowledge of ultimate reality, and claim that apparent reality is faith, this is an obvious misapplication of the question at hand, for truth is not the relation of ultimate reality to what is truth thus belief, but truth is what is relational to ones biology, defined by ones biology. Faith, is being lead by the experience, testimony of others, it is the trusting embrace of something as truth, which in fact is not of your experience, and can only be tested by the experience of your own biology to be found true or false. Faith is the mother of trial and error.

@boagie,

There are two kinds of propositions being considered here: Experiential e.g. ' I saw a green frog' and Universal e.g.' All frogs are green'.

Now, when we speak of ALL, we speak inductively. This is faith.

When we speak of one experience, we speak of something irrefutably true, 'But what of the person who has hallucinated, therefore he has not actually seen the frog', but he HAS seen the frog, seeing the frog, and the frog being where you deduce it to be from the picture you see are two different things.
Facts hold relationally. Red is by all of my experience thus far, relationally constant; for if one person sees what I would call orange when he looks at an object colored in the way which I would call red but knows the label red to be appropriate, he will still know red by its relational context.

I know what was in relation to what else was, and from this I deduce what shall be and what is, this deduction is faith.

@Zetetic11235,

Zetetic11235 wrote:

There are two kinds of propositions being considered here: Experiential e.g. ' I saw a green frog' and Universal e.g.' All frogs are green'.

Now, when we speak of ALL, we speak inductively. This is faith." quote

"Facts hold relationally. Red is by all of my experience thus far, relationally constant; for if one person sees what I would call orange when he looks at an object colored in the way which I would call red but knows the label red to be appropriate, he will still know red by its relational context.

Zetetic,

:)Yes I think your right, but it is of necessity of the imagination not of experience, so, in the sense that apparent reality is based upon your own biology, any deduction made by another is based presumeably on their biology, if not theirs, then how many times removed from expereince is this universal rumor that all frogs are green, which in fact is false, as I have experienced one that is not. Yes, it is faith, trust in the experience of others, trust in the testomony of others, This faithful deduction can only be checked by experience----going from the particualar to the general is always dangerous, particularly when it is done for you.

:)Facts hold rationality you say, very true, it is also true that a fact must be a constant to be a fact, while biology is variable, but the perception of a constant by biology is always true to its own biology, just as the genaralization of the group is true to the majority of a given number of biological examples. The universal is a statement of a biological group stating that they experience the same thing with the same biology as you. So, again, faith is trust in the experience of others, trust in their testimonly, but, if my own biology told me something different, am I going to trust hear say, or my own experience.

"I know what was in relation to what else was, and from this I deduce what shall be and what is, this deduction is faith.

:)Whatever is going on in the objective relations of the outside world, will always be determined by the subjects own biology. Faith is trusted hearsay, always to be validated by direct experience.

"He will still know red by its relational context."

:)This is where generality/universals have their flaws, the constent precieved by a variable biology, the colour blind man is not mistaken, it is not a matter of right or wrong, but, it is indeed not the same perception of a given freqencey, one perception is necessarily at odds with the set standard of the group. To the individual perception is reality, to the group it is agreement--------------back and babbling as usual!! Faith is trust in hear say, for is not exerperience to know? Often ones biology will not let the head lie to it, when the head wants what the biology does not want and forces it upon that biology, you forfit your health. That which is aquired by hear say/faith is not knowledge, it becomes knowledge when it is affirmed by experience, personal ownership of experience is knowledge.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Aside from that, I agree that, "As long as you can be content with sense impressions, knowledge is secure." This, I would argue, is just another way of saying, "As long as you can trust/ have faith in/ believe in your sense impressions, knowledge (which, by its very nature is always ultimately tentative) is secure (meaning that we have no choice but to adopt certain forms of knowledge and assume them to be true for the sake of the practical aspects of our lives).

But believing something need not be, and usually is not, faith. You may have good reasons for what you believe. I have excellent reasons for believing that there is a country called "Japan", and so do you. All faith is belief (of a kind) but not all belief is faith. So, you can't equate belief with faith.

The phrase, "believing in" is tricky, and means one of two things:

1. Believing that something exists, as in, "I believe in God" (or don't believe in God).

2. Trusting, as in "I believe in my son. He would never steal". Of course, in this sense of "believe in" (the 'trust' sense) what you believe in has to exist, in order for you to trust what you believe in. You can hardly trust your son unless your son exists.

Do I believe in (trust) my senses? Yes, because they have always been reliable. Of course, it must depend on circumstances. If the conditions under which I am using my senses are in some way less than optimum, or even abnormal, then I will be more cautious in trusting what I see or hear, etc.

@kennethamy,

a cool breeze in summer would be a warm breeze in winter.

@Dichanthelium,

That doesn't stop the cool breeze in summer from being a cool breeze.

@Kolbe,

winter conditions stop it from being a cool breeze :bigsmile:

@Dichanthelium,

Haha, but what matters is that a cool breeze in summer is a cool breeze in summer! No time like the present, and all that hat.

@boagie,

It seems like there are certain uses of the terms "faith" and "belief" that may be obscuring the meaning of my proposition. I'm not stuck on proving the proposition, but I don't want to discard it on the basis of what may be merely semantics. And, as zetetic pointed out, we use the term "know" to convey different ideas, too. When I say faith or belief in this context, I mean that in the sense of "trusting" something or somebody. It could be a book, an expert, my sensory perception, my reasoning processes...

Here's how I am seeing it:

Reliable Factual Claim: "I know the earth is round." I can't experience the shape of the earth, so in this case I am trusting the body of evidence and the explanations that have been presented to me.

Reliable Factual Claim: "I know this apple is red." I have direct eye contact on it. My visual processes are reporting it as red. I am trusting my sensory perception.

Reliable Familiarity Claim: "I know Barak Obama." I have spent time with him and have read his books, so I can claim to be familiar with his personality and character. I'm still trusting my experiences. I'm believing that my experiences have conveyed truth.

Reliable Capability Claim: "I know how to drive a car." I believe, based on previous experiences, that I can make my mind and body function in all the complex ways that are necessary in order for me to safely operate a motor vehicle.

So, recognizing that my knowing is ultimately based on trust/ belief/ faith doesn't necessarily imply that my knowing is unreliable. It appears to be reliable, at least with respect to the mundane activities.

And, I should say, the reason I'm so focused on this is because often we don't seem to be aware that some of our claims to knowing something are actually quite tenuous. The consequence is that we are unduly confident in our knowledge, because we haven't properly examined our assumptions.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

It seems like there are certain uses of the terms "faith" and "belief" that may be obscuring the meaning of my proposition. I'm not stuck on proving the proposition, but I don't want to discard it on the basis of what may be merely semantics. And, as zetetic pointed out, we use the term "know" to convey different ideas, too. When I say faith or belief in this context, I mean that in the sense of "trusting" something or somebody. It could be a book, an expert, my sensory perception, my reasoning processes...

Here's how I am seeing it:

Reliable Factual Claim: "I know the earth is round." I can't experience the shape of the earth, so in this case I am trusting the body of evidence and the explanations that have been presented to me.

Reliable Factual Claim: "I know this apple is red." I have direct eye contact on it. My visual processes are reporting it as red. I am trusting my sensory perception.

Reliable Familiarity Claim: "I know Barak Obama." I have spent time with him and have read his books, so I can claim to be familiar with his personality and character. I'm still trusting my experiences. I'm believing that my experiences have conveyed truth.

Reliable Capability Claim: "I know how to drive a car." I believe, based on previous experiences, that I can make my mind and body function in all the complex ways that are necessary in order for me to safely operate a motor vehicle.

So, recognizing that my knowing is ultimately based on trust/ belief/ faith doesn't necessarily imply that my knowing is unreliable. It appears to be reliable, at least with respect to the mundane activities.

And, I should say, the reason I'm so focused on this is because often we don't seem to be aware that some of our claims to knowing something are actually quite tenuous. The consequence is that we are unduly confident in our knowledge, because we haven't properly examined our assumptions.

But trusting is based on evidence or credentials. At least, it should be. There is an Italian proverb that goes: "To trust is good, but not to trust is better". Doubtless, some people claim to know when they should say only that they believe. But that doesn't mean that all claims to know are tenuous. Many claims to know are well-grounded and legitimate. For instance I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. I don't just believe it, I know it. And I have a wealth of evidence to support my position. In fact, if I were to say that I don't know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I would be saying something that was misleading. There are many things I know that I have not experienced directly, but know, nevertheless. I know I live in the Northern Hemisphere; I know that water is H20 (who has experienced that water is H20 directly?) I know that I was born, and what's more, I know that you were born. I know that I had parents, and I know you had parents too. So, although some of ours claims to knowing are tenuous, at least as many (and probably more) are well-founded.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But why are you not justified in trusting your senses and your reasoning powers? Our senses and our reasoning powers lead us to truth more often than not. Even if my automobile sometimes fails me, that does not mean the car is not reliable.

What methods do we have for verifying the reliability of our senses and reasoning powers?

The difference between knowledge and faith rests within tautologies and rhetorical conventions.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But trusting is based on evidence or credentials. At least, it should be. There is an Italian proverb that goes: "To trust is good, but not to trust is better". Doubtless, some people claim to know when they should say only that they believe. But that doesn't mean that all claims to know are tenuous. Many claims to know are well-grounded and legitimate. For instance I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. I don't just believe it, I know it. And I have a wealth of evidence to support my position. In fact, if I were to say that I don't know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I would be saying something that was misleading. There are many things I know that I have not experienced directly, but know, nevertheless. I know I live in the Northern Hemisphere; I know that water is H20 (who has experienced that water is H20 directly?) I know that I was born, and what's more, I know that you were born. I know that I had parents, and I know you had parents too. So, although some of ours claims to knowing are tenuous, at least as many (and probably more) are well-founded.

Again, the point is not to cast doubt on mundane claims to know things, but to emphasize the need to examine claims to know when there are issues involved. It may be that we need to distinguish between the quality of a claim to know and the process of a claim to know. The quality of a claim to know may be very high, especially in mundane cases, but in each case, if I ask myself "How do I know that?" I discover that I came to know it via a process, and that process always involves trust in something or somebody. Let's see if this makes sense...

"I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador."
1. Quality of the claim: High, supported by all available evidence, but not absolute, because (for example, just for the sake of the argument) it's conceivable and possible that Ecuador could have changed its capitol to another city since the last time I checked.
2. Process of the claim: It is based upon my trust in my sensory perception and my trust in my mental processes. (People told me about it; I read about it in multiple sources; I learned the meaning of the word "capitol" in school, etc., etc.

"I know I live in the Northern Hemisphere."
1. Quality of the claim: High, supported by all available evidence, but not absolute, because (for example, just for the sake of the argument) it's conceivable and possible that I am the "brain in the jar" or I am hallucinating, or I am insane, etc.
2. Process of the claim: Based upon my trust in my sensory perception and my trust in my mental processes. (People told me about it; I read about it in multiple sources; I learned the meaning of expression "Northern Hemisphere" in school, etc., etc.

"I know that I was born."
1. Quality of the claim: High, supported by all available evidence, but not absolute, because (for example, just for the sake of the argument) it's conceivable and possible that I am the product of a scientific experiment and all my development was by artificial means.
2. Process of the claim: Based upon my trust in my sensory perception and my trust in my mental processes. (People told me about it; I read about it in multiple sources; I learned the meaning of the word "born" in school, etc., etc.

It's obviously preposterous and pointless to doubt some of these claims to know. The exercise is like the "brain in the jar" thought experiment, done merely to illustrate a point. The problem comes along, though, when we fail to doubt and examine claims that really ought to be doubted and examined. "Democracy is the best form of government." "I can prove that God exists." "Capitalism is the only good economic system." "Conservative Republicans are a bunch of idiots."

@Kolbe,

Kolbe wrote:

Haha, but what matters is that a cool breeze in summer is a cool breeze in summer! No time like the present, and all that hat.

it's not summer at present. it's January in Canada. We need that hat.

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