knowledge is merely one of faith's children

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

No. If at the time you claim to know Quito is the capital, it is, then you do know it. On the other hand, if it is not the capital, you do not know it. Although you may believe you know it. But, I don't know what you mean by the experience of knowing that Quito is the capital. Knowing, so far as I know, is not any experience. Believing is an experience, but knowing is a justified true belief. And there is no experience that presents itself justified and true rather than not. For the person himself, there is no difference between knowing and believing he knows, but not knowing. He cannot look into his mind and discern whether he knows or does not know. In our case, he has to find out what is true in Ecuador.

... I dunno ... it just seems an odd definition of "knowledge" that if I can one day think one thing it is "knowledge" and if another day I think the exact same thing it is "belief" ... that seems to me to be more a definition of "truth" than a definition of "knowledge" ... I'm trying to imagine if such a definition works outside the realm of the personal, as in "human knowledge" - but the fact that there remain conflicts within the body of human knowledge implies that even there knowledge cannot be synonymous with truth ... and since science acknowledges that what science is today is only a rough approximation that may be turned on its head as our technology improves allowing us to learn more tomorrow, does that mean that there is no such thing as scientific knowledge - only scientific belief? ... and does that mean the science of yesterday was not knowledge that was simply incorrect - but rather was not knowledge at all?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... I dunno ... it just seems an odd definition of "knowledge" that if I can one day think one thing it is "knowledge" and if another day I think the exact same thing it is "belief" ...

Suppose I believe I know that Rio de Janiero is the capital of Brazil, and I learn later that the capital is Brasilia, then when I believed I knew the capital was Rio, I was mistaken in thinking I knew that Rio was the capital, since I was mistaken in thinking that Rio was the capital. Consequently, when I believed I knew that Rio was the capital, I only believed that Rio was the capital, and I never knew it was the capital in the first place. So, when I "thought of (Rio as the capital) as knowledge", I was just mistaken, just as I can be mistaken about anything else, and I did not know it at all, I only believed it.

I know it looks a little complicated when it is laid out like that, but isn't it how we ordinarily think about knowledge?

@kennethamy,

that rather sums up what the original post is about, doesn't it? nothing can ever really be known for sure, particularly without something objective to compare it to.

i think this quote by Max Planck sums up not only scientific knowledge, but what people often refer to as common knowledge:

"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it"

@Kreist,

Kreist wrote:

that rather sums up what the original post is about, doesn't it? nothing can ever really be known for sure, particularly without something objective to compare it to.

Was that what the OP was about? I thought it was about whether faith is basic to all knowledge.
In any case, even if it is true that nothing can be known for certain (I suppose that is what you mean by "sure") that does not mean that nothing can be known. We all know a lot of things. We know, for example, that we have parents, that we were born, and many of us know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. The idea that to know means that it is impossible to be mistaken, rather than just that to know is not to be mistaken, is a philosophical mistake. I might be mistake about Quito, but since I am not, then I know that it is the capital of Ecuador.

I don't understand what you mean by what you say about "objective".

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I might be mistake about Quito, but since I am not, then I know that it is the capital of Ecuador.

... but how do you know you are not mistaken? ... if the definition of "knowledge" hinges on objective truth, then everything we think which is potentially knowledge or belief is in an indeterminate state: it is neither "knowledge" nor "belief" because for it to be one of those two it has to be validated against objective truth ... and since we do not have direct access to objective truth (our experience of it is filtered through senses that can themselves be mistaken), if we are to assert "I know" something beyond the self-evident subjective truths of "I experience" and "I reason", this is really just shorthand for "I believe I know", yes?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... but how do you know you are not mistaken? ... if the definition of "knowledge" hinges on objective truth, then everything we think which is potentially knowledge or belief is in an indeterminate state: it is neither "knowledge" nor "belief" because for it to be one of those two it has to be validated against objective truth ... and since we do not have direct access to objective truth (our experience of it is filtered through senses that can themselves be mistaken), if we are to assert "I know" something beyond the self-evident subjective truths of "I experience" and "I reason", this is really just shorthand for "I believe I know", yes?

That Quito is the capital, do you mean? I have overwhelming evidence that it is the capital. That doesn't mean it isn't barely possible that I am wrong. But that is no reason to think I am wrong, and I every reason to think I am right. So that is how I know I am not mistaken. To know is not to be absolutely certain in the sense that the very possibility of mistake is ruled out. Knowing just requires that I be right, not that it is impossible that I am wrong. I can be right, and yet it be possible that I am mistaken. And if I am right, then I know.

I don't know what you mean by "direct" access to truth, but it seems clear to me that we often have access to truth. Some times we can simply see that something is true, i.e. there is a dog in my front yard. I can see it. Sometimes we have to infer the truth from direct evidence, as when I see letters in my mailbox, and infer that the mailman has put them there. But neither is superior to the other, direct or indirect.

Believing I know does not exclude my knowing, since if I believe I know, that belief that I know can be true, and so, I do know. And of course, that belief that I know can be false, in which case, I do not know. But when I claim to know something, I do, I suppose, believe I know, unless I am lying. But what I am claiming is, of course, that I do know. And, as I have said, I may very well be right that I do know.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I can be right, and yet it be possible that I am mistaken. And if I am right, then I know.

... that reminds me of something Popper once said: that science's search for truth can never end - that even if science happens to stumble upon an objective truth, it has no way to verify this and thus will continue the search ... I think your definition of knowledge has this same quality - that even if you were to stumble upon knowledge, you have no way of removing all doubt that you could be mistaken (as observed by Popper, science may not even be able to help you here!) and thus can at best only believe you have discovered knowledge ... in which case it seems that the title of this thread has significant validity.

But does your definition of knowledge jibe with common usage of the word? ... does it jibe with the concept of a "body of knowledge"? ... does it jibe with the DIKW heirarchy?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... that reminds me of something Popper once said: that science's search for truth can never end - that even if science happens to stumble upon an objective truth, it has no way to verify this and thus will continue the search ... I think your definition of knowledge has this same quality - that even if you were to stumble upon knowledge, you have no way of removing all doubt that you could be mistaken (as observed by Popper, science may not even be able to help you here!) and thus can at best only believe you have discovered knowledge ... in which case it seems that the title of this thread has significant validity.

But does your definition of knowledge jibe with common usage of the word? ... does it jibe with the concept of a "body of knowledge"? ... does it jibe with the DIKW heirarchy?

The fact that I might be mistaken (as I have pointed out) does not show I do not know. Only if it can be shown that I am mistaken, can it be shown that I do not know. Consider this conversation:
A. I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.
B. But you might be mistaken.
A. Yes, but do you think that I am mistaken
B. No, I believe you are right. It is the capital. I was there just other day.
A. So, you think I do know that Quito is the capital.
B. No I do not?
A. But why, you say you believe it is the capital.
B. Yes, but you might be mistaken.
A. ??????

The "body of knowledge" is what people know. That is, believe, and their belief is both true and justified. So why does it not jibe?

As for Popper, somewhere in his, "Conjectures and Refutations" he draws the following analogy:

A mountain climber is trying to get to the summit of a mountain. He believes he has reached the summit, and from his calculations he is justified in believing he has reached the summit. But where he stands is shrouded in clouds, so he cannot tell he has reached the summit. Nevertheless, he has reached the summit, He is right in believing he has.
Now, Popper says, that mountain climber knows he has reached the summit. He believes he has. He is justified in believing he has. And it is true that he has.
The mountain climber does not have to know that he knows he has reached the summit, in order to know he has reached the summit. Indeed, on the contrary, he has to know he has reached the summit in order to know that he knows he has reached the summit.

@Kreist,

Kreist wrote:

that rather sums up what the original post is about, doesn't it? nothing can ever really be known for sure, particularly without something objective to compare it to.

One thing I have realized is that we should be distinguishing between the process of knowing, knowing itself, and truth.

As for the process of knowing, let me try this: It appears that it starts with some pre-programming--(hard wiring or whatever we may call it, the brain, the eqipment, and possibly some concepts (!?). With the inherited stuff we begin to encounter the sense-data (I'm thinking of an infant, now), and we process it in our brains and begin to develop mental constructs and more and more complex associations and stored images. Now the infant knows its mother's face. Soon it knows that when it reaches toward an object, sometimes its fingers can come in contact with it. The child begins to hear certain words often enough in association with certain situations and people to know what some of them mean.

Anyway, the point is that the process of knowing is inextricably connected to sense data translated by brain functions. Thus the universe is in my mind. It may also very well be "out there" but that is a separate issue.

If we understand the process to be so, then when we reflect on what it means to know, we can arguably say that it just means we believe something to be true. Kennethamy would add, "and indeed, it must be true, or else it is not knowing." The problem with adding that caveat is that it overlooks what we observed when we examined the process of knowing, i.e., that, in the final analysis, the universe is in my mind--it is a result of me encountering sense data and processing those data. Adding that caveat presumes that we can somehow directly encounter truth.

So what is truth? Facts that can be verified? But how do I verify them? I have to employ my senses and my mind again. I can verify plenty of things, but each and every verification is itself part of the universe that resides in my mind.

So I think it's better to just say that knowing (as in knowing a fact) is merely believing something to be true.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

The "body of knowledge" is what people know. That is, believe, and their belief is both true and justified. So why does it not jibe?

... is General Relativity in the body of scientific knowledge? ... is Quantum Mechanics in the body of scientific knowledge? ... if so, then this does not jibe with your definition of knowledge ... both are excellent sources of scientific prediction ... yet they conflict with one another and therefore cannot both be true.

At any rate, for the purposes of this discussion it may not matter whether your definition jibes with mainstream definitions or not ... whether we define knowledge as dependent upon objective truth - "I believe I know" - or define it as dependent upon subjective certitude - "To know is to believe to be true" - I think Dicanthelium's original statement holds water, yes?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... is General Relativity in the body of scientific knowledge? ... is Quantum Mechanics in the body of scientific knowledge? ... if so, then this does not jibe with your definition of knowledge ... both are excellent sources of scientific prediction ... yet they conflict with one another and therefore cannot both be true.

At any rate, for the purposes of this discussion it may not matter whether your definition jibes with mainstream definitions or not ... whether we define knowledge as dependent upon objective truth - "I believe I know" - or define it as dependent upon subjective certitude - "To know is to believe to be true" - I think Dicanthelium's original statement holds water, yes?

In that case, one is known, and one is only believed to be known. If they conflict with each other in the way you say they do.

No, since we can believe a statement to be true, and the statement is false. The Geocentric hypothesis was believed true, but it turned out to be false, so the Geocentric hypothesis turned out not to be known. In any case, even if someone believed a proposition was true, and it was true, it still would not follow that it was known to be true. For it might just be a lucky guess, and a lucky guess is not knowledge. Knowledge has to be supported with adequate evidence. So Dicanthelium's statement has two gaping holes in it: 1. being believed true is not knowledge, because it does not follow that just because you believe a proposition is true that it is, in fact true. And if the proposition is not true, then it cannot be knowledge; and, 2. Even if the proposition is believed true, and is, in fact, true, it need not be knowledge, for it might just be a lucky guess, which had no evidential support. Therefore, being believed true is not knowledge. So, D's statement would be far to leaky to hold anything. Much less water.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

In that case, one is known, and one is only believed to be known. If they conflict with each other in the way you say they do.

... actually, if history is any indication then neither is true Wink

...

kennethamy wrote:

So Dicanthelium's statement has two gaping holes in it: 1. being believed true is not knowledge, because it does not follow that just because you believe a proposition is true that it is, in fact true. And if the proposition is not true, then it cannot be knowledge; and, 2. Even if the proposition is believed true, and is, in fact, true, it need not be knowledge, for it might just be a lucky guess, which had no evidential support. Therefore, being believed true is not knowledge. So, D's statement would be far to leaky to hold anything. Much less water.

... I guess if you interpret D's statement as an assertion that knowledge is anything at all you believe, then it is (EDIT: "then it is" should actually read "then you're right") ... however, I didn't interpret D's statement that way, and I don't think anything else D has said really supports such an interpretation ... so given the original statement and D's elaborations upon that statement, I personally have to say it holds water ... so I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree Wink

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

1. being believed true is not knowledge, because it does not follow that just because you believe a proposition is true that it is, in fact true. And if the proposition is not true, then it cannot be knowledge; and, 2. Even if the proposition is believed true, and is, in fact, true, it need not be knowledge, for it might just be a lucky guess, which had no evidential support. Therefore, being believed true is not knowledge. So, D's statement would be far to leaky to hold anything. Much less water.

The issue is that, even if I subtract the demonstably false from what I believe (or believed) to be true, and even if I subtract the unverified from what I believe to be true, there remains a body of belief that I believe to be both true and verified. We have only shifted the question to what is "true" and what is "verified."

I can only KNOW if what I claim to know is both true and verified? Then how do I verify? How do I encounter truth?

Only if I trust something. Only if I choose to believe in something. Only if I have faith in something.

What shall I trust? What shall I believe in? What shall I have faith in? My perception of sense-data and my brain functions? Okay, that's fine. That gets me through my day. I have no choice, presumably. For all I know, it works "more often than not."

But let's not confuse that with some hypothetical encounter with absolute, irrefutable Truth.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

The issue is that, even if I subtract the demonstably false from what I believe (or believed) to be true, and even if I subtract the unverified from what I believe to be true, there remains a body of belief that I believe to be both true and verified. We have only shifted the question to what is "true" and what is "verified."

I can only KNOW if what I claim to know is both true and verified? Then how do I verify? How do I encounter truth?

Only if I trust something. Only if I choose to believe in something. Only if I have faith in something.

What shall I trust? What shall I believe in? What shall I have faith in? My perception of sense-data and my brain functions? Okay, that's fine. That gets me through my day. I have no choice, presumably. For all I know, it works "more often than not."

But let's not confuse that with some hypothetical encounter with absolute, irrefutable Truth.

I am not sure what you mean by "subtract", but if you mean that even if a propositions is not true or verified, it is, still true and verified, then that is a contradiction, and you and if you intentionally assert a contradiction, then you and I can no longer reason together, for intentionally to assert a contradiction is the very pinnacle of irrationality.

I never said that what you know has to be verified. But that what you know has to be true, is clear. For, when anyone states that he knows this or that, that is just short for saying that he knows that this or that is true. What else can it mean? So to say that I can know what is not true is to say that I can know that what is true is not true, and, again, we have a contradiction.

It is a common observation to anyone who is older than six that sometimes people trust, have faith in, or believe in what turns out to be untrustworthy, and false. So, trust and faith and belief are not enough. We have to have faith in, and believe what is credible, and trust in what is trustworthy. And, that means that we have to use our brains as well as our heart. If we should trust, and have faith in, or believe in, what is worthy of our faith, trust, and belief, then how do we separate what is belief-worthy, or faith worthy, from what is not? Not by using belief or faith or trust, for that is what we need to test. It must be by evidence and logic. What else. So, at the end, it is evidence and logic which is basic. As President Reagan advised, "trust, but verify" to determine that what we trust in, is worthy of our trust.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

... So, at the end, it is evidence and logic which is basic.

1. I get evidence through my senses.
2. I do logic with my brain.
3. If I trust that my senses delivered the evidence reliably, and if I trust that my brain processed that data reliably, I call the end result "knowledge."

Do you not agree with that summary?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

1. I get evidence through my senses.
2. I do logic with my brain.
3. If I trust that my senses delivered the evidence reliably, and if I trust that my brain processed that data reliably, I call the end result "knowledge."

Do you not agree with that summary?

... at the same time, let me try to put a couple of examples in the original context:

- Knowledge (e.g., General Relativity) is merely one of faith's children (i.e., requires belief in the scientific method; the genius of Einstein et. al.; my senses, if I choose to reproduce an experiment)

- Knowledge (e.g., that Quito is the capital of Ecuador) is merely one of faith's children (i.e., requires belief that the encyclopedia I looked it up in is authoritative; that it is current; that my neighbor who says he's been there isn't pulling my leg; in my senses, should I choose to visit there)

... are either of those objectionable?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

1. I get evidence through my senses.
2. I do logic with my brain.
3. If I trust that my senses delivered the evidence reliably, and if I trust that my brain processed that data reliably, I call the end result "knowledge."

Do you not agree with that summary?

But, how should I decide whether to trust my senses, and my brain? Whether they are trust-worthy?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But, how should I decide whether to trust my senses, and my brain? Whether they are trust-worthy?

... inductive corroboration ... every waking minute, we reason the outcomes of particular actions, act upon that reasoning, and then sense the outcomes we predicted - for example, predicting that a sequence of finger actions will result in the thought "every waking minute, we reason the outcomes of particular actions, act upon that reasoning, and then sense the outcomes we predicted" appearing on my monitor ... if this happens significantly more often than not, then we have reason to trust our senses and reasoning - at least as far as interaction with the phenomenal world goes ... crank this up a notch or two to technology-enhanced intersubjective inductive corroboration, and you have science Wink

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... inductive corroboration ... every waking minute, we reason the outcomes of particular actions, act upon that reasoning, and then sense the outcomes we predicted - for example, predicting that a sequence of finger actions will result in the thought "every waking minute, we reason the outcomes of particular actions, act upon that reasoning, and then sense the outcomes we predicted" appearing on my monitor ... if this happens significantly more often than not, then we have reason to trust our senses and reasoning - at least as far as interaction with the phenomenal world goes ... crank this up a notch or two to technology-enhanced intersubjective inductive corroboration, and you have science

Yes, and so, the trustworthyness of our rational faculties does not rest on faith as D. things.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Yes, and so, the trustworthyness of our rational faculties does not rest on faith as D. things.

... I'm not sure I understand - are you implying that inductive corroboration is proof? ...

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