Yes. I am a compatibilist (as all sensible people are) so I think that people can sometimes do otherwise than they did. I thought I had made that quite clear from the onset, but I am happy to do that now for you. But both compatibilists and incompatibilists hold that people can (sometimes) do otherwise than they did. So I am not at all clear why you believe that we can do otherwise. And, as always in philosophy, the why is much more important than the that. The argument is what is interesting, not the conclusion which is, after all, something we all know is true. How many on this forum really believe that we cannot do otherwise? I don't know of any; do you?

Yes. I am a compatibilist (as all sensible people are) so I think that people can sometimes do otherwise than they did. I thought I had made that quite clear from the onset, but I am happy to do that now for you. But both compatibilists and incompatibilists hold that people can (sometimes) do otherwise than they did. So I am not at all clear why you believe that we can do otherwise. And, as always in philosophy, the why is much more important than the that. The argument is what is interesting, not the conclusion which is, after all, something we all know is true. How many on this forum really believe that we cannot do otherwise? I don't know of any; do you?

Well I think one can do otherwise also
but
What is the natural law that would allow one to do otherwise. There is no known mechanism in the macro world which would allow two different events to occur given the same causes?
and
What then disthinguishes a compatablist from an incompatiblist and do not tell me incompatibilists think that events occur without causes because no one thinks that either?

Some Libertarians believe just that. Indeed, that is what the title of this thread seems to be about. If the Libertarians did not believe that: 1. Some actions are uncaused, and, 2. Those actions are, therefore, done freely, then why would Libertarian free will have to be rescued? Rescued from what?

Recused from those who think that the future is fixed and that there is only one possible outcome for any given set of circumstances including human behaviors.

Recused from those who think that the future is fixed and that there is only one possible outcome for any given set of circumstances including human behaviors.

Suppose the future is "fixed". That would not entail that one does not do what one wants, as what one wants may be part of what it is that brings about the future states that are fixed. So we then may ask, what, precisely, is "free will"? If it is simply doing as one wishes, then there is no incompatibility with that and a "fixed" future.

That there is and has only ever been one possible evolution of the world, is the basic and essential claim of determinism. Kennethamy is not a determinist, why he wants to claim to be a member of a group of people with whom he disagrees, is unfathomable, for me. The compatibilist position isn't Kennethamy's, it's like this:And it's easy to see that it's daft. As what one wants and what one does, in a determined world, are details of a global description, the coincidence of wanting what happens is of no more significance than the colour of clothing worn when whatever happens, happens. There is neither freedom nor will, in compatibilism.

If, "the fixity of the future" means, that necessarily what will happen will happen, who would deny that? But if, "the fixity of the future" means, that what will happen will necessarily happen, who would believe that?

I agree.

If what will happen is that I will wear a yellow shirt tomorrow then there are two ways you can interpret the claim that "what will happen will happen".

1. Wearing a yellow shirt will happen.
2. Whatever that will happen will happen.

The truth of (1) is contingent but (2) is true by definition and also completely trivial, obvious, and implies nothing important. If you understand what "will happen" means then you already know (2) and that it has nothing to do with free will.

Right. The mistake is to think that because (1) that necessarily what will happen will happen is (trivially) true, that it is also true that (2) that what will happen will necessarily happen is also true. But (2) is not true. It is false. And, therefore, (2) cannot be true because (1) is true. As soon as people distinguish between (1) and (2) they will see that fixity is false.

You can just pick one side, not both...

But you seem to think that neither libertarian free will nor hard determinism are true. I think you are right. But I think that is because compatibilism is the alternative to both. But you reject compatibilism too. So if you reject hard determinism because it implies fixity; and if you reject libertarianism because it implies there are causeless events; and if you reject compatibilism because you think it somehow evades the issue, and is an exercise is "semantics", then what is your view? You seem to have painted yourself into a corner.

The incompatibilist theories that have been offered fall into three main groups, depending on which type of indeterminism (uncaused events, nondeterministically caused events, agent- [or substance-] caused events) they require. Further variations among accounts concern where in the processes leading to decisions or other actions they require indeterminism and what other conditions besides indeterminism they require. The first three sections below examine recent versions of each of the three main types of incompatibilist view. The fourth section considers the evidence regarding whether in fact there exists what any of these accounts requires.

The scientific evidence for quantum mechanics is sometimes said to show that determinism is false. Quantum theory is indeed very well confirmed. However, there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it, on what it shows us with respect to how things are in the world. Indeterministic as well as deterministic interpretations have been developed, but it is far from clear whether any of the existing interpretations is correct. Perhaps the best that can be said here is that there is currently no good evidence that determinism is true.

In most of what follows, I will speak simply of determinism, rather than of causal determinism. This follows recent philosophical practice of sharply distinguishing views and theories of what causation is from any conclusions about the success or failure of determinism (cf. Earman, 1986; an exception is Mellor 1994). For the most part this disengagement of the two concepts is appropriate. But as we will see later, the notion of cause/effect is not so easily disengaged from much of what matters to us about determinism.

Traditionally determinism has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. This is only problematic if one is investigating determinism in a specific, well-defined theoretical context; but it is important to avoid certain major errors of definition. In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:
Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Fatalism is easily disentangled from determinism, to the extent that one can disentangle mystical forces and gods' wills and foreknowledge (about specific matters) from the notion of natural/causal law

A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.

How come what will happen if true will not happen out of necessity if it will in fact happen ??? It happens for no cause or it happens with a cause ?
You can just pick one side, not both...

The following is the thesis of compatiblism and for me is quite clear how I should to look at it...

YouTube - Daniel Dennett lecture on "Free Will" (Edinburgh University)

Thank you for this. But I do not understand your comment, unless you have changed your mind, for Dennett is a compatibilists, and in this lecture he argues for compatibilism just as he does in his two books on free will.

You are I would say both a hard determinist (meaning you think the future is fixed) and an incompatiblist (meaning you think "free will" is false and "hard determinism" is true). Please correct me if I am wrong.