Can Libertarian Free Will Be Rescued?

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salima
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 06:52 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;157678 wrote:
Yes. I am a compatibilist (as all sensible people are) so I think that people can sometimes do otherwise than they did. I thought I had made that quite clear from the onset, but I am happy to do that now for you. But both compatibilists and incompatibilists hold that people can (sometimes) do otherwise than they did. So I am not at all clear why you believe that we can do otherwise. And, as always in philosophy, the why is much more important than the that. The argument is what is interesting, not the conclusion which is, after all, something we all know is true. How many on this forum really believe that we cannot do otherwise? I don't know of any; do you?


i thought there were a few, but i forgot who they were. it amazes me when someone says that is what they believe, because i think i would have to make a quick final exit. it would not only make morality unimportant, it would make everything utterly pointless-i mean not just like thinking 'oh gee, what is the purpose of life?' but it would mean that there clearly was no purpose at all and nothing to think about.
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 08:28 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;157678 wrote:
Yes. I am a compatibilist (as all sensible people are) so I think that people can sometimes do otherwise than they did. I thought I had made that quite clear from the onset, but I am happy to do that now for you. But both compatibilists and incompatibilists hold that people can (sometimes) do otherwise than they did. So I am not at all clear why you believe that we can do otherwise. And, as always in philosophy, the why is much more important than the that. The argument is what is interesting, not the conclusion which is, after all, something we all know is true. How many on this forum really believe that we cannot do otherwise? I don't know of any; do you?
Well I think one can do otherwise also
but
What is the natural law that would allow one to do otherwise. There is no known mechanism in the macro world which would allow two different events to occur given the same causes?
and
What then disthinguishes a compatablist from an incompatiblist and do not tell me incompatibilists think that events occur without causes because no one thinks that either?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 08:37 pm
@prothero,
prothero;157726 wrote:
Well I think one can do otherwise also
but
What is the natural law that would allow one to do otherwise. There is no known mechanism in the macro world which would allow two different events to occur given the same causes?
and
What then disthinguishes a compatablist from an incompatiblist and do not tell me incompatibilists think that events occur without causes because no one thinks that either?


Some Libertarians believe just that. Indeed, that is what the title of this thread seems to be about. If the Libertarians did not believe that: 1. Some actions are uncaused, and, 2. Those actions are, therefore, done freely, then why would Libertarian free will have to be rescued? Rescued from what?
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 09:11 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;157731 wrote:
Some Libertarians believe just that. Indeed, that is what the title of this thread seems to be about. If the Libertarians did not believe that: 1. Some actions are uncaused, and, 2. Those actions are, therefore, done freely, then why would Libertarian free will have to be rescued? Rescued from what?
Recused from those who think that the future is fixed and that there is only one possible outcome for any given set of circumstances including human behaviors.

No one thinks that human behaviors are not constrained by the laws of physics and not conditioned by previous experience and influenced by present circumstances. No one thinks human responses are entirely "free" and devoid of causes not even libertarians. In fact such "freedom" would be little better than randomness.

What people do think is that one has "choices" or options (alternative courses of action) in life, and that future outcomes are affected by such choices.

Why do you always avoid the hard part of the questions, like "what could the mechanism for the ability to do otherwise be?"
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 09:22 pm
@kennethamy,
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 09:31 pm
@prothero,
prothero;157744 wrote:
Recused from those who think that the future is fixed and that there is only one possible outcome for any given set of circumstances including human behaviors.



But that isn't rescuing libertarian free will. Rescuing libertarian free will is rescuing it from the seeming absurdity that some events (human actions) have no causes, and that it is only if an action has no cause that it is a free action. Didn't you, yourself, disparage the notion that anyone thought that some actions have no causes? If libertarian free will were the only alternative to Hard Determinism (which is what you appear to think) then if Hard Determinism is false (as you appear to think) what need has libertarian free will to be rescued?

But you seem to think that neither libertarian free will nor hard determinism are true. I think you are right. But I think that is because compatibilism is the alternative to both. But you reject compatibilism too. So if you reject hard determinism because it implies fixity; and if you reject libertarianism because it implies there are causeless events; and if you reject compatibilism because you think it somehow evades the issue, and is an exercise is "semantics", then what is your view? You seem to have painted yourself into a corner.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Wed 28 Apr, 2010 09:45 pm
@kennethamy,
Kennethammy I think you said some posts above that some times it is the case that you can chose to do otherwise...could you care to explain logically how it is so to the forum if not to me ?

IF YOUR CHOOSING HAS A PRECISE CAUSE, HOW COME THIS CAUSE IS NOT CAUSE ENOUGH TO CAUSE, TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE OTHERWISE ???


---------- Post added 04-28-2010 at 11:03 PM ----------

 
ughaibu
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 03:31 am
@prothero,
prothero;157744 wrote:
Recused from those who think that the future is fixed and that there is only one possible outcome for any given set of circumstances including human behaviors.
That there is and has only ever been one possible evolution of the world, is the basic and essential claim of determinism. Kennethamy is not a determinist, why he wants to claim to be a member of a group of people with whom he disagrees, is unfathomable, for me. The compatibilist position isn't Kennethamy's, it's like this:
Pyrrho;157522 wrote:
Suppose the future is "fixed". That would not entail that one does not do what one wants, as what one wants may be part of what it is that brings about the future states that are fixed. So we then may ask, what, precisely, is "free will"? If it is simply doing as one wishes, then there is no incompatibility with that and a "fixed" future.
And it's easy to see that it's daft. As what one wants and what one does, in a determined world, are details of a global description, the coincidence of wanting what happens is of no more significance than the colour of clothing worn when whatever happens, happens. There is neither freedom nor will, in compatibilism.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 06:11 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;157856 wrote:
That there is and has only ever been one possible evolution of the world, is the basic and essential claim of determinism. Kennethamy is not a determinist, why he wants to claim to be a member of a group of people with whom he disagrees, is unfathomable, for me. The compatibilist position isn't Kennethamy's, it's like this:And it's easy to see that it's daft. As what one wants and what one does, in a determined world, are details of a global description, the coincidence of wanting what happens is of no more significance than the colour of clothing worn when whatever happens, happens. There is neither freedom nor will, in compatibilism.


That there is and has only ever been one possible evolution of the world, is the basic and essential claim of determinism.

Maybe it follows from determinism, but that is exactly what soft determinists deny, that it does follow from determinism. Determinism says that every event is subsumable under a law of nature. Whether that implies fixity is a philosophical question. To define "determinism" as if it implied fixity has (to use a nice phrase by Russell in another context) "has all the advantages of theft over honest toil". It makes the issue of free will a (as people love to put it) "just semantic".

It seems to me that if a person does something because he want to do it, that is prima facie evidence that he did it of his own free will. At least, that is how the term in used in English.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 07:18 am
@kennethamy,
a cause, obviously one of them has to win over the others, and asserts that therefore the fixity of the future is in fact necessary at least in our Universe...
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 07:30 am
@chap9898,
If, "the fixity of the future" means, that necessarily what will happen will happen, who would deny that? But if, "the fixity of the future" means, that what will happen will necessarily happen, who would believe that?
 
Night Ripper
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 07:48 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;157926 wrote:
If, "the fixity of the future" means, that necessarily what will happen will happen, who would deny that? But if, "the fixity of the future" means, that what will happen will necessarily happen, who would believe that?


I agree.

If what will happen is that I will wear a yellow shirt tomorrow then there are two ways you can interpret the claim that "what will happen will happen".

1. Wearing a yellow shirt will happen.
2. Whatever that will happen will happen.

The truth of (1) is contingent but (2) is true by definition and also completely trivial, obvious, and implies nothing important. If you understand what "will happen" means then you already know (2) and that it has nothing to do with free will.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 08:28 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
The following is the thesis of compatiblism and for me is quite clear how I should to look at it...

YouTube - Daniel Dennett lecture on "Free Will" (Edinburgh University)
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 08:34 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;157933 wrote:
I agree.

If what will happen is that I will wear a yellow shirt tomorrow then there are two ways you can interpret the claim that "what will happen will happen".

1. Wearing a yellow shirt will happen.
2. Whatever that will happen will happen.

The truth of (1) is contingent but (2) is true by definition and also completely trivial, obvious, and implies nothing important. If you understand what "will happen" means then you already know (2) and that it has nothing to do with free will.


Right. The mistake is to think that because (1) that necessarily what will happen will happen is (trivially) true, that it is also true that (2) that what will happen will necessarily happen is also true. But (2) is not true. It is false. And, therefore, (2) cannot be true because (1) is true. As soon as people distinguish between (1) and (2) they will see that fixity is false.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 09:17 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;157958 wrote:
Right. The mistake is to think that because (1) that necessarily what will happen will happen is (trivially) true, that it is also true that (2) that what will happen will necessarily happen is also true. But (2) is not true. It is false. And, therefore, (2) cannot be true because (1) is true. As soon as people distinguish between (1) and (2) they will see that fixity is false.


How come what will happen if true will not happen out of necessity if it will in fact happen ??? It happens for no cause or it happens with a cause ?
You can just pick one side, not both...
 
prothero
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 06:21 pm
@kennethamy,
[QUOTE=Fil. Albuquerque;157965]How come what will happen if true will not happen out of necessity if it will in fact happen ??? It happens for no cause or it happens with a cause ?[/QUOTE]
Fil. Albuquerque;157965 wrote:

You can just pick one side, not both...

You are I would say both a hard determinist (meaning you think the future is fixed) and an incompatiblist (meaning you think "free will" is false and "hard determinism" is true). Please correct me if I am wrong.

[QUOTE=kennethamy;157754]But that isn't rescuing libertarian free will. Rescuing libertarian free will is rescuing it from the seeming absurdity that some events (human actions) have no causes, and that it is only if an action has no cause that it is a free action. Didn't you, yourself, disparage the notion that anyone thought that some actions have no causes? If libertarian free will were the only alternative to Hard Determinism (which is what you appear to think) then if Hard Determinism is false (as you appear to think) what need has libertarian free will to be rescued? [/QUOTE]
kennethamy;157754 wrote:


But you seem to think that neither libertarian free will nor hard determinism are true. I think you are right. But I think that is because compatibilism is the alternative to both. But you reject compatibilism too. So if you reject hard determinism because it implies fixity; and if you reject libertarianism because it implies there are causeless events; and if you reject compatibilism because you think it somehow evades the issue, and is an exercise is "semantics", then what is your view? You seem to have painted yourself into a corner.
Not that it will make any difference to you, since you seem unusually self assured about what the meaning of these terms are in "true philosophy" but three separate entries in the SEP by three different authors writing about the issue of free will and determinism disagree with your definition and usage of "determinism" and also with your narrow notion of "libertarian free will". I am a non determinist but that does not mean that I think events occur without causes only that I think the future is not fixed. I am also a "libertarian free will advocate" but that does not mean that I think human behavior is without causes, deliberations or reason only that one can do otherwise. We can of course continue to discuss the "true" meaning of these terms but perhaps the more basic concepts about the non fixity of the future and the ability to do otherwise are both more important and clearer. I might add it is not only the people writing for the SEP that use the terms differently than you but also most of the writers in Wiki and the IEP as well as many other sites devoted to philosophy and free will and determinism.
Quote:
The incompatibilist theories that have been offered fall into three main groups, depending on which type of indeterminism (uncaused events, nondeterministically caused events, agent- [or substance-] caused events) they require. Further variations among accounts concern where in the processes leading to decisions or other actions they require indeterminism and what other conditions besides indeterminism they require. The first three sections below examine recent versions of each of the three main types of incompatibilist view. The fourth section considers the evidence regarding whether in fact there exists what any of these accounts requires.
Quote:
The scientific evidence for quantum mechanics is sometimes said to show that determinism is false. Quantum theory is indeed very well confirmed. However, there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it, on what it shows us with respect to how things are in the world. Indeterministic as well as deterministic interpretations have been developed, but it is far from clear whether any of the existing interpretations is correct. Perhaps the best that can be said here is that there is currently no good evidence that determinism is true.

From: SEP "Incompatibilist Non deterministic Theories of Free Will"

Quote:
In most of what follows, I will speak simply of determinism, rather than of causal determinism. This follows recent philosophical practice of sharply distinguishing views and theories of what causation is from any conclusions about the success or failure of determinism (cf. Earman, 1986; an exception is Mellor 1994). For the most part this disengagement of the two concepts is appropriate. But as we will see later, the notion of cause/effect is not so easily disengaged from much of what matters to us about determinism.

Quote:
Traditionally determinism has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. This is only problematic if one is investigating determinism in a specific, well-defined theoretical context; but it is important to avoid certain major errors of definition. In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:
Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.


Quote:
Fatalism is easily disentangled from determinism, to the extent that one can disentangle mystical forces and gods' wills and foreknowledge (about specific matters) from the notion of natural/causal law
.SEP Entry on "Causal Determinism"

Quote:
A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.
From SEP entry on "Compatibilism"
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 06:33 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;157965 wrote:
How come what will happen if true will not happen out of necessity if it will in fact happen ??? It happens for no cause or it happens with a cause ?
You can just pick one side, not both...


Because causes do not necessitate. (As David Hume pointed out). It is logically impossible for something both, to happen and not happen. For that is a contradiction. But it is not logically impossible for something that did happen not to have happened. For that would not be a contradiction. Example: It is logically impossible for me both, to have eaten that apple and not to have eaten that apple. But it is not logically impossible for me not to have eaten that apple (although, in fact, I did eat it). That would not be a contradiction.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 10:09 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;157956 wrote:
The following is the thesis of compatiblism and for me is quite clear how I should to look at it...

YouTube - Daniel Dennett lecture on "Free Will" (Edinburgh University)


Thank you for this. But I do not understand your comment, unless you have changed your mind, for Dennett is a compatibilists, and in this lecture he argues for compatibilism just as he does in his two books on free will.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 11:16 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;158215 wrote:
Thank you for this. But I do not understand your comment, unless you have changed your mind, for Dennett is a compatibilists, and in this lecture he argues for compatibilism just as he does in his two books on free will.


---------- Post added 04-30-2010 at 12:24 AM ----------

prothero;158131 wrote:
You are I would say both a hard determinist (meaning you think the future is fixed) and an incompatiblist (meaning you think "free will" is false and "hard determinism" is true). Please correct me if I am wrong.
 
prothero
 
Reply Thu 29 Apr, 2010 11:29 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;158234 wrote:
Now you see you say all this and it is still not clear to me:
do you think there is one possible future (fixed) or many possible futures?
do you think you have the possibility to do otherwise or that your actions, decisions, thoughts and feelings are likewise fixed and determined?

Because I have to tell you when people tell me that they are a compatibilist, an incompatibilist, a determinist or a free will libertarian, I just do not know what they mean anymore. Half the time I do not think they know what they mean. The "ability to do otherwise" and the "fixity of the future" although not without their own conceptual problems at least seem clearer.
 
 

 
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