Can Libertarian Free Will Be Rescued?

@chap9898,

TBH, what is the point of having free will when in the end, you're still going to have choices, but there will only be one choice you can make, there are alternate situations within alternate solutions, but you will only have one choice, and one fate - which is death.

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156468 wrote:

Nonsense. Free will is not presupposed in practice. First of all, your definition of "free will" is not satisfactory, as it is not clear what you mean. (In one sense of what you stated, it is clearly false that there is an ability to do otherwise, as whatever one does, one does that and nothing else, and cannot have done what one has not done, as then one would have done that and not something else. It is self-contradictory to say that one has done what one has not done, or that one will do what one will not do. Presumably, though, you mean something else by "the ability to do or to have done otherwise", but you have not explained your meaning at all.) And second, there are people who do not believe in free will, and there are those who do not think about the question of whether there is free will or not. One does not need metaphysical speculation to live one's life at all.

I am willing to bet you do in fact rationally consider alternative courses in action and consider their consequences in "choosing" or "willing" which path to follow. If you deny this, I have to doubt that you are being entirely honest with yourself and with others.

Do a simple google search on "free will" and "ability to do otherwise" and you will find it is in fact the definition of free will used by most libertarians and many compatiblists as well. So it may be "nonsense" to you but many ultilize it.

As for metaphysical assumptions, we all operate under them, even though many of us do not think deeply about them, do not care to discuss them, or deny that they are assumptions; usually we think they are just "the way things are" or "common sense". These days materialism and determinism are common metaphysical assumptions which many think it is "silly" to question. Philosophy is precisely the questioning of such assumptions and deeper thinking about the nature of the world. Philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is held to be " a silly waste of time about matters unknowable by many" presumbly not by participants in a philosophy forum.

---------- Post added 04-25-2010 at 01:06 PM ----------

Diogenes;156486 wrote:

TBH, what is the point of having free will when in the end, you're still going to have choices, but there will only be one choice you can make, there are alternate situations within alternate solutions, but you will only have one choice, and one fate - which is death.

If the world is pre determined and there truly is only one possible future, then isn't the "deliberation" about choices that we all engage in "futile and pointless"?
For that matter is not the meaningfulness of our hopes, wishes and dreams
at stake as well? Except as an intellectual proposition, no one really surrenders their "free will" to hard determinism or to fatalism.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156483 wrote:

Even such a hard line free will denier as Wegner admits that, not only is it impossible for him to function without the assumption of free will, but also he must undergo "the illusion" in order to perform the very acts for which he claims that it's unnecessary. All healthy human adults assume that if they visit an unfamiliar location, and they want to piss, they can find out where the toilet is and if it's vacant, they can piss and if it's occupied, they can refrain from pissing. In other words, they assume that they can make and enact a conscious choice between realisable alternatives, and that is demonstrating free will.

I assume that I do something of my own free will whenever I do something which I am not compelled to do. Is that what is meant by assuming that one has free will? If not, I don't understand what it is supposed to mean. (Not, I hope, that what I did was not caused by anything). So, I suppose that if someone is under the illusion that he is acting freely, he thinks he is not compelled to do something when he is actually compelled to do that thing? Is that it?

@chap9898,

so the ability to do otherwise is easy enough to prove, isnt it? you know you would choose to have something for dinner that you like, so you can choose to have something you hate instead.

the thing about having a cause doesnt matter-because if our own thinking is the cause of what we do or what we choose, then that is free will, isnt it? unless our thinking is programmed somehow ... and how would we know that?

@salima,

salima;156607 wrote:

so the ability to do otherwise is easy enough to prove, isnt it? you know you would choose to have something for dinner that you like, so you can choose to have something you hate instead.

the thing about having a cause doesnt matter-because if our own thinking is the cause of what we do or what we choose, then that is free will, isnt it? unless our thinking is programmed somehow ... and how would we know that?

Yes, and that is the point. Being caused is irrelevant (as you say) just as long as the cause is not one that compels you to do something you do not choose to do.

@salima,

salima;156607 wrote:

so the ability to do otherwise is easy enough to prove, isnt it? you know you would choose to have something for dinner that you like, so you can choose to have something you hate instead.

the thing about having a cause doesnt matter-because if our own thinking is the cause of what we do or what we choose, then that is free will, isnt it? unless our thinking is programmed somehow ... and how would we know that?

Hi Salima !

But is n?t your own thinking caused by your genetic heritage and cultural background ? I mean no one thinks a thing out of the blue, do they ?

...bringing the word coercion to such a strict sense is not but an ingenious way to go around the problem...and this is mostly politics, surely you can see that... Smile

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156483 wrote:

Even such a hard line free will denier as Wegner admits that, not only is it impossible for him to function without the assumption of free will, but also he must undergo "the illusion" in order to perform the very acts for which he claims that it's unnecessary. All healthy human adults assume that if they visit an unfamiliar location, and they want to piss, they can find out where the toilet is and if it's vacant, they can piss and if it's occupied, they can refrain from pissing. In other words, they assume that they can make and enact a conscious choice between realisable alternatives, and that is demonstrating free will.

If that is all that you mean by "free will", it is not incompatible with determinism.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;156618 wrote:

is n?t your own thinking caused by your genetic heritage and cultural background ? I mean no one thinks a thing out of the blue, do they ?

None of which implies determinism, in fact you're listing requirements for free will, ie that there be an agent with a means of choosing. Further, this stuff can be circumvented by using a pair of dice to select from the menu.

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 05:52 PM ----------

Pyrrho;156647 wrote:

If that is all that you mean by "free will", it is not incompatible with determinism.

1) should I take that as acknowledgement that you accept that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume and act on the assumption that they have free will?
2) it is incompatible with determinism because in a determined world the state of the world at all times is a fact at all times, in short, in a determined world there are no realisable alternatives. So, it is the case that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume that they have incompatibilist free will.

@chap9898,

chap9898;154708 wrote:

I have yet to come across a coherent defense of libertarian free will, which I define as "the ability to have done otherwise." Basically, I can conceive of only three possible ultimate sources of one's actions: (1) that with which one is born, (2) one's environment (from one's birth to the time of the action), and (3) randomness (which may arise in the context of quantum indeterminacies). None of these three sources enables libertarian free will.

Is there anyone out there who can provide a sound argument in favor of the existence of libertarian free will?

I feel that this is an important issue because without libertarian free will, the concept of moral responsibility is rendered incoherent.

Thank you for your time.

Hardly anybody is arguing for it because they think it's phenomenologically/metaphysically accurate. It's a belief that is held because there is simply no alternative way to live one's life than under the assumption that one can choose.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156670 wrote:

None of which implies determinism, in fact you're listing requirements for free will, ie that there be an agent with a means of choosing. Further, this stuff can be circumvented by using a pair of dice to select from the menu.

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 05:52 PM ----------

1) should I take that as acknowledgement that you accept that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume and act on the assumption that they have free will?
2) it is incompatible with determinism because in a determined world the state of the world at all times is a fact at all times, in short, in a determined world there are no realisable alternatives. So, it is the case that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume that they have incompatibilist free will.

What makes an alternative realizeable? I would think it meant that if you chose to do it, then you could do it. Why is that not compatible with determinism?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156670 wrote:

None of which implies determinism, in fact you're listing requirements for free will, ie that there be an agent with a means of choosing. Further, this stuff can be circumvented by using a pair of dice to select from the menu.

Being an agent implies will very much so, I agree, and that will is my one of course, but not necessarily that that will is free just because its my one in some loose sense, as if I were its first and last cause...in what sense could it be ? because one has the impression that soft coercion from patterns all around us, is not important on how we are shaped by them?
Or because one is not even aware of most of this conditioning patterns ?

Its will free because I "agree" with it, or rather the opposite is it conditioned because I can?t disagree with it given the specific circumstances in which I will ?...

...of course what I come to think is caused efficiently by me, but it happens just as efficiently, that something else, caused me to think what I come to think in my own so called "free" thinking...we just may not disregard this last detail...the chain of cause once "materialized" is very specific on how it happens. (the collapse of the wave function for instance) Obviously that?s why such thing its called cause in the first place !
The contradiction rests on disregarding the efficient previous cause for the efficient cause of my own thinking which is me only in its last final sequence, and then accepting that as a sufficient boundary for freedom of choice to be considered true...an ingenious illusion but hardly a fact !

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 08:30 AM ----------

I mean given the circumstances could you wish otherwise ? I don?t think so...even the sense of selfness is a phenomenological construction in the brain on a close observation...we are way past to that kind of linear perception on how world works, or at least we should be...anyway, such is life !...:rolleyes:

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 09:11 AM ----------

Last but not least it ads that tossing a coin for decision making is a very determined way of choosing...It means you always chose accordingly with the result and cannot do otherwise, given the precise rules of the game...
So the efficient cause is very determined indeed even if the result in action is unpredictable...and here we have another perfect example of how illusions take the best of our rationality right out through the window...

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156670 wrote:

1) should I take that as acknowledgement that you accept that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume and act on the assumption that they have free will?

No. Particularly in view of your further claims:

ughaibu;156670 wrote:

2) it is incompatible with determinism because in a determined world the state of the world at all times is a fact at all times, in short, in a determined world there are no realisable alternatives. So, it is the case that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume that they have incompatibilist free will.

When one decides to do what one wants, the question that you seem to fail to ask is this: Why does one want what one wants? A particular example may clarify the issue. Most normal people, if they wanted to do so, could slice their arms with a razor blade, with ten slices half a foot long on each arm, and then pour rubbing alcohol onto them, one at a time, at ten second intervals. The thing is, most normal people cannot want to do that, so they do not do that. And the fact that they cannot want to do that is not primarily due to any choices that they made, but is due to the way that people naturally occur. In other words, their lack of desire to do that is caused by preceding circumstances that have little or nothing to do with their choices or "free will". And this extends to things that people tend to like as well, such as eating and sex. Most people are such that they want these things, but their wanting them is not because they chose to be a certain way, but due to the causes of them being people (i.e., heredity and environment).

So, when it is said that people "could do otherwise if they wanted", that in no way implies that they could want to do otherwise, given all of the circumstances that in fact obtain. So they may not, in fact, be able to do otherwise, if they cannot want to do otherwise.

Or, to put the matter quite simply, doing what one wants in no way implies that one is not causally determined to do it. The wanting of it may simply be a part of the causal chain of events.

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156826 wrote:

they may not, in fact, be able to do otherwise, if they cannot want to do otherwise.

Of course they can. This can be proved, to anyone who accepts that radioactive decay isn't determined, by acting according to whether or not a decay event occurs. It can be proved, to be the case with an infinitely great probability, by acting according to the result of a tossed coin.
Do you think I haven't been faced with these kind of objections before, literally hundreds of times, at the other site?

In any case, regardless of your theorising, it remains the case that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume that they do have realisable alternatives, whether you deny this or not.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156828 wrote:

Of course they can. This can be proved, to anyone who accepts that radioactive decay isn't determined, by acting according to whether or not a decay event occurs. It can be proved, to be the case with an infinitely great probability, by acting according to the result of a tossed coin.
Do you think I haven't been faced with these kind of objections before, literally hundreds of times, at the other site?

In any case, regardless of your theorising, it remains the case that all healthy human adults unavoidably assume that they do have realisable alternatives, whether you deny this or not.

The tossing of a coin is a determined event. Whether it turns up heads or tails is a function of several things, such as the force exerted on it, the direction of the force, the resistance of the air, and the properties of the surface upon which it lands. The fact that people do not have sufficient control over the force that they exert, and do not know about all of the properties of the relevant other factors, makes them unable to accurately predict the outcome. But that inability to predict the outcome does not entail that it was not caused by the preceding events. What this illustrates is that epistemically there may appear to be more than one possible outcome, but that does not make it actually the case that there is more than one possible outcome. One not knowing what will happen does not make the event not causally determined. Likewise, the decision to act in accordance with the outcome of some event may itself have preceding causes.

And, of course, no one can prove that they could have done other than what they have done, given all of the circumstances that obtained. When one decides to have chocolate rather than vanilla, that is likely due to preferences one has regarding the taste, though it could also have to do with beliefs regarding allergies and so forth. Or one might attempt to prove that one has "free will" by choosing what one would normally not choose. But that desire to prove something is then the cause, which itself is probably due to preceding events, and so we still have not left the realm of causal determination.

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156839 wrote:

And, of course, no one can prove that they could have done other than what they have done, given all of the circumstances that obtained.

I think that only someone who was in the throes of philosophizing would make that statement. I wonder what you would require as proof that I could not have asked for chocolate rather than vanilla ice-cream at the ice-cream show the other day if what we would ordinarily accept as evidence would not do the trick, as obviously it would not, since if you thought it would, you would not have made that statement the first place. You seem to be requiring absolute certainty for I am sure that you don't think that in the normal run of things there would be any good reason to think that I could not have asked for chocolate when, in fact, I asked for vanilla.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156849 wrote:

Pyrrho;156839 wrote:
And, of course, no one can prove that they could have done other than what they have done, given all of the circumstances that obtained.

I think that only someone who was in the throes of philosophizing would make that statement. I wonder what you would require as proof that I could not have asked for chocolate rather than vanilla ice-cream at the ice-cream show the other day if what we would ordinarily accept as evidence would not do the trick, as obviously it would not, since if you thought it would, you would not have made that statement the first place. You seem to be requiring absolute certainty for I am sure that you don't think that in the normal run of things there would be any good reason to think that I could not have asked for chocolate when, in fact, I asked for vanilla.

I think you are misunderstanding my remark. First of all, not being able to prove something does not entail that its opposite is true.

You could have asked for chocolate ice cream the other day if you had wanted to. No one (so far) is denying that. But the question is, could you have wanted to ask for chocolate, given all of the circumstances that obtained the other day? One problem, of course, is that we do not know all of the relevant circumstances for why you wanted what you wanted. So, we may say, as far as we know, you could have picked chocolate instead of vanilla, as we do not in fact know why you wanted vanilla on that occasion. But since we do not know very far on this, we do not know that your desire for vanilla was not determined by the circumstances that obtained the other day. And if your desire for vanilla was determined by those circumstances, then given those circumstances, you could not have wanted chocolate. But, perhaps, what one wants is uncaused, and then it may be that things could really have been otherwise, given all of the circumstances that obtained the other day. But no one seems to believe that desires are uncaused, do they? But that is taking us in another direction that is unimportant for my present purposes. Until we can answer the question fully, why you wanted vanilla, we cannot know what, if anything, would have to change in the circumstances the other day for you to have wanted chocolate. If your desire for vanilla was caused by the circumstances that obtained, then, given those circumstances, you could not have wanted chocolate, as those circumstances caused your desire for vanilla. If they did not cause your desire for vanilla, then they would not have to change in order for you to have desired chocolate, though it would then be wondered, what caused the change in desire? Or are desires uncaused?

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156856 wrote:

I think you are misunderstanding my remark. First of all, not being able to prove something does not entail that its opposite is true.

You could have asked for chocolate ice cream the other day if you had wanted to. No one (so far) is denying that. But the question is, could you have wanted to ask for chocolate, given all of the circumstances that obtained the other day?

I did not think that not being able to prove something entailed its opposite is true. To believe that is fallacious. It is a variant of the fallacy of the argument from ignorance.

If you mean to ask whether I could have done otherwise in precisely the same circumstances that I did what I did, then the answer is that I could only if determinism is false. However, there is no reason to think that anyone who, in ordinary circumstances (I mean when not philosophizing) claims that he could have done otherwise would be making such a claim. As Dennett says, that would not be the kind of free will worth having.

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156856 wrote:

I think you are misunderstanding my remark. First of all, not being able to prove something does not entail that its opposite is true.

You could have asked for chocolate ice cream the other day if you had wanted to. No one (so far) is denying that. But the question is, could you have wanted to ask for chocolate, given all of the circumstances that obtained the other day? One problem, of course, is that we do not know all of the relevant circumstances for why you wanted what you wanted. So, we may say, as far as we know, you could have picked chocolate instead of vanilla, as we do not in fact know why you wanted vanilla on that occasion. But since we do not know very far on this, we do not know that your desire for vanilla was not determined by the circumstances that obtained the other day. And if your desire for vanilla was determined by those circumstances, then given those circumstances, you could not have wanted chocolate. But, perhaps, what one wants is uncaused, and then it may be that things could really have been otherwise, given all of the circumstances that obtained the other day. But no one seems to believe that desires are uncaused, do they? But that is taking us in another direction that is unimportant for my present purposes. Until we can answer the question fully, why you wanted vanilla, we cannot know what, if anything, would have to change in the circumstances the other day for you to have wanted chocolate. If your desire for vanilla was caused by the circumstances that obtained, then, given those circumstances, you could not have wanted chocolate, as those circumstances caused your desire for vanilla. If they did not cause your desire for vanilla, then they would not have to change in order for you to have desired chocolate, though it would then be wondered, what caused the change in desire? Or are desires uncaused?

Of course that uncaused correlated events would be the only possible alternative to determinism... and we say uncaused and correlated instead given the normal interpretation of what cause may be or signify...because ultimately, correlation may well be considered the only source of "cause" there is, specially in a deterministic perspective in which reality is just a hard ontic fact...we say caused given the spacial and temporal proximity between two events, and given the simulated state of affairs in which they seem to relate...

Relation, as I understand it, implies that such, always results in such in a sequence of events there is, but cannot ultimately prove that the classical sense of cause is in fact present...what it proves instead is Logos. Cause is just an brain interpretation of the phenomena we are confronted to, and probably nothing else...

As others, (Reconstructo+ made it a central question ) I pointed out before that we still in the realm of concepts, and their cultural and background limits all along...I?m forced to conclude In the end of the day, that the only reality there is to debate, is our epistemological perception of it...

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 04:57 PM ----------

kennethamy;156864 wrote:

I did not think that not being able to prove something entailed its opposite is true. To believe that is fallacious. It is a variant of the fallacy of the argument from ignorance.

If you mean to ask whether I could have done otherwise in precisely the same circumstances that I did what I did, then the answer is that I could only if determinism is false. However, there is no reason to think that anyone who, in ordinary circumstances (I mean when not philosophizing) claims that he could have done otherwise would be making such a claim. As Dennett says, that would not be the kind of free will worth having.

This, what you?r saying, claims nothing but common sense to beg the question...and THAT is without shadow of a doubt the plain cold hard fact of what it states !

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156864 wrote:

I did not think that not being able to prove something entailed its opposite is true. To believe that is fallacious. It is a variant of the fallacy of the argument from ignorance.

If you mean to ask whether I could have done otherwise in precisely the same circumstances that I did what I did, then the answer is that I could only if determinism is false.

Yes.

kennethamy;156864 wrote:

However, there is no reason to think that anyone who, in ordinary circumstances (I mean when not philosophizing) claims that he could have done otherwise would be making such a claim. As Dennett says, that would not be the kind of free will worth having.

I think that you are forgetting the title of this thread, and are not reading the posts in it closely enough. The "pro-free will" camp in this thread is claiming that an incompatibilist version of free will is necessary for morality, and is presupposed by all normal adults in making decisions. See posts 1, 47 and 48 (though the ideas that are pointedly expressed in 47 and 48 are also expressed earlier in the thread). Those are the claims that I think are false, and the people who have claimed them should provide evidence for them, as well as a coherent explanation of what they mean by "libertarian free will", as so far, the things that look like definitions are either incomplete and unclear or are not such that they are incompatible with determinism.

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;156909 wrote:

Yes.

I think that you are forgetting the title of this thread, and are not reading the posts in it closely enough. The "pro-free will" camp in this thread is claiming that an incompatibilist version of free will is necessary for morality, and is presupposed by all normal adults in making decisions. See posts 1, 47 and 48 (though the ideas that are pointedly expressed in 47 and 48 are also expressed earlier in the thread). Those are the claims that I think are false, and the people who have claimed them should provide evidence for them, as well as a coherent explanation of what they mean by "libertarian free will", as so far, the things that look like definitions are either incomplete and unclear or are not such that they are incompatible with determinism.

I suppose that they have to explain why they think that would be the kind of free will that was worth having, even if it were possible. I see what you mean, though.

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