@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote: The point to remember is that although all causes that compel, do compel, not all causes compel.
That point has not escaped me. All events are caused, but only some events are compelled, so although some events that are caused compel, not all events that are caused compel; therefore, there are 1) compelled causes and 2) uncompelled causes.
For example, there is a cause for why the tree fell--the wind blew sufficiently hard to knock it over, but never was it so (despite that) that the wind compelled the tree to fall over. Furthermore, there is a cause for why I went to the restaurant--I wanted to go, but never is it so (despite that) did my wanting to go compel me such that I could not refrain from going. So, in both cases, there was a cause, yet in neither case was there compulsion.
Ughaibu believes that 'determinism' (for lack of a better term) is the view that our world is clock-like such what will happen must happen. By "must", however, I do not mean "logically necessary." I mean physically necessary. He views a world ran on 'deterministic' principles as a world ran by gears that wind in only one direction, but because it's ran by gears, the implication is that if it could be rewound like a VCR, then each moment in the past would repeat itself if rewound and played over.
He may deny (or even feverishly deny) that his view is such, but it's the close as I have gotten to what I believe the implications of his view to be. For clarity, he doesn’t believe that view is true; he just believes that that is the view of determinism. He thinks that if 'determinism' is true (not to be confused with determinism, of course), then (and back to the tree example), no other physical possibility was present except for the tree to fall--it had to fall. Hence, despite the presence of logical possibilities (e.g. if the winds didn't blow, the tree wouldn't have fell because of the wind), the physical cause and effect relationship, being a consequence of laws of nature, would have been such that the tree had to fall. The point is that no other physical possibility was present, so things couldn't have happened otherwise. Logically, they could have, but physically because of the laws of nature, they could not have.
That point is made only to serve as the foundation for the next point about my wanting to go to the restaurant. Logically, I didn't have to go; after all, I wasn't compelled to go despite the causes, so I most certainly did go of my own free will, and I went despite the other logical possibilities ... for instance, going somewhere else or nowhere at all.
The real question though is how could I not have gone given the laws of nature—that apply not only to the tree and wind buy my wants and decisions? That I made the decision of my volition to go? The contention by one that would espouse 'determinism' is that of course you could have logically chosen otherwise, just as you agree that you could have chosen to not take your mile walk, but they also contend that the laws of nature have such an impact on us that even our very wants are governed by the laws of nature such that everything we think and do is a product of physical causes that not merely do happen but must happen in the before-mentioned clocklike gear run fashion.
Still, as you say, determinism is compatible with free will. That remains so. But, 'determinism', however, that's not so clear cut.
