Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

There's so much clarification that's needed in regards to what ughaibu is saying here. He may in fact be onto something, but I still can't make out what he means, even though I've reread all his posts from the last five pages. That said, I don't think we should ignore him. And I say this because there seems to be a bias against him due to some history between him and other members. But we must let that go and focus on the issues.

So, is there anyone that can rephrase or explain what ughaibu's point is? Ughaibu, I would ask you to explain again, but not only would that annoy you (justifiably), but it probably wouldn't do us any good.

I'm just not grasping why determinism has nothing to do with causality, even though almost every source I can find says it does. Perhaps I am just slow, and that is why I want you all to assist me!

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

There's so much clarification that's needed in regards to what ughaibu is saying here. He may in fact be onto something, but I still can't make out what he means, even though I've reread all his posts from the last five pages. That said, I don't think we should ignore him. And I say this because there seems to be a bias against him due to some history between him and other members. But we must let that go and focus on the issues.

So, is there anyone that can rephrase or explain what ughaibu's point is? Ughaibu, I would ask you to explain again, but not only would that annoy you (justifiably), but it probably wouldn't do us any good.

I'm just not grasping why determinism has nothing to do with causality, even though almost every source I can find says it does. Perhaps I am just slow, and that is why I want you all to assist me!

Why would you think U. is on to something unless you have some inkling (at least) of what he is talking about? (I expect that if he even replies, it will be with a mass of google, but he won't explain what he means. That's the U. way). Why, if no one can understand U. would it justifiably annoy him to be asked to explain? There is no bias, and even if there were, so what. Would that absolve him from not explaining what he means so that he can be understood? Is he supposed to be the Delphic Oracle so that it is up to us supplicants to understand him, and if we don't, then it is our fault?

Of course determinism has everything to do with causality unless you think that U. has some super-insight that no one else has. And why should anyone think that? U. seems to have at best some eccentric view that no one understands. And that is the most charitable interpretation I can provide. If he had such an insight, he should have been able to explain it by now in terms we can understand. Unless it is one of the Seven Mysteries of the Temple which only the initiate can understand.

@fast,

fast wrote:

Quote:
[A]t all times the world has a definite state, given the state of the world at any time, then the state of the world at all other times is exactly specified by the given state in conjunction with unchanging laws of nature.

Does this usage of "specified" have anything to do with causation, and if so, does it specifically exclude all kinds of causes with the exception of physical causes?

That question may come across as being out of left field, but I'm just trying to find a connection (loose as it might be) with the philisophical theory of determinism that does having something to do with events being caused--but not necessarily physically caused--unless an invitation for dinner is a physical cause for going out to eat.

Why wouldn't it be? Reasons can also be causes. In fact, although I may have many other reasons for doing something, when I say that such-and-such is the reason I did that thing I am indicating that it is the cause of my doing what I did, and that I probably would not have done it without that reason/cause. The reason I did X explains why I did X. And why should it not be a physical explanation? Indeed it must be a physical explanation if all explanations are physical explanations.

I wanted to go to the restaurant, and because I wanted to go, I went, but was the fact I wanted to go a cause for going? Apparently so, but was it a physical cause for going? I suppose not. However, though no mental want is a physical cause, there are no wants without underlying neurological physical causes, so just as there is no mind without the underlying physical brain activity to bring rise to a mind, there are underlying physical causes to the fact I even wanted to go.

Aren’t these physical events of the brain (that have physical causes) subject to the very same natural laws that make it so that trees must (physically must, that is) fall when winds are sufficiently strong enough to blow them over?

Not even in a world absent decision-making entities is it the case that things that do happen must happen, logically speaking (since if the winds don’t blow, the trees won’t fall because of wind). Yet, mustn’t the trees fall nevertheless when the winds blow sufficiently hard enough? Not logically speaking of course, for never must it be that it will fall, logically speaking. I mean, mustn’t the tree fall given the winds and the underlying principles of the laws of nature?

In a world like our own (with decision-making entities), we don’t have to go to the restaurant when we want to. We can restrain ourselves and resist and refrain from doing what we want. No wonder it’s us that is responsible for our behavior—and not Mother Nature.

Puts on my crazy hat:

Or so we think. Not just think, of course. Have good reason for thinking. But of course we do. Mother Nature might have saw to it on the micro level—far from the macro level from which we are accustomed to speaking. This is why people say free will is an illusion. This is why certain people feel sadness and gloom. They know full well that they are making choices and can readily see the effect of the choices they make, but they also take a barely developed understanding of the implications of what they think the laws of nature are and allow their imaginations to run amuck and wildly surmise what they do.

I’m not talking about anyone on this thread, of course. Not even Ughaibu. He doesn’t believe that determinism is true. Well, let me clarify that. He may think all macro events have causes, as do you, but he’ll deny that determinism is true none-the-less, not because he denies what you believe determinism is but because he denies what he thinks determinism is.

When we talk about the topic of determinism, free will, and their compatibility, we often talk about causes on the macro level, but to see what Ughaibu sees, you’ll need to record snow on a television set in slow motion and play it back one frame at a time. As you slowly watch it play back, take special note of where each pixel is highlighted, as if each pixel were an atom in our universe. Imagine the movement of each atom (pixel of snow) being determined [um, make that entailed (specified?)] by the laws of nature. Pay very special attention to the upper right corner of the screen and see the pixels that represent the atoms in our brains, and watch for the underlying causes that cause us to want what we do and see why there are some that believe you couldn’t physically walk that morning mile—even though logically speaking, you could have.

Wow, this post is long, and it needs cleaning up, but I gotta run now. I’ll send as is. Don’t hold me to anything false, lol.

@fast,

fast wrote:

I wanted to go to the restaurant, and because I wanted to go, I went, but was the fact I wanted to go a cause for going? Apparently so, but was it a physical cause for going? I suppose not. However, though no mental want is a physical cause, there are no wants without underlying neurological physical causes, so just as there is no mind without the underlying physical brain activity to bring rise to a mind, there are underlying physical causes to the fact I even wanted to go.

Aren’t these physical events of the brain (that have physical causes) subject to the very same natural laws that make it so that trees must (physically must, that is) fall when winds are sufficiently strong enough to blow them over?

Not even in a world absent decision-making entities is it the case that things that do happen must happen, logically speaking (since if the winds don’t blow, the trees won’t fall because of wind). Yet, mustn’t the trees fall nevertheless when the winds blow sufficiently hard enough? Not logically speaking of course, for never must it be that it will fall, logically speaking. I mean, mustn’t the tree fall given the winds and the underlying principles of the laws of nature?

In a world like our own (with decision-making entities), we don’t have to go to the restaurant when we want to. We can restrain ourselves and resist and refrain from doing what we want. No wonder it’s us that is responsible for our behavior—and not Mother Nature.

Puts on my crazy hat:

Or so we think. Not just think, of course. Have good reason for thinking. But of course we do. Mother Nature might have saw to it on the micro level—far from the macro level from which we are accustomed to speaking. This is why people say free will is an illusion. This is why certain people feel sadness and gloom. They know full well that they are making choices and can readily see the effect of the choices they make, but they also take a barely developed understanding of the implications of what they think the laws of nature are and allow their imaginations to run amuck and wildly surmise what they do.

I’m not talking about anyone on this thread, of course. Not even Ughaibu. He doesn’t believe that determinism is true. Well, let me clarify that. He may think all macro events have causes, as do you, but he’ll deny that determinism is true none-the-less, not because he denies what you believe determinism is but because he denies what he thinks determinism is.

When we talk about the topic of determinism, free will, and their compatibility, we often talk about causes on the macro level, but to see what Ughaibu sees, you’ll need to record snow on a television set in slow motion and play it back one frame at a time. As you slowly watch it play back, take special note of where each pixel is highlighted, as if each pixel were an atom in our universe. Imagine the movement of each atom (pixel of snow) being determined [um, make that entailed (specified?)] by the laws of nature. Pay very special attention to the upper right corner of the screen and see the pixels that represent the atoms in our brains, and watch for the underlying causes that cause us to want what we do and see why there are some that believe you couldn’t physically walk that morning mile—even though logically speaking, you could have.

Wow, this post is long, and it needs cleaning up, but I gotta run now. I’ll send as is. Don’t hold me to anything false, lol.

You are just assuming that what is mental cannot be material. You cannot assume that. It has to be argued. But as long as we know that an action can both have a cause, and yet be done freely because the cause does not compel the action, it does not matter to the present issue. The point to remember is that although all causes that compel, do compel, not all causes compel. For example, although I was caused to (want to) go to the restaurant by my friend's recommendation, I was not compelled want to go to that restaurant. And since I was not compelled to go, I needn't have gone, and if I needn't have gone, I went freely, for I could have done otherwise.

@fast,

fast wrote:

I wanted to go to the restaurant, and because I wanted to go, I went, but was the fact I wanted to go a cause for going? Apparently so, but was it a physical cause for going? I suppose not.

When we ask for cause, we're looking to add to our knowledge. We're asking how an event is part of a bigger picture.

So I ask you why you went to the restaurant. Was it to meet someone? Were you putting in an application for a bartending job? I'm trying to fit a single event into a meaningful framework.

If it turns out you were abducted and taken against your will to the restaurant, then I know your volition wasn't involved. The question "why did you go" no longer makes sense in the way I intended it. I was asking for motive. You had none.

So a determinist isn't saying there's no such thing as motive. He recognizes it and understands that the idea of volition is part of our experience. When we speak of volition, we're talking about motive... self-directed motion.

Newton's outlook leads to this conclusion: all motion can be described by mathematical equations. This outlook became essential to modern life. Everywhere you look there are testaments to its validity.

We'd probably all be assuming it's true now if it hadn't been discovered that an electron acts like both a wave and a particle. This made us realize that our picture of reality as discreet objects rolling through time couldn't be correct.

So at this point we're free of Newton. Or are we?

The thing I sometimes find to be a drag is that we so often fixate on the particulars of our expressions and forget that it's all poetry. Newtonian physics is poetry... and like all poetry it's pointing to something. Specifically: an objective picture of the universe. An objective view is like a map with an arrow sticker on it that reads: you are here. We all use this image. We can't escape it at this point because it's essential to meaning.

I don't know how much more obvious it can be that cause is an aspect of meaning. It's part of the poetry.

The separation between you and the physical world is also just as inescapable. No sentence you speak would be meaningful without it. If you weren't abducted, you went to the restaurant by your own will.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

I'm just not grasping why determinism has nothing to do with causality, even though almost every source I can find says it does.

First; Kennethamy has returned to this claim:

kennethamy wrote:

the philosophical theory of determinism is that every event has some cause sufficient to produce it

As I told you earlier, when asked to provide a definition of cause, which would cover both his examples: heating causes metal to expand, and recommendations from friends cause him to visit restaurants, he consistently failed to do so, to the point when he said 'let's just call a cause something which determines'. This is pure nonsense, even Fast, who thinks that the sun shines from Kennethamy's arse, came round to admitting that the examples can only be accommodated by equivocating on "cause". The only clearly stated notion of cause, which Kennethamy has been seen to espouse is Hempel's model of scientific explanation, and the only laws involved in this model are laws of science, that is statements made by scientists. So, Kennethamy is either still talking about statements or he is blowing air.
Second; Fast says

fast wrote:

A causal law is a universal regularity that is both non-accidentical and explainable.

Again, it has already been pointed out that these regularities are observables, they are not laws. Also, by limiting himself to explainables, he is talking about an epistemic thesis, and this has nothing to do with any notion of determinism relevant to the free will debate.

Determinism is the claim that the state of the world is at all times exactly fixed, there is only one possible evolution and there was only one possible past. This is nothing to do with logical possibility, physical possibility or any other manner of word game, it is a statement about the actual world, and is the basis of determinism. If you reject this claim, as do Fast and Kennethamy, then you are not a determinist. End of story.
Imagining that there is some consistent model of cause which includes both of Kennethamy's examples, what we would have is a temporally ordered pair of events; some event C followed in some relevant manner by another event E. There are two points about this notion (cause and effect): 1) it is irreducibly local, E is caused by C, it is not caused by any event which took place millions of miles and millions of years away, although some such events might be traceable to it via some causal chain. 2) it is irreducibly irreversible, it is the case that C causes E, it is not the case that E causes C.
For determinism to be supportable several conditions must obtain:
1) at all times the world has a definite state
2) there are laws of nature which are exactly the same in all times and places
3) given the state of the world at any time, then the state of the world at all other times is exactly fixed by the given state in conjunction with the laws of nature.
This means that, in principle, a determined world is exactly describable mathematically (from outside the world).
About 3, as there are no privileged points in space or time, in order for any mathematisation of the world to exactly capture the transformations of states, over time, that model must be expressible as a reversible equation. Also, all features in the description of the world (its state), are equally features of that description, nothing can be changed without changing the states of the world at all other times. This means that no event can be isolated, and no particular feature of the world can be said to be the cause of any other.
In short, a determined world is irreducibly global and time symmetric, while a world of cause and effect is irreducibly local and time asymmetric. Thus cause and effect is incompatible with determinism.
It's easy to construct demonstrations of this independence from the basis of either relativity or quantum mechanics.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

Zetherin wrote:
I'm just not grasping why determinism has nothing to do with causality, even though almost every source I can find says it does.
First; Kennethamy has returned to this claim:
kennethamy wrote:
the philosophical theory of determinism is that every event has some cause sufficient to produce it
As I told you earlier, when asked to provide a definition of cause, which would cover both his examples: heating causes metal to expand, and recommendations from friends cause him to visit restaurants, he consistently failed to do so, to the point when he said 'let's just call a cause something which determines'. This is pure nonsense, even Fast, who thinks that the sun shines from Kennethamy's arse, came round to admitting that the examples can only be accommodated by equivocating on "cause". The only clearly stated notion of cause, which Kennethamy has been seen to espouse is Hempel's model of scientific explanation, and the only laws involved in this model are laws of science, that is statements made by scientists. So, Kennethamy is either still talking about statements or he is blowing air.
Second; Fast says
fast wrote:
A causal law is a universal regularity that is both non-accidentical and explainable.
Again, it has already been pointed out that these regularities are observables, they are not laws. Also, by limiting himself to explainables, he is talking about an epistemic thesis, and this has nothing to do with any notion of determinism relevant to the free will debate.

Determinism is the claim that the state of the world is at all times exactly fixed, there is only one possible evolution and there was only one possible past. This is nothing to do with logical possibility, physical possibility or any other manner of word game, it is a statement about the actual world, and is the basis of determinism. If you reject this claim, as do Fast and Kennethamy, then you are not a determinist. End of story.
Imagining that there is some consistent model of cause which includes both of Kennethamy's examples, what we would have is a temporally ordered pair of events; some event C followed in some relevant manner by another event E. There are two points about this notion (cause and effect): 1) it is irreducibly local, E is caused by C, it is not caused by any event which took place millions of miles and millions of years away, although some such events might be traceable to it via some causal chain. 2) it is irreducibly irreversible, it is the case that C causes E, it is not the case that E causes C.
For determinism to be supportable several conditions must obtain:
1) at all times the world has a definite state
2) there are laws of nature which are exactly the same in all times and places
3) given the state of the world at any time, then the state of the world at all other times is exactly fixed by the given state in conjunction with the laws of nature.
This means that, in principle, a determined world is exactly describable mathematically (from outside the world).
About 3, as there are no privileged points in space or time, in order for any mathematisation of the world to exactly capture the transformations of states, over time, that model must be expressible as a reversible equation. Also, all features in the description of the world (its state), are equally features of that description, nothing can be changed without changing the states of the world at all other times. This means that no event can be isolated, and no particular feature of the world can be said to be the cause of any other.
In short, a determined world is irreducibly global and time symmetric, while a world of cause and effect is irreducibly local and time asymmetric. Thus cause and effect is incompatible with determinism.
It's easy to construct demonstrations of this independence from the basis of either relativity or quantum mechanics.

You continue to confuse two issues. 1. What is generally meant by philosophers when they refer to the philosophical theory of determinism. 2. Whether what they refer to can stand up to close analysis. 1 and 2 are separate questions, Clearly. I have pointed out the distinction to you several times, and since it is not complicated I suppose you grasp it. But for some reason of your own, you don't recognize it. Neither fast, nor Zeth, nor I, are espousing determinism. All we are maintaining is that what philosophers generally mean by determinism has to do with causation. So, although your criticisms of the causal understanding of determinism may be made of sterling silver, they are simply irrelevant. How I can explain this more clearly I have no idea.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

You continue to confuse two issues. 1. What is generally meant by philosophers when they refer to the philosophical theory of determinism. 2. Whether what they refer to can stand up to close analysis.

Rubbish. Even the article cited by you, clearly states a definition of determinism which agrees with me and disagrees with you.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
You continue to confuse two issues. 1. What is generally meant by philosophers when they refer to the philosophical theory of determinism. 2. Whether what they refer to can stand up to close analysis.
Rubbish. Even the article cited by you, clearly states a definition of determinism which agrees with me and disagrees with you.

I don't want here to dispute whether philosophers generally use "determinism" to refer to a theory that essentially involves causal laws, for that is not now the issue. The issue is whether you finally recognize that the issue of how philosophers use the term "determinism" is a separate one from whether that theory is true or false. If you have finally made that separation (after all this time) I am content that some progress has finally been made. (But even this was a long slog!).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I don't want here to dispute whether philosophers generally use "determinism" to refer to a theory that essentially involves causal laws, for that is not now the issue.

I take it then that we can look forward to a discussion which is not constantly sidetracked by your attempts to introduce an antiquated and naive notion of determinism.

kennethamy wrote:

The issue is whether you finally recognize that the issue of how philosophers use the term "determinism" is a separate one from whether that theory is true or false.

You made a prat of yourself, again, live with it. You are now formally challenged to support your ridiculous imputation that I confused these issues. Bear in mind, anyone can read back through this thread.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
I don't want here to dispute whether philosophers generally use "determinism" to refer to a theory that essentially involves causal laws, for that is not now the issue.
I take it then that we can look forward to a discussion which is not constantly sidetracked by your attempts to introduce an antiquated and naive notion of determinism.
kennethamy wrote:
The issue is whether you finally recognize that the issue of how philosophers use the term "determinism" is a separate one from whether that theory is true or false.
You made a prat of yourself, again, live with it. You are now formally challenged to support your ridiculous imputation that I confused these issues. Bear in mind, anyone can read back through this thread.

But you did confuse them, since whenever you were informed that the term "determinism" is used by philosophers to refer to a theory that has to do with causation, you came back with a criticism of such a theory. When you did seem to recognize the point, your only evidence for your view was a stray remark by some author of an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia, which is really very weak evidence to range against the Cambridge Dictionary Of Philosophy. As Zeth. said, in one of his posts, all of his research has backed how the Cambridge dictionary specifies determinism, and does not support yours. So, I conclude that the way you think about determinism is idiosyncratic. How professional philosophers use the term ?determinism" is not really a matter for philosophical debate any more than (to use an example of this kind of thing from Aristotle) the spelling of a word is a matter for philosophical debate. All of the evidence that I know of (and others know of) is contrary to your contention. So, that would seem to settle the matter.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But you did confuse them, since whenever you were informed that the term "determinism" is used by philosophers to refer to a theory that has to do with causation, you came back with a criticism of such a theory.

Rubbish, and as has only just been pointed out, your own source, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy disagrees with you.

kennethamy wrote:

When you did seem to recognize the point, your only evidence for your view was a stray remark by some author of an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia, which is really very weak evidence to range against the Cambridge Dictionary Of Philosophy.

Thanks, any reader can see that this is bullshit. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy publishes articles authored by recognised experts in their field, peer reviewed by further experts. Your cite of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy was not even from an article about determinism, and its author's field is the philosophy of religion, and even then it disagrees with you. Your Cambridge Dictionary quote is worthless, as your reader has no access to explore context, etc.
I understand that you suffer from a narcissistic personality disorder, and losing face over even the most trivial matter is, emotionally, a matter of life and death, for you. But I dont give a shit. Your recent posts have been insulting and I'm pissed off. On the present occasion I really dont mind how much time I waste exposing your bullshit to those who, for god knows what reason, cant see it for themselves.

@kennethamy,

What do philosophers call the type of determinism that ughaibu is talking about?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
But you did confuse them, since whenever you were informed that the term "determinism" is used by philosophers to refer to a theory that has to do with causation, you came back with a criticism of such a theory.
Rubbish, and as has only just been pointed out, your own source, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy disagrees with you.
kennethamy wrote:
When you did seem to recognize the point, your only evidence for your view was a stray remark by some author of an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia, which is really very weak evidence to range against the Cambridge Dictionary Of Philosophy.
Thanks, any reader can see that this is bullshit. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy publishes articles authored by recognised experts in their field, peer reviewed by further experts. Your cite of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy was not even from an article about determinism, and its author's field is the philosophy of religion, and even then it disagrees with you. Your Cambridge Dictionary quote is worthless, as your reader has no access to explore context, etc.
I understand that you suffer from a narcissistic personality disorder, and losing face over even the most trivial matter is, emotionally, a matter of life and death, for you. But I dont give a shit. Your recent posts have been insulting and I'm pissed off. On the present occasion I really dont mind how much time I waste exposing your bullshit to those who, for god knows what reason, cant see it for themselves.

As soon as you begin your abusive ad hominems (this time those stemming from pop psychology) I realize that there is really no point in going on with the issue (if there is one). Zeth too has said he has done some research on the matter, so his can support my own. To say that an authoritative source like the Cambridge Dictionary is "worthless" is so bizarre as to make clear that you have too much emotional investment is what is, after all, an unimportant issue compared with whether determinism can be understood without the idea of causation, that is really is not worth continuing the discussion. As, I said, the more important issue is whether causation is (as you claim) irrelevant to determinism. But your views on this matter are so obscure, that not only I, but fast and Zeth. are baffled by them.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:
I understand that you suffer from a narcissistic personality disorder, and losing face over even the most trivial matter is, emotionally, a matter of life and death, for you.
As soon as you begin your abusive ad hominems (this time those stemming from pop psychology) I realize that there is really no point in going on with the issue (if there is one).

The above aren't worthless ad hominems, it's a precis of the only convincing explanation of behaviour that I've observed over several years. These are worthless ad hominems:

kennethamy wrote:

Why would you think U. is on to something unless you have some inkling (at least) of what he is talking about? (I expect that if he even replies, it will be with a mass of google, but he won't explain what he means. That's the U. way). Why, if no one can understand U.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
ughaibu wrote:
I understand that you suffer from a narcissistic personality disorder, and losing face over even the most trivial matter is, emotionally, a matter of life and death, for you.
As soon as you begin your abusive ad hominems (this time those stemming from pop psychology) I realize that there is really no point in going on with the issue (if there is one).
The above aren't worthless ad hominems, it's a precis of the only convincing explanation of behaviour that I've observed over several years. These are worthless ad hominems:
kennethamy wrote:
Why would you think U. is on to something unless you have some inkling (at least) of what he is talking about? (I expect that if he even replies, it will be with a mass of google, but he won't explain what he means. That's the U. way). Why, if no one can understand U.

The fact remains that no one (at least on this forum) can make out what you are saying. Let's just leave it at that.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

The fact remains that no one (at least on this forum) can make out what you are saying.

You now have the burden of supporting this contention too. As my response to Zetherin has been thanked, it seems likely that at least one member understood it.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
The fact remains that no one (at least on this forum) can make out what you are saying.
You now have the burden of supporting this contention too. As my response to Zetherin has been thanked, it seems likely that at least one member understood it.

That was not the impression I got. Maybe we should wait to hear Zeth speak definitely. It may be that he was grateful for your giving an intelligible response, even if he did not think it was true.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
The fact remains that no one (at least on this forum) can make out what you are saying.
You now have the burden of supporting this contention too. As my response to Zetherin has been thanked, it seems likely that at least one member understood it.
your giving an intelligible response

So it was an intelligible response but no one can make out what it says?!?

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