Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

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kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 07:57 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;152574 wrote:
lol. well then you obviously think the principle of bivalence is either false or has exceptions

the very thing you've been arguing against...and that I was arguing for


I never argued that it doesn't have exceptions. It is not a matter of argument. Is my Hamlet example an exception or not? I suppose that can be argued about.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 08:01 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;152577 wrote:
I never argued that it doesn't have exceptions
I have stated over and over that propositions about the future are neither true nor false before the fact and you have disagreed over and over....
so. yes, you have argued that proposition bivalence has no exceptions or is not false.

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 09:02 PM ----------

now if you've reconsidered then OK and I think you could make an argument....I know....I've been making one! I have been arguing(though it is not my personal belief) that propositions about future choices are such an exceptions since they contain a value which is neither true nor false before the actual happening but you have disagreed.....have you changed your mind?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 03:21 am
@Amperage,
Amperage;152578 wrote:
you have argued that proposition bivalence has no exceptions or is not false.
In any case, this is irrelevant unless one also espouses realism about propositions as bi-valent abstract objects, which puts those holding such a position into what I assume to be your boat, just with the substitution of abstract objects for god's knowledge.
However, the so-called timelessness, as described on this thread, is nonsense. It's based on a perversion of grammar and is selectively asymmetrical, whereas, to be consistent, it must be fully symmetrical.
About the question of realism about bi-valence; bi-valence implies the law of excluded middle, so if the law of excluded middle is false, then bi-valence is false. The law of excluded middle is equivalent to the axiom of choice, and the axiom of choice is false if there is randomness. As randomness apparently exists, the principle of bi-valence appears to be false, so espousing realism about it appears to be a mistake. Of course, realists can deny the existence of randomness, but this carries the usual consequences, a neo-Pythagorean discrete ontology at odds with the best theories of science. Alternatively, one can take a formalist stance, forget about supernatural objects and award truth about bi-valence only within specific formal and informal linguistic systems.
 
Night Ripper
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 03:42 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152681 wrote:
However, the so-called timelessness, as described on this thread, is nonsense. It's based on a perversion of grammar and is selectively asymmetrical, whereas, to be consistent, it must be fully symmetrical.


How is it asymmetrical?

Quote:
About the question of realism about bi-valence; bi-valence implies the law of excluded middle, so if the law of excluded middle is false, then bi-valence is false.


What do you mean realism about the principle of bivalence? I think it's true but what would it mean to say that it's real?

Quote:
The law of excluded middle is equivalent to the axiom of choice, and the axiom of choice is false if there is randomness.


Why is that?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 05:55 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;152686 wrote:
How is it asymmetrical?
Take the case of a person who on each day wears a shirt which is one of two colours, either black or white, the colour chosen by tossing a fair coin. If we have no further information and, on the second of the month, we state "that person wears a black shirt on the first of this month", the probability of this being the expression of a true proposition is one half. If we state "on the third of this month that person wears a black shirt", then that person can make this a true proposition on every month. If this is symmetrical, such a result is infinitely improbable, so it can not be symmetrical.
Night Ripper;152686 wrote:
What do you mean realism about the principle of bivalence? I think it's true but what would it mean to say that it's real?
I mean that bi-valence is being presented as a feature of the world, not as a feature of logics.
Night Ripper;152686 wrote:
Why is that?
Given any proposition and the axiom of choice, the law of excluded middle can be derived. The falsity of the axiom of choice entailed by randomness follows from independence.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 06:17 am
@Amperage,
Amperage;152578 wrote:
I have stated over and over that propositions about the future are neither true nor false before the fact and you have disagreed over and over....
so. yes, you have argued that proposition bivalence has no exceptions or is not false.

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 09:02 PM ----------

now if you've reconsidered then OK and I think you could make an argument....I know....I've been making one! I have been arguing(though it is not my personal belief) that propositions about future choices are such an exceptions since they contain a value which is neither true nor false before the actual happening but you have disagreed.....have you changed your mind?


The example of the exception I gave has nothing to do with your problem. My example was that of a character in a play, Polonius. It was, the statement, Polonius sneezed before he was murdered by Hamlet. This is a fictional statement. It would never be true or false, since it does not say in the play Hamlet whether or not the sneeze occurred. This could not be a statement that becomes true. So, no, I have not changed my mind at all. You do not understand why I say that my example is an exception to bi-valence. It has nothing to do with the kinds of cases we have been talking about. My kind of case is an exception. Yours is not.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 06:53 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152710 wrote:
Take the case of a person who on each day wears a shirt which is one of two colours, either black or white, the colour chosen by tossing a fair coin. If we have no further information and, on the second of the month, we state "that person wears a black shirt on the first of this month", the probability of this being the expression of a true proposition is one half. If we state "on the third of this month that person wears a black shirt", then that person can make this a true proposition on every month. If this is symmetrical, such a result is infinitely improbable, so it can not be symmetrical.I mean that bi-valence is being presented as a feature of the world, not as a feature of logics.Given any proposition and the axiom of choice, the law of excluded middle can be derived. The falsity of the axiom of choice entailed by randomness follows from independence.


So for instance, action or not action, on something in relation to something is not a feature of the World ?

I guess I said this before but is worth saying it again, one thing is the epistemic problem of knowing, and another what actually happens or not happens, what is, or what is not...

It is either true or false that X tomorrow will happen or not happen, if we can know it with certainty it is an entirely different matter...
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:00 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;152724 wrote:
It is either true or false that X tomorrow will happen or not happen
I accept that the statement "tomorrow I will either drink beer or I will not drink beer" is true, but I do not accept that either of the statements "tomorrow I will drink beer" or "tomorrow I will not drink beer" is true.
 
Night Ripper
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:03 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152726 wrote:
I accept that the statement "tomorrow I will either drink beer or I will not drink beer" is true, but I do not accept that either of the statements "tomorrow I will drink beer" or "tomorrow I will not drink beer" is true.


Doesn't the truth of "tomorrow I will either drink beer or I will not drink beer" imply that exactly one of the statements "tomorrow I will drink beer" or "tomorrow I will not drink beer" is true? How could the former sentence be true but neither of the latter two?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:11 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152726 wrote:
I accept that the statement "tomorrow I will either drink beer or I will not drink beer" is true, but I do not accept that either of the statements "tomorrow I will drink beer" or "tomorrow I will not drink beer" is true.


But why? That is the question.

Consider the argument:

1. Whenever I drink beer, I become sick.
2. Tomorrow, I drink beer.

Therefore, 3. Tomorrow I get sick.

How would you evaluate this argument, and why?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:14 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;152730 wrote:
Doesn't the truth of "tomorrow I will either drink beer or I will not drink beer" imply that exactly one of the statements "tomorrow I will drink beer" or "tomorrow I will not drink beer" is true?
I dont see it, what's the implication?
Night Ripper;152730 wrote:
How could the former sentence be true but neither of the latter two?
I dont really understand your question, if something's true, then it's true.

---------- Post added 04-16-2010 at 10:16 PM ----------

kennethamy;152736 wrote:
1. Whenever I drink beer, I become sick.
2. Tomorrow, I drink beer.

Therefore, 3. Tomorrow I get sick.

How would you evaluate this argument, and why?
There's a suppressed "if" in 2.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:18 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152740 wrote:
I dont see it, what's the implication?I dont really understand your question, if something's true, then it's true.

---------- Post added 04-16-2010 at 10:16 PM ----------

There's a suppressed "if" in 2.


What makes you think that?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 07:23 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;152743 wrote:
What makes you think that?
Otherwise there would be no way to judge the soundness of the argument, is there some point to proposing arguments the soundness of which is indeterminate?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 08:40 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152744 wrote:
Otherwise there would be no way to judge the soundness of the argument, is there some point to proposing arguments the soundness of which is indeterminate?


Now that reply seems to get things exactly backwards. The argument would not be determinate in te first place if bi-valence were true. So that if your view were correct, then there would be no way of judging the soundness or the argument. But since the argument is sound, your view is wrong.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 09:45 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;152761 wrote:
But since the argument is sound, your view is wrong.
So you're going to be sick from drinking beer tomorrow? Post photos.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 09:51 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152788 wrote:
So you're going to be sick from drinking beer tomorrow? Post photos.


I don't know yet, but if I am, I will.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 12:15 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;152715 wrote:
My kind of case is an exception. Yours is not.
this statement, coming from you, is laughable....you rely so much on reasoning but you fail to see the hypocrisy of saying that your situation gets to be an exception and mine does not get to be.

bivalence does not allow for exceptions whatsoever so for you to be saying you came up with a proposition which is an exception would be enough to prove to the falsity of proposition bivalence or, at a minimum, that some propositions are indeed not bivalent......and I would then assert propositions about future choices are also of this type.

if your statement is a proposition then(by the law of bivalence) it MUST either be true or false, but not both and not neither. If a proposition is not true then it follows that it is false....this is bivalence and LEM
 
Night Ripper
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 12:40 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;152740 wrote:
I dont see it, what's the implication?


That's what "or" means, isn't it?

1. true or true = true
2. true or false = true
3. false or true = true
4. false or false = false

So, to say that "it will rain or not rain tomorrow" is true, is to say that at least one of the propositions "it will rain tomorrow" or "it will not rain tomorrow" is true i.e. it's not (4). It's actually an exclusive or since not both could be true but you get the point.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 04:12 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;152877 wrote:
to say that "it will rain or not rain tomorrow" is true, is to say that at least one of the propositions "it will rain tomorrow" or "it will not rain tomorrow" is true
No it isn't. "It'll rain or it won't" is complete, but neither of "it will rain" or "it won't rain", is.
 
awareness
 
Reply Sat 17 Apr, 2010 07:20 am
@Night Ripper,
Your not forced to react, you are manipulated by or react to internal and external experiences. if you choose to not react to what is going on inside (thoughts/feelings) and outside you will find that you are not a part of causality but are the seer/viewer of "reality"/experiences.
 
 

 
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