When you say morally restriant do you mean that it as to be known ?

Quote:
Originally Posted by north
so let me get this straight

we now the cat will die if given posion , in the open

but we question the cat dying from posion , in a closed box ?

well thats rational

Fil. Albuquerque;149850 wrote:

Well that is the alternative to classical determinism so far as I know...and is the one you and others have been defending so far....



coercion is forcable restriant , morally or physically ( as defined by my dictionary )

For sure the Cat is dead. The Time U;R discussion took no-body fed the poor Cat, or give some milk to it...

Sometimes common sense is more practical / pragmatic than Theory proven scientificly. I wish I understood more about the Boxes of Philosophy... I am more Holistic (looked it up to check).

Friendly greetings,

Pepijn Sweep

1)
5) imagine that I use radioactive decay, after the manner of Schrodinger, to decide whether or not to smoke at the turn of each hour, what causes my decision?

Your decision to use radioactive decay to decide whether or not to smoke, obviously.

In short, the cause originates with me.

When I say that I could have done otherwise I am not saying that under the very same conditions I could have done otherwise.

I don't see what the fuss is all about.

How is the current discussion related to the first post in this thread, if at all?

Well, what percentage of threads of this length are more closely related to their opening posts?

If you want to have a different discussion then start a new thread.

I made this thread to talk about causal determinism and I've provided an argument to show how it's not a threat to free will. That should be the focus of this discussion.

Are we talking about something other than determinism apropos free will?

You're turning this into yet another generic free will thread. This thread is talking about a specific argument against free will, causal determinism, namely that the laws of nature necessitate future events.

Okay, ask the moderators to split out the derail content.

You're turning this into yet another generic free will thread. This thread is talking about a specific argument against free will, causal determinism, namely that the laws of nature necessitate future events.

I'll let you do that since that's your concern.

From post #618:


1. If you could not have done otherwise under the very same conditions, doesn't it follow that those conditions compelled you to do what you did?

2. Could you have done otherwise under the very same conditions that you were aware of (but under different conditions that you were not aware of - i.e. neurological/chemical ones)? If so, the unconscious conditions will need to feature in the explanation of your action. This situation will arise where:

(a) the conscious factors are finely balanced, and you can only explain your action by saying "I chose at random"; or

(b) the conscious factors are clearly in favour of one particular action, but you choose a different action "just for the hell of it".

1. I don't see why that follows. Whether I am compelled to do something depends, in part, on whether I am being constrained or restrained. But if I visit a restaurant because I want to do so, I am not being constrained to visit that restaurant even if in that case one of the causes of my visiting the restaurant was that it was recommended to me that I do so, and I would not have chosen to visit the restaurant unless I had received that recommendation.

2. That my action has an explanation does not mean that my action was compelled.

Nonsense, you moan, you do it. I'm happy with the progress of the thread.

Have you given up on causal completeness, or are you harbouring some plan to respond to me at some nebulous point in the future?