I don't make such a distinction because I don't believe there are any non-accidental regularities. If you make such a distinction then it can't be based on evidence since there is no possible evidence that can support that a regularity is accidental or non-accidental.

Of course, sometimes there are things we think are strong regularities but aren't really, such as the regularity between my heartbeat and the sunrise. That is what controlled experiments are actually for, they show how strong regularities really are, in this case, rather weak since the sun rose and continues to rise regardless of my heartbeat.

However, there are only the differences between strong, robust regularities and weaker ones. There is no experiment that can ever provide evidence that a regularity is non-accidental.

Yes, as I pointed out, yours is just a change in notation (like the change from one scale of measurement to a different scale of measurement). So, what is ordinarily called, "causation" you call, "a robust regularity", and what is ordinarily called an "accidental regularity" you call a "weak regularity". It is only a verbal change, and nothing more. We mean the same thing. Of course, "causal connections" support counterfactuals.

Here is Solomonoff's autobiography: http://world.std.com/~rjs/barc97.pdf and his full publications page: Publications of Ray Solomonoff If one holds a belief, and that belief depends on a claim which one finds out has been proven false, then one has a choice:
1) adjust one's beliefs to accommodate this proof
2) continue believing regardless.
Adopting the second option puts a person outside the community of rational discussion. It's up to you.

If you are abandoning your claim from prediction, what reason can you offer to suggest realism about determinism?

---------- Post added 04-02-2010 at 01:48 AM ----------

In another explanation Scenario, namely a free one, Being would be indefinitely growing towards nothingness in both directions...
...not just an infinite regress, but an infinite progression...
...a pure nonsense, as nothingness by its own definition, not is...
(...not even empty Space, as Space has the property of allowing stuff to move around...)
...Imagine a magic growing, in which the next moment ads more to what is, coming randomly from nothingness in a perfect correlation with previous moments...

Give me a brake !!!

In the 1968 report he shows that Algorithmic Probability is complete; that is, if there is any describable regularity in a body of data, Algorithmic Probability will eventually discover that regularity, requiring a relatively small sample of that data. Algorithmic Probability is the only probability system know to be complete in this way. As a necessary consequence of its completeness it is incomputable. The incomputability is because some algorithms - a subset of those that are partially recursive - can never be evaluated fully because it would take too long. But these programs will at least be recognized as possible solutions. On the other hand, any computable system is incomplete. There will always be descriptions outside that system's search space which will never be acknowledged or considered, even in an infinite amount of time. Computable prediction models hide this fact by ignoring such algorithms.

Ray Solomonoff - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Being against non-Being must, by definition, not be incomplete !!!

Consequences:

Zero is a function, not a set...

However, there are only the differences between strong, robust regularities and weaker ones. There is no experiment that can ever provide evidence that a regularity is non-accidental.

Do you believe that strong and weak regularities are different in kind, or only in degree? Are they two distinct categories, or are some regularities intermediate between the two? If the latter, can you give an example of an intermediate regularity? I wonder whether I (a believer in causation) would describe such a regularity as caused or accidental.

What I take from what Fil. has stated above is this: The problem is due to our own frame of reference WITHIN the system and as A PART OF the system.

I'll take your word for what he said, it seemed meaningless to me. Assuming that this is a successful objection to Solomonoff's proofs, because predictions remain possible, in principle (ie from outside the world), your position still fails, because you can not demonstrate the predictability that you claim, and your claim is based on an observed predictability.
In order for such a prediction to be made, the world would have to be free of all mathematical randomness, which it demonstrably is not, so again, you would need to throw out pretty much all of mathematics and science since Pythagoras. Once you have thrown out modern mathematics and science, what is the basis of your claim for determinism?
In any case, your objection misses the point, as Solomonoff's limitations apply no matter how small the universe of interest.

The problem may be that the idea of "random" can only ever be half the story. You always need a (global) process to produce (locally) random events. So randomness usually turns out to be the flip side of something highly determined. For example, if I want to toss a coin randomly, I have to go to great lengths to control the process. The coin must be fair. The toss must be high and fast to ensure no possibility of my controlling the outcome. A flat landing place must be chosen so the coin does not land on edge. Lots of constraints needed to ensure a "random outcome".

So the idea that anything is "purely" random is to ignore the matching need for a "perfectly constrained randomness producing process".

This does apply directly to QM. You can produce "pure randomness" at the local level if you can perfectly isolate the system in question. But then you can't ever perfectly isolate a part of the Universe as this level of shielding would require infinite energy.

The universe is contingent. It doesn't have to be the way it is, it just is.

First, I would ask that you clarify or expound upon what you mean when you say, "your position fails, because you can not demonstrate the predictability that you claim, and your claim is based on an observed predictability"

Second, "mathematical randomness" (from any perspective that I can think of) comes from a lack of information.

Another analogy that was brought up is this.....one can shuffle a deck to get a "random" sorting but there is no escaping that the cards have been placed in a specific order.

When this debate on randomness breaks down we can always go back to contingency which is better defined philosophically.

You claim, as far as I can tell, that the fact that the world has an observable predictability suggests that it is completely predictable, as a determined world would, in principle, be. But, if complete predictability is impossible, then the observed degree of predictability does not suggest determinism.

Mathematical randomness is to do with algorithms, a string is mathematically random if it can not be generated by a shorter string. As determinism requires that the world entirely conform to finite length algorithms, determinism is false with a probability of one, unless the world is discrete, ie unless relativity, for one, is wrong.

Both strong and weak regularities can be accidental. .

What can you mean? I thought you did not believe that any regularity was accidental, since you do not believe that any regularity is not accidental. Water turns to ice when it is very cold, and it does not turn into steam, right? Well, what do you mean when you say that it is accidental. How would it not be accidental?

All you can mean, I suppose, is that it is not logically necessary that water should freeze when it is very cold, and it is not logically necessary that it should turn into steam when heated, and I agree with that. For you, "accidental" just means, not "logically necessary". Isn't that right? Otherwise, for you there is no difference between whether the water turns to steam when cold, or whether it turns to ice. Either may happen for all you know, since it is contingent. Isn't that right?

You're the one that believes somethings aren't accidental. I'm simply pointing out that even strong regularities can be accidental. For something not to be accidental then it would have to be necessary, in this case physically necessary.



If something isn't necessary, physically, logically or otherwise then it's contingent or accidental. I'm denying your claims in your terms. You're the one that believes some things aren't accidental.

I believe some things are logically necessary or logically impossible. There is no evidence that anything is physically necessary or physically impossible. Experiments can't provide evidence for physical necessity or physical impossibility because it's untestable.

So, since you don't believe there is physical necessity, then what can you mean when you say that when water turns to ice when it is cooled it is accidental except that it is not logically necessary that it should turn to ice when cooled? Isn't that right? So, for all we know (according to you) it may also turn to steam when cooled. There is no way of telling.

Right. Also, let's just assume for the sake of argument that the following is a universally true statement, "water never turns to steam when cooled". It simply never happens, ever, no exceptions. Of course, since it never happens, all experiments confirm that it never happens. My claim is that the fact that it never happens still doesn't entail that it's physically impossible for water to turn into steam when cooled. Obviously, we know it doesn't happen but that doesn't mean that it can't happen. (See: modal fallacy)

That is what I claim. You do realize that if it's your contention that randomness "rules the day" that you too have no free will since your actions are governed by pure randomness.

"In the 1968 report he[Solomonoff] shows that Algorithmic Probability is complete; that is, if there is any describable regularity in a body of data, Algorithmic Probability will eventually discover that regularity"

See that word in bold underline and italics?

not only that where does it say anything about being random?

Secondly, this guy is dealing with computers I take it and he says " The incomputability is because some algorithms can never be evaluated fully because it would take too long" Not because of some magic randomness in the universe.

Why does determinism require the world to be discrete? Please explain because that does not follow at all.

To mathematically represent something exactly it might have to be discrete but the real world does not need to conform to anything of the sort and can still be completely deterministic as evidenced by empirical observation.

The claim is that the ability to predict suggests the reality of determinism, as exact predictions are impossible, there is no such support from the predictability of this world.

Right. Also, let's just assume for the sake of argument that the following is a universally true statement, "water never turns to steam when cooled". It simply never happens, ever, no exceptions. Of course, since it never happens, all experiments confirm that it never happens. My claim is that the fact that it never happens still doesn't entail that it's physically impossible for water to turn into steam when cooled. Obviously, we know it doesn't happen but that doesn't mean that it can't happen. (See: modal fallacy)

We consistently demonstrate that our predictions can be true, and when a certain prediction proves true very often, it is reasonable to conclude that there is reason why said prediction is true so often. For instance, as I noted, I can predict that my car will stop if I press on the brake pedal, and since my prediction is true so often, it is reasonable to conclude there is a reason why my car stops.

What about this do you disagree with, and why do you think predictions are impossible? But more importantly, once again, what do you mean that predictions are impossible? That our predictions cannot be true? Well, that is false. And I just gave you a counterexample.

We consistently demonstrate that our predictions can be true, and when a certain prediction proves true very often, it is reasonable to conclude that there is reason why said prediction is true so often. For instance, as I noted, I can predict that my car will stop if I press on the brake pedal, and since my prediction is true so often, it is reasonable to conclude there is a reason why my car stops.

What about this do you disagree with, and why do you think predictions are impossible? But more importantly, once again, what do you mean that predictions are impossible? That our predictions cannot be true? Well, that is false. And I just gave you a counterexample.

---------- Post added 04-03-2010 at 03:53 AM ----------



Let me start by saying I think physical necessity is being used (and ought to be used) in the same way empirical necessity is being used here.

"Something is empirically necessary when it could have happened otherwise but didn't. So, it might be an empirical necessity that there are no orange elephants or that I have to go to sleep at some time. Someone might talk of it being "unthinkable" not to act in a certain way, as if it were impossible not to, or for it to be "impossible" for something not to be the case. However, these examples only show what is the case, not what must be the case. These are called contingent or synthetic truths."

But with that said, and given that any change in water's form is not logically necessary, it does not follow that:

A.) We cannot know that water will not turn to steam when cooled.
B.) We cannot be certain and have good reason to believe water will not turn to steam when cooled.

Your position, I think, is thus: If X is not logically necessary, we can not know that X is true or false. But that is false. That X isn't logically necessary doesn't mean that we can't know that X is true or false. For instance, the proposition "There are no orange elephants" is not logically necessary (it is contingent matter), but we know that that proposition is true. Don't mistake the fact that X isn't logically necessary as a reason to think we cannot know about X. That the matter with the orange elephant isn't logically necessary is no reason to think we are mistaken that there are no orange elephants.