That would depend on what's meant by a law, in any case, there's no reason to suppose that a world as predictable as ours is determined.

Reasons to reject realism about determinism:
1) circularity
2) incommensurability
3) irreversibility
4) randomnesses
5) regresses.
Reasons to accept realism about determinism, I cant think of any.
Reasons to espouse realism about free will:
1) it can be demonstrated
2) there are no good objections.
Reasons to deny realism about free will, see above, there is no good reason.

Exactly right. If we are randomly selecting from all possible randomly configured worlds then there are plenty of possible worlds that are predictable but still random.

1 - Something, what there is, being defined and circumscribed instead of infinite...Infinity implies indefiniteness if quantified, or that quantification makes no sense...(infinities in Physic bring all sorts of contradictions and problems)

2 - That a bruit fact of Nature, ultimately, Reality, is resumed, meaning it exists...and that becoming is a phenomena of what is, not of what is not...(against non-being)

3 - Whatever expansion might be, for the Universe, is not towards, or, in nothingness, this in the old paradigm, once being implies all times instantaneously, as all the space...or, that Multiverse in the new paradigm, if being all there is, cannot be infinite. Avoiding nothingness as an exterior to infinite energy dynamic in a confined space, or avoiding infinite space conception (it can be only a metaphor)...all in all avoiding infinities seems wise and reasonable if one thinks on what it means.

4 - Determinism implies the Necessity and Universality of the Law as a reflection of Being itself, for what it is in all Times...meaning it flies in the face of "magic" conceptualization of the world in a open future...

It would seem to me that the only way your view can even be plausible is with the presupposition of an infinite number of random worlds. Anything else and the odds simply do not support such a theory.

This is quite a large jump however.....Not only are you suggesting an infinite number of worlds but they must also be random. We have no sufficient reason to believe that our world is random therefore it seems unreasonable to think there would be an infinite number(something that seems implausible as well) which were. On the other hand we have piles of data that suggest it is highly highly more likely that our world is governed by preset laws/conditions rather than by ever increasing odd defying chance.

All my view requires is that it's logically possible which you've just conceded. The only thing left now is to make you understand the mistake that's allowing you to think you have evidence for something that is untestable.

I've tried to do so by suggesting that overwhelming confidence can be placed in certain correlations(if I chop someones head off they WILL die) to the point that it seems highly more likely that the conclusion IS actually and necessarily caused by the premise.

I have also pointed out numerous times the absurdity to the idea that there ARE an infinite number of worlds.

Emil;146365 wrote:

all outcomes equally probable

This is the definition I'm using. Is there a problem with it? If I randomly select from all possible universes one of those possible universes is that in which nothing ever accelerates faster than the speed of light.

Emil;146365 wrote:

The flip of a fair coin is purely random.

This was the example I gave earlier. Was there a problem with it? If we select from every possible infinite string of fair coin flips there is a possible string of infinite heads. That kind of huge coincidence is analogous to a universe where nothing ever accelerates faster than the speed of light.

Having unpredictable outcomes and, in the ideal case, all outcomes equally probable; resulting from such selection; lacking statistical correlation. The flip of a fair coin is purely random.The newspaper conducted a random sample of five hundred American teenagers.The results of the field survey look random by several different measures.

Night Ripper;146354 wrote:

The universe can be both predictable and random. If nothing ever accelerates faster than the speed of light, not because there is a law but randomly, then we will be able to predict that nothing ever accelerates faster than the speed of light even though the universe is random.

You are using "random" in an uncommon way. Here is a dictionary look-up. ACB is quite correct.

random - Wiktionary

random (comparative more random, superlative most random)
Positive
random

Comparative
more random

Superlative
most random

1. Having unpredictable outcomes and, in the ideal case, all outcomes equally probable; resulting from such selection; lacking statistical correlation. The flip of a fair coin is purely random.The newspaper conducted a random sample of five hundred American teenagers.The results of the field survey look random by several different measures.
   
2. (mathematics) Of or relating to probability distribution. A toss of loaded dice is still random, though biased.
   
3. (computing) Pseudorandom in contrast to truly random; mimicking the result of random selection. The rand function generates a random number from a seed.
   
4. (colloquial) Representative and undistinguished; typical and average. A random American off the street couldn't tell the difference.
   
5. (colloquial) Apropos of nothing; lacking context; unexpected; having apparent lack of plan, cause, or reason. That was a completely random comment.The teacher's bartending story was interesting, but random.The narrative takes a random course.
   

So you are completely unjustified in using induction or any other method of predicting the future, if your theory is correct.

The pragmatic approach to the problem of induction associated with Hans Reichenbach and Herbert Feigl, that tries to show not that inductively based conclusions will be true, nor even that they will probably be true, but instead that there can be no other better strategy for predicting the future, or generalizing from evidence: induction will do well if anything at all will. An analogy is being stranded on a desert island with the opportunity to float off a bottle with a note requesting rescue: it may not be knowable how probable it is that this action will be successful, but it may be known that it will be successful if anything is, and hence the strategy is rational.

Physics, from Newton on, relies on real numbers as ontological facts. This is a commitment to infinity. I agree that this is a problem for determinists, they have the problem of needing to throw out the vast majority of physics since Pythagoras.I dont know what you mean, so this doesn't constitute a reason, as far as I'm concerned.Again, if you "avoid" infinities, then you're at odds with the best theories of physicists.This view needs to be justified by an argument establishing that human beings are capable of completely understanding the world. Such an argument is obviously impossible, and human beings are stuck with the fact that there will always be things that they dont understand. There is no implication from this concerning magic, quite the reverse, the notion that human beings can understand everything has religious roots, like the PSR.

Again, you're questioning why I rely on induction. The answer is because there can be no other better strategy for predicting the future.

If it works then it works. If it doesn't then I couldn't have done any better. I am justified in using induction.

Exactly right. If we are randomly selecting from all possible randomly configured worlds then there are plenty of possible worlds that are predictable but still random.

Avoiding infinity would be easier if we didn't need it as the foundation of the idea of finiteness, right?

From what vantage point do we see both? Who is it... who sees the relationship? Is there an uncrossable abyss between infinite and finite? Or are they two sides of the same coin?

Inside the happy bubble of the universe, we pause to consider what's outside it. Where must we be standing to see the bubble?

That's why you can't logically say there's nothing outside the bubble. Because when you said bubble... you were already positing something outside it... right?

1. Without exception, when someone's head is chopped off, they die.
2. Necessarily, when someone's head is chopped off, they die.

You are committing the modal fallacy if you think (1) implies (2).

'The' Modal Fallacy - Prof. Norman Swartz

Your argument is fallacious. The truth of (1) gives us no reason to believe (2).

3. Contingently, when someone's head is chopped off, they die.

It also supports (3) equally well.



I said an infinite number of logically possible worlds. These possible worlds aren't actual. There's nothing absurd about it at all.

1. Without exception, when someone's head is chopped off, they die.
2. Necessarily, when someone's head is chopped off, they die.

You are committing the modal fallacy if you think (1) implies (2).

First of all, although that argument is invalid, it does not commit the modal fallacy, since it does not switch a modal operator illegitimately. In any case, 2. is obviously false if the necessity operator in 2. is logical necessity.

Second of all: No one who think that necessarily when someone's head is chopped off, thinks that the necessity is logical necessity. The necessity there is physical necessity, not logical necessity. You seem to be extremely confused. Do you know the difference between logical and physical necessity? You do not seem to. I think that is your problem.

1 - I which yo hear Omega man problematizing the serious possibility of real numbers not being real at all...you now, Chaitin, one of the best mathematicians around...he even said that possibly, if he would be remembered for more than 5 minutes in History, would be for something that may not even exist...

3 - I mean, that the future is already there, so all time/space matter/energy and dynamic is defined in BEING ! Becoming is not magically open ended...

As I said, this view commits you to throwing out pretty much all of physics since Pythagoras. Once you've done that, other than it suiting your explanatory needs, what justification do you have for realism about determinism?I dont see any reason to believe this, have you got one?

2 - I just gave you many reasons

As far as I can tell, your reasons are only psychological, you think it would be nice if determinism was the case, so you espouse realism about determinism. That's up to you, but it's neither a rational nor a convincing stance.