So just for fun I looked up a PDF copy of Berkeley dialogues and used the search function for the word god in the document. I simply do not know how one can maintain that Berkeley's form of idealism can be separated from the notion of the infinite mind of god as creating the sensible properties which finite human minds then perceive. I do not care how many times you read them; Berkeley's idealism is completely dependent on the notion of the infinite mind of god and makes no sense without the religous concept. IMHO

"At time 1 the stick *appears* bent to me, and at time 2 the stick *appears* straight." But question is: If all that exist are appearances, how is it that one appearance is veridical, but the other not?

I would think that depends on how narrowly or widely you construe, "Berkeley's form of idealism". Specifically the term, "form". Certainly, God is integral to Berkeley's own views, but I would have thought that by using there term "form of" you mean something wider than that. For example, John Stuart Mill defined physical objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation", a view that has been called, "Berkeley without God".

So just for fun I looked up a PDF copy of Berkeley dialogues and used the search function for the word god in the document. I simply do not know how one can maintain that Berkeley's form of idealism can be separated from the notion of the infinite mind of god as creating the sensible properties which finite human minds then perceive. I do not care how many times you read them; Berkeley's idealism is completely dependent on the notion of the infinite mind of god and makes no sense without the religous concept. IMHO

Berkeley's strategy of invoking God to guarantee the continued existence of the world of *sensible* ideas upon one's own failure to perceive X is directly analogous to Descartes' strategy of invoking God to guarantee that his beliefs about the existence of physical world are not mistaken. Both end up being circular arguments.

Wouldn't the answer be: it is neither straight, nor bent. For there is nothing in which the attribute of straightness or bentness inheres. For an appearance to be 'veridical' it would have to correspond to something; but according to Berkeley, there is not a question of 'the perception' and 'that which it corresponds to'. I think Berkeley's answer would be - not saying I believe it mind you - would be 'you are multiplying entities here.'

I disagree. Berkeley has to either admit God sustains the existence of unperceived ideas by me, or he has to bite the bullet and admit that the world of ideas ceases to exist upon my death. He is stuck in this very dilemma due to his own definitions--which is precisely his motivation for adopting the God-hypothesis.

Quite honestly, JSM's version of defining objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation" (which I am not sure Mill was clear about what he meant anyway) seems to more accurately describe Kant's Idealism, not Berkeley's.

Exactly. So how does this help Berkeley account for the notion of error? He has no way of explaining why perceptual illusions are illusions, and why mistaken judgments are mistaken judgments if all that exists are perceptions, judgments, sensations, and ideas.

Exactly. So how does this help Berkeley account for the notion of error? He has no way of explaining why perceptual illusions are illusions, and why mistaken judgments are mistaken judgments if all that exists are perceptions, judgments, sensations, and ideas.

I disagree. Berkeley has to either admit God sustains the existence of unperceived ideas by me, or he has to bite the bullet and admit that the world of ideas ceases to exist upon my death. He is stuck in this very dilemma due to his own definitions--which is precisely his motivation for adopting the God-hypothesis.

Quite honestly, JSM's version of defining objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation" (which I am not sure Mill was clear about what he meant anyway) seems to more accurately describe Kant's Idealism, not Berkeley's.

I think you ought to explain how they are circular. There is what is known as "the Cartesian circle" but that concerns Descartes's arguments for God, not his arguments for physical objects. And I don't see what you could mean when you say that Berkeley's view that God guarantees the persistence of physical objects is circular. It certainly has problems, but not circularity.

Yes! Excellent point. I wonder if Hylas thought of that? (I suppose I will have to read some more.....)

It is true from Berkeley own perspective that his theory is not complete without the concept of god.
But on hindsight and with current knowledge, Berkeley's idealism comprised of sub-modules which can be dealt with philosophically as independent modules.
That is why i suggest that one read up Berkeley's book to understand the sub-modules other than god.
If you are unable to agree to any sub-module, what is left for you is to ask Berkeley to prove the existence of god.
In this case, arguing Berkeley's theism would be more effective than his idealism and that will save you all the fuss.

I am not sure what you are driving at. I've read Berkeley numerous times, and I don't see any way out of his dilemma based on (1) his strict empiricist principle and (2) his ontology of esse est percipi. If there is any other way out this predicament Berkeley-style, I'm glad to hear what you have to say. Until then, I remain unconvinced.

Originally Posted by Extrain
Exactly. So how does this help Berkeley account for the notion of error? He has no way of explaining why perceptual illusions are illusions, and why mistaken judgments are mistaken judgments if all that exists are perceptions, judgments, sensations, and ideas.



Here's some points from the Dialogs for your reference in addition to the ones he made regarding hallucination and reality in the Treatise.


705 HYLAS. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things,
and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream--since they are all equally in the mind?

706 PHILONOUS. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and
indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will.
But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear;
and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like
dependence on our will.
There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is
as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular,
and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural,
yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and
subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities.
In short, by whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM CHIMERAS on
your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine.
For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for
depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

You and Berkeley are missing the point, even if one perception is "more clear and vivid than another."

Ideas are ideas whether you think they are chimeras or not-chimeras. It simply doens't matter because only ideas, sensations, perceptions, and chimeras exist.

If a straight stick doesn't exist, but only my idea of a straight stick and my idea of a bent stick, why is the content of the one perception being-straight veridical while the content of the other being-bent chimerical?

Why is one perception an error, and the other perception not an error? You have no way of explaining in what this distinction consists. You have only told me that there are distinctions between more and less clear and vivid perceptions. But you haven't told me why one is an error and the other not. There simply doesn't exist any external reality to give an account of the true and the false.

The concept of "esse est percipi" secondary to Berkeley's idealism and refutation of materialism

Berkeley wrote two books to support his idealism.

Thus when you limit and reduce his argument to one phrase and a syllogistic presentation, it is definitely way off tangent from his original idea.

If you need to discuss Berkeley it has to do without the god element which (imo) can be disregarded without disrupting his refutation of materialism and philosophy of idealism.

How could we perceive that the foot and stone are solid without the foot and stone being solid? And, if matter is not solid, then what is solid?

The points from the Dialog is to prove that Berkeley did consider variations of between what is real objects when relate all objects as IDEAs.

By the way, Berkeley conception of IDEA, perception is different from the ordinary and conventional meaning.

I was just providing the reference and not proving any point in that post.

To get the point you will need to read his books to fully understand them in the right context.

How so? I am ready to discuss this point by point.