Did Samuel Johnson misunderstand George Berkeley?

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;141721 wrote:

I think the discussion of modes of existence and degrees of reality, and also the notion that reality is hierarchical, was basic to all philosophy until modern philosophy reduced the entire subject to 'things you do with words'. The task of philosophy in this understanding was to help us to overcome our foolish attachment to the ephemera of existence and awaken to greater truths, a mission which I believe western philosophy has long since abandoned, in favour of doing things with words.

I know of course that you will disagree with this, and it got me into no end of trouble at University. But I will never refrain from saying it.:bigsmile:

Well, there may be progress even in philosophy. Philosophers can now demand greater clarity about what may have been taken for granted previously. And, as a consequence, more attention is demanded for what is said, and what is meant when it is said. I don't see this as a bad thing.

@mickalos,

mickalos;141498 wrote:

Clearly, common sense realism is something quite different from objects consisting of ideas in the mind of some perceiving being. Direct realism states there are mind independent objects (independent of all minds, including god) whose essence is not to be perceived, but simply to be. For realists, direct or indirect, objects are not ideas (that is what makes them realists). Realism is irreconcilable with idealism, to suggest otherwise is simply wrong.

In a way, you are correct. Berkeley recognised that his ontology had few, if any practical implications, short of changing the conceptual meanings of what a few terms such as 'object' and 'matter'. However, in another, very real, way, you are wrong to say this means Berkeley is a realist; he wasn't, that's not what realism means.

Note,

Berkeley in Treatise wrote:

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion.
That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.

From the above and he had repeated many similar statement, it is obvious in the very real way that Berkeley was a practicing common sense realist.
If he see a boulder coming at him, he would definitely run aside to avoid being killed and not think that all these are only existing in his mind.

Berkeley is a common sense realist, but he is not a philosophical realist.
As i had posted a few times already,

Berkeley in Treatise wrote:

35. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.

There is a very great distinction between common sense realism and philosophical realism.

What is irreconciliable is between philosophical idealism and philosophical realism.

Infact, philosophical realism is a misnomer.
Philosophical realism is unrealistic.
It is speculative and do not conform to reality.

Philosophical idealism is more realistic.
I am sure you have more confidence in how your mind is involved in whatever you are doing,
then for your mind to speculate that there is
some inert subtance out there that is called matter which is independent of your mind.

In addition, how can you ever extricate your mind out of a reality,
in which the mind is a part of?

---------- Post added 03-20-2010 at 10:12 PM ----------

jeeprs;141721 wrote:

I think the discussion of modes of existence and degrees of reality, and also the notion that reality is hierarchical, was basic to all philosophy until modern philosophy reduced the entire subject to 'things you do with words'.
The task of philosophy in this understanding was to help us to overcome our foolish attachment to the ephemera of existence and awaken to greater truths, a mission which I believe western philosophy has long since abandoned, in favour of doing things with words.

I know of course that you will disagree with this, and it got me into no end of trouble at University. But I will never refrain from saying it.:bigsmile:

Wow... the above was great knowledge.

Reality is continuous but we humans has to deal with it on a discrete basis with words, concepts, universals, and the likes, for some good reasons, albeit with some potential dangers of extreme speculations (& others).

It is to avoid the above dangers that we should deal with the very sensitive concept of "existence" from as many perspectives as possible.
"Existence" is a man-made concept, why should one group of humans claim sovereign and exclusiveness of on its definition and meaning.

Whatever the consensus of what "existence" is, the most critical point
to note above all else, is to recognize that it is fundamentally based
on a human-made concept by consensus. i.e. mind-interdependent.

@Humanity,

Humanity;141754 wrote:

"Existence" is a man-made concept, why should one group of humans claim sovereign and exclusiveness of on its definition and meaning.

Whatever the consensus of what "existence" is, the most critical point
to note above all else, is to recognize that it is fundamentally based
on a human-made concept by consensus. i.e. mind-interdependent.

Since all concepts are man-made, the concept of existence is also, man-made. But that does not mean that whether or not something exists is man-made. In particular, it is not up to anyone whether a stone exists. The concept of stone is man-made. But that does not mean that whether stones exist is up to people. Stones are not man-made. Concepts are one thing; what they are concepts of is a different thing. In fact, as Johnson himself said, "words are the creatures of men, but things are the creatures of God".

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;141762 wrote:

Since all concepts are man-made, the concept of existence is also, man-made.
But that does not mean that whether or not something exists is man-made.
In particular, it is not up to anyone whether a stone exists.
The concept of stone is man-made.
But that does not mean that whether stones exist is up to people.
Stones are not man-made.
Concepts are one thing; what they are concepts of is a different thing. In fact, as Johnson himself said, "words are the creatures of men, but things are the creatures of God".

Your dilemma of what is 'reference' and the 'referent' had been clearly resolved and explained by Berkeley.

Note Hylas raised the following questions.
HYLAS. To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another.

HYLAS. One great oversight I take to be this--that I did not sufficiently distinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. Now, though this latter [sensation] may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former [object] cannot.

The above is evident that B understood the question you posed.
If you read both the Treatise and Dialogs, you will get to understand how Berkeley explained that both "to exist" and "to be perceived" cannot be absolutely independent of mind and why they are mind-interdependent.

I have not fully grasped B's ideas on my fingertips, so to paraphrase him may lead to some misrepresentation of his explanation.
Go and read his books in detail and tell us why B is wrong.

Let's analyze your earlier statements;
(1) All concepts are man-made.
(2) The concept, existence and word 'exist' are also man-made.

Quote:

But that does not mean that whether stones exist is up to people.

If it is not up to peole, then it is up to what?
God or some supernatural being??

When cornered that an object (e.g. stone) is not made of mind-independent primary or secondary qualities, Hylas replied that object are made of somesort of inert corporeal substance called 'matter'.

And Hylas admitted he had no notion of what that inert subtance is?
Therefore, how can Hylas know with absoluteness what is a 'stone' and its existence when he did not even know what it is made-of and what its fundamental substance is.
The above succumbed to Meno's paradox.

---------- Post added 03-20-2010 at 11:25 PM ----------

kennethamy;141518 wrote:

Yes, some words are. But not all words. How about the word, "when", or the word, "but"? Or an abstract word like, "exist"?
In fact, Berkeley was mistaken in thinking that the term, "exist" was tied to sensations.
When I say that X's exist, how is that tied to any sensations? X may be, but how about "exist"?

Bold mine.
You do not understand Berkeley's view and you are putting words into his mouth.
I am sure you are very familiar the strawman fallacy.

@kennethamy,

It seems to me that there are two categories of experience. One category focuses on a shared realm where conscious beings interact within a space-time continuum; we call it the world or the universe. Another category of experience focuses on a private realm where each conscious being interacts only with itself and its mental and spiritual activities; we call it the mind or the self.

Not only are there two categories of experience, but experience is itself a category of existence, specifically experience is manifest or revealed existence. It is what Berkeley probably meant by existence. But how much of existence is manifest actually? Only a single instant out of all the eons of time is evident and manifest and observable to any conscious being--the instant we call NOW. All other existence is hidden and unmanifest, it is only existence in potentia. None of the vast unspoken future exist now, nor any of the ancient past. Therefore, there are two states of existence: (1) potential but unmanifest existence, hidden existence; and (2) revealed and manifest existence, experience in the instant of the now of things.

An object that we observe may exist in either of the two realms of experience; that is, it may exist as an object in the universe and thus may be experienced by a number of conscious beings each from their own perspective, or it may exist as an object in the mind where it can only be experienced by the mind that creates it. Thus, we speak of objects being real (we all can see it) or imaginary (only one of us can see it).

No such dual category exists for the observer of an object. The observers of objects, which is to say, conscious beings, exist in both realms at once. A conscious being cannot be imaginary; it must be real. Therefore we may argue that to be is to be conscious--or in other words, we may say that our consciousness proves our existence as real beings in the universe.

But do I mean to imply that rocks and quarks are conscious beings? Yes. Precisely so. Consciousness as the ability to experience, and that alone, does not require sentience or self-awareness. It requires only the ability to experience, by which I mean specifically the ability to react or respond to a stimulus. How does an apple fall to ground if it doesn't experience the tug of gravity? How do quarks bond to form protons and neutrons if the do not experience the color force? This is all I mean when I say that apples, rocks, and quarks are conscious beings as we humans are. The only differences are that our experiences are more numerous and more complex and that our experiences include sentient functions that allow us to have and make choices.

Consciousness permeates the universe at many levels. In humans for example, there are quantum particles that experience, elements (atoms) that experience, chemicals (molecules) that experience, cells that experience, organisms that experience, and sentient experience. All these levels of experience are occurring at once, and most conscious beings are aware only of the experiences of which they are capable of experiencing. For example, I am not aware of my heart's beating, or the tug of electrical forces between the protons and electrons in my body; I do not often realize all the sounds my ears hear or all the images my eyes pick up. But I am aware of my thoughts and feelings and the ideas filling my attention.

Samm

@Humanity,

Humanity;141775 wrote:

Bold mine.
You do not understand Berkeley's view and you are putting words into his mouth.
I am sure you are very familiar the strawman fallacy.

I thought that Berkeley believed that for something to exist was for the perceiver to have certain sensations. Isn't that true? What else does esse est percipi mean?

---------- Post added 03-21-2010 at 05:13 AM ----------

Samm;141808 wrote:

But do I mean to imply that rocks and quarks are conscious beings? Yes. Precisely so. Consciousness as the ability to experience, and that alone, does not require sentience or self-awareness. It requires only the ability to experience, by which I mean specifically the ability to react or respond to a stimulus. elings and the ideas filling my attention.

Samm

So if I say to a car mechanic, "my car experienced a loss of battery power" (which I would never say) that implies that my car is conscious? After all, all that means is that my car's battery died. (Which is what I would say).

@SammDickens,

Samm;141808 wrote:

It seems to me that there are two categories of experience. One category focuses on a shared realm where conscious beings interact within a space-time continuum; we call it the world or the universe. Another category of experience focuses on a private realm where each conscious being interacts only with itself and its mental and spiritual activities; we call it the mind or the self.

Very interesting idea. I wonder if you could understand this 'private realm', however, as ontologically primitive - that is, as a basic constituent of being which every one would experience. In other words, is this a given for everyone? I think that is a question worth considering. If you were from a pre-literate or tribal society, you might have no conception of the 'private realm'. Which is not to say that the private realm is not real. But in discussions such as this, it is important to make these kinds of distinctions. We are after all discussing very fundamental categories.

The distinction you are making between the objective and mental realms is actually quite Cartesian. As I remarked earlier, this basic sense of the subjective ego in a world of objective phenomena is very fundamental to our view of the world which is very much beholden to the Cartesian outlook. I am not saying there is anything the matter with it, but it is worth noticing how much of our basic orientation revolves around this 'self-other' relationship. It is very much implicit in our view of the world. But it might be considered that in an important way, this is a picture of how we think we are: it is like our imagined place in the world. But who is imagining this? That is an extra step that Indian philosophy will ask, that perhaps Western philosophy does not.

Have a look at the Amazon description of Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, by Philip Carey. Carey "argues that Augustine invented the concept of the self as a private inner space-a space into which one can enter and in which one can find God". I think this is at the root of a whole current of philosophical understanding which culminated in Descartes' meditations.

Samm;141808 wrote:

Consciousness permeates the universe at many levels. In humans for example, there are quantum particles that experience, elements (atoms) that experience, chemicals (molecules) that experience, cells that experience, organisms that experience, and sentient experience. All these levels of experience are occurring at once, and most conscious beings are aware only of the experiences of which they are capable of experiencing. For example, I am not aware of my heart's beating, or the tug of electrical forces between the protons and electrons in my body; I do not often realize all the sounds my ears hear or all the images my eyes pick up. But I am aware of my thoughts and feelings and the ideas filling my attention.

I have heard this argument before, but I must admit I have trouble understanding it. I do understand it in relation to living beings, insofar as living beings remember and adapt in some primitive kind of way, right from the outset. And without some kind of adaption and inheritance, which is kind of like 'memory', I find it hard to conceive of 'experience'. But I am not disagreeing with this idea - it is something I will keep thinking over.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;141836 wrote:

I have heard this argument before, but I must admit I have trouble understanding it. I do understand it in relation to living beings, insofar as living beings remember and adapt in some primitive kind of way, right from the outset. And without some kind of adaption and inheritance, which is kind of like 'memory', I find it hard to conceive of 'experience'. But I am not disagreeing with this idea - it is something I will keep thinking over.

It seems to be based on metaphorical meanings of terms like "memory" ('kind of like') and "experience". Kind of like "poetry".

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;141822 wrote:

So if I say to a car mechanic, "my car experienced a loss of battery power" (which I would never say) that implies that my car is conscious? After all, all that means is that my car's battery died. (Which is what I would say).

If you say to your car mechanic that your car has experienced a loss of battery power, you are using the word (experience) in its common usage in an entirely appropriate manner. But in philosophy, we must either create words (monad) or borrow existing words (spirit, mind, etc.) in rather specific ways that are not necessarily the most common usage for them.

Actually, your car DOES experience (my usage) the loss of battery power, if you think about it. When the battery is good, your car experiences the electrical energy the battery provides. So when the battery goes bad, your car ceases to experience that energy necessary for it to function. I do not mean to suggest that your car is sentient anymore than I would suggest that a quark is sentient.

Experience as I see it is a truly universal phenomenon, a state of existence that we usually refer to in common usage when we ask "Does that unicorn [pointing at the unicorn] exist?" It means "do you see what I see?" or, is this a shared experience?

Remember that you would not experience the visible world around you if your eyes did not experience it first and respond (automatically) to their experience of photons striking the rods within the eye by sending electrical signals to the brain. Nor would you experience those visual images unless your brain also experienced the electrical signals from the eyes and somehow responded by generating the image of the visible world that your own consciousness experiences. By the time you are responding to the visions in your consciousness, your brain is registering other experiences from your eyes and your eyes are responding to even newer experiences conveyed by photons from the world outside them.

If your car were equipped with a Hal 9000 computer (2001: A Space Oddessy), it might say, "Sorry Dave, I cannot do that," when you try to start it. "You see Dave, I am experiencing a loss of electrical power resulting in combustion failure in cylinders one through four. I'm afraid we won't be going anywhere until you get me to a mechanic." But your car's computer, although it can experience many "sensations" from the various sensors that monitor your cars performance, is not a sentient Hal 9000. My wife, by the way, suggested this analogy and added that one should never ever name their car either "Hal" or "Bartleby"; it's just asking for trouble. :bigsmile:

Experience is how everything in the universe interacts with everything else, at least everything within their range of sensation. I can't think of an instance in which the common usage of the word, experience, does not also refer to my philosophical usage of the word, at least indirectly. But of course, I can only base that assertion on my own experience.

Samm

@SammDickens,

Samm;141902 wrote:

If you say to your car mechanic that your car has experienced a loss of battery power, you are using the word (experience) in its common usage in an entirely appropriate manner. But in philosophy, we must either create words (monad) or borrow existing words (spirit, mind, etc.) in rather specific ways that are not necessarily the most common usage for them.

Actually, your car DOES experience (my usage) the loss of battery power, if you think about it. When the battery is good, your car experiences the electrical energy the battery provides. So when the battery goes bad, your car ceases to experience that energy necessary for it to function. I do not mean to suggest that your car is sentient anymore than I would suggest that a quark is sentient.

Samm

In that case, I will say that my car hates it when it loses battery power, and adores it when it is restored. (Of course, that would be my usage of "hate" and "adore"). Ascribing human characteristics to non-human objects is called, "anthropomorphism" and is called, "the pathetic fallacy". But, if you are not using a term like "experience" in anything like the sense that it is ordinarily used, that is fine. Of course, it would be less confusing if you used some other term, since it is obviously very misleading to use the same term, and not mean the same thing. Don't you think?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;141908 wrote:

In that case, I will say that my car hates it when it loses battery power, and adores it when it is restored. (Of course, that would be my usage of "hate" and "adore"). Ascribing human characteristics to non-human objects is called, "anthropomorphism" and is called, "the pathetic fallacy". But, if you are not using a term like "experience" in anything like the sense that it is ordinarily used, that is fine. Of course, it would be less confusing if you used some other term, since it is obviously very misleading to use the same term, and not mean the same thing. Don't you think?

No I don't think so, kenny. I explained as much in my previous post. Philosophers often use terms in special ways other than the common usage we have for them in our daily lives. You know this is true.

You and others who accuse me of "anthropomorphism" make the mistake of thinking that I ascribe human characteristics to non-human objects. If you understand what I am saying, you will see that I am merely ascribing non-human characteristics to human objects and functions. We are so damned egocentric in our views of humanity that it is difficult for us to see the connections between anything human and anything non-human. No wonder our religions often portray us as God's special little children made to rule over nature rather than being a part of nature.

We should be mindful that even the sentience that sets us apart from other animals (in some opinions) could not exist if a sort of proto-sentience were not evident in the brains of earlier species of primate. We are not apart from nature; we are a part of nature. The universe evolved for 13.7 billion years worth of changes to bring us where we are, and we are by no means an end product.

Frankly, I think it would be a great insult to much of existence were I to attribute to it any truly human characteristics! But our human characteristic of being conscious is not unique. Berkeley, the idiot, supposed that it was, but we do not generally or favorably suppose such nonsense today. (Not that the world is without its morons.) You will attribute consciousness to your pet, to dogs and cats, even birds and fish. But you suppose that a being may not be conscious if it is not able to conceptualize the phenomena of which it is conscious?

I am merely suggesting that consciousness is a fundamental function of the universe, or at least that the process which in humans is identified as consciousness is a fundamental function of the universe. It did not start with humans, it only became more complex in us. But the fundamental function from which human consciousness has evolved is simply an innate ability of matter at even the quantum levels to act in response to stimulus.

I hope that you can see what I am saying and understand its consequences with regard to our place in the universe. But if not you, then others will see it and understand. It's not complicated, but if you see man as a superior and distinct creature of God, you may never be willing to accept it.

I almost forgot to add that I use the terms "experience" and "consciousness" because they are the closest terms I can think of to what I am trying to describe. Except for our human bias, they are nearly spot on. My official definition of Experience however is this.

"Experience is that interactive process by which that-which-experiences (consciousness) responds to the stimulus of that-which-is-experienced (the world and the mind)."

Samm

@SammDickens,

Samm;141917 wrote:

No I don't think so, kenny. I explained as much in my previous post. Philosophers often use terms in special ways other than the common usage we have for them in our daily lives. You know this is true.

You and others who accuse me of "anthropomorphism" make the mistake of thinking that I ascribe human characteristics to non-human objects. If you understand what I am saying, you will see that I am merely ascribing non-human characteristics to human objects and functions. We are so damned egocentric in our views of humanity that it is difficult for us to see the connections between anything human and anything non-human. No wonder our religions often portray us as God's special little children made to rule over nature rather than being a part of nature.

We should be mindful that even the sentience that sets us apart from other animals (in some opinions) could not exist if a sort of proto-sentience were not evident in the brains of earlier species of primate. We are not apart from nature; we are a part of nature. The universe evolved for 13.7 billion years worth of changes to bring us where we are, and we are by no means an end product.

Frankly, I think it would be a great insult to much of existence were I to attribute to it any truly human characteristics! But our human characteristic of being conscious is not unique. Berkeley, the idiot, supposed that it was, but we do not generally or favorably suppose such nonsense today. (Not that the world is without its morons.) You will attribute consciousness to your pet, to dogs and cats, even birds and fish. But you suppose that a being may not be conscious if it is not able to conceptualize the phenomena of which it is conscious?

I am merely suggesting that consciousness is a fundamental function of the universe, or at least that the process which in humans is identified as consciousness is a fundamental function of the universe. It did not start with humans, it only became more complex in us. But the fundamental function from which human consciousness has evolved is simply an innate ability of matter at even the quantum levels to act in response to stimulus.

I hope that you can see what I am saying and understand its consequences with regard to our place in the universe. But if not you, then others will see it and understand. It's not complicated, but if you see man as a superior and distinct creature of God, you may never be willing to accept it.

I almost forgot to add that I use the terms "experience" and "consciousness" because they are the closest terms I can think of to what I am trying to describe. Except for our human bias, they are nearly spot on. My official definition of Experience however is this.

"Experience is that interactive process by which that-which-experiences (consciousness) responds to the stimulus of that-which-is-experienced (the world and the mind)."

Samm

The important point is that if I use "hate" and "adore" in a special way of my own, then I am not disagreeing with anyone who denies that cars can hate and adore things in the ordinary sense. We are just speaking different languages so far as that goes. So, if you say that inanimate things have experience, or are conscious, in some special sense of those words of your own, my response will be, "Fine. But it is absurd to think that inanimate things have experiences or consciousness in the ordinary sense of those terms. (All you seem to mean is that when something happens to these inanimate objects, for instance like being dented, you will elect to say that they "experienced a dent". I understand. It is just a trivial matter of translation of your language into mine).

@kennethamy,

For Bishop George Berkeley
All of the "world" is dependent upon the mind of god.
This view is part of a spiritual world view in which all of nature is interdependent, interrlated and in some sense experiential. Nature is not primarily innert, dead and insensate but alive, enchanted and experiential. Yes I think Johnson and all materialists and mechanistic determinist fundamentally fail to understand Berkeley and for that matter fail to understand the true nature of the world as well.

@prothero,

prothero;141961 wrote:

For Bishop George Berkeley
All of the "world" is dependent upon the mind of god.
This view is part of a spiritual world view in which all of nature is interdependent, interrlated and in some sense experiential. Nature is not primarily innert, dead and insensate but alive, enchanted and experiential. Yes I think Johnson and all materialists and mechanistic determinist fundamentally fail to understand Berkeley and for that matter fail to understand the true nature of the world as well.

I know you think that. Now, if only you would give some good reasons for thinking that, others might think so too. But asserting that you think that P is not giving any kind of reason for thinking that P is true.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;141939 wrote:

The important point is that if I use "hate" and "adore" in a special way of my own, then I am not disagreeing with anyone who denies that cars can hate and adore things in the ordinary sense. We are just speaking different languages so far as that goes. So, if you say that inanimate things have experience, or are conscious, in some special sense of those words of your own, my response will be, "Fine. But it is absurd to think that inanimate things have experiences or consciousness in the ordinary sense of those terms. (All you seem to mean is that when something happens to these inanimate objects, for instance like being dented, you will elect to say that they "experienced a dent". I understand. It is just a trivial matter of translation of your language into mine).

kennethamy, as I expected, you don't understand a thing of what I said and have chosen to find whatever meaning YOU want it to have. You are God's gift to those who hate philosophers. Give it up, ken. I have no hope for you.

Samm

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;141982 wrote:

I know you think that. Now, if only you would give some good reasons for thinking that, others might think so too. But asserting that you think that P is not giving any kind of reason for thinking that P is true.

Well a good place to start is always with questions like "where in the chain of being or the realm of "existence" does experience begin or end and what are your reasons for thinking that?"

Drawing the line between mind and no mind, or experience or no experience, between the mental and the material is actually not an easy thing to do. Science tells us relatively little about the subjective nature of our own experience and there is little reason to think that science does or will tell us much about the experiences of other "entities" that have material aspects or properties as well.

George Berkeley basically gives primacy to the mental and experiential properties of reality and I do not think modern physics or human experience refutes him. No one is denying the reality of the material world they are just denying that that is the entire story. There is no ultimate reality without the mental. In Berkeley.s case there is no world without God. The ultimate basis for the world for Berkeley is divine thought.

@SammDickens,

Samm;141997 wrote:

kennethamy, as I expected, you don't understand a thing of what I said and have chosen to find whatever meaning YOU want it to have. You are God's gift to those who hate philosophers. Give it up, ken. I have no hope for you.

Samm

A personal attack is no substitute for an argument.

---------- Post added 03-21-2010 at 07:38 PM ----------

prothero;142000 wrote:

Well a good place to start is always with questions like "where in the chain of being or the realm of "existence" does experience begin or end and what are your reasons for thinking that?"

Drawing the line between mind and no mind, or experience or no experience, between the mental and the material is actually not an easy thing to do. Science tells us relatively little about the subjective nature of our own experience and there is little reason to think that science does or will tell us much about the experiences of other "entities" that have material aspects or properties as well.

George Berkeley basically gives primacy to the mental and experiential properties of reality and I do not think modern physics or human experience refutes him. No one is denying the reality of the material world they are just denying that that is the entire story. There is no ultimate reality without the mental. In Berkeley.s case there is no world without God. The ultimate basis for the world for Berkeley is divine thought.

But is any of what you have written a reason for thinking that Johnson did not understand Berkeley, and refute him? Berkeley assuredly does deny the reality of the material world. He believes that the world is spiritual. If you don't understand that, you do not understand Berkeley's main thesis. If the "ultimate basis for the world" is divine thought, then how could there be a material world? Unless Berkeley believes that divine thought is material. But do you think that is so? Berkeley constantly denies there is a material world, and he thinks that the belief that there is a material world is a belief implanted in us by the Devil to conceal God. For. Berkeley argues, if we but understood that there is not material world, we would see clearly that the only cause of our experiences could be (as you say) divine thought. Without the supposition of a material world, we would have no explanation of our experiences by God. So, to say that he is not denying the reality of the material world (as you do) undercuts Berkeley's argument at the knees.

@SammDickens,

Samm;141997 wrote:

kennethamy, as I expected, you don't understand a thing of what I said and have chosen to find whatever meaning YOU want it to have. You are God's gift to those who hate philosophers. Give it up, ken. I have no hope for you.

Samm

Quite the contrary. You seem not to understand at all the pont Kennethamy was making.

No one can stop you from using words completely differently than how they are normally used. But you shouldn't pretened or fool yourself into thinking you have discovered something new by doing so. You are simply advocating an alternate norm of representation that the rest of us see no reason to adopt.

@kennethamy,

From post #173:

kennethamy;140140 wrote:

By kicking a stone, Johnson kicked a material object, and according to Berkeley, there are no material objects. Therefore, Johnson refuted Berkeley.

Doesn't the underlined phrase beg the question?

@ACB,

ACB;142045 wrote:

From post #173:

Doesn't the underlined phrase beg the question?

No, because it does not assume what needs to be proved. It is designed to prove what needs to be proved. That is to say that when, by kicking a stone, Johnson's foot did not pass through the stone, but impacted it, and moved it, he proved that it was a material object. For that is what material objects are like. Suppose I am challenged to prove that there are giraffes, and I take someone to the zoo and I point to a giraffe. Am I then begging the question?

Philosophy Forum

Did Samuel Johnson misunderstand George Berkeley?

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