Hard determinism is incompatible with free will; soft determinism is compatible with free will. Since these are contrary attributes, hard and soft determinism must be different kinds of determinism (of which only one, at most, can be true). That's all I was saying. The only reason I mentioned cheese was to make the general point that if two contrary adjectives can be applied to a noun, they must refer to two different things. So hard determinism is a different thing (a different idea) from soft determinism..

No one seems to be able to define the difference between hard and soft determinism except in relationship to free will. I have come to the conclusion that the the crux of the matter is in changing the defintion or notion of "free will" not of "hard and soft determinism. Hard and soft determinists employ different conceptions of " free will" but determinism "hard" or "soft" is still determinism.

An additional confusion (in my view) is to conflate causality with determinism which is consistently done in the thread. If event A necessarily or inevitably follows cause C you are talking about classical determinism not just the notion of causality. The key terms being "necessarily" or "inevitably" not causality.

No one seems to be able to define the difference between hard and soft determinism except in relationship to free will. I have come to the conclusion that the the crux of the matter is in changing the defintion or notion of "free will" not of "hard and soft determinism. Hard and soft determinists employ different conceptions of " free will" but determinism "hard" or "soft" is still determinism.

An additional confusion (in my view) is to conflate causality with determinism which is consistently done in the thread. If event A necessarily or inevitably follows cause C you are talking about classical determinism not just the notion of causality. The key terms being "necessarily" or "inevitably" not causality.

I'm trying to understand why you think this. Say there are physical causes for every choice I make - why does this mean we aren't making choices? If I bend my legs and jump, am I not jumping, since I built up kinetic energy in my hamstrings and quads? Do we dismiss other things that happen, simply because they have a cause?

So, in a universe where everything was totally predictable, there would be no room for real freedom because the course of all events would be fixed in advance. But, as noted above, unpredictability doesn't give rise to free will either. Either (a) you couldn't have done otherwise, because everything is predetermined, or (b) you could have done otherwise, but only as a result of chaos or randomness, for which you are not responsible.

Either (a) you couldn't have done otherwise, because everything is predetermined

The combination of prior events and physical laws would then make you think and act in a certain way at that time. From your conscious point of view, however, you would feel free.



I think we are in agreement as to what actually happens. We only disagree about the words we should use to describe it. This is understandable; when common words such as "free" and "compel" (which are perfectly clear in everyday usage) are used to discuss contentious philosophical issues, they can be imprecise and confusing.

If it is caused it is not free...

Things are precisely and necessarily and inevitably as they should be...

I disagree. How do you suppose choices come to be, if they have no cause?

I disagree. Something can be caused, and yet something could have been otherwise.

As they should be? According to...?

Do you mind rephrasing this?

But someone can choose otherwise, even if everything is predetermined.

That's the important point. Say there is a God, and this God has predetermined everything -- nothing that happens can deviate from God's plan. This doesn't mean I cannot make choice, or I couldn't have chosen otherwise; I can still choose and reconsider as many times as I like, and my choosing and/or choosing otherwise can be the thing that is determined. God would have just determined that I would have reconsidered!

Choices imply the idea that 2 variables have the same chance of becoming...that is not true. So there are not 2 choices, only an impression of it.

I think it is agreed that if my choices are controlled by a hypnotist, then they are not free. So how are they free if they are controlled by God?

So what you're saying is this:

Given 2 competing influences, Choice A and Choice B
With both exerting influence on me.
Choice B is exerting more influence on me than Choice A.
There is no way I can choose Choice A

Correct?


I think the only problem I'm having is that why can't "our will" be part of what is creating the influential difference?

If we eliminated every external influential factor we would only be left with internal influential factors.

Why cant our will be one of these? I would say we are "determined"(or that we have no choice) but to bend to the influential factor of our "will" so in a sense I suppose we are both right.

***Reading the previous sentence again I think I see where the confusion comes in in thinking we are the chooser. We are not.....the will, our will, is though.

We indeed have no choice but to bow to the influence of our will***

Because, in the case of being hypnotized, my choices would be compelled. But God's knowing that I will do X before I do X, doesn't compel me to do X.

No, I can know that my brother will hit me, and that doesn't imply that my brother didn't have a choice to hit me. Hell, it doesn't even mean I compelled him to hit me.

I have also stated a couple of things about choice. Prove them wrong, instead of repeating yourself.