The Difference Between Causality and Determinism

@Fil Albuquerque,

[QUOTE=Fil. Albuquerque;118037]I have stated a couple of things about choice. Prove them wrong, instead of repeating yourself...
(in fact if someone can clarify this issue to pull me out of this idea I would feel a lot more "happier", again...)

If lightening hits a tree, and if it falls because it was hit by lightening, then did the lightening compel the tree to fall? No.

Compulsion implies causation, but causation doesn't imply compulsion. We ought not confuse the two. There are two things to consider: 1) events that are caused and compelled and 2) events that are caused and not compelled.

The lightening example is an event that has a cause (as all events are caused), but it is not a compelled event (and note that only some events are compelled).

Some of us can tell the difference between causation and compulsion, but many of us confuse the two. If you are constrained to do something you don't want to do, or if you are restrained from doing something you want to do, then you are being compelled. Notice that compulsion involves two things: 1) constraint or restraint and 2) wants.

In the lightening example, the tree neither wanted to nor wanted not to fall, so the tree could not have been compelled to fall.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;118034 wrote:

No, I can know that my brother will hit me, and that doesn't imply that my brother didn't have a choice to hit me. Hell, it doesn't even mean I compelled him to hit me. My knowing that my brother will hit me does not carry any implication that my brother was compelled to him me. Similarly, God's knowing one of my actions does not carry any implication that I was compelled to do said action.

You cannot know for certain that your brother will hit you. But God is omniscient, and I think that makes all the difference. Especially if God has actively predestined what will take place.

Look at it this way:

1. If God has arranged (predetermined) that a particular event will definitely happen, he must have forced the physical matter of the universe to behave in a certain way. (If he has not forced it, it cannot be guaranteed to happen.)

2. My brain, with which I make my choices, is part of the physical matter of the universe.

3. Therefore, God has forced my (physical) brain to behave in a certain way.

4. Therefore, he has forced me to behave in a certain way.

I know you disagree with this, but can you please tell me which part of my argument you think is wrong.

(I have deliberately used the word "force" here, rather than "compel", as I think some people consider it wrong to say that inanimate objects can be "compelled". An alternative word to "force" or "compel" would be "make".)

@fast,

fast;118146 wrote:

If lightening hits a tree, and if it falls because it was hit by lightening, then did the lightening compel the tree to fall? No.

Compulsion implies causation, but causation doesn't imply compulsion. We ought not confuse the two. There are two things to consider: 1) events that are caused and compelled and 2) events that are caused and not compelled.

The lightening example is an event that has a cause (as all events are caused), but it is not a compelled event (and note that only some events are compelled).

Some of us can tell the difference between causation and compulsion, but many of us confuse the two. If you are constrained to do something you don't want to do, or if you are restrained from doing something you want to do, then you are being compelled. Notice that compulsion involves two things: 1) constraint or restraint and 2) wants.

In the lightening example, the tree neither wanted to nor wanted not to fall, so the tree could not have been compelled to fall.

i am not sure if the term compulsion is part of philosophy and has some strict definition, so i am asking what about obsessive compulsive disorder? what compels a person to wash his hands a hundred times a day, and in fact he is not doing something he doesnt want to do-he very much wants to wash his hands again and again and in fact will become very distressed if not able to do so.

isnt it something within his own physiology? like his brain? i dont really think so, but couldnt it be his will? isnt it will that seeks to compel, such as political leaders and romantic partners, and wil that eventually either compels or is hit up against another will more powerful?

at any rate, i dont think the definition is quite wrapped up yet...

in fact i believe someone can compel me to do something i really want to do and yet do not have enough will power on my own to do it.

@prothero,

The idea that because someone knows what you will do implies that he cannot know that you will do it of your own free will is really very strange. Why should the fact that I know that you will eat oatmeal tomorrow morning mean that it was not up to you whether you chose oatmeal tomorrow morning? Of course, if I controlled what you did, say by hypnosis, then it would not be up to you what you did. But how is knowing what you will do like hypnosis? And knowing is not controlling.

To force someone to do something is to cause him to do that thing. But, it does not follow, and it is not true, that to cause someone to do something is to force him to do that thing. I may cause you to hit me because I kissed your girlfriend, but I did not force you to hit me because I kissed your girlfriend. It was up to you whether or not you would hit me.

@prothero,

But God's knowing is different than God's forcing. If you are to say that God forces everyone to do the things they do, like a puppetmaster to a puppet, then there's really no contention. I mean, sure, then you would be correct. But that isn't what I was talking about. I was talking about God's knowing (which is what I thought this discussion was concerning).

Keep in mind, once again, just in case you're confusing the two: God's knowing is not God's forcing, and God's knowing does not imply that God is forcing.

@salima,

salima;118173 wrote:

i am not sure if the term compulsion is part of philosophy and has some strict definition, so i am asking what about obsessive compulsive disorder? what compels a person to wash his hands a hundred times a day, and in fact he is not doing something he doesnt want to do-he very much wants to wash his hands again and again and in fact will become very distressed if not able to do so.

isnt it something within his own physiology? like his brain? i dont really think so, but couldnt it be his will? isnt it will that seeks to compel, such as political leaders and romantic partners, and wil that eventually either compels or is hit up against another will more powerful?

at any rate, i dont think the definition is quite wrapped up yet...

in fact i believe someone can compel me to do something i really want to do and yet do not have enough will power on my own to do it.

Why should any term not be part of philosophy? OCD is, as the name implies, compulsive. The victim does not want to do it, but, as you say, is not able to refrain from (say) washing his hands so many times a day that they may actually bleed. So, he is under compulsion (internal) and, since he is doing it under compulsion, he is not doing it of his own free will. The fact that he does wash his hands doesn't mean that he wants to do it, any more than the fact that you pay a large bill means that you want to pay it.

@prothero,

salima wrote:

isnt it something within his own physiology? like his brain? i dont really think so, but couldnt it be his will? isnt it will that seeks to compel, such as political leaders and romantic partners, and wil that eventually either compels or is hit up against another will more powerful?

It is considered a disorder, because it is not in a person's will to wash their hands a hundred times a day. But, yes, the disorder does compel.

@ACB,

ACB;118172 wrote:

You cannot know for certain that your brother will hit you. But God is omniscient, and I think that makes all the difference. Especially if God has actively predestined what will take place.

Look at it this way:

1. If God has arranged (predetermined) that a particular event will definitely happen, he must have forced the physical matter of the universe to behave in a certain way. (If he has not forced it, it cannot be guaranteed to happen.)

2. My brain, with which I make my choices, is part of the physical matter of the universe.

3. Therefore, God has forced my (physical) brain to behave in a certain way.

4. Therefore, he has forced me to behave in a certain way.

I know you disagree with this, but can you please tell me which part of my argument you think is wrong.

(I have deliberately used the word "force" here, rather than "compel", as I think some people consider it wrong to say that inanimate objects can be "compelled". An alternative word to "force" or "compel" would be "make".)

what if God has not predetermined or arranged that a particular thing will happen? He can know ahead of time what will happen because He knows all the laws of the universe and He knows the future as well as the past because He is outside of time. He knows what choices will be made and everything leading up to them, but that doesnt mean they arent being made by particular individuals.

if you really want to get far out, He should be able to know exactly what will happen and also intervene if He so wishes to change something.

@ACB,

ACB;118172 wrote:

You cannot know for certain that your brother will hit you. But God is omniscient, and I think that makes all the difference. Especially if God has actively predestined what will take place.

Look at it this way:

1. If God has arranged (predetermined) that a particular event will definitely happen, he must have forced the physical matter of the universe to behave in a certain way. (If he has not forced it, it cannot be guaranteed to happen.)

Why would you suppose that God arranged that a particular event would happen? God know that Judas would sin, and He knew He would sin of his own free will. He knew both that Judas would sin, and that Judas would freely choose to sin. What is the problem about that?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;118177 wrote:

But God's knowing is different than God's forcing. If you are to say that God forces everyone to do the things they do, like a puppetmaster to a puppet, then there's really no contention. I mean, sure, then you would be correct. But that isn't what I was talking about. I was talking about God's knowing (which is what I thought this discussion was concerning).

Keep in mind, once again, just in case you're confusing the two: God's knowing is not God's forcing, and God's knowing does not imply that God is forcing.

You mentioned predestination in your post #146. So there are two issues here:

1. Does God's (active) predestining imply that God is forcing?

2. Does God's (passive) omniscience imply that God (or something) is forcing?

Let's take these two questions separately. Re (1), how can God predestine without forcing? How else can he ensure that his predestination is accomplished? Re (2), how can it be that particular events absolutely must occur, if nothing is forcing them? What factor is closing off the possibility of their non-occurrence?

When we are talking about God's foreknowledge, analogies with people's foreknowledge are unhelpful, because people can never know any future event with absolute certainty. The infallibility of God's knowledge is an essential part of my argument.

@prothero,

ACB wrote:

The infallibility of God's knowledge is an essential part of my argument.

Before we continue and I respond to all you have written, I'd like to clarify what your argument is. The conclusion of your argument is that God's knowing X will occur, forces that X will occur. That is, if God is omniscient, people do not actually make choices.

Is this correct?

Sorry, due to the length of the posts, and the time between many of them, I find it important that we check and recheck what it is we're actually discussing (or arguing) with eachother.

@ACB,

ACB;118210 wrote:

You mentioned predestination in your post #146. So there are two issues here:

1. Does God's (active) predestining imply that God is forcing?

2. Does God's (passive) omniscience imply that God (or something) is forcing?

Let's take these two questions separately. Re (1), how can God predestine without forcing? How else can he ensure that his predestination is accomplished? Re (2), how can it be that particular events absolutely must occur, if nothing is forcing them? What factor is closing off the possibility of their non-occurrence?

When we are talking about God's foreknowledge, analogies with people's foreknowledge are unhelpful, because people can never know any future event with absolute certainty. The infallibility of God's knowledge is an essential part of my argument.

I didn't even know that "to predestine" was a verb. Nor am I clear what it might mean. But if it means that God causes it to be true that, for instance, Judas sinned, then that is inconsistent with Judas freely sinning.

Why, if God knows that Judas will sin, it is true that Judas must sin? I think you are confusing: (a) It must be that if God knows Judas will sin, then Judas will sin; with,(b) If God knows that Judas will sin, then Judas must sin. The confusion is known as the modal fallacy, and, of course, (b) does not follow from (a) nor is (b) true. It is true that (necessarily) if A knows that p, then p. But it is not true that, (b) if A knows that p, then necessarily, p. (b) would mean that only necessary truths can be known, and, of course, that is false. You have to be careful how you place the modal operator, "necessary".

@ACB,

ACB;118210 wrote:

When we are talking about God's foreknowledge, analogies with people's foreknowledge are unhelpful, because people can never know any future event with absolute certainty. The infallibility of God's knowledge is an essential part of my argument.

but we can know what has already happened. And for God, it's already happened.

@Amperage,

the terms cause, effect, determined, predetermined, determinism, free will and so on are all rationalist terms in the context of this discussion.

Suppose you go to a football match and sit down to watch the game. The person next to you asks 'who do you support?' and you answer "oh no one, i just enjoy the game". 'right, so you don't support either of these two teams, but which football team do you support?' .... you reply "i don't support any football team". 'so why are you here' - "i just enjoy the crowd and the colours and the athletes and the songs and the hot dogs .... everything". 'right. but why don't you support a football team?' ...... "i always like both sides i suppose". 'yeh, but why don't you support one and still like the rest?' ......

i get that vibe reading this thread. The football supporter (logic supporter) can't understand what the other person is doing there from what they are saying. The football watcher doesn't commit to the narrative necessary to be a football supporter.

The rationalist game with regard to cause, effect, free will and history has a relatively new thing to consider. Probability waves. Within the game they ask 'how can probability waves explain free will differently to classical cause and effect?' They conclude that it can't. The reason being that probability waves do not offer an explanation for free will any more than classical determinism. Therefore it doesn't exist.

So why would anyone who enjoys rationalism turn up for the game not wearing a scarf for one of the rationalist philosophies that denies free will? For exactly the same reason that the football watcher turned up. You don't have to be a supporter.

QM does not offer an explanation for free will, but it does offer a gap for a force of will outside physics to operate ...... for someone who takes rationality seriously but who is not a full on supporter that is. It does no such thing for those that are supporters. Nevertheless that gap has been the bane of many a prominent scientist who is a full on supporter. They are willing to recognise that if there are areas of a particular knowledge game and power of prediction that are fundamentally reduced to statistics, then it means that such a knowledge game is incomplete. That allows for all kinds of other 'games' to fill in the gaps.

Free will is necessarily not understandable within the language game of scientific rationality, except as non existent. The reason is that rationality is 'post event' analysis leading to 'pre event' prediction. Free will is by definition inherent within events as they take place. It is in the 'now'. You won't understand it by 'post event' scientific analysis. All you could possibly do is find 'its illusion' (rationalist supporter) or possible trace (rationalist watcher) by such a method.

@pagan,

pagan;118261 wrote:

the terms cause, effect, determined, predetermined, determinism, free will and so on are all rationalist terms in the context of this discussion.

Suppose you go to a football match and sit down to watch the game. The person next to you asks 'who do you support?' and you answer "oh no one, i just enjoy the game". 'right, so you don't support either of these two teams, but which football team do you support?' .... you reply "i don't support any football team". 'so why are you here' - "i just enjoy the crowd and the colours and the athletes and the songs and the hot dogs .... everything". 'right. but why don't you support a football team?' ...... "i always like both sides i suppose". 'yeh, but why don't you support one and still like the rest?' ......

i get that vibe reading this thread. The football supporter (logic supporter) can't understand what the other person is doing there from what they are saying. The football watcher doesn't commit to the narrative necessary to be a football supporter.

The rationalist game with regard to cause, effect, free will and history has a relatively new thing to consider. Probability waves. Within the game they ask 'how can probability waves explain free will differently to classical cause and effect?' They conclude that it can't. The reason being that probability waves do not offer an explanation for free will any more than classical determinism. Therefore it doesn't exist.

So why would anyone who enjoys rationalism turn up for the game not wearing a scarf for one of the rationalist philosophies that denies free will? For exactly the same reason that the football watcher turned up. You don't have to be a supporter.

QM does not offer an explanation for free will, but it does offer a gap for a force of will outside physics to operate ...... for someone who takes rationality seriously but who is not a full on supporter that is. It does no such thing for those that are supporters. Nevertheless that gap has been the bane of many a prominent scientist who is a full on supporter. They are willing to recognise that if there are areas of a particular knowledge game and power of prediction that are fundamentally reduced to statistics, then it means that such a knowledge game is incomplete. That allows for all kinds of other 'games' to fill in the gaps.

Free will is necessarily not understandable within the language game of scientific rationality, except as non existent. The reason is that rationality is 'post event' analysis leading to 'pre event' prediction. Free will is by definition inherent within events as they take place. It is in the 'now'. You won't understand it by 'post event' scientific analysis. All you could possibly do is find 'its illusion' (rationalist supporter) or possible trace (rationalist watcher) by such a method.

Don't get me wrong, I read this entire post, but do you think you could sum up your main point(s) in one paragraph?

@Zetherin,

hi zetherin

well i will try in the context of the previous post.

Scientific and materialistic rationalism attempts to use language in an unambiguous way, and this is a major point of reference for those that are committed to fully supporting it. Hence the disagreements between its supporters in this thread re 'causality', 'determinism' and the non existence of 'free will'. But free will more generally concieved (linguistically) is intrinsically part of an event through a being that is able to use it. It is not material. Therefore it isn't even measurable by rationalistic determinism because that is post and pre event materialist analysis upon such data necessarily provided by a machine (which by definition does not have free will ....... and therefore cannot recognise it). However, those of us who believe we are not just deterministic machines, recognise free will as a force of nature. Some of us are nevertheless interested in what materialistic rationalism has to say ..... and note the difference between the cast iron straight jacket of classical determinism as compared to the potential indetermism of say QM. In fact the latter makes it even more interesting. Nevertheless science in my opinion cannot ever supply an understanding of free will generally concieved as a personal force within us, because it is neither measurable by a machine or describable within material rationalism. It is in that sense that i am speaking to rationalist game watchers rather than rationalist supporters (who reject the possibility of its existence within their language and data of understanding the world. For which i agree ...... as an onlooker of the committed supporters, whether they reach a conclusion as to the correct definition of their terms or not. ie to them i comment that no agreement of terms would alter their position re free will.)

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;118287 wrote:

Don't get me wrong, I read this entire post, but do you think you could sum up your main point(s) in one paragraph?

Or even two, but concise?

---------- Post added 01-07-2010 at 06:48 PM ----------

pagan;118296 wrote:

hi zetherin

well i will try in the context of the previous post.

Scientific and materialistic rationalism attempts to use language in an unambiguous way, and this is a major point of reference for those that are committed to fully supporting it. Hence the disagreements between its supporters in this thread re 'causality', 'determinism' and the non existence of 'free will'. But free will more generally concieved (linguistically) is intrinsically part of an event through a being that is able to use it. It is not material. Therefore it isn't even measurable by rationalistic determinism because that is post and pre event materialist analysis upon such data necessarily provided by a machine (which by definition does not have free will ....... and therefore cannot recognise it). However, those of us who believe we are not just deterministic machines, recognise free will as a force of nature. Some of us are nevertheless interested in what materialistic rationalism has to say ..... and note the difference between the cast iron straight jacket of classical determinism as compared to the potential indetermism of say QM. In fact the latter makes it even more interesting. Nevertheless science in my opinion cannot ever supply an understanding of free will generally concieved as a personal force within us, because it is neither measurable by a machine or describable within material rationalism. It is in that sense that i am speaking to rationalist game watchers rather than rationalist supporters (who reject the possibility of its existence within their language and data of understanding the world. For which i agree ...... as an onlooker of the committed supporters, whether they reach a conclusion as to the correct definition of their terms or not. ie to them i comment that no agreement of terms would alter their position re free will.)

Sorry. Doesn't help. I still don't understand what you are getting at.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;118220 wrote:

Before we continue and I respond to all you have written, I'd like to clarify what your argument is. The conclusion of your argument is that God's knowing X will occur, forces that X will occur.

Not quite. My conclusion is that God's knowing X will occur requires that something (either God or something else) forces that X will occur.
(Fil. Albuquerque made this point in his post #156.)

Zetherin;118220 wrote:

That is, if God is omniscient, people do not actually make choices.

Is this correct?

They do make choices, in the sense that they consider various courses of action and then act in accordance with their wishes. But they do not choose their wishes. Some factor (e.g. God himself, or the laws of nature) determines (forces) people's wishes, and hence, indirectly, their actions. There are therefore pre-existing facts about people's future actions, and God knows these facts.

But my basic argument does not depend on the existence of God. It would be best to keep God out of it as far as possible, otherwise we could get sidetracked by religious or mystical concepts which are irrelevant to the real world.

@ACB,

ACB;118341 wrote:

Not quite. My conclusion is that God's knowing X will occur requires that something (either God or something else) forces that X will occur.
(Fil. Albuquerque made this point in his post #156.)

And the argument for that is? Suppose that God knows I will have oatmeal for breakfast. Why do you think that something forced me to have oatmeal for breakfast? I like oatmeal. Indeed, I choose oatmeal for breakfast everyday. And, it is good for me too.

@prothero,

well it would make sense that you can only do something that a force led you to do.... but that force could simply be one's own will

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