Yes, you could do what you want to do. So you would have "will". But how could it be "free"? Isn't lack of freedom the very essence of determinism? I think you are using the term "free will" to mean simply "will".

In any case, I thought we were agreed that pure determinism does not exist. So are you saying that there is partial determinism, and that we have free will to the extent that it applies? That would be counter-intuitive. I am sure many people think we have free will to the extent that determinism does not apply.

Yes, you could do what you want to do. So you would have "will". But how could it be "free"? Isn't lack of freedom the very essence of determinism? I think you are using the term "free will" to mean simply "will".

In any case, I thought we were agreed that pure determinism does not exist. So are you saying that there is partial determinism, and that we have free will to the extent that it applies? That would be counter-intuitive. I am sure many people think we have free will to the extent that determinism does not apply.

The difference between no freedom and a little freedom is all the difference in the world. Your "free will" is always constrained by the laws of nature; but the laws of nature are not deterministic only causal.
.

There are many possible futures and human mind and will have limited but effective causal efficiency in determining the future.

But we are always limited in what we can do. We are never completely free. Our bodies are limited by the laws of physics. Our minds are more "free" in terms of imagination but even our minds have conceptual limitations. So our "freedom" is always of a limited and constrained nature.

For me the notion of "causality" implies a degree of order, regularity and predictability. Determinism implies a single fixed, invariant, inevitable form of causality. The laws of nature are not mathematically random. The laws of nature are stochastic. The chaos that occurs in mathematical chaotic systems does not generate random chaos but does generate strange attractors and other initially, unpredictable, novel and creative features, behaviors and properties. The random, but repetitive and iterative process of fractals does not generate meaningless forms but the forms of nature. It is order and stochastic randomness that lie at the heart of nature.

Will has causal efficiency. There is a degree of freedom. Freedom only operates together with causality. If there were no predictability or regularity then what would "freedom" or "causal efficiency" mean? Order, regularity and reasonable predictability are necessary for "free will" but complete determinism destroys it.

What kind of "freedom" do you think we "humans" have? I think we have pretty much the kind of "freedom" we "think" we have. A small degree of freedom constrained by the laws of nature (which are not deterministic) and the conceptual limits of our minds. Are the laws of nature deterministic (one possible future and one possible past) no. Is everything possible? No. There are many possible futures and human mind and will have limited but effective causal efficiency in determining the future. The exact means by which this occurs is still a mystery but the causal efficiency of mind or will has not been excluded by experience or by science. "Free will" is only excluded by a mechanistic deterministic materialistic world view or philosophical assumption. "Materialism" and "mechanistic determinism" are not "science' they are metaphysical assumptions and philosophical speculations. In fact modern science makes mechanistic determinism suspect.

Determinism and causality are not synonyms. The world is causal but not deterministic. "Free will" does not imply randomness or mathematical chaos. The world is one of ordered or constrained possibilities. Within ordered possibilities lies the opportunity for novelty, creativity and freedom. Complete unpredictability, randomness and chaos would destroy value just as complete determinism would; it is a matter of balance. Is it all the result of accident and chance, blind purposeless forces? not in my view.

If there is a little bit of indeterminism in the laws of nature, then that does not offer us freedom.

Persons who are not compelled to do as they do not want to do, are free to that extent. But the fact that I am caused to do something I want to do anyway does compel me to do that thing. Consequently, I do that thing of my own free will. A will may be caused or not caused. But it is the person who is free or not free.

1. If I have free will, I could have acted otherwise.
2. If there is strict determinism, I could not have acted otherwise.
Therefore:
3. Free will is incompatible with strict determinism.

Seems clear to me.



I agree (though prothero does not).



I don't entirely understand your distinction between the will and the person. We are not talking here about the will being merely caused (in the weak sense referred to by prothero); we are talking about it being strictly determined (i.e. compelled). I understand that recent experiments have shown that the brain does not form a conscious decision to perform an action until a split second after it has initiated the action. So it would be unscientific to regard the decision/will as being responsible for the action. Hence free will is an illusion. To the extent that determinism is true, both the will and the action are compelled.

I don't agree that being caused (determined) implies being compelled.

I have already given the example of my action to visit the restaurant being caused by my friend's suggestion, but that does not mean that my visit to the restaurant was compelled. What makes you think I was compelled to visit the restaurant by the suggestion of my friend to visit it?

You don't? :confused:



Let's look again at your definition of determinism:

"Every event has a cause, and every cause is an event."

Your friend's suggestion cannot have been the whole cause of your action. You might have declined to go, for any number of reasons. At a conscious level, these might include: you felt unwell, you were short of money, you were too busy, you just didn't feel in the mood, etc, etc. At an unconscious (neurological) level, it could be said that the mindless laws of physics (classical and/or quantum) set up a particular brain state that caused (compelled) you to react in a certain way to your friend's suggestion.

Once we consider the entire cause of your action, I suggest that we will find no room for any residual factor called "free will".

Why does the fact that because I might not have gone to the restaurant show that my friend's suggestion was not the whole cause of my going? If it is because had it been the whole cause, I would have been compelled to go, then you are just begging the question of whether causes compel. You are arguing that because all causes compel, if C did not compel E, then C was not the cause of E. And that is simply assuming that all causes compel. And it is that which is at issue.

. So why assume free will in the case of people?

Because people are subjects, not objects. The rules for subjects are entirely different from the rules for objects.

Because people are subjects, not objects. The rules for subjects are entirely different from the rules for objects.

I will try to frame my argument without begging the question of whether causes compel. But I would ask you likewise not to beg the question of whether free will exists. Let us first look at the issue of 'cause versus compulsion' in terms of inanimate objects, and then try to apply it to people, without assuming in advance that free will exists.

1. If your fence blows down in a gale, the gale has caused the fence to assume its current position. But it might not have blown down; the circumstances might have been such that it would have withstood the gale. It would then have been the case that all the relevant circumstances, taken together, had caused the fence to remain upright.

2. If you switch off your light at night and the room goes dark, your action has compelled the room to go dark. It could not have done otherwise (if we disregard any far-fetched scenarios such as a searchlight suddenly being shone into the room.)

Obviously neither fences nor rooms have free will. So we have established that there can be both non-compulsive causes (as in (1) above) and compulsive causes (as in (2)) without free will. Now, people can also be subject to both compulsive and non-compulsive causes. But we know from (1) above that a non-compulsive cause can exist without free will. So why assume free will in the case of people? It is superfluous to the explanation of events, and hence violates Ockham's Razor.

True, we have the appearance of free will, but that proves nothing. Our direct experience of the mechanisms of our brain is only superficial. And, as I said earlier, I believe that recent experiments have provided positive evidence against a causative "will".

So, your friend suggested you go to the restaurant. As a result of all the relevant factors in play, you agreed to go. What good reason have you to assume that one of those factors was a mysterious, unscientific entity called "free will"?

Are you sure you are not begging the free will question?

If you think that I (on the contrary) must have been forced to go to the restaurant on the suggestion of my friend, then you must be assuming that whatever causes me to do something (the suggestion, in this case) compelled me to do it.

You have no other reason for thinking that I was compelled to do it, and therefore, that I did not do it of my own free will.

No, I don't think that the suggestion (alone) compelled you to do it.



Yes, I do have another reason. I am arguing that your decision, although voluntary, was caused by your brain state at that moment. Given that brain state, you could not have done otherwise. You were not compelled to go to the restaurant against your will, but you were physically caused (or compelled) to want to go. The physical state of your brain was a sufficient reason for your decision.

I had thought you were making the category mistake of using "free will" as an explanation for your decision/action. I now appreciate that you only mean that you were not compelled. But is it true that you were not compelled? In one sense no, in another sense yes. See the previous paragraph.

You state that the term "free will" is saying something negative. But I am more interested in the positive reason for your action. Why, precisely, did you agree to go to the restaurant?

This thread has deviated somewhat from the original topic, which was not about free will, but about strict determinism (as in classical physics) versus loose causality (which allows for chaos theory and quantum mechanics). Both strict (Newtonian) determinism and loose causality are, in my opinion, compatible with what you mean by "hard determinism" (i.e. the absence of free will), because both ultimately involve impersonal forces.