The Difference Between Causality and Determinism

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kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 1 Jan, 2010 08:30 pm
@ACB,
ACB;116189 wrote:
Yes, you could do what you want to do. So you would have "will". But how could it be "free"? Isn't lack of freedom the very essence of determinism? I think you are using the term "free will" to mean simply "will".

In any case, I thought we were agreed that pure determinism does not exist. So are you saying that there is partial determinism, and that we have free will to the extent that it applies? That would be counter-intuitive. I am sure many people think we have free will to the extent that determinism does not apply.


As Locke pointed out, "it is not the will that is free, it is the person". A person acts freely if he can do what he wants to do. If you is not compelled to do what he does not want to do. That fact that what he wants to do is caused is irrelevant unless the cause of of a particular kind. For example, if his want is the result of an addiction, or of hypnosis. The mere fact that it is caused is no reason to think that it is somehow compelled. For instance, if I want to go to a restaurant, and the cause of that is the suggestion of a friend, my I was not compelled to want to go, and, therefore, my going to the restaurant was of my own free will. To say I did something of my own free will is simply to deny that I was forced to do that thing.

I don't know ordinary people (not philosophers) who would say that we act freely when we are not determined to do what we do, if only because "determined" in that sense is a philosophical term of art, and most people are not philosophers. Just to repeat; I am not using "free will" just to mean,"will" (as you write I am) since I might want to do something, and if that want is caused in a particular way (say it is an addiction) then I am not acting of my own free will. Therefore, you must be mistaken.
 
prothero
 
Reply Fri 1 Jan, 2010 08:42 pm
@ACB,
ACB;116189 wrote:
Yes, you could do what you want to do. So you would have "will". But how could it be "free"? Isn't lack of freedom the very essence of determinism? I think you are using the term "free will" to mean simply "will".

In any case, I thought we were agreed that pure determinism does not exist. So are you saying that there is partial determinism, and that we have free will to the extent that it applies? That would be counter-intuitive. I am sure many people think we have free will to the extent that determinism does not apply.

"free will" without "predictability and order" would be a fairly meaningless gift. The ability to "choose" among ordered possibilities is more than sufficient.
The difference between no freedom and a little freedom is all the difference in the world. Your "free will" is always constrained by the laws of nature; but the laws of nature are not deterministic only causal.
Does "will" have causal efficiency in the world?

My view would be that "mind, will" does have causal efficiency. My view would be that nothing about causality denies the possible efficacy of will. Mind is one among many causes. Determinism (Laplace type) fixes the future and the past and thus denies "will" as anything but "illusion". Determinism also denies notions of meaningful novelty, creativity and freedom. Complete randomness and complete chaos would destroy "freedom" in the same sense that complete determinism does. A little "freedom" is all you need and all you really want.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 1 Jan, 2010 08:47 pm
@prothero,
prothero;116207 wrote:

The difference between no freedom and a little freedom is all the difference in the world. Your "free will" is always constrained by the laws of nature; but the laws of nature are not deterministic only causal.
.


Could you explain what it means to say that the laws of nature are causal and not deterministic? Does that just imply that the laws of nature are somewhat random? If so, then how does that allow for freedom, rather than just indeterminism. A "little freedom" i.e. by which you mean, a little indeterminism, it seems to me, is like being a little bit pregnant.
 
prothero
 
Reply Fri 1 Jan, 2010 10:27 pm
@kennethamy,
[QUOTE=kennethamy;116204] As Locke pointed out, "it is not the will that is free, it is the person". A person acts freely if he can do what he wants to do. [/QUOTE]But we are always limited in what we can do. We are never completely free. Our bodies are limited by the laws of physics. Our minds are more "free" in terms of imagination but even our minds have conceptual limitations. So our "freedom" is always of a limited and constrained nature.

[QUOTE=kennethamy;116209]Could you explain what it means to say that the laws of nature are causal and not deterministic? Does that just imply that the laws of nature are somewhat random? [/QUOTE]For me the notion of "causality" implies a degree of order, regularity and predictability. Determinism implies a single fixed, invariant, inevitable form of causality. The laws of nature are not mathematically random. The laws of nature are stochastic. The chaos that occurs in mathematical chaotic systems does not generate random chaos but does generate strange attractors and other initially, unpredictable, novel and creative features, behaviors and properties. The random, but repetitive and iterative process of fractals does not generate meaningless forms but the forms of nature. It is order and stochastic randomness that lie at the heart of nature.

[QUOTE=kennethamy;116204] If so, then how does that allow for freedom, rather than just indeterminism? [/QUOTE]Will has causal efficiency. There is a degree of freedom. Freedom only operates together with causality. If there were no predictability or regularity then what would "freedom" or "causal efficiency" mean? Order, regularity and reasonable predictability are necessary for "free will" but complete determinism destroys it.

[QUOTE=kennethamy;116204] A "little freedom" i.e. by which you mean, a little indeterminism, it seems to me, is like being a little bit pregnant. [/QUOTE]What kind of "freedom" do you think we "humans" have? I think we have pretty much the kind of "freedom" we "think" we have. A small degree of freedom constrained by the laws of nature (which are not deterministic) and the conceptual limits of our minds. Are the laws of nature deterministic (one possible future and one possible past) no. Is everything possible? No. There are many possible futures and human mind and will have limited but effective causal efficiency in determining the future. The exact means by which this occurs is still a mystery but the causal efficiency of mind or will has not been excluded by experience or by science. "Free will" is only excluded by a mechanistic deterministic materialistic world view or philosophical assumption. "Materialism" and "mechanistic determinism" are not "science' they are metaphysical assumptions and philosophical speculations. In fact modern science makes mechanistic determinism suspect.

Determinism and causality are not synonyms. The world is causal but not deterministic. "Free will" does not imply randomness or mathematical chaos. The world is one of ordered or constrained possibilities. Within ordered possibilities lies the opportunity for novelty, creativity and freedom. Complete unpredictability, randomness and chaos would destroy value just as complete determinism would; it is a matter of balance. Is it all the result of accident and chance, blind purposeless forces? not in my view.
 
ACB
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 08:56 am
@prothero,
prothero;116218 wrote:
There are many possible futures and human mind and will have limited but effective causal efficiency in determining the future.


You state this as if it were an established fact, but as far as I can see there is no hard evidence for it. It is quite a bold claim, apparently involving some kind of mind/body dualism. You are in effect introducing a "ghost in the machine".
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 09:02 am
@prothero,
prothero;116218 wrote:
But we are always limited in what we can do. We are never completely free. Our bodies are limited by the laws of physics. Our minds are more "free" in terms of imagination but even our minds have conceptual limitations. So our "freedom" is always of a limited and constrained nature.

For me the notion of "causality" implies a degree of order, regularity and predictability. Determinism implies a single fixed, invariant, inevitable form of causality. The laws of nature are not mathematically random. The laws of nature are stochastic. The chaos that occurs in mathematical chaotic systems does not generate random chaos but does generate strange attractors and other initially, unpredictable, novel and creative features, behaviors and properties. The random, but repetitive and iterative process of fractals does not generate meaningless forms but the forms of nature. It is order and stochastic randomness that lie at the heart of nature.

Will has causal efficiency. There is a degree of freedom. Freedom only operates together with causality. If there were no predictability or regularity then what would "freedom" or "causal efficiency" mean? Order, regularity and reasonable predictability are necessary for "free will" but complete determinism destroys it.

What kind of "freedom" do you think we "humans" have? I think we have pretty much the kind of "freedom" we "think" we have. A small degree of freedom constrained by the laws of nature (which are not deterministic) and the conceptual limits of our minds. Are the laws of nature deterministic (one possible future and one possible past) no. Is everything possible? No. There are many possible futures and human mind and will have limited but effective causal efficiency in determining the future. The exact means by which this occurs is still a mystery but the causal efficiency of mind or will has not been excluded by experience or by science. "Free will" is only excluded by a mechanistic deterministic materialistic world view or philosophical assumption. "Materialism" and "mechanistic determinism" are not "science' they are metaphysical assumptions and philosophical speculations. In fact modern science makes mechanistic determinism suspect.

Determinism and causality are not synonyms. The world is causal but not deterministic. "Free will" does not imply randomness or mathematical chaos. The world is one of ordered or constrained possibilities. Within ordered possibilities lies the opportunity for novelty, creativity and freedom. Complete unpredictability, randomness and chaos would destroy value just as complete determinism would; it is a matter of balance. Is it all the result of accident and chance, blind purposeless forces? not in my view.


You think that freedom is the opposite of determinism, whereas it is really the opposite of compulsion. If there is a little bit of indeterminism in the laws of nature, then that does not offer us freedom. It offers us randomness, and what has randomness to do with freedom? Nothing that I can see. As I have already argued, it is persons who are free, not wills. Persons who are not compelled to do as they do not want to do, are free to that extent. But the fact that I am caused to do something I want to do anyway does compel me to do that thing. Consequently, I do that thing of my own free will. A will may be caused or not caused. But it is the person who is free or not free.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 09:35 am
@kennethamy,
 
ACB
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 10:29 am
@kennethamy,
1. If I have free will, I could have acted otherwise.
2. If there is strict determinism, I could not have acted otherwise.
Therefore:
3. Free will is incompatible with strict determinism.

Seems clear to me.

kennethamy;116305 wrote:
If there is a little bit of indeterminism in the laws of nature, then that does not offer us freedom.


I agree (though prothero does not).

kennethamy;116305 wrote:
Persons who are not compelled to do as they do not want to do, are free to that extent. But the fact that I am caused to do something I want to do anyway does compel me to do that thing. Consequently, I do that thing of my own free will. A will may be caused or not caused. But it is the person who is free or not free.


I don't entirely understand your distinction between the will and the person. We are not talking here about the will being merely caused (in the weak sense referred to by prothero); we are talking about it being strictly determined (i.e. compelled). I understand that recent experiments have shown that the brain does not form a conscious decision to perform an action until a split second after it has initiated the action. So it would be unscientific to regard the decision/will as being responsible for the action. Hence free will is an illusion. To the extent that determinism is true, both the will and the action are compelled.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 11:06 am
@ACB,
ACB;116344 wrote:
1. If I have free will, I could have acted otherwise.
2. If there is strict determinism, I could not have acted otherwise.
Therefore:
3. Free will is incompatible with strict determinism.

Seems clear to me.



I agree (though prothero does not).



I don't entirely understand your distinction between the will and the person. We are not talking here about the will being merely caused (in the weak sense referred to by prothero); we are talking about it being strictly determined (i.e. compelled). I understand that recent experiments have shown that the brain does not form a conscious decision to perform an action until a split second after it has initiated the action. So it would be unscientific to regard the decision/will as being responsible for the action. Hence free will is an illusion. To the extent that determinism is true, both the will and the action are compelled.


But premise 2 seems to me false. Since even if my action was caused, I might have done otherwise if I had chosen to do so, or wanted to do so.

I don't agree that being caused (determined) implies being compelled. I have already given the example of my action to visit the restaurant being caused by my friend's suggestion, but that does not mean that my visit to the restaurant was compelled. What makes you think I was compelled to visit the restaurant by the suggestion of my friend to visit it?
 
ACB
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 01:58 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;116361 wrote:
I don't agree that being caused (determined) implies being compelled.


You don't? :confused:

kennethamy;116361 wrote:
I have already given the example of my action to visit the restaurant being caused by my friend's suggestion, but that does not mean that my visit to the restaurant was compelled. What makes you think I was compelled to visit the restaurant by the suggestion of my friend to visit it?


Let's look again at your definition of determinism:

"Every event has a cause, and every cause is an event."

Your friend's suggestion cannot have been the whole cause of your action. You might have declined to go, for any number of reasons. At a conscious level, these might include: you felt unwell, you were short of money, you were too busy, you just didn't feel in the mood, etc, etc. At an unconscious (neurological) level, it could be said that the mindless laws of physics (classical and/or quantum) set up a particular brain state that caused (compelled) you to react in a certain way to your friend's suggestion.

Once we consider the entire cause of your action, I suggest that we will find no room for any residual factor called "free will".
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 03:45 pm
@ACB,
ACB;116419 wrote:
You don't? :confused:



Let's look again at your definition of determinism:

"Every event has a cause, and every cause is an event."

Your friend's suggestion cannot have been the whole cause of your action. You might have declined to go, for any number of reasons. At a conscious level, these might include: you felt unwell, you were short of money, you were too busy, you just didn't feel in the mood, etc, etc. At an unconscious (neurological) level, it could be said that the mindless laws of physics (classical and/or quantum) set up a particular brain state that caused (compelled) you to react in a certain way to your friend's suggestion.

Once we consider the entire cause of your action, I suggest that we will find no room for any residual factor called "free will".



Why does the fact that because I might not have gone to the restaurant show that my friend's suggestion was not the whole cause of my going? If it is because had it been the whole cause, I would have been compelled to go, then you are just begging the question of whether causes compel. You are arguing that because all causes compel, if C did not compel E, then C was not the cause of E. And that is simply assuming that all causes compel. And it is that which is at issue.

Exactly what is your justification for saying that 'once we consider the entire cause of your action, I suggest that we will find no room for any residual factor called "free will" '. ? You are begging the question again. For you make it true "by definition" that if I could not have gone as a consequence of my friend's suggestion, if I did go it would not have been the "entire cause". You simply mean by "the entire cause", a cause that compels me to go. So you just define "cause" as a compulsion. But that is exactly what I am denying. You cannot refute me by definition.

All compulsions are causes, but neither does it follow from that, that all causes are compulsions, nor is it true that all causes are compulsions I was not compelled by my friend's suggestion to go. It was a suggestion. It was not a threat. It was not even a command. It was just a suggestion.
 
ACB
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 08:13 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;116457 wrote:
Why does the fact that because I might not have gone to the restaurant show that my friend's suggestion was not the whole cause of my going? If it is because had it been the whole cause, I would have been compelled to go, then you are just begging the question of whether causes compel. You are arguing that because all causes compel, if C did not compel E, then C was not the cause of E. And that is simply assuming that all causes compel. And it is that which is at issue.


I will try to frame my argument without begging the question of whether causes compel. But I would ask you likewise not to beg the question of whether free will exists. Let us first look at the issue of 'cause versus compulsion' in terms of inanimate objects, and then try to apply it to people, without assuming in advance that free will exists.

1. If your fence blows down in a gale, the gale has caused the fence to assume its current position. But it might not have blown down; the circumstances might have been such that it would have withstood the gale. It would then have been the case that all the relevant circumstances, taken together, had caused the fence to remain upright.

2. If you switch off your light at night and the room goes dark, your action has compelled the room to go dark. It could not have done otherwise (if we disregard any far-fetched scenarios such as a searchlight suddenly being shone into the room.)

Obviously neither fences nor rooms have free will. So we have established that there can be both non-compulsive causes (as in (1) above) and compulsive causes (as in (2)) without free will. Now, people can also be subject to both compulsive and non-compulsive causes. But we know from (1) above that a non-compulsive cause can exist without free will. So why assume free will in the case of people? It is superfluous to the explanation of events, and hence violates Ockham's Razor.

True, we have the appearance of free will, but that proves nothing. Our direct experience of the mechanisms of our brain is only superficial. And, as I said earlier, I believe that recent experiments have provided positive evidence against a causative "will".

So, your friend suggested you go to the restaurant. As a result of all the relevant factors in play, you agreed to go. What good reason have you to assume that one of those factors was a mysterious, unscientific entity called "free will"?

Are you sure you are not begging the free will question?
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Sat 2 Jan, 2010 09:08 pm
@ACB,
ACB;116523 wrote:
. So why assume free will in the case of people?


Because people are subjects, not objects. The rules for subjects are entirely different from the rules for objects.
 
prothero
 
Reply Sun 3 Jan, 2010 12:52 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;116537 wrote:
Because people are subjects, not objects. The rules for subjects are entirely different from the rules for objects.
to be inside looking out is much different than just being outside looking. My perspective is a lot of nature has an interiority which is not available looking from the outside. We keep telling stories and denying there is a storyteller. Strange?
 
Alan McDougall
 
Reply Sun 3 Jan, 2010 02:44 am
@prothero,
Is there really a difference between causality and determinability? Take the shifting of tectonic plates, this causes and determines an earthquake. What about the creation of the universe did it have a cause or was it determined by some super intelligence?

Causality

The relation between a cause and its effect. this relationship was defined by Aristotle as a relation between events., processes or events, the one being a reason or explanation of the other there are four types of causes according to a material cause,( what a thing is made of), formal cause (what it is) the final cause (what is its function purpose) and (efficient cause) what brought it about

Determinism

The doctrine that everything fact or event in the universe happens according to universal laws this seems to clash with the idea of free will



http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

Causal/ determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other. In both of these general areas there is no agreement over whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known true or false), and what the import for human agency would be in either case.

The roots of the notion of determinism surely lie in a very common philosophical idea: the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained, or that everything that is, has a sufficient reason for being and being as it is, and not otherwise. In other words, the roots of determinism lie in what Leibniz named the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But since precise physical theories began to be formulated with apparently deterministic character, the notion has become separable from these roots. Philosophers of science are frequently interested in the determinism or indeterminism of various theories, without necessarily starting from a view about Leibniz' Principle.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Mon 4 Jan, 2010 09:22 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;116537 wrote:
Because people are subjects, not objects. The rules for subjects are entirely different from the rules for objects.
 
prothero
 
Reply Tue 5 Jan, 2010 01:40 am
@Fil Albuquerque,




[QUOTE=Fil. Albuquerque;117127] Is true that several factors mix together in Causal process (non-linear), but and precisely because, such is true, the outcome is only one...a NECESSARY outcome ! [/QUOTE] Even using the equations of classical mechanics, it is not possible to find a deterministic solution to multiple body or multiple gravitational field equations. Approximations and perturbations must be used. Quantum mechanical equations do not even have deterministic solutions. What you suggest is not science but metaphysics.

[QUOTE=Fil. Albuquerque;117127] This is the very first intuition in Philosophy(shoul be)...not getting it, is a serious mistake ![/QUOTE] The inability to distinguish between facts and assumptions is a serious mistake. Hard determinism is not the first intuition or principle in philosophy. Hard determinism is a first class philosophical speculation.

Rejecting Hard Determinism is a metaphysical assumption and a philosophical speculation but so is accepting it. Science does not confirm or deny hard determinism. Science does not imply or confirm hard determinism.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 5 Jan, 2010 02:43 am
@ACB,
ACB;116523 wrote:
I will try to frame my argument without begging the question of whether causes compel. But I would ask you likewise not to beg the question of whether free will exists. Let us first look at the issue of 'cause versus compulsion' in terms of inanimate objects, and then try to apply it to people, without assuming in advance that free will exists.

1. If your fence blows down in a gale, the gale has caused the fence to assume its current position. But it might not have blown down; the circumstances might have been such that it would have withstood the gale. It would then have been the case that all the relevant circumstances, taken together, had caused the fence to remain upright.

2. If you switch off your light at night and the room goes dark, your action has compelled the room to go dark. It could not have done otherwise (if we disregard any far-fetched scenarios such as a searchlight suddenly being shone into the room.)

Obviously neither fences nor rooms have free will. So we have established that there can be both non-compulsive causes (as in (1) above) and compulsive causes (as in (2)) without free will. Now, people can also be subject to both compulsive and non-compulsive causes. But we know from (1) above that a non-compulsive cause can exist without free will. So why assume free will in the case of people? It is superfluous to the explanation of events, and hence violates Ockham's Razor.

True, we have the appearance of free will, but that proves nothing. Our direct experience of the mechanisms of our brain is only superficial. And, as I said earlier, I believe that recent experiments have provided positive evidence against a causative "will".

So, your friend suggested you go to the restaurant. As a result of all the relevant factors in play, you agreed to go. What good reason have you to assume that one of those factors was a mysterious, unscientific entity called "free will"?

Are you sure you are not begging the free will question?


In the case of inanimate objects there cannot be compulsive causes, since inanimate objects cannot be compelled to do anything. To be compelled is to be forced either to do what you do not want to do (constraint) or forced not to do what you do want to do (restraint). But inanimate objects have no wants, therefore, they can neither be constrained or restrained. It is only people, and to a certain extent animals that can be compelled to do anything. That is because they want (or do not want) things.

I was clearly not compelled to go to the restaurant by my friend's suggestion. As I have already pointed out, suggestions are not threats. There was no compulsion since it was not true that I did not want to go to the restaurant. In other words, I went there of my own free will. You misunderstand if you think I use the notion of free will as a kind of explanation of my action. Far from it. To say that I did something of my own free will is (in English) to deny (and not assert anything, certainly not an explanation) What does the phrase, "I did it of my own free will" deny? It denies that I was compelled to do what I did. It is not saying anything affirmative. It is saying something negative; namely, that I was not forced to do what I did. If you think that I (on the contrary) must have been forced to go to the restaurant on the suggestion of my friend, then you must be assuming that whatever causes me to do something (the suggestion, in this case) compelled me to do it. You have no other reason for thinking that I was compelled to do it, and therefore, that I did not do it of my own free will. (It is not the appearance of free will when I am not compelled to do what I do. It is free will).
 
ACB
 
Reply Tue 5 Jan, 2010 08:28 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;117194 wrote:
If you think that I (on the contrary) must have been forced to go to the restaurant on the suggestion of my friend, then you must be assuming that whatever causes me to do something (the suggestion, in this case) compelled me to do it.


No, I don't think that the suggestion (alone) compelled you to do it.

kennethamy;117194 wrote:
You have no other reason for thinking that I was compelled to do it, and therefore, that I did not do it of my own free will.


Yes, I do have another reason. I am arguing that your decision, although voluntary, was caused by your brain state at that moment. Given that brain state, you could not have done otherwise. You were not compelled to go to the restaurant against your will, but you were physically caused (or compelled) to want to go. The physical state of your brain was a sufficient reason for your decision.

I had thought you were making the category mistake of using "free will" as an explanation for your decision/action. I now appreciate that you only mean that you were not compelled. But is it true that you were not compelled? In one sense no, in another sense yes. See the previous paragraph.

You state that the term "free will" is saying something negative. But I am more interested in the positive reason for your action. Why, precisely, did you agree to go to the restaurant?

This thread has deviated somewhat from the original topic, which was not about free will, but about strict determinism (as in classical physics) versus loose causality (which allows for chaos theory and quantum mechanics). Both strict (Newtonian) determinism and loose causality are, in my opinion, compatible with what you mean by "hard determinism" (i.e. the absence of free will), because both ultimately involve impersonal forces.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 5 Jan, 2010 08:38 am
@ACB,
ACB;117253 wrote:
No, I don't think that the suggestion (alone) compelled you to do it.



Yes, I do have another reason. I am arguing that your decision, although voluntary, was caused by your brain state at that moment. Given that brain state, you could not have done otherwise. You were not compelled to go to the restaurant against your will, but you were physically caused (or compelled) to want to go. The physical state of your brain was a sufficient reason for your decision.

I had thought you were making the category mistake of using "free will" as an explanation for your decision/action. I now appreciate that you only mean that you were not compelled. But is it true that you were not compelled? In one sense no, in another sense yes. See the previous paragraph.

You state that the term "free will" is saying something negative. But I am more interested in the positive reason for your action. Why, precisely, did you agree to go to the restaurant?

This thread has deviated somewhat from the original topic, which was not about free will, but about strict determinism (as in classical physics) versus loose causality (which allows for chaos theory and quantum mechanics). Both strict (Newtonian) determinism and loose causality are, in my opinion, compatible with what you mean by "hard determinism" (i.e. the absence of free will), because both ultimately involve impersonal forces.


Your "previous paragraph" tells me that although my action was voluntary, nevertheless it was compelled because it was "physically caused or compelled". Doesn't it seem to you that simply begs the question when whether being caused and being compelled is exactly what is at issue? And, incidentally, doesn't it strike you that saying that what I did was voluntary, but compelled is a contradiction?

I went to the restaurant because my friend suggested it. I thought I had explained that already.

As I have already explained, determinism is defined in terms of causation. It is the thesis that every event has some cause, and every cause is an event.
 
 

 
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