@Amperage,
Amperage;118526 wrote:to make the assertion that we could not have done otherwise given the circumstances is to presume to know something that could not be known.
Of course we could have done otherwise but through deliberation we did not.
It would seem to me that you're inferring that since only one alternative is ever chosen that means that only one alternative could have been chosen. Well there is no way to verify this that I can see so stating it as fact seems a little presumptuous.
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As I've said everything(IMO) needs a cause minus the(an) original cause or causer. In the case of our actions, I submit that my free will is an original cause. Now at the same time we can want to do something and still not be allowed to do it, but in such cases someone or something has to negate our will.
For example, say I want to get through a doorway that someone is blocking and that person says they have orders not to let me through. Now say I still will(or desire or choose or whatever word you want to use) to go in the other room so I try and make a break for it and in the process he knocks me unconscious. My will has just been negated by an outside force but this did not negate that I desired or willed to go to the other room
I think if you separate the will from the act it becomes clearer(for me at least). We are compelled, but the only compelling force that matters is our will.
I guess it reminds me of a quote I heard one time which was "A man can do what he wants, but he can't will what he wills"
which I always took to mean that while I can do anything, the things I desire to do, aren't up to me. For example, I can do school work, but I can't make myself have a yearning for it.
1. The issue is not whether or not we
know whether or not we can do otherwise, but whether or not we can do otherwise whether we know it or not. It is a metaphysical issue, and not an epistemological issue.
2.It was the philosopher, Schopenhauer who wrote, that we can do as we please, but we cannot please as we please. This raises two questions: (a) Is it true? Can I not, for example please to smoke, but then decide not to please to smoke? 2. Even if it is true, does that mean that even if I cannot please as I please, that if I do as I please, that I am
not acting of my own free will?
3. Why would anyone think that when I do what I want, I am compelled to do it, because my want compels me? It is exactly when I do what I want that I can be said not to be compelled.
4. Finally, why should it be thought that if I do X, it is only if I can do other than X in exactly identical condition I did X, that this would be acting of my own free will? First of all, no one (except some theologians and philosophers who ape them) use the term "free will" that way. Second of all, as Daniel Dennett puts it, why would anyone even think such indeterministic free will was worth having?