But then Kennethamy, how is compulsion different from passion? How is the obsession of hand-washing, which forces you to wash your hand every 3 minutes, and the obsession of the person you love for instance, which causes you to act in such and such ways, different? The definition you give of free will seems to be a necessary one for our society, one without which there would be no morality and no responsability. However, it is still a distinction (depending on the kind of causation, as you said) which is rather artificial, merely invented. It is a limit we created in order not to fall in such a philosophy as Nietzsche's. You didn't answer Eudaimon's post, but the arguments he pointed out deserve to be considered: indeed, "if some one is raised in environment where killing, robbery, prostitution are quite usual or if he has, as they like to say to-day "bad genes", or... find another reason thyself, they are innumerable, why is this liable to penalty?"

You know, I think we are both right, only not talking on the same level, or degree I'd say, as for the definition of free will. That's what I meant by "artificial". At the level you're talking about, there is a distinction for sure. But to take your example again, going to a friend's party, well you never chose to meet that person in the first place. That's why I also said it implies a great problem of identity: you didn't choose where, when, in what type of communauty, or body, you would be born. If you were born in a slum where crime, drug, prositution, etc. is commun, raised there, without anything to compare, were then propulsed in society and committed some kind of crime, or even murder, you are considered responsible by society, and it is necessary because otherwise it seems it would be chaos, nobody being considered responsible of anything since nobody chose as who they would be born. So you do have a point, by saying it would be anti-social, or even, actually amoral (and I mean amoral, not immoral) From the moment we were born, we were not "free" (=exempt from. external authority, interference, restriction, etc., as a person or one's will, thought, choice, action, etc.; independent; unrestricted), and our will was not free either. Do you see what I mean?

Well, I might very well have chosen to meet the person. But suppose not, how would that make any difference. I still chose to go to the party on his invitation, and that choice was not something forced on me, so I did it freely. What difference does it make how we became friends. I think you still confuse causation with compulsion. All compulsions are, of course, causes, but not all causes are compulsions. That's the key distinction I think ought to be made.

Difference between compulsion and causation is artificial. In fact my post did not received appropriate answer: we take one cause that some values his life and say that under this conditions it is excusable to a certain extent to act immoraly. What if my religion is more valuable for me and I can hi-jack airplanes? What if my honour, abd I can kill supposed offender? Or authority, or anything else? But it is now not important just because we are conditioned in a way that this is not important.
On the other hand, we should know that every one has his own causes for his acts. Why is it that when some one is teasing me, I don't get angry, whereas others may kill one another? Is it not because I was raised in such and such environment, had such and such heredity, met such and such people, read such and such books... that I could not act otherwise.

Is it not because I was raised in such and such environment, had such and such heredity, met such and such people, read such and such books... that I could not act otherwise.

Even if I chose to act otherwise? If I could not have acted otherwise even if I had chosen to act otherwise (like the kleptomaniac) then I was compelled to act as I did. But, if I could have acted otherwise if I had chosen to act otherwise, then I was not compelled, and I am morally responsible for what I did.

Not merely external agency.

Satan, what do you mean determinism is false?

Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse: These are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature, and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.

All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

Hume points out that it's not rationally provable that causes and effects exist or that the future will resemble the present (or that the present resembles the past for that matter).



In short, there is no amount of reasoning or evidence that can lead anyone to conclude there exists determinism or cause and effect. We simply make usage of these ideas because they are natural and in practical life, unavoidable, though of course, completely irrational. Thus, anyone trying to discredit free will with determinism is not being rational.

Indeed, Hume argued that there cannot be any free will with moral responsibility, unless determinism is true.

He was not arguing for determinism. Causation does not require determinism. He was simply showing us that the expectation that a person's choices reflect their character is based on at least some notion of causation. That is not an argument for determinism but an argument against the idea of an uncaused will. Otherwise, if you killed someone and it was uncaused then locking you up in a cell would just be an act of vengeance. There's no way we could predict that you would kill again or even that any of us wouldn't be just as likely to kill someone.

But isn't the point that unless there is determinism in the case of people, there is no freedom of will with moral responsibility? How can you be morally responsible unless you actions are caused by your character? How are determinism and universal causation supposed to differ?

Hume says that all we know of causes is that they are regularities in our experience. If moral responsibility really requires causes in any stronger sense of the word then that, then we have no evidence of any such entities. All we can do is make predictions based on the character of the individual. Which, is all we need for moral responsibility.

And how do we make such predictions unless we think that the if the jailer were to release the prisoner, he would be acting "out of character"? We expect him to hold on the to prisoner because of his character. If we did not, we would not entrust him to be in charge.

Yes and we base these expectations on custom. It's practical not rational.

I don't think I know what you mean. After all, the warden of a prison presumably interviews and looks into the records of his prison guards, and would not hire one who he did not think he could rely on to keep the cell doors locked.

I think I understand Satan's thought: the wareden can never know exactly anything about his prison guards. However he may make some inferences which are not necessarily true but rather needful for their hiring (since we have to hire anyone in any case) and in this sense only pragmatic.

If he means that, that is not news. No one knows anything much for certain, so there is noting special about the warden's not knowing for certain that his prison guards are reliable. But, so what? It isn't as if we either know for certain, or it is all pragmatic, is it? If it is, then we just have to say, "o.k. it is all "pragmatic" but still, we have a lot more evidence for some things we know "pragmatically" than other things we know "pragmatically", so it does not make much difference. We'll just say that the warden knows ("pragmatically) that his guards are reliable (or should, anyway).

As long as you don't mistake useful for true, there is no problem. However, you can't say it is true we have free will, only that it is useful (unavoidable in practical life) to believe we do.

What is the main objection to the proposal that we have free will? The longer these debates go on the harder it is to see the objections.Is it that we are predisposed by other events? There is a chain of causes and events that will describe my actions under any circumstance?From the BB my actions in writing this posts was undeniable? I would like some real clarification on this.

Why can't I say it is true we have free will, especially since it is true?