If there is no God or fate or destiny, than free will as an idea doesn't really exist, although I think you would technically have it, because there is nothing to oppose it, nothing to take it away.

Ok I get your point. It all seems to be pointing to exactly what is the definition of free will?

If free will is defined as one's ability to do whatever they want, then as you described, the answer is obviously no.

Is free will the ability to do what you want? If so, than the answer is obviously yes.

Here's where it gets hairy. Is free will the ability want and act on that want. I'm not sure if that makes sense. Am I capable of actually wanting chocolate ice cream? Is that want really my want, or is that a feeling instilled in me by some higher power or destiny? Are our feelings our own? Do you have any control over what you want? So that more explains what I said earlier. Depending on your stand on predestination, and your definition of free will, the answer may vary.

I agree that free will usually turns up in discussions about God. The concept of free will almost seems dependent on the fact that there could be otherwise, i.e. a God that controls every thing and every emotion. If there is no God or fate or destiny, than free will as an idea doesn't really exist, although I think you would technically have it, because there is nothing to oppose it, nothing to take it away.

I'm kind of thinking out loud, so go ahead and rip that apart. I suppose I just don't understand the question. "Do we have free will?" I don't know. What exactly is free will?

I don't know why everyone makes such a big deal out of this whole "Free Will" thing. I mean, it's not like we have any control over it.

Control over what? What we do? Of course we (often) have control over what we do. I have control over what I am writing to you, for instance.

Well, obviously, it is my want. It is no one else's want. You are asking where that want comes from. How is it caused? Well, it might (say) be caused by my having been given a drug which compels me to want to do what I want to do. Or, by a post-hypnotic suggestion, if you have seen either version of the film, "The Manchurian Candidate" you know what I mean. In that case, of course, since I was compelled to want what I wanted, and did what I wanted (say) then I was not acting freely. But, now, suppose that what caused me to want to do what I wanted to do, and what I did do, was not something that compelled (or forced) we to want to do what I did. Suppose, for instance, that my friend recommended a restaurant to me, and suggested that he thought I might like the food there, and the atmosphere. And, as a result of his recommendation, I went to the restaurant. Did I go of my own free will? I would say so. Why would anyone say I did not go of my own free will? I was not forced to go.

He's saying we don't have control over whether or not we have free will. And I have to agree with him. We have the illusion of free will, which is all that really matters, no? We believe and feel we have control over what we do, and that illusion is all that really makes a difference in our lives anyways. After further pondering this question, I've come to the realization that the whole discussion is rather pointless. Free will is only an illusion. An illusion we have.

It is relevant for a very simple reason that has been realised centuries ago: without free will, there is no morality. And let me make this clearer: if there is no free will, than we are not responsible of our actions, since they are all the effects of causes we did not ourselves trigger. If there is no free will, there is no distinction between nature and nurture, and we cannot judge a criminal more guilty of a crime he committed than we can judge a man guilty of having white or black skin, since both of them are just the reasult of causality, meaning determinism.

Aha! But is it possible for me to choose to judge or not to judge a criminal if there is no free will?
On the hand, I have to ask everybody here, without science. Is it possible to prefer what is worse. I mean that when some one does choice, it always appears to him due to some reasons that it is better to choose this! Does it mean there is no free will?

That need not be true. People often choose to do things which they are quite sure will turn out badly for them in the long run, or even pretty soon, but they choose it anyway, and take the consequences. Insofar as people make choices, and they are not under compulsion, they choose of their own free will. Isn't that what we mean by, "choosing freely"?

Although they may know that it will turn out to be bad some time, they ignore that because for the sake of minute satisfaction which due to some misunderstanding appears to be worth than not to be exposed to those bad consequences. Or, is choice based on nothing? Just spontaneous?

You say choosing without being under compulsion...
I think we seriously need to give a clear definition of free will here otherwise we won't be getting anywhere. If we understand free will as the capacity to choose without there being a cause to our choice, without there being any influence, then it seems like there is no free will, because we were always influenced, since the day we were born, just by being in contact with the outer world. Then the question is, again, what is the subject, and what is "I", if we exclude everything which falls under determinism...
Please tell me if I am not being clear because I really wish to discuss this, but if we don't understand what the other is talking about it will be a meaningless dialogue.

I think I got what you meant. But what distinction do you make exactly between being forced to and caused to? The whole issue of determinism vs free will, which has been a philosophical polemic at least since Spinoza, lies in the definition of free will I gave (and that I didn't invent ^^'). If the definition you give was universal, then there wouldn't even be an issue at all.
And then, why would acting out of love be considered more moral then acting spontaneously? Oscar Wilde wrote that "all influence is immoral - immoral from a scientific point of view". Because where is the limit? When can you be considered responsible, or not?

I agree, but I don't think it changes the problem. Wanting in itself is a cause. Every time we make a choice, there is a cause to it. Free will isn't just will. Although our choices may be the results of our will, it is never of our free will (see definition of free) for even our will has a cause.

Of course wanting something is part or the reason (cause) you try to acquire it...
It is also true that our wants and beliefs are caused. I don't deny that... But, if someone is threatening me with a gun to make me do something that I do not want to do (like talk to the person) well, that is quite a different thing. In the first case, there are causes for my wanting to cross the street, but I am not compelled to cross the street. I want to. In the second case, I do not want to cross the street, but I am forced to. So, in both cases, I cross the street. But in the first case, I do it of my own free will; in the second case, I do not do it of my own free will. So it isn't causation as such which is the factor we have to consider, but the kind of causation.

I agree, but I don't think it changes the problem. Wanting in itself is a cause. Every time we make a choice, there is a cause to it. Free will isn't just will. Although our choices may be the results of our will, it is never of our free will (see definition of free) for even our will has a cause.

I think Hume had it right, determinism is false but free will is incoherent, if by free you mean uncaused. The kind of free will we really want is the kind that kennethamy is talking about, freedom from external agency. Unless someone held a gun to your head, the source of your bad actions is you and the particular causes and effects of how you brought them about are irrelevant.