Yes, I've always been curious about that. I do not know exactly how language correlates with thought. I have heard that we think in language, but I'm inclined to think that we can think without language. I'd like to learn more about this - what exactly does language contribute to our thought?

Good point. Language itself is learned from experience. So tautologies in a language really don't in the strictest sense provide a priori knowledge. Even the language of mathematics must be learned first from experience before we can recognize a tautology as a tautology.

m. We are looking at whether tautologies can be know prior to the experience of learning a language..

Which is why it's clear that a wrong turn has been taken if people are discussing W's view by insisting that he's engaged in a priori analysis of some kind or by reference to traditional philosophical examples of tautological propositions.

I agree, so it is a good thing that no one (to my knowledge) is trying to do such a silly thing.

No one said that W attacked the idea that philosophy was a form of conceptual clarification. What I said was that -- contrary to your suggestions -- he rejected the idea that philosophy was an a priori conceptual discipline. If that seems like an odd reading of W to you, I don't think you're very familiar with his philosophy.

Well, I would be interested in hearing why you thought that, too. What kind of thing do you think W. thought philosophizing was? Of course, he thought we had to examine the actual use of our language, in case you are thinking of that. But after we understood the meanings of our words, then the connections among them was known a-priori. Maybe the disagreement comes from looking at the different stages of the philosophizing. Wittgenstein admonishes us to "look, don't think". But after we look, we have to think.

You earlier comments clearly suggested that W could be regarded as engaging in a priori conceptual analysis. That's how the tangent regarding the meaning of "a priori" knowledge arose. To recapitulate:





The clear suggestion here is that you believe that W does regard philosophy as an a priori conceptual discipline. He didn't. That you should even express any doubt on this point makes it clear that you don't have a firm handle on W's view. I don't say this as an insult, because you don't pretend to have a firm handle on his view. The problem is that you still seem determined to say things about W's view and to challenge what others say about his view. Since you're not able to discuss W's view itself, you end up taking the thread off track in order to discuss other issues. I think this is unfair to the folks who want to discuss W's view and come to a better understanding of it. Just my two cents.

Well, he certainly does not think of it as an empirical discipline, otherwise he would think of it as a branch of linguistics. What sort of statement do you think that knowledge implies truth is? That was my example.

W wasn't too interested in characterizing his view in terms of the a priori/empirical knowledge dichotomy. He would have said that that distinction merely betokened a difference in language games.

In point of fact, W regarded philosophy as similar to disciplines like linguistics -- and anthropology. In PI, he says of his philosophy: "What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings." (PI 415). He's talking here very much about "empirical" descriptions of linguistic practices.

As for statements like "knowledge implies truth," as I've pointed out, W wouldn't have agreed with that proposition, and he wasn't interested in deriving those kinds of principles from studying language games.

I don't know, and neither do you know, what W. would have said about the proposition that knowledge implies truth. What I was wondering was whether you rhought it was an empirical proposition. If I were interested in interpreting Wittgenstein, I would have joined the interpretation of W. thread. "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own".

Yes, I

Asking whether the proposition "knowledge implies truth" is an "empirical" one is to start down the road of asking misguided philosophical questions. W is asking us to simply look at the way in which the words "know" or "knowledge" are used..

In that case I would suppose that the question is an empirical question. But, why should I stop asking that question? Any particular reason you know of. If so, do let me know. It seems to me, though, that the answer to that question is yes, since if someone claims to know that p, and p is false, then that person is going to withdraw his claim. Wouldn't you say so? For instance, if I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Bolivia, someone can easily make me withdraw that claim by showing me a map of Bolivia, and pointing out that La Paz is the capital of Bolivia. And, he might even then show me a map of Ecuador, and point out that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Does that sound right to you?

I just explained the reason for not asking questions like "Does knowledge imply truth?" in my previous post: they're based on a mistaken view of language and don't make sense. I'm afraid I can't give you any better reason than that.

It doesn't make sense to ask whether knowledge implies truth? On what sense of "sense" is that? I just offered an argument for the proposition that knowledge implies truth. Do you have any objections to it? If so, what are they? Most peculiar.

As for statements like "knowledge implies truth," as I've pointed out, W wouldn't have agreed with that proposition, and he wasn't interested in deriving those kinds of principles from studying language games.

That's a reason for thinking that the question is senseless? That Wittgenstein was not interested in it?

The statement you've quoted was made in the context of our exchange over W's view of statements such as "knowledge implies truth." My point was that W wouldn't have thought that the question made any sense. This particular remark obviously wasn't offered as a reason for thinking that the question was senseless -- I went on to explain his reasons later.

As it happens, I am persuaded by W's views on this point, but my only concern in this thread has been to discuss W's position -- a topic on which you have expressed much confusion -- not to debate the question whether knowledge implies truth, or to discuss whether the statement "knowledge implies truth" is "empirical." If I had wanted to discuss those issues, I'd have posted my thoughts in a thread on epistemology. This thread, of course, is about W.

I would doubt very much that he would have thought that question made no sense. I cannot imagine in what sense of "sense" he would have thought such a thing. It is plain English, and anyone could understand what it means. In fact, I have already explained what it meant to you. To say that W. would have thought that question made no sense would be like saying that he would have thought that asking, what was the color of his shoes made no sense.

I've tried to explain as best I could but have come up short. I gives up.

Is that because it makes sense to ask what color a pair of shoes is, or because it makes sense to ask whether when I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I am implying that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? If it it isn't, then I don't know it is. P implies Q iff not-Q implies not-P. I am sure even Wittgenstein knew that.

I gives up.

:brickwall:

You already mentioned that.

And yet, you continued to ask questions.