Would you agree that the Investigates have little to say about the history of philosophy? Extremely piece-meal work. The Tractatus is more exciting by far, I think. And yet I feel that the picture theory of language is quite limited. Can the later statements in the Tractatus concerning the self and silence be accounted for by the picture theory of meaning? In your opinion?

Have you read Wittgenstein's Vienna? That book implies that Fritz Mauthner - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia influenced Wittgenstein. Indeed, that Vienna was generally concerned with Wittgensteinian issues.
Also that ethics were Wittgenstein's motivating concern.

I agree that the Investigations has little to say about the history of philosophy, but I wouldn't say that it's a piecemeal work.

I can't say whether the Tractatus's later propositions concerning the self and silence are compatible with the picture theory of meaning. I'm inclined to think they are compatible, though, because W in the Tractatus apparently thinks they're compatible.

I haven't read that book, but it sounds interesting.

I agree that the Investigations has little to say about the history of philosophy,

One of the things that I admire about Wittgenstein and perhaps the analytics in general is their apparent independence of historical context.

If these guys drop fewer names of past philosophers that doesn't mean they are without historical context.

I do think that's part of their charm.

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That's true. I do feel that Wittgenstein takes the long, and possibly superior, way around. His "reminders for a particular purpose" are so anti-systematic that he seems especially open to interpretation. I have tended to enjoy the interpreters of Wittgenstein more than Wittgenstein, excepting the Tractatus.

That said, I'm about to tackle both with a little more determination. Before, I didn't know anyone who had heard of him. (No, I don't hang around with philosophy readers. Does anyone else find philosophy to be a minority interest?)

It seems to me that his, "reminders for a particular purpose" is very much like what Socrates/Plato said. In philosophy, we don't learn anything new, but we are reminded of what we already know, and, perhaps, see it in a new light. After all, it isn't that we did not know, for example, that knowledge implies truth, but when someone holds that knowledge is only justified belief, Socrates in Theatetus reminds him that a lucky guess is not knowledge, and gives him an example of a lucky guess to stir his memory. Wittgenstein does the same thing. He also reminds us of what we already knew, but forgot while our language was "on holiday" and "idling".

Why do you think while studying philosophy we do not learn anything new? Though you are right that reminders are key, I believe that I do learn things I hadn't previously known before.

Well, like what? I don't mean technical things, of course.

Consider my example about knowledge and truth. (Of course, even if that is not knowing something new, that doesn't mean that you don't learn something new from philosophy, but it illustrates what I am getting at). The general idea is that science provides knowledge, but philosophy understanding. But, of course, that is very general, and needs investigation and clarification.

Hm. You distinguish between knowledge and understanding, though the juxtaposition here isn't all that clear to me. By understanding, I suppose you mean a new outlook on what we already know, as opposed to learning something new. But isn't achieving a new outlook, learning something new? And couldn't this be considered knowledge?

I will give you an example. A few months ago, I had never heard of the modal fallacy, and while philosophizing, unbeknownst to me, I had been committing it. After learning more about modal operators, I have clarified many problems I had struggled with before, and now am able to realize the mistake when I make it. Didn't I learn something here, haven't I gained knowledge about something?

One can definitely come to know something new by practicing philosophy in W's way. .

Curious, I think the PI is incredibly historical.

Every time Wittgenstein says "SLAB!" I think of Egyptian and Mayan pyramids being built on opposite sides of the world, and how curious of a fact it is.

The first part of PI takes issue with Augustine's discussion of how we learn words. If that isn't involving itself in the history of Philosophy, I don't know what is.
It also helps to understand what W. was trying to do if one reads some of G.E. Moore and others of the ordinary language school.

Then you must have some examples of it. Can you share some?

Yes, the best examples I'm aware of can be found in the writings of Peter Winch, D.Z. Philips (especially where religion is concerned), and other so-called Swansea Wittgensteinians.

Can you mention one or two? You are so definite about it. I gave an example of (what I considered not learning something new, and I can give more if you like).

If you want examples for the sake of clarification, I could come up with some, but I certainly can't come up with anything as good as Winch and company, so it would seem like a waste of time.

On the other hand, if you want examples because you doubt my claim that a person can come to know new things on W's view, examples shouldn't be necessary. It should be pretty clear from his writings.

As I mentioned before, W is constantly emphasizing the complexity and variety of our linguistic practices. It's by examining these practices that we come to understand what concepts and expressions mean. Given the complexity and variety of our language games, it would be odd to think that we could never learn something new by paying close attention to how the games are played. There's plenty of stuff that goes on when we do things like pray, confess, propose, etc., etc., that we're unaware of because we've never paid any attention to it.

I can't see any basis for attributing to W the extreme view that we can never learn things we don't already know. This view might have made sense for Plato, given his views about the soul and so forth. Obviously, W doesn't share Plato's view on this point (or on many other points). To attribute such a rigid view to W would be to suggest that he had some epistemological theory to advance. He didn't. His simply tells us to look at our linguistic intercourse with one another in all its subtlety and to see how it works. If a person is unable to learn new things -- about words, expressions, and about our form of life -- by engaging in this kind of inquiry, he's doing it wrong.

Well, examples of what you think is true would really help to substantiate your claim. And the absence of examples, although not showing that your claim is false, don't encourage me to believe it is true, especially when I have advanced the contrary claim. You can understand that, of course. Could you give me even one of the examples of philosophers you have mentioned? It certainly does not help to insist on the truth of what you say with no argument to support it. Perhaps you would like to say what you think is wrong with my example of not learning something new in philosophy?

It seems to me that his, "reminders for a particular purpose" is very much like what Socrates/Plato said. In philosophy, we don't learn anything new, but we are reminded of what we already know, and, perhaps, see it in a new light. After all, it isn't that we did not know, for example, that knowledge implies truth, but when someone holds that knowledge is only justified belief, Socrates in Theatetus reminds him that a lucky guess is not knowledge, and gives him an example of a lucky guess to stir his memory. Wittgenstein does the same thing. He also reminds us of what we already knew, but forgot while our language was "on holiday" and "idling".

I would think that most educated people have heard of Wittgenstein. He has been quite influential outside of philosophy, particularly his notion of "language games". It fits into the prevailing idealist ethos.