Although you didn't attribute the "knowledge implies truth" view to W, I wanted to point out that (the later) W never held such a view, and that approaching concepts such as "knowledge" in the way you describe is antithetical to his position. If you disagree -- and I'm not sure that you do -- it would be an important thing to get clear about.

Oh, I don't care about W's views about knowledge. I just offered that as an example of what he might have meant by "philosophy is an assemblage of reminders for a particular purpose". I think that is largely true, and that it fits in with W's way of doing philosophy. It doesn't matter whether W. believed it was true, and, in any case, how could we know such a thing?

I regret that you could not substantiate your claim about philosophy teaching what is new, since I am not at all sure about my claim that it does not, and I would be glad to learn whether my claim is true or false. That is why I asked whether you have any objections to my view that in analyzing knowledge as implying truth, we are not learning anything new, but simply making clear what we already know.

Well, it should be pretty clear that (the later) W didn't believe any kind of general statement like "knowledge implies truth," because such a statement is completely inconsistent with everything in his later philosophy. In this sense, W's views about knowlege are important: if a person's unclear about whether W held such a belief, I don't think he can have a very firm grasp of what W was up to.


As I said, if you want to look further into the issue, the writings of Winch et al. would be very helpful. In fact, I would recomend their writings in any event. Some of it is very deep and interesting stuff.

However, I don't think further reading of these sources should be necessary to clarify whether your view is true or false. I don't mean this disrespectfully, but I don't think you've given any reason to believe your view is true. And the view you're attributing to W is very peculiar, so some very strong reasons should be given before saddling him with such a position. Surely, it can't just be his remark about "reminders for a particular purpose." And as I said before, I can't imagine that you believe W has some metaphysical or epistemological view about the nature of the mind or of knowledge that would support such an interpretation. What is it, exactly, that makes you believe that W believed philosophy couldn't teach anything new?

Given the complexity and variety of our language games, it would be odd to think that we could never learn something new by paying close attention to how the games are played. There's plenty of stuff that goes on when we do things like pray, confess, propose, etc., etc., that we're unaware of because we've never paid any attention to it.

I can't see any basis for attributing to W the extreme view that we can never learn things we don't already know. This view might have made sense for Plato, given his views about the soul and so forth. Obviously, W doesn't share Plato's view on this point (or on many other points). To attribute such a rigid view to W would be to suggest that he had some epistemological theory to advance. He didn't. His simply tells us to look at our linguistic intercourse with one another in all its subtlety and to see how it works. If a person is unable to learn new things -- about words, expressions, and about our form of life -- by engaging in this kind of inquiry, he's doing it wrong.

I think this is a great post. I'm suspicious of anyone who wants the game to be over, who claims that the game is over. It's a natural temptation, I think, but one that should be resisted. Wittgenstein should be a beginning, not an end. Just my opinion, of course.

I did not say that Wittgenstein believed that philosophy could not teach anything new. I said that his statement about philosophy being an assemblage of reminders might imply that. I have no idea what W. believed about that.

Actually I was just following the sentiment he produces in his preface to the PI. He writes: "I should not like my writing to spare people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own". I was simply thinking about whether his remarks about "assemblage" might be understood to imply the Socratic/Platonic view of philosophy as recollection. (Not literally, of course. But philosophy as an a priori conceptual discipline).

Yes, I was just trying to explain why I don't think W's remark should be understood as implying that philosophy can't teach anything new. In further support of my view, I would point out that (the later) W didn't regard philosophy as an a priori conceptual discipline. Quite the contrary. Indeed, that way of looking at philosophy is one of the main targets of attack in the Investigations.

Why you think that the idea that Wittgenstein (in the PI) was attacking the notion that philosophizing was conceptual clarification, I have no idea. To me it is like saying that Plato was attacking Rationalism and was an Empiricist, exactly the opposite of the truth. I look forward to your supporting this (to me) bizarre view. But it is certainly out of the mainstream. I'll give you that.

In further support of my view, I would point out that (the later) W didn't regard philosophy as an a priori conceptual discipline. Quite the contrary. Indeed, that way of looking at philosophy is one of the main targets of attack in the Investigations.

No one said that W attacked the idea that philosophy was a form of conceptual clarification. What I said was that -- contrary to your suggestions -- he rejected the idea that philosophy was an a priori conceptual discipline. If that seems like an odd reading of W to you, I don't think you're very familiar with his philosophy.

Wittgenstein admonishes us to "look, don't think". But after we look, we have to think.

...and we cannot help but "look" first. So it is about isolating and recognizing that moment when we look before it slip into thought. Who knows what mistakes can happen if we miss this moment for this moment contains the original and actual information that is presented for our analysis. We have to start there because that's where it starts.

Well, I would be interested in hearing why you thought that, too. What kind of thing do you think W. thought philosophizing was? Of course, he thought we had to examine the actual use of our language, in case you are thinking of that. But after we understood the meanings of our words, then the connections among them was known a-priori. Maybe the disagreement comes from looking at the different stages of the philosophizing. Wittgenstein admonishes us to "look, don't think". But after we look, we have to think.

I don't know what you mean by this. W's point is that we can't know anything about the meaning of terms (except in the most trivial cases) without looking at how they're used in various kinds of discourse. Obviously, we reflect on what we learn when we examine how our language works. Clearly, W wasn't telling people not to think. But I don't see how that could possibly be called "a priori conceptual analysis." A priori refers to what can be known "prior to" (and independent of) experience, not what we can know by abstracting from our experience.

After we have learned the difference between two concept by looking, we then have to understand the difference by thinking. For example: we examine how the term "exist" is used in ordinary circumstances. But as the result of that examination of how "exist" is used, we come to the conclusion that despite surface appearances, "exist" is not a predicate of things. Two stages: looking, and then, thinking. "A priori" means "known independently of experience" and the second stage (that "exists" is not a predicate, is known independently of experience. As you say, by reflection.

This simply isn't what "a priori" means. "A priori" means "from the first." It refers to knowledge that we can have independent of experience because we can know it prior to experience. Thus, with the classical examples of triangles and other mathematical truths, it's not necessary to look first and then think. It's necessary only to think. On your view, virtually all reflection is a priori. That obviously can't be right.

For example: does the statement "the sum of the angles of a triangle = 180 degrees" behave and interact within language differently in some striking ways from the statement "dogs are carnivorous"; and so does this difference in behavior at the surface eventually cause us to class "the sum of the angles of a triangle = 180 degrees" in a group we call "a priori" and "dogs are carnivorous" in a group we call "a posteriori"?

That is how "a priori knowledge" is used in philosophy. It means, known independently of experience. For example, we know that All dogs are dogs, a priori. We do not know that all dogs are carniverous, a priori.

The confusion is between how we acquire our concepts, and how, once they have been acquired, they are used. It is generally (although there are exceptions) believed that we acquire our concepts a posteriori, empirically, and by experience. For example, we learn the meaning of the word "dog" empirically. But, when we have learned the word "dog", and we understand want the statement, all dogs are dogs, means, we then know, a priori, that it is true, that all dogs are dogs. That all dogs are dogs is not an empirical contingent truth. It is an a priori, and necessary truth.