Well, they didn't know the truth. Does that mean that some people do not know the truth, just because other people think they know the truth and, in fact, do not? Galileo did know the truth, didn't he?

Yep. There are people who know the truth and there are people who know the truth. The main difference between the two is that one knows the truth and the other one only knows the truth. In either case, they both know the truth ... and you had better well listen or else!!!

Rich

Well, they didn't know the truth. Does that mean that some people do not know the truth, just because other people think they know the truth and, in fact, do not? Galileo did know the truth, didn't he?

It appears that he was closer to the truth than his opponents. But all hypotheses are provisional, so we cannot say without qualification that he "knew the truth". We can never say that of anyone.

We can believe (as I do) that there are truths "out there". But we obviously cannot be 100% certain that we know them. Can we claim to know them beyond reasonable doubt? Well, we need to be careful about that. Galileo's persecutors thought their beliefs true beyond reasonable doubt, but it turned out that they were not. So it is better simply to believe a thing than to believe that one knows it; the latter can lead to intolerance, as richrf points out.

I can certainly say of Galileo, that he knew the truth, and I would be right. The fact that I might be mistaken, although correct, is not relevant as long as what I say is true.

That I might be mistaken does not show that I am mistaken, does it?

The two phrases in bold are mutually contradictory as they stand. Don't you mean "I would probably be right" or "I believe I would be right" or "I am sure I would be right"?



No, but it leaves that possibility open.

But, it is possible that in the last half-hour, the Ecuadorean legislature has changed the capital to Guyaquil (Ecuador's second city). However, that did not happen.

Can you please clarify the following:

(a) Do you know that it did not happen?
(b) Are you simply assuming that it did not happen?
(c) Can you simply assume it, yet nevertheless know it?

I don't know it did not happen. But let's just assume it did not.
Yes
I am assuming it for the sake of the argument.

Imagine the following conversation:

Teacher: Johnny, do you know what the capital of Ecuador is.
Johnny: Yes, it is, Quito.
Teacher: You do not know it is Quito.
Johnny: Why? Isn't it Quito?
Teacher:Yes, it is Quito, but it might not be Quito, so, even if it is Quito,
you do not know it is Quito.
Johnny: HUH?

Let me give you a different dialog:

Judge: Kennethamy, are you certain about your testimony?
Kennethamy: Yes, judge. I am certain.
Judge: You are certain?
Kennethamy: Yes, I am positive.
Judge: You know, we are sending this person up the river based upon your testimony. So, I just want to make sure, that you are absolutely certain.
Kennethamy: Yes, Judge. As certain as anybody can be.
Judge: OK. Thank you for your testimony.
Kennethamy: May I say one more thing judge?
Judge: Yes, please do.
Kennethamy: I could be mistaken.
Judge: :perplexed:

Rich

We have to distinguish between two kinds of certainty. Psychological, or subjective, or philosophical, or objective. We all feel psychologically, or subjectively certain of many things. But that is different from objective certainty where the claim is that it is impossible that one is mistaken. We have that (if at all) about very few things.

I take it that you are arguing as follows:

1. Psychological/subjective certainty about a belief that happens to be true constitutes knowledge.

2. When you call something "possible", you mean that it could logically have happened, even though in fact it definitely did not. In this sense of "possible", therefore, it is possible that Germany won the Second World War.

3. The likelihood of the capital of Ecuador having been changed in the last half-hour is negligible for the purpose of deciding what you know about it.

4. If, nevertheless, you were to discover at 8.45 that the capital had been Guayaquil since 8.15, you would still maintain in retrospect that at 8.30 you had known it was (then) Quito.

Is that an accurate representation of your argument?

1. No, I am not arguing that at all. The standard definition of "knowledge" is, justified, true, belief. As a matter of course, people who believe they know, feel certain. But not necessarily. But the feeling of certainty is not a part of the idea of knowledge.

2. Yes, it was logically possible that Germany won the war. Which is to say, that Germany won the war is not self-contradictory. Sometimes, it is possible that p means epistemic possibility. It is "epistemically possible that p" means something like, "for all I know, p". And, of course, it would be false for me to say that for all I know Germany won the war. Since I know that Germany lost the war. But I am using the term modally, and not epistemically. I am sure that is a source of confusion.

3. It is negligible. But that is not the point. The point is that whether it is negligible or very great, it does not matter as long as it did not happen.

4. I cannot know what is false. So, while Guyaquil was the capital, I would not, and could not. have known that Quito was the capital. That is why I said above that the degree of liklihood is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether there was a change. Why, though, would you have supposed that I was arguing that I could have know the capital was Quito when it was not Quito? What have I written that might give you reason to suppose such an obvious decisive objection to what I might have said? It is not possible that A know that p, and p be false. But it is possible that A know that p, and it be possible that p is false. Which is to say that knowing that p is true does not imply certainty that p is true. Knowledge does not imply certainty. That is called, "fallibilism". And, of course, conforms with scientific knowledge, since if infallibilism were true, then there could be no scientific knowledge, and that is, of course, absurd.

Interesting. I don't think I would say "I know" (or "I knew") if I didn't feel (or hadn't felt) certain. I would say "I think" or "I believe" or "I'm fairly sure".



I agree it was logically possible that Germany won the war. What confused me was your use of the present tense "is". But I understand you now.



This comes back to point 1. If the likelihood of the capital having been changed was very great, you wouldn't say you knew it was still Quito, would you? That would be a misuse of the word "know". And even if (despite being aware of the likelihood of change) you still believed it was Quito, such a belief (though possibly true) would not be justified, so it could not objectively be called knowledge.



Sorry, I was confusing your argument with that of Zetherin in an earlier thread (post #51 of 'Absolute Truth is Unobtainable'). He was, I think, arguing that we can sometimes know things that are false (e.g. that a vase is on a table when in fact it has been taken off for cleaning). So - let me get this straight - you would initially claim to know that Quito was the capital, but, when you discovered it was not, you would rescind that claim.

Kennethamy - Thanks. That clears up most of my queries, but I have one further point to put to you.

Suppose I have a vague recollection that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (which it still is). Actually, someone has told me so in the past, but I have only a dim memory of this and am far from confident about it. I say: "Well, I think the capital is Quito". My belief is both justified and true, but very tentative. Now, if an Ecuadorean tells me: "You're right - it is Quito", can I then truly assert: "So I knew it all the time"?

There is such a thing as tentative belief. If such belief is both justified and true, does it become tentative knowledge? Is there such a thing? In other words, is there a symmetry between belief and knowledge, such that "I tend to believe P" becomes "I tend to know P" if the truth and justification conditions are satisfied?

Perspectivism is the philosophical view developed by Nietzsche which says that truth is a matter of individual perspective, and that we cannot have knowledge of the thing in itself. It also says that we must adopt one of the perspectives, but no perspective is more correct than its rivals.

The problem with this is that perspectivism is in itself a perspective, and so it is somewhat self-defeating.

Secondly, suggesting that we must adopt a particular perspective seems to suggest that at least one perspective is closer to the truth than the others, which contradicts perspectivism's claim that no perspective is more correct than the other.

Perspectivism seems to suggest that there can be no objective reality (another perspective), and that reality is a matter of individual perspective. This sounds like another philosopher putting human perception at the center of the universe. Science tries to discover what's real in spite of our mental perceptions and concepts, and I would say that it is quite successful at doing this (certainly the most successful).

Last but not least, like most of Nietzschean philosophy, perspectivism only deals in the negative, not contributing any practical theory to the field of philosophy.

All knowledge, to some degree, is based on a series of assumptions.

I sometimes prefer to think of science as the struggle to eliminate (or reduce as much as possible) uncertainty.

I would be the first to assert that knowledge is a beautiful artifact, a glorious pursuit, when sought for its own sake.

However, I feel that pursuing it ought to have a primary purpose: learning from the past for future benefit.

We study viral infections and recognize patterns to ensure that future illness may be prevented.

In itself, knowledge is a summation of past lessons - failing to learn from history (no matter how recent or ancient) is one of the worst mistakes humankind can make.

Hi,



Yes, we must start from somewhere. Different people start with different assumptions and thus the path is different.





Rich