This is how I think of noumena. I'm not sure what you mean by Witt's implementation. I'm a big fan of the TLP, though, so it would interest me to hear your thought.


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What has this to do with your question about believing and knowing? Anything at all? I offered an answer. Do you think it true or false? If false, then why? What has it to do with Kant or Hegel, or with phenomenology? No wonder philosophers get nowhere. They never deal with the issue for two minutes.

What has any of this to do with the issue of the relation between believing and knowing? No wonder people think that philosophers get nowhere. They don't, because they don't care about answering questions. This thread has been a study in what psychologists call free association. It is embarrassing.

I agree with you on the strength of knowing over believing. A belief would be groundless in a sense, insofar as it has no logical and empirical support (or at the very least insufficient support). Knowing comes as a testing of that belief, a strenghtening of it if you will through both logical and empirical support. If one starts off with a belief though, would it not be subsumed under what is now known after our investigation to make our belief into something known?

My aim is to deal with the questions presented, but I am not going to simply disregard talking about other things as well. Besides I enjoy talking about Kant and Hegel, along with any other German philosopher. Nevertheless I will not neglect my duty to answer and discuss the problems originally posted. You can blame reconstructo for sidetracking me haha.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 09:23 PM ----------



I just answered your question, unfortunately you lack patience. Sometimes I have to think about what one posts before I can give an answer or objection to what was presented. Forgive me for my lack of promptness in making a response to your most urgent reply.

I have patience. But in this case, what should I have patience for? I thought you were interested in the question you asked, and interested in the answer. Apparently you were not. All this talk about Hegel and Kant and the other stuff was utterly irrelevant. It is largely because of this that philosophy is often thought of as trivial and pointless. And people who think that have a strong point if philosophy is conducted as if it was free association on the psychiatrist's couch so that anything that happens to come up is discussed, and the issue is left far behind in the dust. It is sheer pointlessness.

Well then we shall disregard all other talks about Kant and Hegel and deal with what needs to be dealt with here good sir.

Of course. Since the talk about Kant and Hegel have nothing to do with it. How can any progress be make if there is continuous diversion?

Yes this is true: we would not be maximizing our investigation into the subject matter. Once again we will deal solely with what I myself presented.

In my mind, it's obviously all connected. Some prefer to zoom in so close that in my mind they can no longer see the relationship of the part to the whole. We can define words like "knowing" and "belief" to any precision desired, within this tiny little conversation. But then we enter the world of strangers again, and that's where the impossibility of precisely defining such broad words becomes apparent.

I say let's just look at how the words are used. Meaning as use. And they don't seem to be used in any consistent exact way. Jim knows. John is certain. James believes. What does this tell you, if taken out of context. About as much as "x+2." Thus my suggestion of a quantification. But this quantification is hardly going to be embraced for general use, as gesture and voice tone are satisfactory for such purposes in the real world.
I feel that Witt and others have already cleaned this issue up. Just an opinion. Your O.P. was quite good, though, and many of those questions are great kindling.

What I would like to get at is when it is appropriate to say these things (belieing, knowing, and certainty) as well as whether certain words function the same as others e.g. belief and opinion, believing and knowing, etc. Witt probably has cleaned most of this up, but that doesnt mean we shouldnt further investigate.

No. Your question assumes that what is thought to be known is actually known, but because knowledge implies truth, and because what was thought to be known was disproven, then it's not the case it was ever actually known to begin with.

Yes, people sometimes forget that thinking one knows, or claiming that one knows, is very different from actually knowing. Perhaps because they believe that knowledge is a mental state, and so whether or not one knows can be detected by introspection. That also is why some have held that when one knows, one knows one knows.

So knowing is independent of one's mental state? This seems much better than relying solely on mental states.

So knowing is independent of one's mental state? This seems much better than relying solely on mental states.

I did not say that. Believing is a mental state, and knowing implies believing, therefore, knowing is not independent of one's mental state. However, knowing does not depend on one's mental state. One cannot determine whether one knows simply by looking a one's mental state, although one can determine whether one believes one knows by looking at one's mental state. Sometimes, people confuse believing that one knows with actually knowing.

Ok I see. I was just making sure. Thanks for clearing that up.

Good. I hope your questions have been answered. I am sure you understand that it is not as if philosophers have not asked and thought about these questions. They have, and I have given you the best available answers. I think they are correct answers to your questions. There are some people who believe that philosophical questions are questions that cannot be answered. They are, of course, wrong. They think that just because they cannot answer them, that they cannot be answered. Which I think you will agree is pretty silly of them. On top of that, they think up all kinds of bogus reasons to explain why philosophical questions cannot be answered. They then typically change the subject and tell you what they think some philosopher would say, not particularly on the issue, but what happens to occur to them. And so, the thread is derailed, and a lot of irrelevant nonsense is spouted. That is why many threads get nowhere, and turn into bull-sessions.

Philosophical questions better have answers, otherwise its irrelevant to ask them. What would be the point to even ask the question if it cant be answered? Probably to simply confuse other people I suppose.

That's a good point. But there are people on this forum and elsewhere who delight in thinking that philosophical questions do not have answers, and sometimes, definite answers. They think (for some reason) that makes philosophy exciting, or some trash like that. Actually, I suspect that they are doing a CMA.