1. At what point does one stop believing and simply knows?
2. I believe that 2+2=4, but that does not mean that there is any truth to it. I am simply asserting a belief.
3. Does truth come by degree? No. Suppose I tell a lie with parts in it that are true e.g., I tell you that I went to the grocery store and bought celery, when in actuality I went to a grocery store and bought carrots. It is indeed true that I went to the grocery store. There is no degree of truth in this. The part that is true is true and the other parts are otherwise (false).
4. Is a belief equivalent to an opinion? Are they equally groundless?
5. Can 2+2=4 ever be of opinion?
6. Suppose I say to you, "In my opinion 2+2=4." Is opinion used properly here?
7. But suppose I say "I know 2+2=4."? Is there ever reason for doubt? In what way can you doubt this?
8. You can doubt an opinion, but can you doubt what one knows?
9. Is it possible to doubt everything? Yes but to do so would be senseless.
10. Where there is doubt, there is an answer. But at what point is it legitimate to doubt?
11. Say that I tell you "I know God exists."? Certainly there is room to doubt this from the standpoint of the person listening. Suppose the listener replies with. "I know God does not exist."? Is this based solely on his doubt or upon knowing?
12. What if a third listener was to say, "You cannot know either one."? Would that not cast all parties into doubt or just the first two?
13. There is a point where a person that knows something becomes certain of it, but that point is not the same for all.
14. Suppose that I met a man who only said that he believes but does not know? Would I then be able to doubt everything he said?
15. Math is a subject that is hard to doubt, even on a philosophical scale.
16. I know that someone has been to the moon, but on what grounds? From what other people have told me and upon what textbooks and videos have shown me. But there are those that doubt this; they even say that everything presented in textbooks and videos that have been shown to me are mere fabrications. Who is right in their knowing? Better still: have they given me sufficient room to doubt?
17. Coming back to the man who only said that he believes but does not know? Would his believing not be equivalent to our knowing?
18. Here we see that language plays an important part in our understanding of knowing, believing, and certainty.
19. Say I show to you a modus ponens proof, e.g., p->q/p//q. Can you doubt the logic itself or the intent behind it?
20. Can someone doubt logical and mathematical form? Certainly. But if there is no answer to his doubt then what is the point in doubting?

Would you please prune this list of questions down to just the most important? It is too large to answer.

To 1, for instance, I would say there is no point at which one stops believing, and starts knowing, since knowing implies believing. At one time I believed that Quito was the capital of Ecuador. But then, I looked it up in the Encyclopedia, and found out it was, indeed, the capital of Ecuador. So then, I knew it was. But when I knew it was, I did not stop believing it was. I continued to believe it was. Maybe you want to ask a different question. Maybe you want to ask the question, when do you stop only believing, and beginning to know? That, of course, is a different question.

1. At what point does one stop believing and simply knows?

In my opinion, it's all a matter of terminology. We could quantify it, and ask a person to rate their certainty between 1 and 10. But this is still just a moment's self-consciousness.

15. Math is a subject that is hard to doubt, even on a philosophical scale.

And I am guessing that a 10 on the quantified scale would be Absolute Knowing? Or am I mistaken?

18. Here we see that language plays an important part in our understanding of knowing, believing, and certainty.

For the most part, I agree. But there are some weak spots here and there. What is math based on? IMO, it is founded on certain intuitions, and particular upon the simple notion of unified quantity, and the core of this is singularity. Without this, all concept of ratio would be impossible. Now where does this come from? I think it's transcendental.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:24 PM ----------



You could use 10 or 1, depending if you were "measuring" doubt or certainty. But in essence, yes.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:25 PM ----------


I think this is an understatement, even. What could understanding be, if it were not lingual? I include mathematics as a sort of rarefied logos, fit to deal with quantity rather than qualia.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:27 PM ----------

I like "Notion qua Notion." For me, that's a key concept.....the concept of concept...

But what does it mean to/for you? I'm curious.

I suppose I couldve gone from 10 to 1 with 1 being the unity. Im just curious as to what you mean when you speak of mathematics at its root being the simple notion of the unified quantity. Is this Hegelian? I would agree that mathematics is transcendental, but it also must be grounded in experience (it cannot simply be a thought form).

Being, as Being, is nothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which, also taken immediately, is Nothing. After all, the point is that Being is the pure Thought; whatever else you may begin with (the I = I, the absolute indifference, or God himself), you begin with a figure of materialised conception, not a product of thought; and that, so far as its thought-content is concerned, such beginning is merely Being.

I would agree that mathematics is transcendental, but it also must be grounded in experience (it cannot simply be a thought form).

Language plays an incredible part, in fact the most vital part, of our understanding. It forms our picture of the world.

I think if we look at the core of Hegel's logic, we find it there...but this is matter of interpretation. So, I reference Hegel to confess my influences, but I suppose I should stress that ultimately I'm presenting ideas I have elaborated from such influences. Here's Hegel, though:

He's wrestling, in my view, with something similar to Heidegger's Being. Pure and empty conception is equivalent to nothing. You remember that Heidegger eventually started crossing out the word Being, as this word was just a being and not Being.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:43 PM ----------


I agree that we would have to learn the language of math within time (from experience), and we would need time also to abstract rarefied concepts like numbers. I would also argue that math is great exactly because it is so abstract. It's about as divorced as form can be from contingent experience.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:43 PM ----------


Agreed. I think you and I have similar influences/attitudes.

The questions and statements posted above are questions that I have been asking myself for a while and simply wanted to begin a conversation with; you could have picked any one of these to start a dialogue. Do you think that Knowing is simply a stronger form of believing and that it subsumes belief?

Notion qua Notion means for me exactly what it means for Hegel: the concept as concept. Notion in-and-for-itself.

In my opinion, it's all a matter of terminology. We could quantify it, and ask a person to rate their certainty between 1 and 10. But this is still just a moment's self-consciousness.

And this is what Kant points out in his Critique: All empty thoughts mean nothing. This is seen particularly in the latter part of the Critique dealing with reason (and in particular with God). Math is incredibly abstract and I would also agree that it is as abstract as it will ever get for human beings. Language can run along similar lines too: Language involves both experience and logic. But where to draw the lines in language is difficult.

What nonsense!............

Haha I agree with you. If Hegel has done anything for me it is simply to understand Kant and concept better. I wouldnt view Hegel's philosophy as anything but pseudo-scientific (much like the phenomenology of the day).

Haha I agree with you. If Hegel has done anything for me it is simply to understand Kant and concept better. I wouldnt view Hegel's philosophy as anything but pseudo-scientific (much like the phenomenology of the day).

(much like the phenomenology of the day).

Ah but Kant is just as riddled with obsolete notions. Both men were geniuses, and both men made mistakes. Ken likes neither, and has probably hardly examined either.
The noumena is arguably an absurd concept, and Fichte and Hegel saw this. It makes sense at first, but upon careful reflection it's a paradox.

Do you mean phrenology?

None of this has anything to do with the question you asked. Wander, wander. Why not stick to the issue?

And its one that Wittgenstein implements effortlessly in his TLP (that is Noumena or the thing-that-is-thought).

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 09:00 PM ----------



No I mean the phenomenology of our day.

[INDENT] "Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge".[23]
[/INDENT] [INDENT] "What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something".[24]