Absolute Truth is Unobtainable

@JeffD2,

Okay. But that's a big 'if'.

What if there is no change, only the perception of change? Zeno arguments against change are strong ones. To me it seems that the idea of change is dependent on a particular notion of time, and also of some essence underlying the (changeable) attributes of an entity. Both are paradoxical concepts. Our usual idea of change is a non-starter in metaphysics. It seems implausible that a paradoxical concept can be an existential constant. I'm with Parmenides on this one.

@Fido,

Fido;71021 wrote:

Uhhh... A certain branch of Philosophy having to do with knowledge, and how we know what we think we know... How is that for a hint???

---------- Post added at 08:55 AM ---------- Previous post was at 07:11 AM ----------

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Well, that is what I thought it would be about, and it should be about. But it does not at all seem to be about epistemology, or anything else, so that is why I asked.

@kennethamy,

Fido: What is your definition of a conceptual manifold? As far as I can tell, it is not a standard term so I assume that either you made it up or you found it in some esoteric source.

As far as I can tell, the only possible coherent meanings that 'conceptual manifold' could have are 'a set of conceptual attributes that form a whole concept' or 'a mental picture/visualization', I don't know if you mean either of these things.

Also, do you not consider visualization though? It is not the same sort of thought that takes place when you are deducing a logical pattern, but it is a thought process is it not?

@JeffD2,

goapy wrote:

The tense implies that we both had knowledge at that time - and - were wrong at the very same time. My question is; what are you saying we were wrong about?

That is exactly what it implies. Because, as noted, "knowledge" is relative.

Quote:

I'm thinking that you don't mean that we were wrong about having knowledge, but rather that we were wrong about Mars being made of rock. Is this correct?

We believed it to be knowledge. Scientific knowledge, to be exact. Since I haven't received a satisfying disctinction between A.) What we believe we know, and B.) What we know, I've come to conclude A=B. I believe I could be wrong, which is why I am continuing.

Quote:

Or, perhaps you do mean that we had knowledge and that we were wrong that we had knowledge?

We held knowledge which happened to be wrong.

Quote:

Whichever it is, it seems that there must be a better way to say it.

I'm confident there is a better way to say it, but I haven't found it yet. Perhaps you can help?

kennethamy wrote:

"We believed we knew that Mars was made of rock, and we were wrong". We can believe we know things, just as we can believe anything else, and be mistaken.

And since you have to believe to know, why does it not follow then that we can also be mistaken about things we know?

---------- Post added at 05:13 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:20 PM ----------

ABC wrote:

I agree with that. But the claim that we hold knowledge at time t should be subject to possible (though very unlikely) revision in the light of new knowledge

Well, those who are made aware of the new information can surely say, "Well, those people with the old information surely didn't know!". This I find to be misleading because "truth" is contextual, and as noted, relative.

Quote:

I am happy to use "know" in a loose sense, so that at time t I can say both (a) "The vase is on the table" and (b) "I know the vase is on the table", even though I am not 100% certain. Thus the word "know" does have a practical use - please note that.

I will note that. This is how I use "know" (when I do use it).

Quote:

But later information may show that the vase was not on the table at time t, meaning that statement (a) was factually wrong. Do you agree with that?

How does placing me in a position where I'd have to agree with that help us?

All facts are true.
'The vase is not on the table' is false.
'The vase is not on the table' is not a fact.

I must conclude that it is factually wrong. So what? The argument is valid, but its soundness is certainly up for argument.

Quote:

Well, if so, you would surely not conclude that it is impossible to claim anything about the vase's location. So if (as I argue) the falsity of (a) automatically makes (b) false also, why should it follow that we can never claim knowledge?

I never claimed that no one should claim knowledge. It simply seemed like a logical alternative given the "Truth" condition I was tossed.

The crux of the problem is thus: As there is no "objective evaluation" (please excuse me, this is the best way I can articulate the idea), what we believe/know is what we know. There are exceptions, particularly with fixed formal logic systems, discussed earlier. These can give us an objective "what is". This "what is" gives us what we refer to as "truth". Without a fixed system, we are left with a muddy five-letter word, which anyone can squabble over. Correct me if I'm wrong.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;71172 wrote:

And since you have to believe to know, why does it not follow then that we can also be mistaken about things we know?

---------- Post added at 05:13 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:20 PM ----------

Well, those who are made aware of the new information can surely say, "Well, those people with the old information surely didn't know!". This I find to be misleading because "truth" is contextual, and as noted, relative.

.

Of course we could be mistaken about things we know. But then, of course, we would not know them. I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. But if it had been true that 10 minutes ago the capital had been switched by an act of the Ecuadorean legislature (if that is how they can do it) then I would be wrong. So, that could (unlikely, but could) have happened. But if it did not happen, as I strongly believe it did not, then Quito is the capital of Ecuador although it might not be. So, although I could be mistaken, since I am not, I know that Quito is the capital. The central point to keep in mind is not to confuse the possibility of being mistaken with the actuality of being mistaken.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;71172 wrote:

The crux of the problem is thus: As there is no "objective evaluation" (please excuse me, this is the best way I can articulate the idea), what we believe/know is what we know. There are exceptions, particularly with fixed formal logic systems, discussed earlier. These can give us an objective "what is". This "what is" gives us what we refer to as "truth". Without a fixed system, we are left with a muddy five-letter word, which anyone can squabble over. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Some people can strongly believe things on little or no evidence. Suppose someone is utterly convinced that the Earth is only 6,000 years old. They think they have ample justification for this view, whereas we think they have none. Must we say that they know it is true, but that we know it is false? What determines whether we attribute to a person (a) non-objective knowledge or (b) mere belief - is it the observed strength of the person's belief, or the observed strength of their evidence?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

The central point to keep in mind is not to confuse the possibility of being mistaken with the actuality of being mistaken.

Not all cases have a referent "truth". That is, "actuality" is contextual; this is the central point I believe we should keep in mind.

An example where referent truth is present:
The capital legislation is exactly what I was referring to in my above post when I mentioned fixed logical systems that define "truth". In the legislation case, we have a record kept that is defined as "truth". Any schmuck with a 2 dollar city map can claim the capital of Ecuador is "Jinglefuck", but he would be wrong as the recorded "truth" of "Quito" is intersubjectively agreed upon. Intersubjective agreement is imperative in this case.

An example where referent truth is not present:
If my wife removed the vase 178 times during her cleaning process, she, in all practicality, wouldn't have kept a record. At work, despite this, I would say I know the vase is on the table. This means that even if my boss asked me at 3:34 if the vase was on the table, and I said "Yes, I know the vase is on the table", without knowing the vase wasn't going to be replaced on the table until 3:35, I would still be content with saying "I know...". This is because for all practical purposes the "know" in this context is a form of probability. The "truth" here is dynamic by it's very nature.

An example where referent truth is present, but "knowledge" is questionable:
A great majority of things we regard as scientific knowledge. The example I gave with Mars may sound farfetched, but I'm confident instances like these have occurred in the past. Particularly, as I noted, the "squaring the circle" problem. But, just to throw the example out there again: If scientists, through our current methods, deem Mars to be made of rock, can we not say this is scientific knowledge? Surely it would have to be intersubjectively agreed upon by scientists. Science is a method, so we do, by definition, have something to reference "truth" by - to a probability. If we regard Mars being made of rock as scientific knowledge, and then the human species discovers Mars is made of playdo 500 years from now, what then? Here we have "knowledge" being questioned and a referent truth present; we have what we at least think to be actuality.

So, when we just say, "Knowledge is JTB (Justified True Belief)", what are we actually saying? Is "truth" being considered from differing contexts?

ABC wrote:

Some people can strongly believe things on little or no evidence. Suppose someone is utterly convinced that the Earth is only 6,000 years old. They think they have ample justification for this view, whereas we think they have none. Must we say that they know it is true, but that we know it is false? What determines whether we attribute to a person (a) non-objective knowledge or (b) mere belief - is it the observed strength of the person's belief, or the observed strength of their evidence?

ABC, please read above as this will also help our conversation.

To answer you, though: The case you brought up would be decided on intersubjective agreement. "Truth", in this case, does have a reference (see my last example), and those who work with the method (whatever science-related field) would come to a conclusion. The conclusion with the most authority we would deem scientific "knowledge".

That person, though, through his own methods (likely to be scientific in nature) has the potential to prove the earth is 6,000 years old. It's possible(not likely) that he could undermine all the research we've done on the aging of this planet and present a new case. If that case became popularized enough, we could deem that "knowledge". Hasn't this how things have always worked?

Besides the innerworkings of one's mind, if one mutters "knowledge", there is justification needed. So, belief, of course, isn't the only necessity. But, keeping in mind, that truth is muddy without clarification.

@ACB,

ACB;71218 wrote:

Some people can strongly believe things on little or no evidence. Suppose someone is utterly convinced that the Earth is only 6,000 years old. They think they have ample justification for this view, whereas we think they have none. Must we say that they know it is true, but that we know it is false? What determines whether we attribute to a person (a) non-objective knowledge or (b) mere belief - is it the observed strength of the person's belief, or the observed strength of their evidence?

What is "non-objective knowledge"? It certainly is not possible for someone to know that p is true, and someone else to know that p is false. For that would imply that p was both true and was false. And that is a contradiction. And, what implies a contradiction is, itself, a contradiction.

I don't know what it is you mean by "ample justification", but certainly one can have justification for a proposition that is false.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;71227 wrote:

What is "non-objective knowledge"?

See the final paragraph of Zetherin's post #104 above.

Quote:

It certainly is not possible for someone to know that p is true, and someone else to know that p is false. For that would imply that p was both true and was false. And that is a contradiction. And, what implies a contradiction is, itself, a contradiction.

I agree.

@Zetetic11235,

Zetetic11235;71171 wrote:

Fido: What is your definition of a conceptual manifold? As far as I can tell, it is not a standard term so I assume that either you made it up or you found it in some esoteric source.

As far as I can tell, the only possible coherent meanings that 'conceptual manifold' could have are 'a set of conceptual attributes that form a whole concept' or 'a mental picture/visualization', I don't know if you mean either of these things.

Also, do you not consider visualization though? It is not the same sort of thought that takes place when you are deducing a logical pattern, but it is a thought process is it not?

I came across the term reading about Kant... Some things like government or society are not simple forms which the dictionary is full of, but are great combinations of forms, and as always, I will add: forms of relationship...

@JeffD2,

My view would be that if you know something then you know you cannot be wrong. It simply wouldn't be possible to know something that might not be true. There could be no possibility of error.

@Whoever,

Whoever;71340 wrote:

My view would be that if you know something then you know you cannot be wrong. It simply wouldn't be possible to know something that might not be true. There could be no possibility of error.

You are right. If you know something then you cannot be wrong. But that, of course, does not mean that if you know something that you could not be wrong, and that being wrong is impossible. And we should not confuse those two different claims.

For instance, if you know the Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then, of course, you cannot be wrong, since if you were wrong, you would not know it in the first place. (I think you agree with that).

But that does not mean the if you know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, that you could not, or it would be impossible for you to be, wrong. For instance, if the capital had somehow been switched five minutes ago (and the news had not reached you yet) then you would have been wrong, and you would not know what you think you know. But, of course, that the capital could have been switched five minutes ago does not in the least mean that it was switched five minutes ago, nor that we have any reason to think that it was switched five minutes ago, so, in that case, although you could be wrong, you are not wrong, and therefore, you know that Quito is the capital.

Think of the difference in meaning between the following two sentences:

A. It is possible that if you know that P, that P is wrong.
B. If you know that P, then it is possible that P is wrong.

Notice where the word, "possible" is placed, where in A, the scope of "possible" is over the whole sentence, but in B, the scope is only over the last part (the consequent) of the conditional that is the sentence.

A is true, but B is false.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;71365 wrote:

Think of the difference in meaning between the following two sentences:

A. It is possible that if you know that P, that P is wrong.
B. If you know that P, then it is possible that P is wrong.

Notice where the word, "possible" is placed, where in A, the scope of "possible" is over the whole sentence, but in B, the scope is only over the last part (the consequent) of the conditional that is the sentence.

A is true, but B is false.

I'm not very convinced of these two sentences...

For me: If you know P, it is impossible that P is wrong.

But perhaps I don't have understand what you want to say...

@Dearhtead,

Dearhtead;71386 wrote:

I'm not very convinced of these two sentences...

For me: If you know P, it is impossible that P is wrong.

But perhaps I don't have understand what you want to say...

It is true that it is impossible that you should know that p, and p be wrong.
But it not true that if you know that p then it is impossible that p is wrong.

The latter sentence would imply that you can know only necessary truths, and that is false. After all, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and that is not a necessary truth.

It is possible that Quito is not the capital of Ecuador. But since I know it is the capital of Ecuador, it is the capital of Ecuador, because if it were not, I would not know it was.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;71365 wrote:

You are right. If you know something then you cannot be wrong. But that, of course, does not mean that if you know something that you could not be wrong, and that being wrong is impossible.

But it means exactly this. If I know I might be wrong then obviously I don't know I'm right. If I know then I cannot be wrong and I could not be wrong.

Quote:

For instance, if you know the Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then, of course, you cannot be wrong, since if you were wrong, you would not know it in the first place. (I think you agree with that).

As you say, I could be wrong. Perhaps they've just changed it.

Quote:

Think of the difference in meaning between the following two sentences:

A. It is possible that if you know that P, that P is wrong.
B. If you know that P, then it is possible that P is wrong.

Both of these propositions define knowledge as something we don't know. I can't see the point of this prevarication. My definition would state that if you know P, then you know that you are not wrong.

@Whoever,

Whoever;71450 wrote:

But it means exactly this. If I know I might be wrong then obviously I don't know I'm right. If I know then I cannot be wrong and I could not be wrong.

As you say, I could be wrong. Perhaps they've just changed it.

Both of these propositions define knowledge as something we don't know. I can't see the point of this prevarication. My definition would state that if you know P, then you know that you are not wrong.

I don't see why you say that both these propositions define "knowledge" as something I don't know. I have already said that ir I know that p is true, then p is true. I cannot know that p is true unless p is true. I think you would have to say why you say this.
I know I might be wrong that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. But that does not mean that I know I am wrong, nor even that I am wrong. I don't see any reason for thinking that unless I know it is impossible that I am wrong, that I do not know I am not wrong, for I can certainly know it is not impossible that I am wrong, but yet know I am not wrong. It is not impossible that I am wrong in thinking that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but that does not mean that I am wrong, not that I do not know that I am right.
I think that you are confusing knowing with being absolutely certain. Why cannot I be right, and therefore know, even if I realize that it is not impossible that I am wrong? So I can know I am right without being certain that I am right. I can conceive that I might not exist, but how would that mean that I do not know I do exist?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;71457 wrote:

I can certainly know it is not impossible that I am wrong, but yet know I am not wrong.

This looks like a contradiction to me. Unless, of course, the statement "I know at time t that I am not wrong" can be repudiated if Quito later turns out not to have been the capital at time t. But then we would have the following contradiction:

(a) "I know at time t that I am not wrong" is true at time t;

(b) "I knew at time t that I was not wrong" is false at a later time.

Quote:

I can conceive that I might not exist, but how would that mean that I do not know I do exist?

It depends what you mean by 'might not exist'. If you mean 'might not have existed now if events had been different', then yes, you can conceive it, but you acknowledge it as counterfactual. If, however, you mean 'may not actually exist', then no, you cannot conceive it, since you know with absolute certainty that you exist (as Descartes pointed out).

@ACB,

ACB;71503 wrote:

This looks like a contradiction to me. Unless, of course, the statement "I know at time t that I am not wrong" can be repudiated if Quito later turns out not to have been the capital at time t. But then we would have the following contradiction:

(a) "I know at time t that I am not wrong" is true at time t;

(b) "I knew at time t that I was not wrong" is false at a later time.

It depends what you mean by 'might not exist'. If you mean 'might not have existed now if events had been different', then yes, you can conceive it, but you acknowledge it as counterfactual. If, however, you mean 'may not actually exist', then no, you cannot conceive it, since you know with absolute certainty that you exist (as Descartes pointed out).

But I would have thought that my example would have cleared all this up. If my belief that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is fully justified, and if it is true that Quito is the capital, then I know it is the capital. But might it not be true that during the night, unknown to anyone, the capital was changed to Guyaqull (the second city of Ecuador)? That is certainly possible is it not. But do you think that because that was possible, I don't know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? If the conditions of knowing are satisfied, why should it be that because it is possible that they are not satisfied, that I do not know? And here is an anlogy: My king is in check, and I have no legal move. So, it follow that I have been checkmated. Isn't that true. Of course, it is possible (since I am a human being) that I am mistaken, and that I am not checkmated. But what difference would that make. Could I plead to a referee that even if I satisfy the conditions of being checkmated, since it is possible that I am not checkmated, that I am not, in fact, checkmated? Of course not. The possiblity of error is not the same as the actuality of error, and the possibility of error does not argue for the inactuality of truth. If I know that p, then I am not mistaken. But why can I not know that p, and it be possible that I am mistaken? No reason that I can see. Indeed, it happens everyday. As I pointed out, if I could not know that p, if it were possible that p was false, the consequence would be that I could know only necessary truths. Do you believe that I can know only necessary truths? If you do, then you cannot know that you were born, or that you had parents, for neither of those truths is a necessary truth. The crux of the matter is that knowledge does not imply certainty. You know only if you are not mistaken; but you are certain only if it is impossible that you should be mistaken. We often know, but we are seldom, if ever, certain. By the way, I think that perhaps one of the things that is meant by "absolute truth" is certainty, so that in one of its senses, it is true that absolute truth is unattainable (or nearly so, anyway).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;71514 wrote:

If the conditions of knowing are satisfied, why should it be that because it is possible that they are not satisfied, that I do not know?

Before I go any further, can you please clarify one point, because the above sentence does not make any sense to me. Are you saying that p is logically consistent with it is possible that not-p?

@ACB,

ACB;71532 wrote:

Before I go any further, can you please clarify one point, because the above sentence does not make any sense to me. Are you saying that p is logically consistent with it is possible that not-p?

My checkmate example should have clarified what I meant. If I satisfy the conditions of being checkmated (king in check, no legal move), then why should the possibility of those conditions not being satisfied matter? Or do you want to say that if I am in checkmate it is not possible for me not to be in checkmate? That is truly implausible, since, to begin with, I am in checkmate is not a necessary truth, so its negation is possible; and second, all my evidence that I am in checkmate is inductive evidence, and so, it is possible for my evidence to be what it is, and for my conclusion from the evidence (that I am checkmated) be false. Thus, it is possible in two ways that I am in checkmate, but that I am not in checkmate. Don't you agree?

In just the same way, I may know that p is true, but, it nevertheless be possible for p to be false. Just as long, of course, as p is not false. You agree, don't you that it is possible for p to be false, and, yet, p be true, don't you? So, it is hard for me to see what your objection is.

Of course, I am not saying that it is possible that p and ~p are consistent. But I am saying that p, and it possible ~p, are consistent.

There is all the difference in the world between, possible p and ~p, and p and possible ~p. In the first, the scope of "possible" ranges over the entire sentence; in the second, the scope of "possible" ranges over only ~p. Thus the first is false, the second is true. Thinking that the first and the second are the same is to commit a modal fallacy. It is to switch the scope of the possibility operator without any reason.

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