As you know, from our lengthy debate in another thread, my biggest problem with a definition of knowledge as JTB would be with the notion of "true" but that is, I think, a distraction from what we are trying to focus on here, which, I think, is the nature of believing. Let me try this:

Do we all agree that "believe" (in the context of a belief that does not qualify as knowledge) means, "give full or partial mental assent to"? If so, then it seems that a necessary condition for any person's justified belief would be that person's awareness of evidence that in that person's mind supports the belief.

So, any given justified belief that nevertheless fails to qualify as knowledge would seem to fall, possibly, into one of three categories: (a) is demonstrably false, (b) cannot be proven to be either true or false, or, (c) is hampered by doubt in the mind of the believer.

It seems to me that any assent is "mental assent". Perhaps it just means the same thing, but I would say that to believe some proposition is to accept that proposition as true. (Another definition, due I think to Peirce, is "be willing to use that proposition as a premise").

It seems to me that if a person claims to know that p, then he should be prepared to present a justification for p. But that doesn't mean that if someone knows that p, he must be prepared to present a justification for p. We often know some proposition, p, when we don't know how we know it. I don't know how I know what my name is, but I do know what my name is because I am in a position to know what it is. Who better than I?

It seems to me that that I can know that p, but not be able to prove that p is true or false. For example, at the moment, that it is impossible to square a circle.
I don't see how someone can both believe that p, and also doubt that p, so I am confused by, is hampered by doubt in the mind of the believer.

It seems to me that that I can know that p, but not be able to prove that p is true or false. For example, at the moment, that it is impossible to square a circle.

A Gettier-case usually has a quirky distinguishing mark. Something awkward and clever to it that makes you question its authenticity for some immediately can't-put-your-finger-on-it reason.

1 So, you know Bill is in the house based on evidence of seeing his twin, but it turns out Bill actually is in the house.

2 Or it's raining outside, but a movie director has covered your apartment building with a dome that blocks the real rain. Nevertheless, the movie scene the film crew is working on calls for rain and they produce artificial rain, which is your evidence for saying "I know it is raining!"

3 Or Jones knows (a) the man who has ten coins in his pocket will get the job but he obviously didn't believe that he'd get the job while never the less (a) is true, Jones believed it, and he was justified in believing it. But after he gets the job and utters it, you certainly would call it dumb luck or accidental knowledge.

4 Or Jones sees Bill driving a Ford, but it turns out that Ford is a rental. And Brown just so happens to be in Barcelona.

You'll notice that Gettier-type cases are set up in strange ways. Your light switch case doesn't have that distinguishing mark that even makes it feel like a Gettier-type case. All you've said is that the light switch works for one and does not work for the other. That's not Gettier-esque.

---------- Post added at 08:22 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:05 AM ----------



It's not that one must go through the act of presenting justification. If that we the case, we'd systematically never know things.

The justification condition holds that justification is possible and that justification is at least had.

You're able to justify that your name is so-and-so because people tell you that it is, you've got a history of using it, etc. You don't know because you're "in a position," which is likely too vague philosophically for us anyway. This intuitive nudge-nudge "who better than I?" business is not philosophically palatable.

Furthermore, let's not just say that we're talking about propositional knowledge while confusing ourselves with knowledge-how issues.

I've already stated that we're not concerned with knowledge-how because propositional knowledge does not come into our conception of knowledge-how. As said, I might be able to know how to ride a bike without knowing that any proposition regarding riding bicycles. We're concerned with episteme not techne.

And look, we need to really stay rigorous with our terms and their meaning:



If you do know that p, then it is implied that p is true. Thus, you would not be possible to show that it is false because knowing it implies that it is true.

S knows p only if p is true. Knowing it implies its true. Proving it to be false if you know it is true is just a self-defeating activity. Of course you cannot prove it to be false! Because you know it's true! Knowing it seems to imply that you've already understood the proof (perhaps this falls under the belief condition).

So if you're unable to understand why it is true, then you've likely presupposed that one of the other conditions for knowledge have not been met.

And really, you need to pay close attention to the examples you're using. "I know that it is impossible to draw a squared circle" is a very strong claim. Saying "I know that X is impossible" raises the bar, so to speak, because "is impossible" usually puts someone into the realm of metaphysics or logic. You have some rough and loose way to prove that it is impossible otherwise, you've merely learned that you can use the predicate "is impossible" in this or that sentence without really understanding what it means.

It's absolutely essentially that the speaker know what his sentence means. If you don't really know what your sentence means, then you obviously cannot know it.

I was replying to "Dich" who wrote:

So, any given justified belief that nevertheless fails to qualify as knowledge would seem to fall, possibly, into one of three categories: (a) is demonstrably false, (b) cannot be proven to be either true or false, or, (c) is hampered by doubt in the mind of the believer.

So, that is why I wrote what I did about proving p is true or false when I know it. Of course, if I know that p, then I cannot prove p is false, since if p were false, I would not know that p in the first place. But I did not want to dodge the question about (b) above.

And I really do not know the proof that it is impossible to square the circle, although I know that a proof was devised in the early part of the 19th century.

I don't think that "in a position to know" is anymore vague than is "justification", and I think that both can be analyzed so as to make them more precise. For instance, I am in a position to know what my name is, because it is generally accepted that I am an authority on what my name it. And to ask, as I did, who should know better, is to ask (rhetorically, and so to say) that I am in a better position to know than anyone else.

It seems to me that I might very well not know what "E=MC2" means, but know it is true because I know that Einstein, and many other physicists I hold in high esteem, know it is true. So I know it is true on authority, although I do not understand what "E=MC2" means.

"
Citing authority is fallacy because it is not a proof at all. It's not that it's a bad proof. Appeal to authority isn't poor justification. It's fallacious because it simply is not justification.
Appeal to authority, in terms of argument, is a category mistake.

But that cannot be true. We appeal to the authority of a dictionary for the correct spelling of a word. And we appeal to the authority of a physician for a diagnosis of our illness. I don't see how it could be a category mistake to appeal to authority. Whether it is a mistake to appeal to a particular authority, a dictionary for spelling, or a physician for a diagnosis, depends on the authority.

Conventions and appeal to authority are not the same thing. But before we go any further, it must be noted that this subdiscussion is not essential to our overall project. I did say other stuff in my post. I was a fairly long one.

My argument for this claim is thus:

Premise 1: Suppose K as JTB holds.
Premise 2: S knows P.
Premise 3: Suppose S believes P.
Premise 4: Suppose S justifies P by appeal to authority.
Premise 5: Suppose P is true so far as the authority knows.
Therefore, S knows P so far as the authority knows.

If this is added explicitly to our knowledge claim, it makes that knowledge claim resemble hedging. It would be perfectly acceptable to add in "but P might be false".

If we appeal some kind of induction across all of history, we could probably add in, further, and "P is likely false because humans undermine old theories overtime, thus showing claims rooted in those theories to be false."

Saying "appeal to authority is not justification" is perfectly consistent with an ethos where the people under it accept appeal to authority by some pragmatic constraint. Obviously not everybody is an arch-skeptic. But simply because they can, to be hyperbolic, play sheep and follow along, does not somehow make appeal to authority a kind of proper justification.

And no, I'm not committing the No True Scotsman fallacy. I still maintain that no appeal to authority is justification. Surely no one would put an appeal to authority premise in an explicit deductive argument nor would anyone put such a premise, explicitly, in an inductive argument.

It's likely an implicit pragmatic presupposition within a culture; but this doesn't make it a justification for an argument. To call it that would give it and all arguments this mysterious property and potential to say "well look, X number of people do it, and this adds to its validity"; but no one does this. And to be an underpinning pragmatic constraint to a culture is not to be a justification in any common sense of the word. It's an inclination that you are more or less aware of and may feel you have to attack if you spot that one subculture's authority manifests this or that way. It's a non-linguistic thing that you have to make linguistic so that you can attack it, and make people realize that it is good or bad. A convention is different from a justification.

You don't think that "weird" is spelled that way because the Merriam-Webster says it is, is a decisive reason for believing that "weird" is spelled that way?

You're able to justify that your name is so-and-so because people tell you that it is, you've got a history of using it, etc. You don't know because you're "in a position," which is likely too vague philosophically for us anyway. This intuitive nudge-nudge "who better than I?" business is not philosophically palatable.

You don't think that "weird" is spelled that way because the Merriam-Webster says it is, is a decisive reason for believing that "weird" is spelled that way?

All that would establish is that "weird" is spelled that way according to a dictionary. Yes, of course it is true that the dictionary has that spelling because, well, the dictionary does have that spelling.

I don't see where your argument could possibly go with argument of that sort. Dictionaries are expressions of conventions. My whole point was to divorce "convention" from "justification"--so perhaps my whole point was lost.

That the dictionary has the spelling this or that way isn't a justification for it being spelled that way. Dictionaries do not justify why a word is spelled the way it is. It simply states its spelling. Again, a dictionary is a manifestation of a convention.

---------- Post added at 08:45 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:33 PM ----------

A convention is not an committee or a body of individuals come together for a conscious and explicit goal. A convention is a custom, habit, social rule, etc.

What is a consensus? Well, certainly there's no consensus in the way words are spelled. Grammarians and lexicographers map spellings to the habits of linguistic practice. At no time did a mass of people say, "Ah yes, our entire vocabulary goes thus!" Linguistic practice is not a conscious endeavor. The words in the dictionaries, though seemingly an "authority", are nothing more than scientific approximations. The spellings and definitions and grammatical categorizations in dictionaries are not mathematical truths, and you should be rightly considered foolish to even class them as such (I mean to be derisive here--I want you to be offended by what I just said, if you are).

Lexicography is a science. It employs induction. It approximates the meaning of terms found in dictionaries. Though, its tradition is very much trusted. (Consider how much we silently and blindly trust physics and engineering sciences today.)

The justification for our use of our own name needs clarification. I am perhaps unclear myself on how this phenomenum is possible. But we must address this phenomenum with the distinction between justification and convention in mind.

A justification is not a consensus. 2+2=4 is not true because many mathematicians sat down and said so. Now Wittgensteinians might disagree, along with relativists. But we should at least consider this analogy. Is mathematics nothing more than a social game? Is mathematics nothing more than "democracy" in a different context?

Understood, thanks for the clarification.

Still not clear whether anything has been established, but here are a few thoughts.

Within the class of beliefs that may be understood to be "justified" there are three distinct possibilities.

1. The justified belief is true (JTB).
2. The justified belief is false.
3. The justified belief cannot be shown to be either true or false.

A belief, it seems, is assent to a proposition. (Yes, apparently no need to say "mental" assent.

That still leaves the possibility of variation within kinds of assent (full or partial). And it still leaves the possibility of variety within the kinds of justification.

Justification would seem to be the most problematic aspect.

I don't quite understand 3. Isn't justification the way a belief is shown to be true (or if the belief is that p is false, false?) Of course, the justification may fail. But, then again, it may not fail. In the first case, the belief will not have been shown to be true (or false) although it is the one or the other. In the second case, the belief will have been shown to be true (or false). Justification is certainly problematic. But so is truth, and even belief. The question is, what are the problems, and, of course, what are the solution? It also can be true that once matters are clarified, at least some of the problems will vanish, for they were the result of confusion.

Not just according to the dictionary. The dictionary does not make up the spelling. If it said that "weird" was spelled, "wierd" it would be wrong. The dictionary reports how educated writers of the language spell the word (at the time the dictionary was published). So, you are mistaken in thinking that the dictionary (or its editors) invent the spelling of the word.

Take a look at post #152 to see how much of a clarification it is.

Sorry, quick revision here...This applies to case #2:

I thought we agreed that a belief can be justified (evidence exists, for example, and the person doing the believing is thinking logically) but the belief may in fact be false. For example, "I understand why you believe it is raining, since it is cloudy and there is water falling against the window, but, in fact, what you are seeing is just the automatic sprinkler system."

The example can be easily modified to apply to #3.

Now you're just being offensive and you're not reading, or at least reading carefully. Where did I say they invent the spelling? Induction and mapping is reporting.

Mapping is description.

Mapping to linguistic practies is inventing the spelling? Do map-makers invent the roads drawn out on their maps?

What is this? Do we need spiteful and snide remarks like this? Of course, he read that post. Of course, he found it clarify given some unclarity he felt was present in this discussion. Of course, his opinion is not your opinion.

All that would establish is that "weird" is spelled that way according to a dictionary. Yes, of course it is true that the dictionary has that spelling because, well, the dictionary does have that spelling.

Let me explain further. "Weird" is spelled that way not because the dictionary says that it is spelled that way. The dictionary does not decide how a word is spelled, and it is not up to the dictionary how the word is spelled (anymore than it is up to the dictionary how a word is used-what the word's meaning is). And that is what you have been suggesting. Rather, what is true, is that the dictionary reports or describes how the word is spelled by educated and fluent writers of English (or whatever the dictionary's language is). It does not say that the word should be spelled that way. It just reports on how the word is spelled by educated and fluent writers of the language. It is up to those who are unsure, or do not know how the word should be spelled, to decide whether to use this report on how the word is spelled as a guide to how it should be spelled. And, of course, most people use it that way. And not only that, but most people will use the dictionary's report on how the word is spelled, as authoritative on how the word is spelled, so, for instance, when there is a dispute about the spelling a a term (like "weird") someone will say, "let's go to the dictionary" and will settle the dispute on how the word is spelled in that way. The same, by the way, is true of what a word means.

The dictionary bases its report on collating many examples of how the word is spelled by fluent educated writers of the language and distilling the most common spelling by such writers. If their are alternative spellings as there might be, for instance in British English, the dictionary will report that too. The same goes for the meaning of words.

What you implied was quite different.And quite misleading too.

Let me explain further. "Weird" is spelled that way not because the dictionary says that it is spelled that way.