Skepticism and Belief

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I suppose so. But why would one question an authority who is clearly reliable without some specific reason? Would you question whether the OED was right about the spelling of "weird". Of course, if you are a fallibilist, any authority might be mistaken, in principle. But there isn't any real possibility that the OED is mistaken about spelling a common word.

No doubt there are many cases, within the realm of "every-day" life, where there is no practical or profitable reason to doubt the reliability of an authority. However, within the realm of pure philosophical analysis, I can think of two reasons why I ought always question the reliability of an authority. 1. I have witnessed multiple cases where presumably reliable authorities have turned out to be wrong. 2. I have witnessed multiple cases where two presumably equally reliable authorities profess mutually exclusive claims.

@nerdfiles,

Good analysis, guys.

Alright, let's get back on track. Please refer to post #189:

Is sensory perception (to any extent, and even if it's deceiving) a condition for believing?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Good analysis, guys.

Alright, let's get back on track. Please refer to post #189:

Is sensory perception (to any extent, and even if it's deceiving) a condition for believing?

A causal condition, or a justification condition (reason)? In both cases, yes. In the latter case, of course, whether it is a good justificatory condition (reason) would depend on the perception.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

A causal condition, or a justification condition (reason)? In both cases, yes. In the latter case, of course, whether it is a good justificatory condition (reason) would depend on the perception.

Are there any causal conditions which do not spawn from perception? P believes Q because P critically thought of Q (with no perception factor). That is, no sensory perception played a role in the formation of this belief - it was simply thunk. Is this possible?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Good analysis, guys.

Alright, let's get back on track. Please refer to post #189:

Is sensory perception (to any extent, and even if it's deceiving) a condition for believing?

It may be a cause or a justification, but it is neither a sufficient or necessary condition for believing.

@Mr Fight the Power,

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

It may be a cause or a justification, but it is neither a sufficient or necessary condition for believing.

So then refer to my last post, and give me an example where sensory perception is not necessary for believing. Thanks.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

So then refer to my last post, and give me an example where sensory perception is not necessary for believing. Thanks.

I believe that if I have two of an object and add two more, I will have four of that object.

@nerdfiles,

kennethamy wrote:

A causal condition, or a justification condition (reason)? In both cases, yes. In the latter case, of course, whether it is a good justificatory condition (reason) would depend on the perception.

Mr. FTP gave a great example in regards to how one could have a justification (reason) for believing without sensory perception:

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

I believe that if I have two of an object and add two more, I will have four of that object.

And as nerdfiles notes:

nerdfiles wrote:

When a maths student is asked to justify why 3x^2+x yields the result that it does, she does not cite her reason for believing it. She provides justification or evidence for why she thinks it is true, or might be true. At this point, the justification becomes external, judged as sufficient or insufficient with respect to a standard (say, the justificatory procedure and system of derivation calculus).

Mr. FTP's belief that adding two to two and achieving four can be justified with mathematical conceptual analysis. Therefore we can conclude whether a justification exists and whether the justification is sufficient or insufficient does not depend on sensory perception (I think we should stray from "good" and "bad", as this will be misleading - either it's sufficient or it's insufficient). Sensory perception, as Mr. FTP notes, can be a cause or justification, but it need not be. It's not a necessary condition here, as illustrated by his example.

I'd like to now go back to the "thinkability" condition proposed earlier by nerdfiles:

nerdfiles wrote:

One idea I have for a necessary condition for belief is that the content of that belief ("the proposition") be thinkable (as opposed to, say, "X thinks that P"--thinkable seems to presuppose vaguely a normative constraint).
Thus, we cannot believe contradictions.

So, S believes that P only if "P" is thinkable; by contraposition: If P is not thinkable, then S does not believe that P.

We've come back to this, but in the end, I don't find it telling us much. "Thinkable belief" seems like a tautology; I don't see how this is enlightening in the least.

Anyone want to take the reins - where do we go from here?

@nerdfiles,

To return to a tangent that was started a few days ago, I would like to ask if external validation is necessary for justification.

Is one justified in claiming knowledge if said knowledge arises solely from his subjective experience? If I am a scientist and I conclude that I have observed some chemical displaying some property, does this satisfy the justification criteria for knowledge, or must I seek external corroboration?

If I must, in fact, get repeatable results from independent and external sources, how does this relate to your opinion on appeals to authority?

If the retelling of the experiences of another lend to my ability to claim "knowledge" when it comes to repeated experimentation, why does it bear none when one has not performed the experiment themselves?

Can I accept scientific consensus as basis for a knowledge claim, and if I can't, can anyone?

@nerdfiles,

Mr. Fight the Power wrote:

To return to a tangent that was started a few days ago, I would like to ask if external validation is necessary for justification.

By definition, I think it does:

"Thus, justification is a normative notion. The standard definition is that a concept is normative if it is a concept regarding or depending on the norms, or obligations and permissions (very broadly construed), involved in human conduct. It is generally accepted that the concept of justification is normative, because it is defined as a concept regarding the norms of belief."
-wikipedia

Normative implies a social context, lest there be no comparison (no ideal model for comparison). If no one was around to validate (or not validate), there would be no need to justify anything, would there?

Quote:

Is one justified in claiming knowledge if said knowledge arises solely from his subjective experience? If I am a scientist and I conclude that I have observed some chemical displaying some property, does this satisfy the justification criteria for knowledge, or must I seek external corroboration?

You must seek external corroboration. Your justification will be evaluated, and it will be regarded as either sufficient or insufficient. If it's regarded sufficient, and I'm not familiar with the actual standards, I'd presume more scientific research (probably replicating your personal experiments) would be done to verify. If enough verification (based on the standards) presents itself, I believe one could call that knowledge. It must be justified, true, and believed (JTB) [Was that Plato?]. But, again, as mentioned earlier, many others speak of "knowledge" differently. Nameless, for instance, doesn't even regard "knowledge" to be true - it's contextual and tentative. This question can only be answered after defining "knowledge".

Quote:

Can I accept scientific consensus as basis for a knowledge claim, and if I can't, can anyone?

Can you accept? What do you mean - is there something holding you back from accepting?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

No doubt there are many cases, within the realm of "every-day" life, where there is no practical or profitable reason to doubt the reliability of an authority. However, within the realm of pure philosophical analysis, I can think of two reasons why I ought always question the reliability of an authority. 1. I have witnessed multiple cases where presumably reliable authorities have turned out to be wrong. 2. I have witnessed multiple cases where two presumably equally reliable authorities profess mutually exclusive claims.

But that absolute certainty is unattainable does not mean that doubt is justified.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But that absolute certainty is unattainable does not mean that doubt is justified.

What is "absolute certainty"? Do you mean "objective truth or knowledge"? I think I know what you mean when you say it's unattainable, yet I can't really grasp what it is that's unattainable. It seems as though it's some sort of abstract notion we can work towards but never achieve. Doesn't a healthy dose of skepticism allow us to work towards certainty? It does for me, at least.

And I never considered doubt having to be justified. We must be justified in our skepticism? Can you elaborate on this? [Have I simply misunderstood your post?]

@Zetherin,

Well, thinkability makes us consider whether or not things like contradictions can be believed.

The thinkability is only a necessary condition. I don't think that "to believe" means just the same thing as "to think," which is what "tautology" would imply.

What can be thought? Wittgenstein, for instance, was concerned with the limits of thought, not belief.
Belief kind of hovers around "opinion."

@Zetherin,

Sorry if I have overlooked any recent posts that deal with this...Please re-direct me, if I am errant...Trying to address the primary theme of the thread.

In order for a belief to occur, a person must give assent to a proposition that is supported by justification.

The following summary is a simplified model. It does not take into account cultural and emotional variables, for example.

S. The person may be disposed toward Skepticism or its opposite, credulity.
I. The person may be exceptionally Intelligent or the opposite.
P. The Proposition may be complex or simple.
J. The Justification may be cogent or not.
A. The Assent may be strong or weak.

For the sake of examination of the model, let's express each of these variables as lying along a simplified continuum.

S. Assign "S3" to strong skepticism, "S1" to credulity, and "S2" to the middle range.
I. Assign "I3" to exceptional Intelligence, "S1" to dimwit-edness, and "I2" to average intellect.
P. Assign "P3" to a complex proposition, etc.
J. Assign "J3" to a cogent justification, etc.
A. Assign "A3" to strong assent, etc.

The point is that "belief" is a complex phenomenon that does not yield to a mathematically precise definition or analysis. Example: a person characterized as "S3" and "I3" may encounter a "P3" and, so long as the justification is "J3" may give "A3."

At the same time, a "S1/I1" may encounter the same "P3" but provided with a "J1" and also give a "A3."

Imagine a matrix that would incorporate all the possible combinations. It does not seem likely to me that any such matrix would have much predictive function (though, indeed, it may have some).

So it seems to me that that the necessary and sufficient conditions for any given "belief" are enormously varied and complex, and I see no reason to *believe* that necessary and sufficient conditions for "belief" in any generic (and thus undefined) sense of the word can be adequately summarized in any formulaic fashion.

@nerdfiles,

Oh wait, now I see... My post is gone! Hah.

---------- Post added at 11:04 PM ---------- Previous post was at 10:42 PM ----------

Well, to tell you the truth... I sort of feel like we've hit the nail on the head, but perhaps in a round-about way. Ultimately, I'm simply pleased with this thread. I realized from the start that it would be a wild one.

nerdfiles wrote:

I'm sure "thinkability" can make us consider a plethora of things, belief-driven or not. I'm not quite following how "thinkability" correlates with analyzing whether or not contradictions can be believed.

In many cases epistemologists talk about the rationality or reasonableness of belief. I think these are just flowery ways of speaking about whether some proposition is thinkable.

Using our schema, S knows that P only if S believes that P; S believes that P only if P is a thinkable proposition.

Thinkability is essentially that which could be entertained in thought. Perhaps another way to put it is that which is passes our logical test. If something does not pass a logical test, in that it is an illogical thing, then we cannot think it. For to think it would require that our thought be illogical; but how can we legitimately arrive at an illogical outcome through illogical thinking? Surely our thinking must be logical so that we can deduce that it is illogical, that particular object of thought. The object itself, however, has contours. We can say, "Yes, that is illogical, and here's the proof" but it is not something that can be entertained in thought as it is.

Perhaps another way to put it is that thinkability and conceivability amount to the same thing. So, for instance, conceive, if you can, that the your neighbor is to be wed to the number 4; or that the concept of time turns into a bowl of ice cream. These are outright abuses of categories. Category mistakes cannot be thought; but they can be pointed to (justificatory pointing), pointing in such a way as if to say, "You cannot enter! Forbidden!"

Quote:

I don't even know how to begin to answer that question.

We certainly know that analytic propositions (Bachelors are unmarried males) and synthetic (The cat is displeased) propositions can be thought. A priori (All bachelors are unmarried) and a posteriori (Four cats are on my house) objects can be known. We can claim to know contingent (I am typing right now) and necessary truths (Cats are mammals).

Quote:

Can you try to flesh out exactly what our next step should be? Actually, can you note exactly what we're even seeking? It seems we've been going post to post, discovering new insights with no proposed goal in mind (at least for a good chunk of the time), instead of going problem to post. What is our target? Are we capable of even achieving this target; have we reached our limits at this time?

Well, I've laid two necessary conditions, though they may not be sufficient. And some of you have addressed their necessity.

1. Thinkability as a necessary condition.
2. Normative constraints on belief formation.

1a. So, S believes that P only if P is thinkable.
2a. S believes that P only if S acquired the belief in an appropriate or reasonable way.

This leaves us to question "appropriate" and "reasonable." We could address these more, add to them, deny them, etc. Or we could just call this thread done, if you wish.

---------- Post added at 11:13 PM ---------- Previous post was at 10:42 PM ----------

Right. I believe I indicated this in the beginning but perhaps with not enough emphasis.

"Necessary and sufficient conditions" are about rigorous definition. I wouldn't be surprised if some epistemologist said at the outset. "You cannot do that with belief!"

Though notice that my two suggestions as necessary conditions are normative. They're not rigorous definitions. "Thinkability" has a logical underpinning, but that's it. Logic alone does not determine what is thinkable. And even then, "Don't believe contradictions!" is a normative claim. What I have tried to provide is argument for why contradictions, and things like them, cannot be entertained in thought.

The necessary condition about belief formation clearly is not rigorous. I was quite explicit and systematic in stating that this condition is normative.

So really, we're using the "necessary and sufficient condition" schema for purposes of layout. The conditions I've presented are not really conditions that appeal to obvious identification.

Though the definition of knowledge-that does employ conditions in this identifiable way. If someone believes it, she'll likely utter it or give an indication of her believing it. And we only care about that much. Justification is clearly an appeal to a standard for justifying which is authoritative and public in some sense. And truth is clearly public, though its objectivity can be questioned for any proposition. Nevertheless, it's clear or at least clearer when the conditions for knowledge are met.

It is not, and perhaps should not, be just as clear when the "conditions" for belief are.

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

2a. S believes that P only if S acquired the belief in an appropriate or reasonable way.

.

Suppose I invented a serum which, if I injected it into you, would cause you to believe that 2+2=5.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Suppose I invented a serum which, if I injected it into you, would cause you to believe that 2+2=5.

...I addressed cases like that pages ago.

Look at what I put in bold. That's the answer to your "riddle."

Putting sequences of letters and punctuation after "suppose" does not guarantee a genuine or even realistic supposition.

In order for you to "cause" such a belief, through your serum, you would have to believe that "2+2=5" is thinkable. But if you believe that it is thinkable, which it is not, to suppose that you could "cause" others to believe it, regardless of the means, would mean that it's possible, on your supposition that you could "cause" others to believe it, for you to believe it yourself. But what reason would you have to reject to such a belief for yourself? And is it a mathematical statement? What of the rest of your mathematics? How do you accomplish proofs in your system of mathematics? Etc, etc. Therein lies your answer.

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

...I addressed cases like that pages ago.

Look at what I put in bold. That's the answer to your "riddle."

Putting sequences of letters and punctuation after "suppose" does not guarantee a genuine or even realistic supposition.

In order for you to "cause" such a belief, through your serum, you would have to believe that "2+2=5" is thinkable. But if you believe that it is thinkable, which it is not, to suppose that you could "cause" others to believe it, regardless of the means, would mean that it's possible, on your supposition that you could "cause" others to believe it, for you to believe it yourself. But what reason would you have to reject to such a belief for yourself? And is it a mathematical statement? What of the rest of your mathematics? How do you accomplish proofs in your system of mathematics? Etc, etc. Therein lies your answer.

I would not have to believe 2+2=5 is "thinkable". Why on earth would I have to do that? And why would I have to believe it myself? I cannot imagine why you would say that. As I have already pointed out, Winston Smith in the novel, 1984 was frightened into believing that 2+2=5 by an agent of Big Brother. But the agent did not think that 2+2=5.

And this is not a "riddle". It is an obvious counterexample to you belief that a belief can to be caused in an appropriate, etc. way.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I would not have to believe 2+2=5 is "thinkable". Why on earth would I have to do that? And why would I have to believe it myself? I cannot imagine why you would say that. As I have already pointed out, Winston Smith in the novel, 1984 was frightened into believing that 2+2=5 by an agent of Big Brother. But the agent did not think that 2+2=5.

And this is not a "riddle". It is an obvious counterexample to you belief that a belief can to be caused in an appropriate, etc. way.

That is absolutely not a counterexample.

In order to cause the belief you would have to understand how it is to be believed by someone. Thus, you have to understand how it could be thinkable, which means you have to understand how it could be thought. Thus, it must be in principle thinkable by you yourself; but something you merely reject as false. You may be able to contrive a thought-experiment where you "inject" false beliefs (though it would still fail the "belief formation normative constraint"), but you certainly cannot inject contradictions. They're not true in any possible would. They're logically impossible. Do you understand what this means? I really want you to understand the difference between contingent falsehoods and necessary falsehoods. You seem to not grasp these concepts.

Further, simply saying "Suppose I cause you to believe 2+2=5" is not a counterexample. If you think that is a counterexample, you fundamentally misunderstand what a counterexample is.

You cannot simply assume your way out. That's question begging.

I hardly even specified what "appropriate" means. I put it in quotation marks. It's required of us to fill it in. Do you understand what "normative" means? And even then, you cannot say "oh, suppose I get around your 'appropriate' constraint" (and this is literally your argument--"suppose I'm right"). The whole point of the constraint is talk about it. I'm not really sure why you're providing counterexamples in the first place. I gave a necessary condition. Specifying a condition is not an argument. It can be viewed as irrelevant, unhelpful, too narrow, too broad, or simply false, but it cannot be countered. You give counterexamples to arguments. Do you understand what the purpose of counterexample is?

So, for instance, I'd ask: Is that a case of acquiring a belief in an appropriate and reasonable why? Most users on the forum would likely say no. Most epistemic minimalists... and many epistemologists would say No. That's an outlier or extreme case, this notion of injecting beliefs.

Coercing someone to believe something is just a matter of forcing them to look like they're believing. But all they're really doing is obeying.
And "counterexample to the claim that belief can be caused in the appropriate way"?

How is showing that belief can be caused in an "inappropriate" way, whatever that's suppose to mean (we have yet to spell out what "appropriate" means--so I'm not sure what it is you're countering or even talking about) supposed to show that belief cannot be caused in the "appropriate" way? A counterexample, were I to give an argument, would show that it is false that beliefs can be acquired in the appropriate way. Showing us that they can be acquired in inappropriate ways does not show it to be false that beliefs still can be acquired in appropriate ways.

@nerdfiles,

Quote:

I think you ought to read, 1984. Winston Smith did believe that 2+2=5. To insist he did not is to beg the question.

It's fiction.

Quote:

You wrote that beliefs have to be acquired in a reasonable or appropriate way. A case in which a belief is not acquired in a reasonable or appropriate way is a counterexample.

A case in which a belief is not acquired in such a way entails that the belief is not present.

S only if P

S -> P

is logically equivalent to

-P -> -S

This is the form of it.

Quote:

But being caused to believe by being given a serum, or by being frightened into belief is not acquiring a belief in a reasonable or appropriate way.
Therefore, both are counterexamples. QED

Again. "not acquiring a belief in the reasonable and appropriate way"

S believes that P only if S acquires the belief, etc etc.

"not acquiring etc etc" denies the consequent (in bold).

That's means, by Modus Tollens, S does not believe that P.

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