Skepticism and Belief

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

You're not suggesting to me that it's so obvious to you. I wasn't giving you those criticisms and thought-experiments to highlight common knowledge. I went through all that rigmarole to indicate to you that your argument is insufficient, non-explanatory, and false.

All right. You have had your turn. Let's get back to the thread topic.

@nerdfiles,

Here's another distinction that comes into play. When I believe something, it may be the result of reflection, a process that culminates in my reaching a point of persuasion. In other cases, it can be the result of an immediate realization (or assumption). Not sure how that will affect the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that nerdfiles is proposing, but here's an example.

1. Someone tells me there is a snake in my tool shed. I don't believe a snake could possibly get in there, so I refuse to believe it. Next time I go into my tool shed, I hear a rustling noise. I still don't believe it's a snake. Next time I go in there, I see a snake skin. Now I say, "Yep, there's a snake in the shed." Necessary and sufficient conditions involved an accumulation of evidences, none of which actually proves that indeed there is a snake in the shed. (I may be wrong. My friend may have even put the snake skin in there to trick me, but counter evidence doesn't occur to me.)

2. I open the door to my shed, and when I move a box, am startled by the very brief sight of something long and slender, that apparently disappears under another box. "Oh, my gosh! There's a snake in my shed!" Now, in jostling around the boxes, and considering the clutter of hoses and tubes, it's entirely possible that my "sight" of a snake was actually an optical illusion. But I don't stop to reflect on other possibilities, because my "sighting" was so vivid. I really believe I saw a snake.

I don't know if, indeed, there is an ultimate difference, but it seems to me that necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief can be very different depending on whether I have thought something through, and have weighed the evidence, or whether I have had one distinct sensory experience.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Here's another distinction that comes into play. When I believe something, it may be the result of reflection, a process that culminates in my reaching a point of persuasion. In other cases, it can be the result of an immediate realization (or assumption). Not sure how that will affect the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that nerdfiles is proposing, but here's an example.

1. Someone tells me there is a snake in my tool shed. I don't believe a snake could possibly get in there, so I refuse to believe it. Next time I go into my tool shed, I hear a rustling noise. I still don't believe it's a snake. Next time I go in there, I see a snake skin. Now I say, "Yep, there's a snake in the shed." Necessary and sufficient conditions involved an accumulation of evidences, none of which actually proves that indeed there is a snake in the shed. (I may be wrong. My friend may have even put the snake skin in there to trick me, but counter evidence doesn't occur to me.)

2. I open the door to my shed, and when I move a box, am startled by the very brief sight of something long and slender, that apparently disappears under another box. "Oh, my gosh! There's a snake in my shed!" Now, in jostling around the boxes, and considering the clutter of hoses and tubes, it's entirely possible that my "sight" of a snake was actually an optical illusion. But I don't stop to reflect on other possibilities, because my "sighting" was so vivid. I really believe I saw a snake.

I don't know if, indeed, there is an ultimate difference, but it seems to me that necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief can be very different depending on whether I have thought something through, and have weighed the evidence, or whether I have had one distinct sensory experience.

It seems to me that what you are showing by your examples is that it is possible for you to be mistaken when, on the basis of sense-perception, you believe something to be true. And, of course, it is always possible for you do be mistaken when you have an empirical belief. But, that does not mean that you are, in fact, mistaken, nor does it even mean that you do not have excellent, and even overwhelming reasons to think that you are correct. It would depend, of course, on the conditions of perception. What you have, in fact, argued, is that you cannot be absolutely certain in the sense that it would be impossible for you to be mistaken. But, of course, we, as human beings, who are prone to error, should not expect to be infallibly correct each time we believe something. So, in fact, in fact, if you mean by "proves" "proves with absolute certainty", then in that strong sense of "prove" no empirical proposition can be proved. But in the ordinary sense in which, in ordinary life, and also, in science, we accept a somewhat lower standard of proof, so that we can be said to prove something even it is barely possible that we are mistaken, although it is not plausible that we are mistaken, or, as we say sometimes, there is not a "real possibility" that we are mistaken, we have proved we are correct. Although, if it turns out, somehow, that we are not correct, we shall have to allow that we have not proved what we thought (and had excellent reason to think) we had proved.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

1. Someone tells me there is a snake in my tool shed. I don't believe a snake could possibly get in there, so I refuse to believe it. Next time I go into my tool shed, I hear a rustling noise. I still don't believe it's a snake. Next time I go in there, I see a snake skin. Now I say, "Yep, there's a snake in the shed." Necessary and sufficient conditions involved an accumulation of evidences, none of which actually proves that indeed there is a snake in the shed. (I may be wrong. My friend may have even put the snake skin in there to trick me, but counter evidence doesn't occur to me.)

Are you implying that it is necessary to have justification to believe at all? It seems that you are saying (positive) justification is presupposed by belief.

Perhaps we should make a distinction clear: to have a reason for believing is not the same as having a justification for believing.

I can say, "My reason for believing that such and such is the case is that my professor told me in high school."

But this will not establish that I believe it. It will only establish that I've been presented with things that could possibly be believed. Of course, you can ask, "But do you believe what you professor told you in high school?"

In this case, you might say, "Sure, and here's why." This "why" might look like justification, but it's not justification that is automatically like justifying a logical proof or justifying a potentially objective proposition.

"Sure, I believe that film was good because it had great cinematography." But this isn't justification like "If A, then B; A; therefore it follows that B by Modus Ponens".

Reasons for believing and justification for believing are different. We usually, if not always, have a reason for believing something is the case (crudely speaking), but we might not always have a justification.

Seeing vividly is a reason for believing, but seeing vividly is not a justification for justification has two senses: internal and external.

Reflecting on your own state of mind or your own perceptions is internal justification. But this seems to fall snuggly into reasons for believing. It seems peculiar to speak of this as justification for some thing. What is the thing in question? Is it private or public? You surely can believe that you saw a snake based on a vivid experience.

This passes the thinkability, but does it pass our "normative belief formation" constraint, whatever that may be (it's largely cultural and intuitve, I suppose).

But is this example so secure and sure in passing our "thinkability" condition? We can generalize to other cases: What if it were a dragon or an alien? Would seeing vividly, whatever it is that is "seen" (notice the scare quotes), pass thinkability? Your snake example seems to pass, but is seeing vividly a condition we want to hold as necessary for saying someone believes that something is the case?

S believes that P only if S sees vividly something conducive to P.

But does the object (the something) itself secure for us kosher and intelligible talk about the proposition?

S believes that there is a snake in the shed only if S sees vividly a snake in the shed.

By contraposition, If S does not see vividly a snake in the shed, then S does not believe that there is a snake in the shed.

Surely this condition isn't going to get us very far, for your friend certainly believes there is a snake in the shed. And you might believe it even if there is no evidence, for you might probably believe it on account of your knowing there are snakes generally in the area.

It seems, then, that seeing vividly is too narrow. It's very possible that you might come to believe it on account of seeing it. But that fits snuggly into our "normative belief formation." Many beliefs are products of having certain experiences. But is seeing vividly the kind of justification we're concerned with (external justification)? I don't think so.

@nerdfiles,

Just to try to boil this down, we're using three terms here: Justification, Reason, and Condition.

Two of which have been clarified (Justification and Reason) in terms of belief. The third snuck up here:

nerdfiles wrote:

Your snake example seems to pass, but is seeing vividly a condition we want to hold as necessary for saying someone believes that something is the case?

Firstly, I don't believe seeing vividly should be taken as a condition. Take this example:

You are walking in the dark, barely able to see a few steps ahead of you. Suddenly you are startled by a snaked coiled in your path. You react with a fierce stomp, only to realize it was a bundle of rope. You believed there was snake, yet your senses deceived you. You couldn't see vividly, but you could see to some extent and still held the belief. Therefore, we must conclude a belief may be held without seeing vividly.

What about seeing at all?

Seeing at all can be reason for a belief, but it certainly doesn't seem to be a condition. In the example I presented, nothing was vividly seen, but something was vaguely seen: A coil resembling that of a snake. However, even if nothing was seen, one could still have believed based on other senses, particularly hearing. As described in Dich's example, one heard rustling in the grass, and that was reason for having believed a snake was in the grass. Therefore, we must conclude a belief may be held without seeing at all.

What about all of our senses?

S believes P only if S has sensory perception (to any extent, and even if it's deceiving) conducive to P. Well, that's fine, but what if I only think of a snake being in the grass, without actually perceiving anything with my senses? This could be based on a reason such as: I've seen the same snake in this plot of grass for the last 6 weeks, and I believe the snake is there now. I am not utilizing any senses to come to this belief, it is only thought, reasoning. Therefore, we must conclude a belief may be held without any sensory perception... or must we? For if we had never seen the snake to begin with, we would have never thought of the snake and would never have believed it was there.

Is sensory perception (to any extent, and even if it's deceiving) a condition for believing?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

It seems to me that what you are showing by your examples is that it is possible for you to be mistaken when, on the basis of sense-perception, you believe something to be true...

Well, the main point was not so much whether or not I can be mistaken, but that there may be multiple classes of beliefs, and, if so, there may be multiple answers to the question, "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions..."

In the first case, my belief is the result of indirect evidence accumulated and considered over time. In the second case, it was an instant realization, because I had direct sensory perception.

---------- Post added at 06:31 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:23 PM ----------

nerdfiles wrote:

Are you implying that it is necessary to have justification to believe at all? It seems that you are saying (positive) justification is presupposed by belief.

Perhaps we should make a distinction clear: to have a reason for believing is not the same as having a justification for believing.

I wasn't actually trying to imply anything, but, rather, to offer an example to highlight one of the ambiguities attached to the concept of believing.

Is it not possible, also, that, for some believers in some situations, the reason for believing is the same as the justification?

If Jimmy's teacher tells him something, he believes it. Jimmy's teacher told him the world is round. Jimmy believes it.

@nerdfiles,

What would be a justification for believing the world is round, if your example falters?

I can't think of any justifications - I can only think of reasons why I do believe it is round.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

What would be a justification for believing the world is round, if your example falters?

I can't think of any justifications - I can only think of reasons why I do believe it is round.

I think that by "reason" you mean, "cause". That is, the explanation of your believing the world is round. But by "justification" is meant the grounds (or the reasons) for believing the world is round. As for example, that astronauts can see that it is round, and satellite pictures show it is round. Of course, astronomers have other reasons or justification for believing the world is round. A justification, or a reason, may cause you to believe that the world is round too. So a justification or reason may also be a cause. So, also, a person's reason for doing something may also be a cause of his doing that thing. Someone may ask me why I crossed the street. I might answer, because I saw Fred across the street, and I wanted to talk to him. I am giving my reason for crossing the street, and also the cause of my crossing the street all at once. A reason for doing something can be understood as a belief and a desire. In my case, my reason for crossing the street was that I, 1. believed that Fred was across the street, and, 2. I desired to talk to Fred.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I think that by "reason" you mean, "cause". That is, the explanation of your believing the world is round. But by "justification" is meant the grounds (or the reasons) for believing the world is round. As for example, that astronauts can see that it is round, and satellite pictures show it is round. Of course, astronomers have other reasons or justification for believing the world is round. A justification, or a reason, may cause you to believe that the world is round too. So a justification or reason may also be a cause. So, also, a person's reason for doing something may also be a cause of his doing that thing. Someone may ask me why I crossed the street. I might answer, because I saw Fred across the street, and I wanted to talk to him. I am giving my reason for crossing the street, and also the cause of my crossing the street all at once. A reason for doing something can be understood as a belief and a desire. In my case, my reason for crossing the street was that I, 1. believed that Fred was across the street, and, 2. I desired to talk to Fred.

And you're noting 1.) and 2.) are your justification? Basically reiterating what Dich stated: There are some cases where your reason is your justification?

@nerdfiles,

"Cause" is a good way to look at it, though we don't want to start conflating our sense of "cause" with one that is too "natural". Rocks causes windows to break; but saying that the rock caused the window to break is insufficient for providing the reason for it causing such an event. If a child tosses a rock at a window, we wouldn't strip the child of his responsibility for tossing it (which is wrapped up in his reasons for tossing it) by saying, "Oh, well, the rock is the reason for it breaking." This would be misleading.

"The last earthquake caused me to believe that..." might be valid. But we might rephrase this as "The last earthquake is my reason for believing that..." We don't want to start mixing spheres. The sphere of causality (natural) is different from the sphere of reasons. We don't want to start entertaining silly science "experiments" where brains have been show to form beliefs, which they cannot do, because of electric stimulation to regions of the brain.

---------- Post added at 06:48 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:43 PM ----------

And we certainly wouldn't say that S knows that P iff
S believes that P (belief condition)
S justifies that P (justification condition; because his teacher told him or because an earthquake occurred)
P is true

The teacher is a reason for the belief being there in the first place (and in this way, a cause for that belief). But S doesn't know that P because he was merely caused to have that belief. Having a belief for a certain reason is not the same as being able to justify it.

When a maths student is asked to justify why 3x^2+x yields the result that it does, she does not cite her reason for believing it. She provides justification or evidence for why she thinks it is true, or might be true. At this point, the justification becomes external, judged as sufficient or insufficient with respect to a standard (say, the justificatory procedure and system of derivation calculus).

@nerdfiles,

The term "reason" is ambiguous as between, a causal explanation, and justification. If someone asks A, "why do you believe in God?", A might reply:
1. Because I was reared in an extremely religious household, or,
2. Because the universe must come from something, and only God could create a universe.
1. is obviously a causal explanation, but not a justification.
2. is obviously a justification, but not (usually) a causal explanation.

Both might be called, A's "reasons" for believing in God.

But, we should note also that sometimes a justification may also be a causal explanation for why someone believes in God. It might be that A was an atheist until someone told him 2. above, and that justification might also be the causal explanation of his belief in God.

But more usually, the justification for my belief is not the causal explanation of my belief.

Beliefs always (I suppose) have some cause. But some beliefs are held without any, or very inadequate, justification.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

The term "reason" is ambiguous as between, a causal explanation, and justification. If someone asks A, "why do you believe in God?", A might reply:
1. Because I was reared in an extremely religious household, or,
2. Because the universe must come from something, and only God could create a universe.
1. is obviously a causal explanation, but not a justification.
2. is obviously a justification, but not (usually) a causal explanation.

Both might be called, A's "reasons" for believing in God.

But, we should note also that sometimes a justification may also be a causal explanation for why someone believes in God. It might be that A was an atheist until someone told him 2. above, and that justification might also be the causal explanation of his belief in God.

But more usually, the justification for my belief is not the causal explanation of my belief.

Beliefs always (I suppose) have some cause. But some beliefs are held without any, or very inadequate, justification.

Yes, so, as I said, reason (causal explanation) can sometimes be justification (but in your case, not usually). I don't think we should use reason and justification interchangeably, though. It seems better to distinguish, now that all participants in this conversation understand the "reason" we're referring.

As an aside, nerdfiles, I've taken a look at some of Wittgenstein's writings, and I now have a firmer grasp on what you've been articulating in a number of your posts. I always saw your title, but wasn't familiar with the philosopher. I found a few relevent passages which nearly echo some of the sentiments shared within this thread, and it'd probably help all participants to see them. If I come across them again, I'll be sure to post. This whole 'language game' concept is really intriguing.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Yes, so, as I said, reason (causal explanation) can sometimes be justification (but in your case, not usually). I don't think we should use reason and justification interchangeably, though. It seems better to distinguish, now that all participants in this conversation understand the "reason" we're referring.

.

I think that we should keep "reason" for "justification", and if we mean, "cause" or "causal explanation", that is what we should say. Remembering, at the same time, that reasons (justifications) can sometimes also be causes (of beliefs).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I think that we should keep "reason" for "justification", and if we mean, "cause" or "causal explanation", that is what we should say. Remembering, at the same time, that reasons (justifications) can sometimes also be causes (of beliefs).

Right. A justification may make the belief for you. One might say, "You don't really believe it unless you can justify it, even if minimally." But when I speak of "causing to belief" I mean something to the effect "being the cause which makes that belief possible."

If you never take maths or get introduced to any sort of it, your belief that 2+2=4 will be non-existence. Teachers, etc make that belief possible. They are causes, in a sense, but they're not justifications.

But even then, a justification does not "cause" you to believe that p like "cause" in the "makes possible" sense, or "makes probable" (a really good teacher).

Justifications are reasons for believing it. To speak of "justification as causes for belief" would just be to mean "justifications are reasons for believing some such proposition."

It's not that reasons themselves can be causes. It's that the word "reason" has a connotation which overlaps with a connotation of the word "cause," and thus they can be used in some cases interchangeably. But these words do have connotations which are mutually exclusive.

@nerdfiles,

Wow, this thread is spinning.

I printed out the last 50 posts for perusal and notation, and I hope to provide a decent catch-up contribution.

@nerdfiles,

nerdfiles wrote:

Right. A justification may make the belief for you. One might say, "You don't really believe it unless you can justify it, even if minimally." But when I speak of "causing to belief" I mean something to the effect "being the cause which makes that belief possible."

If you never take maths or get introduced to any sort of it, your belief that 2+2=4 will be non-existence. Teachers, etc make that belief possible. They are causes, in a sense, but they're not justifications.

But even then, a justification does not "cause" you to believe that p like "cause" in the "makes possible" sense, or "makes probable" (a really good teacher).

Justifications are reasons for believing it. To speak of "justification as causes for belief" would just be to mean "justifications are reasons for believing some such proposition."

It's not that reasons themselves can be causes. It's that the word "reason" has a connotation which overlaps with a connotation of the word "cause," and thus they can be used in some cases interchangeably. But these words do have connotations which are mutually exclusive.

Suppose I say that there were a number of reasons for marrying Mary, she is beautiful, and intelligent.But, if I continue, the real reason I married Mary was that her father owned Walmart's, then I am saying that the reason that was the cause (and not just a reason) for marrying Mary, was that her father owned Walmart's. In other words, all the other reason were good reasons to marry Mary, but the motivating reason without which I (probably) would not have married Mary, was that she had a rich father.

So that reason, that she had a rich father (I am saying) was what caused me to marry Mary.
The terms "reason" and "cause" do not, of course, mean the same thing. They are not synonyms. But that does not mean that they may not sometimes, refer to the same thing. Just as (to borrow an example from Quine) the terms, "creature with a kidney" and, "creature with a heart" obviously do not mean the same thing, but it is a biological fact that both term refer to the same individuals, since all creatures with hearts are creatures with kidneys, and all creatures with kidneys are creatures with hearts. Not synonymous, but co-referential. Thus, a reason may also be a cause. And, a reason for a belief, may also be the cause of that belief. (My reason for believing that Mary was marriage-worthy was that her father was rich, and that reason was also the cause of my belief that Mary was marriage-worthy).

@kennethamy,

If Jimmy believes everything his teacher tells him, then Jimmy's teacher's telling him that the earth is round is the cause, as well as the reason, as well as Jimmy's justification for Jimmy's belief that the earth is round.

We, looking at Jimmy's naivete, would say, "Jimmy, we understand what prompted you to believe it, and we understand why you believe it, but your belief is not adequately justified." But that is due to our more sophisticated and multiple justifications for our belief that that earth is round.

In the final analysis, though, our belief that the earth is round is not that much different than Jimmy's (assuming none of us has actually conducted or directly observed scientific experiments that demonstrate its roundness). He cites one authority. We cite several or many, and add evidence available to us from second-hand sources.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

If Jimmy believes everything his teacher tells him, then Jimmy's teacher's telling him that the earth is round is the cause, as well as the reason, as well as Jimmy's justification for Jimmy's belief that the earth is round.

We, looking at Jimmy's naivete, would say, "Jimmy, we understand what prompted you to believe it, and we understand why you believe it, but your belief is not adequately justified." But that is due to our more sophisticated and multiple justifications for our belief that that earth is round.

In the final analysis, though, our belief that the earth is round is not that much different than Jimmy's (assuming none of us has actually conducted or directly observed scientific experiments that demonstrate its roundness). He cites one authority. We cite several or many, and add evidence available to us from second-hand sources.

Yes, a justification need not be an adequate justification. But, why isn't it an adequate justification of our belief that Earth is round that reliable authorities tell us it is? Most of what we know is justified by authority, and it is up to us to make sure that the authority is reliable. We go to the dictionary to find out the correct spelling of "weird", because the dictionary is an authority on spelling. And we go to our physician to find out what gives us headaches in the morning because we think our physician is an authority on that kind of thing. The issue is not whether we use authorities to justify our beliefs. The issue is whether the authorities are reliable. And, of course, it goes without saying that if the physician tell us that the cause of our headache is a blocked sinus, and if we trust our physician, then what he says will be the cause of our belief that a blocked sinus is the cause of our headaches. So the cause of our belief and the justification of our belief will then be identical.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Yes, a justification need not be an adequate justification. But, why isn't it an adequate justification of our belief that Earth is round that reliable authorities tell us it is? Most of what we know is justified by authority, and it is up to us to make sure that the authority is reliable...

Well, just as the adequacy of any justification is subject to debate, so also is the reliability of any authority. Right?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Well, just as the adequacy of any justification is subject to debate, so also is the reliability of any authority. Right?

I suppose so. But why would one question an authority who is clearly reliable without some specific reason? Would you question whether the OED was right about the spelling of "weird". Of course, if you are a fallibilist, any authority might be mistaken, in principle. But there isn't any real possibility that the OED is mistaken about spelling a common word.

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